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Preface
War, occupation and liberation are phenomena that have a very specific 
character. In the first place, minor incidents are experienced much more 
intensely and self-consciously than similar incidents in peacetime. In-
deed, a population caught up in them has the sense of being involved 
in ‘the making of history’, following the unfolding drama of war with 
acute interest, bearing the attendant misery with courage, sometimes 
being wracked by fear, and not infrequently – through resistance or 
collaboration – playing an active part in the exceptional circumstances.
In the second place, the unfolding of events in war conceals a certain 
paradox. On the one hand, military action and occupation disrupt nor-
mal communication and consequently reduce daily life to the micro-
level of village or town, causing social life to turn in on itself and con-
centrate on the bare essentials. On the other, they generate complexity 
at macro-level. The normal interaction of necessity, coincidence and 
freedom in the historical process is, in fact, seriously compromised: 
during a war, the predictable, structured element in the course of his-
tory appears weaker; in contrast, coincidence plays a greater part and 
there is increased scope for the creative, unpredictable contribution of 
strong personalities. All this leads to a new and more complex combi-
nation of driving forces on the macro-stage of history.
The history of Belgian central banking during the period from 1939 to 
1945 reflects this paradox, making the writing of this narrative an en-
thralling task and at the same time posing a great challenge for the au-
thors. To this was added the serious problem of the source material. The 
archives that have been preserved in Belgium and abroad are unusually 
rich and the general writings on the Second World War – a necessary 
source if the history of Belgian central banking was to be placed in 
its correct, historical context – are myriad. As a result, selection was 
the order of the day, but the question remained of whether the infor-
mation processed was representative. In fact, ensuring representative-
ness was the constant and guiding principle for the authors in their 
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choice of what to include. Lastly, there was the fact that, during the 
war, the Banque Nationale de Belgique and the Banque d’Emission were 
under great pressure and had to cope with tense relationships with all 
kinds of bodies in both occupied and unoccupied territories. In order 
to ascertain the true circumstances of all these tensions, it was often 
necessary to dig deep, the aim always being to unravel as fully as pos-
sible the complexity of the situations examined and to take account of 
all the variables that came into play. This proved to be no simple task 
and goes to explain the book’s substantial size. In the English edition, 
there has been a degree of pruning: detailed explanations about inter-
nal developments in Belgium have been shortened and a large number 
of notes – chiefly in respect of quotations that served only to underpin 
the text – have been excised.
As far as we know, few academic works see the light of day just in con-
sequence of the merits of their authors. In writing this particular book, 
we, too, have been able to count on the cooperation of a wide circle 
of people and on the confidence that they have placed in our work. It 
will surprise no-one that our thanks go first to Guy Quaden, Governor 
of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, and in particular to Luc Coene, 
Deputy-governor: not only were they, together with Alfons Verplaetse, 
former governor of the Bank, the originators of the project, but they 
also secured us the unvaluable support of Luc Ghékiere, Secretary-
general, aided by Ivo Maes and Jean-Percey Cassiers. Coordinating the 
overall project – which, besides our book, included a further three vol-
umes that take the story up to 1971 – was Walter Pluym, ever assiduous 
and willing. Olivier Boehme, and in particular Joseph Makart, made 
our archive research within and outside the Banque Nationale a great 
deal more effective.
We were also able to rely on excellent help in our research into for-
eign archives: guiding us through the Dutch archives were Dr. Sierk 
Platinga, Dr. Christiaan Rupert, Geert Lamfers, Corry van Renselaer 
and Hélène De Muy-Fleurke; through the American archives, the late 
Dr. Milton Gustafson; and through the archives of the Bank of Eng-
land, Dr. Anne Fremault, Archivist Sarah Miljard and Deputy-Archi-
vist Jenny Ulph. The fact that we did not lose the thread in the endless 
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documentation of the French archives we owe to Michel Margairaz, 
Olivier Feiertag, Fabrice Reuzé, and Jean Quinet, and to mesdames 
Bordogna, Pagès, Cueille and Bouttier. For our research into the Ger-
man archives, we were able to turn to Professor Manfred Pohl and Dr. 
Martin Müller. In our home country, we had the unconditional sup-
port of Madeleine Jacquemin, Françoise d’Arras d’Haudrecy, Françoise 
Peemans and Caroline Six, as well as their colleagues Dr. Dirk Luyten, 
René Brion, Jean-Louis Moreau and Mark Van Pottelberghe. A special 
word of thanks goes to Tony Vandeputte, who spoke to us about his 
father, Robert Vandeputte, a former governor of the Banque Nationale.
We are deeply indebted to the Research Fund of Leuven University, 
in particular to its Vicerector Research Policy Professor Dr. Paul De 
Boeck and its Senior staff member Research Policy and secretary of the 
Research Council Ms. Josée Houben, and to the University Founda-
tion at Brussels, in particular Ms. Hilde Garmyn, for their generous 
help for the English edition. Our warmest thanks also to Mrs. An Delva 
for sharing with us her rich experience in the world of book illustra-
tions, and to Leuven University Press, its Chairman and Board of Di-
rectors, and in particular Ms. Marike Schipper, Director, Ms. Beatrice 
Van Eeghem and Ms. Nienke van Schaverbeke, who assisted us most 
friendly and efficiently with the publication of the book. Finally, we owe 
a great debt to Professor Peter Mathias, who was so kind to go over the 
English manuscript. We all know that he is un homme de lettres as well 
as un homme de science: his critical reading and relevant annotations 
of the translation, indeed, enhanced style and transparency of the text 
substantially. We are most grateful to him for this invaluable help.
Researching sources over a period of more than five years can be a 
lonely task, even when two people are doing the work together. For this 
reason, the authors are particularly grateful for the months of hospi-
tality they received at various institutions, where staff and colleagues 
demonstrated an interest in their work and encouraged them in their 
research. Delightful months were spent at the Netherlands Institute for 
Advanced Study in the Humanities (NIAS) at Wassenaar, at the Wissen-
schaftskolleg zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Study), and at the Wissen-
schaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. In this respect, the authors 
16 Preface
owe a very substantial debt of gratitude to Professor Emeritus Henk L. 
Wesseling and Dr. Wouter Hugenholtz, respectively Honorary Rector 
and Director of the NIAS, to Professor Dieter Grimm and Dr. Joachim 
Nettelbeck, respectively Rector and Director of the Wissenschaftskol-
leg zu Berlin, and to Professor Jürgen Kocka and Dr. Dagmar Simon, 
respectively President and Director of the Wissenschaftszentrum. Our 
debt of gratitude also extends to the staff of those institutions for the 
outstanding technical and administrative help that they provided.
The authors also wish to thank a number of institutions that kindly 
made available their rich collections of archives and documentation on 
the war period: firstly, the Banque Nationale de Belgique in Brussels; 
then the Algemeen Rijksarchief in Brussels, the archives of the Royal 
Palace, the Studie- en Documentatiecentrum ‘Oorlog en Hedendaagse 
Maatschappij’ (CEGESOMA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gen-
erale Maatschappij van België, the Krijgsauditoraat, the Université 
Catholique de Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve) and the Kredietbank (now 
KBC Group). They also greatly valued the access they were allowed to 
the private archives of the Ansiaux, Baudewyns and Berger families.
Abroad, they were extremely hospitably and efficiently received at 
the Algemeen Rijksarchief, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Min-
istry of Finance in The Hague, the Nederlandsche Bank in Amsterdam, 
the National Archives in Washington, D.C., the Herbert Hoover In-
stitute on the campus of Stanford University at Palo Alto (California), 
the Bank of England in London, the Banque de France in Paris and the 
Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt-am-Main. 
Heartfelt thanks go to Mr. and Mrs. William and Livine Van de Velde 
and Mr. and Mrs. Theo and Nicole Erauw, who gave us unrestricted use 
of their holiday home, a place where we could work undisturbed, as if 
on an uninhabited island, and where we could live in the peace of na-
ture. Finally, and with sadness, the authors thank the late Ms. Simone 
Verbreyt for the invaluable help she gave in organizing the documenta-
tion for the book: she expected so much of the book, but, alas, she was 
not destined to see it in print.
Herman Van der Wee and Monique Verbreyt 
‘De Hettinghe’, 4 May 2009
Chapter 1
Prelude to a New World Conflict
The policy of neuTraliTy under discussion
The inter-war years (1918-1939) proved to be a very difficult period for 
one Belgian institution in particular; this was the National Bank of Bel-
gium (referred to simply as ‘the Bank’ in what follows). A chaotic gov-
ernment policy failed to curb war inflation after peace was concluded 
in 1918. The Belgian franc therefore remained under pressure, progres-
sively losing ground on both the domestic and international exchange 
markets against the American dollar and the pound sterling, the two 
international reserve currencies at the time. The Bank took action and 
used its powers of persuasion in an effort to reverse the situation, but to 
no avail; the cause appeared to be lost. 
Moreover, during the last years before the Second World War, Bel-
gian politics were characterized by contradictions, confusion and im-
potent drift. Within the span of less than four years – from June 1936 to 
the outbreak of war in September 1939 – six different governments took 
office1. Each of them was plagued by sharp tension between the two 
main language communities and by fierce discussions on the monetary 
policy to be pursued. Monetary policy even to become one of the major 
themes in the parliamentary elections of April 1939. In those elections, 
Camille Gutt, who in February had become Minister of Finance in the 
first Pierlot government (1939), continued his opposition to an eventual 
new devaluation of the Belgian franc, the previous one having been de-
1 For a comprehensive analysis of the activities of the Bank during the inter-war 
years, see: H. Van der Wee and K. Tavernier, La Banque Nationale de Belgique 
et l’histoire monétaire entre les deux guerres mondiales, Brussels, 1975, Chapters 
1-7. For two excellent surveys of Belgian politics during the inter-war period, see: 
T. Luyckx, Politieke geschiedenis van België van 1789 tot heden, Brussels, 1973, and 
more recently, E. Witte, J. Craeybeckx, and A. Meynen, Politieke geschiedenis van 
België van 1830 tot heden, Brussels, 2000.
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cided in 1935. At the same time, Gutt rejected the franc being pegged 
to sterling, as that would in fact represent an implicit, albeit concealed, 
devaluation; moreover, it would undermine the country’s policy of neu-
trality, which, in the uncertain international climate then prevailing, 
could be detrimental to a small country like Belgium. However, the re-
tention of a stable franc required a deflationary policy that, in his opin-
ion, could only be effectively accomplished through higher taxation2.
In the new, second Pierlot government (1939), Gutt was again Min-
ister of Finance. Intelligent and active, Gutt was, above all, thorough, 
efficient and resolute3. He did not easily forget when he felt his pride had 
been injured by someone, the clearest illustration of this being the ran-
cour he harboured against former Prime Minister Van Zeeland, who in 
1935 had devalued the Belgian franc by 28 per cent, against the policy of 
Gutt. In ideology, Gutt was a conservative liberal, with clear-cut ideas 
that he defended obstinately4. His public image was of a stoic and self-
confident technocrat, and hinted at a vigorous and committed person-
ality5. Without doubt, he was the strong man – the dominant figure, 
even – in the Belgian government in exile in London, though that was 
not yet the case in 1939.
Besides the monetary question, a further point of sharp difference 
within the Belgian government during 1938 and 1939 was the policy of 
neutrality, a question that arose from the increasing concern in inter-
national circles about a possible second world war. King Leopold III 
deemed it his duty to keep Belgium out of any new world conflict and 
consistently pursued a policy of strict neutrality6. This policy was en-
ergetically supported by Spaak, a personal friend of the King7 and by 
2 In this respect, see the important contribution of: J.-Fr. Crombois, ‘Finance, écon-
omie et politique en Belgique à la veille de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 1933-1940’, 
in: Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis, 1998, 5, pp. 171-206.
3 A. Van de Voorde, De penningmeesters van de Wetstraat, Tielt, 1993, pp. 140-142.
4 Charles de Gaulle was to describe Gutt’s efforts in London during the Second 
World War as ‘l’ardeur de Gutt’ (Dumoulin, Spaak, pp. 213-214).
5 De Staercke, Memoires, pp. 143-144.
6 In this respect, see particularly: J. Velaers and H. Van Goethem, Leopold III. De 
koning, het land, de oorlog, Tielt, 2001, pp. 44-66.
7 Memorandum of 09.10.1944 from J. Webb Benton, United States Consul-general in 
Leopoldville, with an account of a conversation between Edwin W. Martin, Vice-
consul, and Leopold Lowy, a journalist active in Belgium before the war and at the 
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then already an influential politician. He headed the government from 
May 1938 to February 1939 and thereafter, until the outbreak of the Sec-
ond World War, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the successive Pier-
lot governments. However, not all his colleagues shared Leopold and 
Spaak’s views: certain members of the Pierlot cabinets were, indeed, 
bitter opponents of the neutrality policy. The ensuing differences of 
opinion were one cause of the dilatory, inadequate and uncoordinated 
character of preparations for the looming onset of war.
The King and the government continued officially to hold to the 
neutrality policy after the German invasion of Poland and the out-
break of the Second World War on 3 September 19398. However, eve-
ryone was now convinced that, with any broadening of the conflict, 
Belgium would more than likely become one of the next victims. In an 
ultimate attempt to save his neutrality policy, the King appointed ex-
premier Theunis, a close friend of Gutt, as ambassador extraordinary 
to the United States, with the dual task of firstly seeking support from a 
sister spirit, one that also regarded independence and neutrality as top 
priorities, and secondly of organizing the procurement of armaments 
and food for Belgium, should the situation get out of hand and she be 
drawn into the conflict 9.
The government, on its part, proceeded to a general mobilization. 
Army strength was raised to about 600 000 men, efforts were made to 
modernize military equipment and to increase its production, public 
time agent in Leopoldville for the Bunge Corporation of New York; the conversa-
tion concerned the pre-war political situation in Belgium (Washington, National 
Archives, fonds Belgium).
8 French requests for military contacts to be organized and, later, for permission to 
send troops to Belgium’s south-eastern border were refused. In September 1939, 
however, Spaak began cautiously to adjust his attitude towards Belgium’s policy of 
neutrality to the new circumstances: ‘Notre intérêt belge rejoint ici nos sentiments. 
Il faut rester, malgré notre neutralité, du côté franco-anglais’ (Dumoulin, Spaak, 
Brussels, 1999, p. 136).  
9 Writing about this in 1966, Gutt stated: ‘Dès septembre 1939….nous sentîmes le 
besoin de renforcer notre représentation diplomatique. Nous songeâmes au rôle 
qu’avaient joué les Etats-Unis dès avant leur intervention militaire par la création 
de la “Commission for Relief”, puis par leur formidable contribution en hommes et 
en matériel à la victoire finale. Or, notre représentation à Washington était, pour 
employer un mot modéré, faible’ (BNB, Archives, Diverse documenten: ‘Georges The-
unis (Souvenirs de Camille Gutt)’, 11.07.1966, p. 45).
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works to reinforce the country’s defences were carried out at an accel-
erated tempo. The question now arose of how the government was to 
finance the sudden and considerable increase in public expenditure. 
Oscar Plisnier, Secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance10, and the 
members of the Economic Committee that had been set up within the 
Bank during the first month of hostilities11, were unanimous in their 
opinion that the only possible solution to the problem was a combina-
tion of additional government loans (with the logistical support of the 
Bank), new or higher taxes and direct advances from the Bank to the 
State. In their view, the advances would inevitably have the side effect of 
fuelling inflation, but that could be neutralized by loans and taxation12.
Notwithstanding the pressure on public finances the Belgian franc, 
even after the outbreak of the war, held its own on foreign exchange 
markets, as indeed did the American dollar, unlike the French franc 
and sterling, both of which did less well. There was thus no reason for 
disquiet on that front, but there was a question about what would hap-
pen to the link between the Belgian and the Congolese franc, should 
Germany occupy Belgium. The latest report of the Banque du Congo 
Belge had indicated to the Bank that this problem was being discussed 
in the colony, as well; it even tentatively asked whether it would not 
be better in that circumstance for the link to be abandoned. The Bank 
became concerned about the future of the national currency and con-
sulted Léon-Hugo Dupriez, Professor at the University of Leuven and 
economic adviser to the Bank since 1938.
10 See the text of a lecture given by Plisnier at the Université Libre de Bruxelles on 
18.01.1940: S. Brutsaert, Oscar Plisnier, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1993, pp. 119 ff.
11 The economic committee consisted of the members of the Bank’s board of direc-
tors plus J. Van Nieuwenhuyse, Secretary of the Bank, P. Kauch, Private Secretary 
to the Governor, leading officials of the Bank – more particularly J.-J. Vincent, head 
of the Economic Research Department, and F. Cracco, a member of that depart-
ment – and a number of external experts, more particularly Professors L.-H. Du-
priez, economic adviser to the Bank since 1938, and B.S. Chlepner; as well as F. De 
Voghel (the then Secretary of the Banking Commission): BNB, Archives, SD, Ma-
laise Papers, dossier 11: P. Kauch, La Banque Nationale pendant la seconde guerre 
mondiale (unpublished text), Part 1, Chapter.1, § 2. See also: De toestand en de ver-
richtingen der Emissiebank te Brussel tijdens de Duitsche bezetting. Verslag van het 
Onderzoekscomité, opgericht bij Besluitwet van 11 december 1944. Eerste deel (pub-
lished text), Brussels, 1946, p. 7.
12 Van der Wee and Tavernier, De Nationale Bank, pp. 334-335.
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Dupriez submitted his report in early 194013. He deemed it most un-
desirable and – particularly for Belgium – highly disadvantageous for 
the link between two currencies that had always had the same parity 
to be dropped, and put forward two arguments in support of this. The 
first was monetary in that, should hostilities escalate, the colony would 
enjoy an unprecedented economic boom, a consequence of its favour-
able location and its wealth of raw materials. In the colony, national 
income would rise quickly and the trade balance would record results 
never previously seen. The financial world would regard the uncoupling 
of the two currencies at such a time as indicating a lack of confidence 
on the part of the Belgian government in the national currency. The 
second argument had a colonialist undertone: ‘It’s perfectly legitimate 
that Belgium would take advantage of the colony’s gains to overcome 
its present difficulties : it’s just a compensation for all the sacrifices Bel-
gium made in favour of its colonies’.
The problem of governing under occupaTion
But how was the country to be governed under an occupation? For the 
government, and indeed for the Bank, too, this was a much more insist-
ent question and caused great confusion within government circles14. 
Led by Minister Marcel-Henri Jaspar, certain members of the govern-
ment advocated implacable opposition (‘opposition irréductible’), tak-
ing the view that, should the Germans invade, central, provincial and 
local authorities ought to move to an unoccupied area or even abroad. 
This would confront the enemy with a complete administrative vacu-
um, hindering him in his attempts to plunder the country. However, 
the majority of government members felt that such a strategy was unre-
alistic and declared for rolling resistance (‘résistance mobile’), arguing 
that a complete evacuation of the authorities would be impossible were 
the enemy to advance as quickly as had been the case in Poland.
The international crisis around the German annexation of the Sude-
tenland in September 1938 had led to discussions in the Bank concern-
13 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.02.70.
14 BNB, Archives, SD, dossier 11: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 1, pp. 17-18.
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ing the organization of the administration should there be war. Gov-
ernor Janssen had then already requested the members of the board of 
directors to draw up suggestions for this eventuality. In the opinion of 
the board, one of the essential tasks of the Bank was to underpin the 
national economy; consequently, the Bank ought to pursue its normal 
activity in Belgium, were the country to be occupied. At the same time, 
however, the Bank would also continue to fulfil two other essential 
functions. In the first place, it would carry on supporting the govern-
ment, even if it was forced to leave the country: in other words, the 
Bank would provide help to the government in exile through its mate-
rial presence. Secondly, the Bank would have its possessions and assets 
abroad managed and safeguarded autonomously through a presence in 
unoccupied territory.
Upon the outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September 1939, 
the board of directors began to alter its original strategy; from January 
1940, indeed, the Bank took a pronouncedly combative stance. Voic-
ing its views through its Economic Committee, it now fell closely in 
line with the ideas of Jaspar15. An important reason was the disturbing 
news filtering through from Poland, which awoke memories of the bru-
tality of the German invasion in Belgium during the summer of 1914, 
barely a quarter of a century earlier. However, it was in all likelihood 
the growing tension between the King and the Cabinet that proved to 
be the decisive factor in the changing attitude of the Bank16. Leopold’s 
continuing pursuit of a policy of strict neutrality and his simulta neous 
obstinate and personal intervention behind the scenes was a source 
of intense irritation to the government and resulted in Jaspar and the 
other ministers that advocated a ‘scorched earth’ policy gaining a great 
deal of influence. The pressure that they brought to bear led to a gov-
ernment decree being issued on 2 February 1940, whereby, in case of 
war and for the duration of hostilities, Belgian trading companies (of 
which the Bank was one by definition), were permitted to transfer their 
registered office and the administration of their company or institution 
abroad. Should the country be occupied, directors who remained in the 
15 In this respect, see the minutes of the meeting of 29.02.1940 (quoted by Kauch: BNB, 
Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 11: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished 
text), Part 1, Chapter. 1, p. 16, footnote 14).
16 D’Ydewalle, De Memoires, pp. 168-169.
 Prelude to a New World Conflict 23
occupied areas would cease to have any authority whatsoever in respect 
of assets in the unoccupied areas and would no longer be competent to 
perform any executive act, even in the occupied area.17. Taking its cue 
from this, the Economic Committee drew up a detailed administrative 
regulation on 29 February 194018 .
A policy of implacable opposition was now adopted by the Economic 
Committee, too. The Governor and all directors but one, the supervi-
sory council and the board of scrutineers would follow the government 
into exile where they would continue to function as normal. The Post-
al Cheque Office would follow suit, as indeed would all the country’s 
semi-public credit institutions. The Bank would give a limited trust 
commission to one or more members of the staff remaining in Belgium 
and those persons would represent the Bank in respect of the occupier 
and protect the Bank’s interests still in Belgium19. Counters would be 
closed in both Brussels and the provinces. All the stock of banknotes 
and the entire equipment for producing them would be evacuated to 
safety, as would the Bank’s currency reserves and securities, as well as 
all securities deposited with the Bank by third parties.
The Bank’s changing stance had been viewed with increasing dis-
quiet by the private bankers and on 18 January 1940 Willy de Munck, 
Chairman of the Banque de la Société Générale, and Max-Léo Gérard, 
Chairman of the Banque de Bruxelles, had an initial discussion about 
it with Governor Janssen20. By then, it had already become clear that, 
should the country be occupied, the head-office services of the Bank 
would follow the government abroad, although it was still thought in 
financial circles that the Bank’s local branches in occupied territory 
would continue to operate.
When, shortly afterwards, the regulation of 29 February was made 
known, and it was seen that the Bank’s ‘master plan’ included the clo-
sure of all the Bank’s branches in the occupied areas, the private bank-
17 Belgian Official Gazette, 7.02.1940, No. 38.
18 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 11: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpub-
lished text), Part 1, Chapter. 1, pp. 14-16.
19 ‘Entretiens avec Hubert Ansiaux, I. L’or et les valeurs de la Banque Nationale dans 
la tourmente de 1940’, in: Revue Générale, February 1985, p. 7.
20 BNB, Archives, Dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 13: letter of 08.02.1940 from Jans-
sen to Gérard and de Munck.
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ers deemed it a matter of the utmost urgency to talk with the Bank 
again. They came, not only to express their concern, but also to air their 
indignation at such a deficient view of reality. Furthermore, they stated 
that, were the country to be occupied, they could not abandon their 
essential function of providing support for the Belgian economy. How 
could they go on with their task if the Bank were to evacuate the stock 
of banknotes and, moreover, to suspend all the activities of its branches 
in occupied territory? The consequence of such a policy could be noth-
ing less than a general moratorium on payments21.
Janssen, Gutt and Dupriez appreciated that such a hopeless situation 
could arise and proposed a solution whereby the Bank’s branches in 
occupied territory would not be closed, though without being able to 
supply the private banks with new banknotes22. Janssen and Dupriez 
felt that they could assume that there were sufficient liquid resources 
in the country – private income generated by recent, high government 
expenditure and the mass withdrawals of cash from the banks had been 
largely tucked away in the face of the threat of war, but would in time 
resurface and normalize the day-to-day circulation of money23. The pri-
vate bankers regarded this as an unrealistic assumption; for them, it was 
a question of having the additional cash available during the emergency 
and not after it. As a result, no definitive agreement was reached24. All 
that Janssen and Gutt did was advise the private bankers to provide 
21 BNB, Archives, Dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 13: letter of 08.02.1940 from Jans-
sen to Gérard and de Munck.
22 No minutes were taken, but Dupriez made a summary of the conversations, which 
Kauch quoted in a footnote in his historical review: ‘Afin d’éviter toute équivoque 
à cet égard, la Banque ne peut laisser du côté de l’occupant des organes pouvant 
avoir l’apparence de comité de direction ou de conseil de régence. L’organisation de la 
Banque en territoire occupé devrait reposer: a) sur des délégations de pouvoirs assez 
larges accordées aux agents locaux, en vue de faire face aux besoins financiers du 
pays occupé, ce système étant d’application aussi bien à Bruxelles qu’en province; b) 
sur une coordination de l’action des agences occupées, sous l’égide de personnalités 
compétentes, se réunissant en comité de surveillance’ (BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise 
Papers, dossier 11: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, Chapter. 
1, p. 42, footnote 56).
23 BNB, Archives, Dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 13: note résumant l’entretien du 
mardi 24 septembre 1940 entre M. le Gouverneur et M. Henri Rolin (première at-
ténuation de la solution radicale de l’évacuation).
24 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, p. 243.
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their branches with an additional stock of banknotes and state that the 
Bank would give them all possible help25.
geTTing The gold sTock To safeTy
Besides taking these administrative measures, the Bank began in 1938 to 
make additional provisions to secure its buildings, protect its staff and 
transfer the gold stock and other assets. The idea of evacuation was not 
new, as people in Belgian government circles had already given thought 
to getting the Bank’s stock of gold to safety at the time Hitler came to 
power in 1933 in Germany. Governor Georges Janssen, however, now 
went a step further: not just the gold stock of the Bank needed to be 
evacuated, but also the other securities which the Bank held on its own 
behalf or in safe custody on behalf of the State and other third parties.
Director Louis-Jean Mahieu, was charged with preparing and or-
ganizing the transfer abroad and was aided by Henri Sontag, Treas-
urer of the Bank, and Hubert Ansiaux, an inspector at the Bank. By 31 
March 1938 already, Sontag was able to put forward a proposal for the 
organization of the evacuation, were the armed forces to be mobilized26. 
For his part, Janssen contacted the Bank of England and paid a visit 
to London on 12 March 1938, i.e. shortly after becoming governor. He 
raised the question whether the Bank of England would be prepared to 
take into safe custody the gold, government funds and other securities 
belonging or entrusted to the Bank. The answer, albeit with a few peri-
pheral conditions, was yes and the first gold ingots began to be trans-
ferred from Brussels and Antwerp to London as early as the following 
July27.
25 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 11: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (un-
published text), Part 1, Chapter. 1. See also: SD, dossier 11bis (preparatory measures 
and studies). See also: BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6): 
quelques rétroactes relatifs aux circonstances qui ont provoqué la création de la 
Banque d’Emission à Bruxelles; NBB, Dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 13: note 
résumant l’entretien du mardi 24 septembre 1940 entre M. le Gouverneur et Henri 
Rolin.
26 BNB, Archives, Schatbewaarder, 1, dossier 02.01.02.04 (D 536/7): note du 31.03.1938.
27 BNB, Archives, Schatbewaarder, 1, dossier 02.01.02.04 (D 536/7): note du trésorier 
Sontag, 26.09.1938.
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By 24 September 1938, 151,000 kilograms of Belgian gold, valued at 
7,323 million Belgian francs, had already been deposited in the vaults of 
the Bank of England in London; it represented 22 per cent of the total 
stock, which amounted to 686,000 kilograms28. The Governor of the 
Bank viewed this as only a first step and in the following December 
contacted the Minister of Finance Albert-Edouard Janssen and dis-
cussed with him the Bank’s plan to amend the geographical distribu-
tion of the gold stock as follows: one-third of the stock would remain 
in Belgium, one-third would be deposited in safe custody in Great Brit-
ain and one-third would be transferred to North America (the United 
States or Canada, or both)29.
The minister agreed with the proposal, but requested further in-
formation in order to have well-grounded arguments to convince his 
government colleagues, who would not be in favour of such a substan-
tial transfer abroad. In his supplementary memorandum, the Governor 
pointed out that, with a world war in prospect, all the major central 
banks of Western Europe, including those of Great Britain, France, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, had spread their gold stocks geographi-
cally and had already sent much of them overseas to safety. For Bel-
gium, the best overseas option was North America, either the United 
States or Canada. In each case, there were advantages and disadvan-
tages. Should there be war, the United States would undoubtedly be the 
prime supplier of all types of goods, ranging from military stores and 
materials to food for the population, and New York was a focal point 
for international payments. The big disadvantage lay in the fact that 
Belgium had ceased to service the debts she had incurred in the United 
States during the First World War and the government in Washington 
could well retaliate by freezing or even confiscating the Bank’s gold. 
No such risk existed were the gold to be deposited in Canada, more 
particularly Ottawa, although Canada at that time did not boast an 
important financial centre. The Governor’s personal opinion was that 
the United States was the better option, but he demanded that the gov-
28 BNB, Archives, Schatbewaarder, 1, dossier 02.01.02.04 (D 536/7): note du trésorier 
Sontag, 26.09.1938, pp. 2-3.
29 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 601/1: minutes of the board of directors, 
17.12.1938; minutes of the supervisory council, 21.12.1938.
 Prelude to a New World Conflict 27
ernment absolve the Bank from any responsibility should there be any 
freezing or confiscation of these assets30.
Albert-Edouard Janssen gave the Governor’s proposal his full sup-
port, but he was unable to convince the government to adopt it. Discus-
sion dragged on and no definitive decision was reached. When, upon 
the formation in February 1939 of the first Pierlot government, Gutt 
assumed office as Minister of Finance, the Governor immediately re-
newed his offensive, in order to win the new minister over to his plan. 
The two reached an agreement fairly rapidly and it was now only a mat-
ter of convincing the other members of the government. Again, this 
proved to be no easy matter. The resistance apparent in the previous 
government was still in evidence in the new cabinet31 and the same ar-
guments – monetary and political in nature – were once more deployed 
against moving part of the gold stock to the United States. The mon-
etary argument rested on the fact that the Bank’s bye-laws laid down 
that, to ensure confidence and security, at least 40 per cent of the money 
in circulation be covered by gold, of which a minimum 30 per cent had 
to be in metallic gold, the rest eventually in currencies convertible to 
gold. In a system of convertibility like the one still applied in Belgium, 
this requirement implied the actual material presence of the support-
ive assets in the country. In uncertain times like the present, how was 
one to respond to a massive demand for gold in exchange for cash if a 
substantial proportion of the gold stock had been evacuated overseas? 
The political argument concerned the policy of strict neutrality that 
Belgium was pursuing. Evacuation of two-thirds of the gold stock to the 
United States and Great Britain would be interpreted by Germany as a 
violation of that neutrality, as a hostile act against Germany, a highly 
desirable pretext for the Nazis to invade Belgium32.
To escape from this impasse, Governor Janssen altered his original 
idea33 and proposed to Gutt to halve the amount of gold to be sent to 
30 BNB, Archives, SD, 56, dossier 0.1, ‘or’ (généralités): note sur la répartition géo-
graphique de l’or, 31.12.1938.
31 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 601/1: letter of 22.03.1939 from Gutt to Jans-
sen.
32 ‘Entretiens avec Hubert Ansiaux, I. L’or et les valeurs de la Banque Nationale dans 
la tourmente de 1940’, in: Revue Générale, February 1985, p. 7.
33 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 601/1: letter of 20.03.1939 from Janssen to 
Gutt, p. 1.
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North America to about 3 billion Belgian francs’ worth and add the bal-
ance to the Bank’s stock in Brussels; in this way, the 30 per cent quota 
required by the bye-laws would be respected34. However, he continued 
to insist that a deposit of gold in the United States and in Great Britain 
was of crucial importance for the protection of the national currency, 
and he put forward two arguments to underpin his view. The first was 
that, as Belgium was holding fast to the gold standard, it was not un-
thinkable that, in the uncertain political situation of the time, the franc 
would come under pressure in New York and London; a local deposit 
of gold could relieve that pressure, as indeed had recently happened 
in Great Britain. The second was that, if war broke out, the Belgian 
government could well find itself needing the deposits in order to have 
access to foreign currency and credit abroad. It was clear that the latter 
argument was of a confidential nature. Indeed, the supervisory council 
would never countenance such an initiative, as the purpose of the stock 
of gold was to enable the Bank to carry out its statutory tasks. A final 
obstacle was the cost of transport and insurance to transfer the gold to 
the United States, a cost that had become prohibitive as a result of the 
political situation. The Bank had already requested the previous gov-
ernment to intervene with the Compagnie Maritime Belge to insist on 
special, favourable rates, but the government had not responded. The 
Bank would be able to count on greater cooperation from Gutt35.
Seeking to break the resistance of a section of the government, 
Gutt suggested that, for the moment, the transfer be limited to what 
the Bank deemed technically necessary for the adequate defence of the 
Belgian franc on the New York money market36. At the same time, he 
proposed that the transfer of gold to Great Britain be temporarily in-
creased, so that, in effect, the stock of gold in Belgium would be reduced 
to one-third of the total and the transfers to the United States and Great 
34 BNB, Archives, SD, 56, 1, dossier 0.1, ‘or’ (généralités): letter of 20.03.1939 from Jans-
sen to Gutt, p. 2: ‘Ultérieurement il avait été envisagé de conserver en Belgique la 
couverture métallique nécessaire à assurer une circulation de trente milliards. Cela 
réduisait le dépôt d’or à constituer aux Etats-Unis à quelques trois milliards’.
35 BNB, Archives, SD, 56, dossier 0.1, ‘or’ (généralités): letter of 20.03.1939 from Janssen 
to Gutt, pp. 2-3.
36 BNB, Archives, SD, 56, dossier 0.1, ‘or’ (généralités): letter of 22.03.1939 from Gutt to 
Janssen.
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Britain would together amount to two-thirds of it37. Thanks to Gutt, the 
transfer of gold resumed at the end of March 1939: to London by aero-
plane and by packet boat, to New York by packet boat.
As the international situation worsened, however, Belgium felt in-
creasingly threatened, especially when, at the beginning of November 
1939, there were signals from Berlin indicating an imminent attack38. On 
8 November, Gutt – still Minister of Finance, but now in the third Pier-
lot government (1939-1940) – contacted Governor Janssen for additional 
precautionary measures to be taken regarding the gold still at the Bank, 
including the gold entrusted to the Bank by third parties, in particular 
by the Banque du Congo Belge, the Treasury and the Caisse d’Epargne 
du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. On 9 November, it was agreed that 
gold to the value of about 4,000 million Belgian francs be entrusted 
for safe keeping to the French central bank (Banque de France)39. Two 
days later, on 11 November, Gutt requested the Bank to evacuate a fur-
ther 2,000 million Belgian francs’ worth of gold to France40. Nine days 
later, Governor Janssens was able to report to him that gold pieces and 
ingots valued at 5,938 million Belgian francs and packed in crates had 
been deposited in the vaults of the Banque de France at Bordeaux and 
Libourne41.
Pierre Fournier, the Governor of the Banque de France, had accepted 
the deposit, but not according to the formula Janssen had requested, 
namely that it would be ‘earmarked’, the customary procedure for 
37 This can be deduced from the minutes of the meeting of the supervisory council, 
29.03.1939 (BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 601/1).
38 Dumoulin, Spaak, pp. 140-142.
39 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 601/1: letter of 10.11.1939 from Janssen to 
Gutt.
40 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 601/1: letter of 11.11.1939 from Gutt to Jans-
sen.
41 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 601/1: letter of 20.11.1939 from Janssen to 
Gutt. The breakdown was as follows: 1° securities belonging to the Bank: 9,640 
gold bars (weight: 116,360.8 kg; value: 3,862,422,285 Belgian francs) and sundry 
gold pieces (joint value: 1,905,085,500 Belgian francs); 2° securities belonging to 
the Banque du Congo Belge: 410 gold bars (weight: 5,147.8 kg; value: 170,872,357 Bel-
gian francs). See also: BNB, Archives, Hoofdkas, dossier 25.02.04.00 (G 503 and G 
504); BNB, Archives, Inspectie, dossier 22.00.00.00 (G 373/3). See also: G. Cornu, 
L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle. En marge de l’histoire de la Banque de France: 
aventures de l’or monétaire, Paris, 1981, p. 164.
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transactions between central banks42. Fournier could not accept that 
procedure, as the urgency of the matter precluded a detailed verifica-
tion of the contents of the sealed crates. The Banque de France was pre-
pared officially to acknowledge only the ‘number’ of crates delivered 
with the seals intact, and further to accept the declaration of the de-
positor regarding the content of the crates and its value.
On 18 April, Gutt pressed the Bank to evacuate the remaining stock 
of gold in Belgium to France. Janssen promptly agreed, but the supervi-
sory council was unresponsive and asked whether it would not be safer 
to evacuate all the gold to the United States. Janssen pointed out that 
it was now much too late to put forward such a suggestion: transport 
and insurance costs for shipping gold from Europe to North America 
had meanwhile become prohibitive, thereby completely precluding the 
option, and the risk of freezing these assets, and even confiscation, re-
mained a vexed question in the United States. According to informa-
tion received by Janssen, Danish and Norwegian gold had been frozen 
there as soon as the two countries were in a state of war43.
Table 1.1:  Geographic spread abroad of the gold stock of the BNB (10 May 1940)
(value in Belgian francs)
Deposited in safe custody with the Bank of England, London:
Placed in bond with the Banque de France:
Deposited in safe custody with the Federal Reserve Bank, New York:






Source: BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 2, file 88.02.02.00 (B 608/14)
The measures taken meant that, on the eve of the German invasion, 
there was virtually no further gold of the Bank in the strong-rooms at 
42 The term ‘earmarked gold’ used by central bankers in gold transactions between 
themselves referred to the certainty regarding the perfect quality of the gold trad-
ed, as officially laid down by the central banks. Certainty was arrived at through a 
detailed and guaranteed control of the gold bars in respect of their number, weight, 
fine-gold content and the like, upon delivery to one of the central banks.
43 BNB, Archives, RR, 24.04.1940.
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Brussels or elsewhere in Belgium44. However, the situation was totally 
different in respect of the mass of banknotes, bank paper and securities 
that, at the moment of invasion, was still held in the Bank’s vaults and 
that likewise had to be evacuated45. To evacuate this mass, too, out of 
the country also proved to be no mean task.
44 According to a memorandum drawn up in 1950, the final fifty-four crates of gold 
bars and nineteen crates of gold coins were transferred by the Bank to France on 
11.05.1940: the delivery was valued at 104.6 million Belgian francs, of which 69.4 
million for gold belonging to the Bank, 33.2 million for gold sold to the Bank by the 
Reichsbank on 9 May, 1.2 million for gold belonging to the BIS and 0.8 million for 
gold belonging to the Banque du Congo Belge. On 12 May, a further ninety crates 
were evacuated to France from Ostend: these concerned gold bars belonging to the 
Caisse d’Epargne du Grand Duché de Luxembourg (BNB, Archives, Schatbewaarder, 
1, dossier 02.01.02.06 (536/8.2): étude relative à l’évacuation éventuelle des encaisses 
et valeurs essentielles, 1950).
45 Of relevance here was the stock of coins of the Bank and the Mint, the stock of 
bank notes at the main cash office and at the branches, the banknotes laying ready 
for issue, the banknotes being printed and the stock of banknote paper, the plates 
and dies and other printing equipment, the securities of the State funds and othe 
securities belonging to the Bank, the securities in respect of the various accounts 
held by the State at the Bank, and the securities belonging to various public insti-
tutions (twenty in total), but deposited in safe custody or in pledge at the Bank: 
BNB, Archives, Schatbewaarder, 1, dossier 02.01.02.06 (536/8.2): étude relative à 
l’évacuation éventuelle des encaisses et valeurs essentielles, 1950).

Chapter 2
The Blitzkrieg and 
the Banque Nationale de Belgique
The german invasion
In the small hours of 10 May 1940, a spring day that brought the sun 
with it, German fighting units poured across the south-eastern bor-
der of Belgium: the feared attack was under way. For Hitler, it was a 
new phase in his obsessive plan to reorganize the political and socio-
economic face of Europe into a Groszraum under German hegemony. 
The time of European nation states – in his view, a time of destructive, 
mutual conflicts and murderous economic competition – was dead and 
gone. What the Führer proposed in their place was a new entity, a uni-
fied Europe under German leadership that, by means of a well consid-
ered dirigiste policy, would grow to become a zone of organized autar-
chy, thereby regaining Europe’s status as a dominant world power1. A 
necessary first step in the realization of this grand idea was war, but 
not a long war of attrition like that of 1914-1918, which would only give 
the enemy the opportunity to regroup and catch up in the arms race. 
In Hitler’s strategy, it would be a short and successful Blitzkrieg, a war 
that would have the great advantage of sparing German territory and 
the German population, with an army committing itself effortlessly to 
an ultimate deployment of power; to paraphrase Mussolini: ‘War alone 
brings to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of no-
bility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it’2.
The German ground attack between Liège and Malmédy was sup-
ported by a massive air attack all over the country. A wave of panic 
swept over the population. Schools were closed and, except for anxious 
1 A. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945, London, 1975, pp. 1-17.
2 Milward, War, Economy and Society, p. 6.
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listening to the radio’s continuous stream of alarming news, the activ-
ity of most citizens was restricted to frenetic hoarding and to queuing 
at the private banks to withdraw their deposits. The banks, however, 
were closed over the Whitsun weekend of Saturday 11 May and did not 
open again until the following Tuesday morning, May 14. Although the 
private banks had a stock of approximately 2 billion Belgian francs in 
banknotes on the eve of the German invasion, they awaited the reo-
pening of their counters after the weekend with trepidation. The panic 
withdrawals, in fact, continued and cash reserves became exhausted in 
some private banks3.
In order to prevent the situation descending into chaos, the govern-
ment, in consultation with the bankers, had, by decree of 13 May, issued 
a moratorium on paying out bank deposits; withdrawals were thence-
forth limited to a maximum of 5,000 Belgian francs per account per 
fortnight, though the banks were allowed to make exceptions under 
certain conditions. On 15 May, a moratorium was also instituted on 
paying-out commercial paper4.
Prior to this, the Belgian government had already taken other meas-
ures in response to the crisis. At an emergency meeting on 10 May, it 
had promulgated a series of important decrees, including a number 
bearing on monetary and financial matters5. The gold convertibility of 
the franc was suspended and a mandatory rate of exchange set for paper 
money in circulation; nothing was done in respect of the Bank’s obliga-
tion to maintain a minimum gold cover of 40%. The control on foreign 
exchange transactions– set in place for the first time on 17 March 1935 
and suspended in April of the following year – was reinstated6 and the 
3 At the meeting of the executive committee of the Bank van de Société Générale on 
15 May, for example, the chairman de Munck reported that there was a shortage of 
banknotes in the branches of Charleroi and Mons: SG, Archives, DC, 15.05.1940.
4 Janssens, De Belgische frank, pp. 285-286.
5 BNB, Archives, AV, 30.06.1945, report by the board of scrutineers for the 1940-1944 
financial years, prepared on behalf of the supervisory council, p. 10. See also: Jans-
sens, De Belgische frank, pp. 285-286.
6 In connection with this, a decree of 14 May was to impose an obligation on all in-
habitants to declare all their holdings of gold and foreign currency to the Exchange 
Institute (BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au 
Roi, 20.12.1943, p. 5). See also: BNB, Archives, AV, 30.06.1945: report by the board of 
scrutineers for the 1940-1944 financial years, prepared on behalf of the supervisory 
council, p. 11.
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stock markets were closed until further notice7. Lastly, the government 
authorized the Minister of Finance to conclude with the Bank all regu-
lations that might be necessary to obtain additional credit. 
As was to be expected, the renewal of the control on foreign exchange 
transactions brought problems in its wake. On 11 or 12 May, the Banque 
de France in Paris informed Governor Janssen by telephone that Bel-
gian refugees who had crossed the border in the Ardennes were trying 
to exchange Belgian banknotes for French, and requested a regulation 
in that respect8. Moreover, it wanted the arrangements with Belgium to 
be linked to the Franco-British Reynaud-Simon monetary agreement 
of 4 December 1939. In that agreement, France and Great Britain had 
determined a fixed rate of exchange for their two currencies for the 
duration of the war and, as allies, had undertaken to grant each other 
lines of credit to promote and underpin mutual economic cooperation9.
At the beginning of May 1940 free market rates of up to 173.04 French 
francs to 100 Belgian were being quoted on the Brussels Exchange and 
in Northern France, compared to the then official rate of 143.425 French 
francs to 100 Belgian10. In the telephone discussion of 11 or 12 May with 
Janssen, the Governor of the Banque de France, Fournier, declared that 
he was prepared to accept the exchange of banknotes at the official rate 
of exchange; now that Belgium had called on the French army for help 
and French troops operating in Belgium would necessarily need Bel-
gian money, there would be an offset between the money requirements 
of the French army in Belgium and those of Belgian refugees in France, 
so that the exchange rate risk for the Bank had become virtually non-
7 H. Willems and F. Buelens, ‘De Tweede Wereldoorlog en de Belgische Beurzen’, in: 
M. de Keizer et al., eds., Thuisfront, Oorlog en Economie in de twintigste eeuw, 2003, 
p. 149 ff.
8 BNB, Archives, DC: 12.12.1944: memorandum from Baudewyns. Due to the advance 
of French and British troops to the Belgo-Dutch front, the borders remained of-
ficially closed to non-military traffic until 13 May inclusive: BdFr, Archives, Secré-
tariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/38, ‘or belge’: letter of 13.08.1940 from A. de 
Brouckère (Pau) to the Banque de France (Châtelguyon); note sur les opérations 
traitées aux guichets de la Banque de France par les réfugiés belges, 29.08.1940).
9 BNB, Archives, SD: P. Kauch, note sur les opérations de change de francs belges et de 
francs français lors de la fuite des belges en France et de leur rapatriement (unpub-
lished text), Chapter. 1, pp. 1-3.
10 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, Dossier 88.02.02.OO - B 610/1-5
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existent11. In order to resolve this thorny question, Gutt and Spaak on 13 
May travelled to the French Ministry of Finance in Paris.
The Belgian and French ministers rapidly reached an accommo-
dation and, after consultation with London, it was also accepted that 
Belgium would accede to the Reynaud-Simon monetary agreement of 
4 December 1939. On the following day, 14 May, Gutt and his French 
counterpart Félicien Lamoureux signed an interim Franco-Belgian 
monetary agreement whereby the two countries declared themselves 
prepared to grant credits to each other: the French Treasury opened an 
interest-free line of credit in the amount of 500 million French francs 
in favour of the Belgian Treasury, which in turn opened an interest-free 
line of credit in the amount of 340 million Belgian francs in favour 
of the French. Further details would be included in a subsequent, de-
finitive agreement and a similar agreement would be signed with Great 
Britain in the near future. Debts arising out of the credit lines granted 
would be settled at exchange rates of 147.2 French francs to 100 Belgian 
francs and 1 pound sterling to 120 Belgian francs12; the rates would re-
main in force for the duration of the war and could be changed only by 
mutual agreement13.
11 BNB, Archives, DC, 12.12.1944: memorandum from Baudewyns.
12 According to an indication by Hubert Ansiaux, it was only from 17.05.1940 on that 
there was any extensive exchange of Belgian money into sterling in Great Britain: 
exchange was at a rate of 1 pound sterling to 120 Belgian francs, with a maximum 
permissible amount of 10 pounds per person per week: BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 
dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6): memorandum of 28.08.1942 from Dussart to Kauch. 
Although the French pushed for a rapid conclusion of a provisional Anglo-Belgian 
monetary and financial agreement on the same lines as the Franco-Belgian agree-
ment, and although the Bank of England indicated that it would have no objection, 
there was opposition from the British Treasury. Sir David Waley, while agreeing in 
principle, wanted first thoroughly to examine the text of the Franco-Belgian agree-
ment, which is why assent to an Anglo-Belgian agreement came only later, prob-
ably on 16 May (BEngl, Archives, Belgium, dossier OV88/3: telephone conversation 
of 14.05.1940 with Philips (Paris); letter of 14.05.1940 from Waley to Cobbold).
13 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter.1, p. 7. The 
agreement regarding the mutual granting of credit lines never came into force, due 
to the changed military circumstances, and was in fact superseded in this respect 
by the Franco-Belgian agreement of 7 June (BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les 
opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 11, footnote 28). See also: V. Janssens, De Bel-
gische frank, p. 287.
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However, the exchange rate that the ministers had set between 
the French and Belgian francs proved unacceptable to the Banque de 
France, which, on 15 May, notified its branches that the rate of 144.4 
French francs to 100 Belgian it had announced on 9 May remained in 
force14. The Belgian government made a vague protest, but to no avail15. 
The Bank appeared to accept neither of the rates, as, that same day, 
the board of directors resolved that only small quantities of bank notes 
presented by French soldiers would be exchanged, and then only at the 
pre-war free market rate of 172.4 French francs to 100 Belgian. At Gutt’s 
express request, the Bank fairly quickly relaxed its stance16 and on 16 
May announced that French military personnel could exchange bank-
notes up to an amount of 25,000 French francs per person at a rate of 
144.4 French francs to 100 Belgian, but that the rate of 172.4 French 
francs to 100 Belgian would remain in force for private individuals. On 
the other hand, and with chiefly the safeguarding of the Bank’s gold 
reserves in mind, the board of directors urged the Banque de France to 
restrict the exchange of Belgian banknotes for French to the maximum 
of 5,000 Belgian francs per account per fortnight17.
The provisional arrangement of 16 May with Great Britain was also 
received with a certain degree of displeasure on the part of the Bank. In 
the same way as France had supported Belgium militarily, Great Brit-
ain had sent a great number of troops to the continent and, again like 
France, looked to obtain as favourable an exchange rate as possible for 
her military forces’ spending in Belgium. In consequence, the Bank of 
England was not prepared to accept the unfavourable free market rate 
of 1 pound sterling to 101.675 Belgian francs that had been quoted on the 
Brussels Exchange just prior to its closure. It wanted the official rate of 1 
pound sterling to 120 Belgian francs to be applied. On 11 May, it notified 
14 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6): letter of 28.08.1942 from 
Dussart to Kauch; Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 287. 
15 BNB, Archives, SD, 36, Service étranger, dossier 8.11.30/1: activité du service des 
changes et du service étranger, 10 mai 1940-31 décembre 1941 (rapport au comité de 
direction); Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 287.
16 BNB, Archives, SD, 49, dossier 8.13.11/ s. f. 1: ‘période de guerre, correspondance 20 
mai 1940-30 mai 1940’: letter of 28.05.1940 from Janssen to Gutt.
17 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6): letter of 28.08.1942 from 
Dussart to Kauch.
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the Bank by telephone that British forces would exchange their pounds 
at the official rate, but that there would be a limit of two pounds per sol-
dier18. After discussion with Governor Janssen, Gutt declared himself in 
agreement with the rate proposed by the Bank of England 19.
rising war panic
Since the invasion, a rising sense of unease about the course of military 
operations had prevailed at the Bank in Brussels. The management of 
the Bank, therefore, judged it wise to make all haste to complete the 
evacuation of Bank’s holdings of gold, as well as all other valuables it 
held20. On 15 May, the government decided to leave Brussels and estab-
lish itself at Ostend. Gutt requested the Bank to transfer its registered 
office to where the government was retreating and to carry out its mon-
etary tasks there. The Bank decided that Governor Janssen, Deputy-
governor Ingenbleek and Director Baudewyns would follow the gov-
ernment to Ostend. Director Goffin and the Treasurer Sontag were to 
remain in Brussels. Thirty-three members of the head office staff were 
detailed by the board of directors to follow the management to where it 
was decamping21. Various semi-public institutions, including the Postal 
Cheque Office and other public services such as the Banking Commis-
sion were to follow, as were a number of secretaries-general, or their 
representatives, with part of their administration.
Once the government had resolved to quit Brussels, it invited lead-
ing figures from the world of banking to the Ministry of Finance to 
discuss with Gutt and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Spaak how af-
fairs were to be managed in the occupied area of the country after the 
government’s departure. Only Alexandre Galopin, Governor of the So-
ciété Générale, Max-Léo Gérard, Chairman of the Banque de Bruxelles, 
and Fernand Collin, Chairman of the Kredietbank, were in a position 
18 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, Chapter. 
2, p. 32, footnote 40. See also: BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de 
change, Chapter. 1, pp. 6-7.
19 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 1, pp. 6-7.
20 Between 11 and 14 May gold was sent to France by Ansiaux under rail convoy (BNB, 
Archives, Boekhouding, dossier 88.02.02.OO - B 610/1-5).
21 BNB, Archives, DC, 15.05.1940.
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to participate in the discussion. Gutt notified the three of the decision 
regarding the imminent departure of the government and added that a 
substantial proportion of government institutions and the central ad-
ministrative framework would follow the government to Ostend and, 
in the event, abroad. Because a departure on this scale would create a 
large administrative vacuum in the occupied territory, particularly in 
respect of public finances, Gutt requested the bankers to assume re-
sponsibility for the payment of the wages and salaries of the public sec-
tor employees who remained behind, and, to that end, handed Galopin 
a blank cheque from the Treasury22.
The discussion in Gutt’s bureau revealed once again with what in-
comprehensible ignorance the Belgian government faced the war. Ga-
lopin sought in vain for a guiding principle among those in author-
ity remaining in Belgium, whether in the public or the private sector. 
What attitude was he and his colleagues to adopt toward the German 
occupier, he asked, now that the departing government had resolved 
to pursue a scorched earth policy as regards politics and administra-
tion (‘stratégie de vide politique et administrative’)? Surely it was not 
the government’s intention to abandon the population unprotected to 
the occupier or, as Galopin put it, ‘You don’t want us, after all, to turn 
Belgium into a cemetery?’ That was certainly not what was wanted by 
the ministers, who accepted that concessions had to be made to the 
occupier, but gave no indication as to what they were. How this thorny 
question was to be dealt with they left to the wisdom and courage of 
those in authority remaining behind23. Spaak ended the discussion with 
the rhetorical declaration that was later to cause so much controversy, 
‘Gentlemen, we entrust you with Belgium’24.
22 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, pp. 243-246.
23 Quoted by R. Brion and J.-L. Moreau, La Société Générale, 1822-1997, p. 333.
24 UCL, Archives, fonds A.-E. Janssen, dossier 200B/10: letter of 30.08.1946 from Col-
lin to A.-E. Janssen and letter of 11.07.1946 from Gérard to A.-E. Janssen. See also: 
UCL, Archives, fonds A.-E. Janssen, dossier 200B/11: letter of 05.01.1947 from Velge 
to A.-E. Janssen. A great deal has been written about the exact scope of the request 
by Gutt and Spaak to the three bankers to follow-up the economic development of 
the country prudently. It is very certain that no details were discussed – indeed, 
there was no time for that – and nothing was set down in writing. The discussion 
nevertheless followed the direction indicated above. For more details of the entire 
debate, see particularly: M. Van den Wijngaert, L’économie belge sous l’occupation. 
La politique d’Alexandre Galopin, gouverneur de la Société Générale, Brussels, 1990.
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osTend, a confused episode
Governor Janssen and Baudewyns left for Ostend on 16 May, togeth-
er with the government, and Ostend automatically became the place 
where the Bank’s registered office was established25. The very next day, 
the Germans marched into Brussels. Before this happened, Sontag and 
Ansiaux had worked feverishly at head office to move the last securi-
ties and the printing equipment out of the capital, and to safeguard the 
cash stocks and securities of the branches that, in accordance with the 
evacuation plan, had in an initial phase been transferred to Brussels 
from the south and east of the country26.
The evacuation of the branches went far from according to plan. In 
many cases, the transfer was a chaotic affair, even though, miraculous-
ly, it was completed successfully27. In the final instructions from head 
office before the German invasion, the branch managers had been told 
to stay at their posts for as long as possible before bringing their cash 
stocks and securities to Brussels or Ostend under escort from the local 
gendarmes. The rapid advance of the German troops stymied that flow, 
as did the fact that, in certain cases, the gendarmes withdrew without 
alerting the local branch. Thus, abandoned totally to their own devices, 
the managers had to find secure transport. They could call on the local 
military commandant to requisition the necessary lorries. Where that 
was not possible, they had to get out as best they could, using whatever 
means of transport they could lay their hands on. Once transport was 
secured, they then had to make their way between the advancing or 
retreating armies and the swarms of refugees that clogged the roads 
everywhere. On top of that, they had to run the gauntlet of German 
fighter planes in search of military convoys. They arrived sporadically 
at head office in Brussels, some of them, including the managers from 
25 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, dossier 88.02.02.00 (B 608/12): France 1940. In-
ventaires, évacuation, rapatriement (ordre de service du 17 mai, signé par Goffin).
26 In this respect, see the reports of the agents about their evacuation: BNB, Archives, 
Inspectie, dossier 22.00.00.00 (G 373/4): rapports d’évacuation des agences de la 
BNB.
27 The agents’ reports contain interesting details about this: BNB, Archives, Inspectie, 
dossier 22.00.00.00 (G 373/4): rapports d’évacuation des agences de la BNB.
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Tongres, Nivelles and Mons, having had to abandon branch premises 
destroyed or damaged by bombardment28.
In the early afternoon of 15 May, Ansiaux left Brussels for Ostend for 
the last time, accompanied by a few lorries packed chiefly with unissued 
banknotes and the stocks of cash that had arrived from the local branch 
managers in the south of the country29. It was only in the early morn-
ing of the following day that he arrived with his consignment at the 
branch in Ostend. Confusion reigned there, too. Considerable quanti-
ties of cash were arriving from the branches in the north and centre of 
the country, that from Antwerp even in a number of commandeered 
hearses, for want of other means of transport. There was naturally in-
sufficient manpower to inventory everything accurately and, moreover, 
the labels of many sacks and crates had been torn or lost.
Governor Janssen was in a sombre mood. He had learned from Gutt 
that the military situation was hopeless and that the government would 
soon decamp: in Gutt’s words, ‘’It’s a disaster, the government will leave 
for France, either to Le Havre, or further south’30. Following this bad 
news, Janssen convened an emergency meeting of the board of direc-
tors at the Ostend branch on the morning of Friday 17 May, in order 
to discuss what course of action the Bank ought now to take31. It was 
resolved that the Governor should follow the Minister of Finance and 
that Baudewyns should leave immediately for Paris and there contact 
the Banque de France. In the early morning of 18 May, the government 
resolved to leave forthwith for Le Havre, its departure from Ostend 
having been hastened by a night bombardment of the town. The fol-
lowing day, Gutt and Governor Janssen arrived in Paris, where Janssen 
accepted the hospitality of the Banque de France, in whose premises he 
established the Bank’s registered office32.
28 BNB, Archives, RR, review of 1940. See also: Tijdschrift voor het personeel van de 
NBB, 1958, 6, pp. 1-6.
29 ‘Entretiens avec Hubert Ansiaux, I. L’or et les valeurs de la Banque Nationale dans 
la tourmente de 1940’, in: Revue Générale, February, 1985, p. 10; Ansiaux, Souvenirs, 
1990, pp. 48-50. 
30 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, p. 2.
31 BNB, Archives, DC, 17.05.1940.
32 BNB, Archives, SD, 36, Foreign Department, dossier 8.11.30/1: activité du service des 
changes et du service étranger, 10 mai 1940 – 31 décembre 1941 (rapport au comité 
de direction, Chapter. 1).
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When Ostend came under renewed bombardment later in the day, 
Ingenbleek deemed it time to get the staff and most of the cash stocks 
deposited at the branch there to safety in Le Havre. Greater urgency was 
given to his decision by the news, just received, that the German army 
was successfully forcing a breakthrough to the north French coast, so 
that Belgium would probably very soon be cut off from France. The task 
now facing Ansiaux, left behind in Ostend, was hopeless33. The load still 
to be evacuated consisted of 281 crates, weighing approximately forty 
tonnes. Apart from a few staff from head office, he had virtually no one 
left; much worse was the fact that he had only one lorry with which to 
transport the entire load. The day before, 17 May, he had been in con-
tact with the port authority, which was then in the hands of the French 
military, and had found a willingness to help; but the port lay deserted 
and no further ships were expected to arrive, so that no salvation could 
be expected from that quarter.
With Sunday 19 May dawning, the situation had become hopeless. 
By amazing good fortune, however, a Belgian coastguard vessel bear-
ing the number A4 sailed into Ostend from Dunkirk at around six o’ 
clock that evening and Ansiaux was able to convince the local Belgian 
Naval commander to make the ship available. Initially, the A4 hugged 
the Belgian coast. As it approached Nieuwpoort, however, the port of 
Dunkirk came into sight, ablaze; the rudder was thrown over and the 
vessel headed out into the open sea. The following morning, the A4 
reached the Thames estuary, where the British Admiralty instructed it 
to sail on to Folkestone. From Folkestone, the A4 was directed to Dart-
mouth and from there to Plymouth, where transport to London would 
be provided34. At last, on the morning of 26 May, the vessel tied up in 
Plymouth harbour. Under the watchful eye of Ansiaux, the valuable 
crates were unloaded onto the quay and transported to the vaults of the 
Bank of England. Ansiaux had carried out his remit with flying colours.
33 For what follows, see: ‘Entretiens avec Hubert Ansiaux, I. L’or et les valeurs de la 
Banque Nationale dans la tourmente de 1940’, in: Revue Générale, February, 1985, 
pp. 11-12. See also: Ansiaux, Souvenirs, pp. 53-55; J. Pluym, ‘Geld aan boord’, in: 
Connect (NBB staff magazine), May 2002, pp. 21-22. See also: Private Archives of 
Ansiaux Jr.: ‘Evacuation de l’encaisse à Ostende’. 
34 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.00.10 (A 230/4): quelques renseignements 
recueillis concernant les évacuations des encaisses de la Banque Nationale.
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The peregrinaTion Through france
The evacuation of the cash stocks and valuables of the local branches 
to France was a very tortuous affair, particularly the first stage to Le 
Havre. Once again, progress was hindered by clogged roads, numer-
ous diversions and incessant bombardment. Furthermore, the con-
voy assembled in Ostend lost some of its cohesion, so that a number 
of branch managers were thrown onto their own resources and had 
to resort to a great deal of improvisation in order to reach Le Havre. 
The majority of the convoy finally reached the agreed place of assem-
bly at Sainte-Adresse near Le Havre around 21 May; there they were 
awaited by Ingenbleek and directed further to Caen35, where they met 
Bastiné, a deputy-general manager of the Bank, and Pierre Kauch, the 
Governor’s private secretary. These two organized convoys destined for 
Tarbes in southwest France36, where the Banque de France had placed 
the strong-room of its branch there at the Bank’s disposal to deposit the 
cash stocks; between 21 and 29 May, no less than thirty of the Bank’s 
forty-two branch managers made use of this facility37. This brought the 
number of staff and family members in Tarbes and its surroundings to 
24038. Fortunately, the staff had received three months’ pay in advance 
upon their departure from Belgium, a gesture that was repeated on the 
instructions of Bastiné in Caen39.
35 For a detailed account of the wandering of a large number of these agents, see 
their reports in: BNB, Archives, Inspectie, dossier 22.00.00.00 (G 373/4): rapports 
d’évacuation des agences de la BNB mai-juin 1940. See also: the diary of a member 
of staff, Walter Patoor (NBB, war diary of Walter Patoor).
36 BNB, Archives, Inspectie, dossier 22.00.00.00 (G 373/4): rapports d’évacuation des 
agences de la BNB, mai-juin 1940.
37 BNB, Archives, Inspectie, dossier 22.00.00.00 (G 374/4): rapport consécutif à 
l’évacuation de l’encaisse de nos agences, 10.06.1940; BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek 
Papers: le problème de la vie sous l’occupation, Chapter. 4, p. 11.
38 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, dossier 88.02.02.00 (B 608/12): France 1940. In-
ventaires, évacuation, rapatriement (these figures also included the staff in Tou-
louse, but not the staff at Mont-de-Marsan; in total, 344 members of staff were re-
patriated in July-August to Belgium: see below).
39 BNB, Archives, Inspectie, dossier 22.00.00.00 (G 373/4): rapports d’évacuation des 
agences de la BNB, mai-juin 1940 (report of the agent J. Leleux of the Ath branch, 
30.05.1940). See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 49, dossier 8.13.11/ s. f. 3, ‘période de guerre, 
correspondance du 6 au 10 juin 1940’: letter of 06.06.1940 from Baudewyns (Paris) 
to Van Nieuwenhuyse (Mont-de-Marsan)).
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As already mentioned, Janssen, accompanying Gutt, had left Ostend 
for Paris on 18 May, in order to establish the Bank’s registered office 
there. No less important, though, was the matter of the provisional 
monetary agreement of 14 May, which now had to be given definitive 
form. The matter had become exceptionally urgent, as the number of 
Belgian refugees in France was now enormous, the government putting 
it at nearly two million40. It was probable that there were, in fact, only 
about a million or somewhat more Belgian refugees actually in France 
and that the government estimate wrongly included the approximately 
800,000 Belgian refugees in West Flanders and a part of East Flanders41, 
but this still meant that more than one million refugees in France were 
looking to exchange Belgian francs for French.
Consequently, the French banks were inundated with requests to 
convert Belgian money into French, something that gave Janssen and 
Baudewyns extreme cause for concern about the future of the gold re-
serves that had been deposited with the Banque de France. Conversion 
on a massive scale would result in a sharp increase in the quantity of 
Belgian banknotes in the hands of the Banque de France. Buying them 
in with gold, the only method normally permitted, would severely di-
minish the Belgian gold deposit in France or even jeopardize it com-
pletely.
For his part, Gutt was well aware that he would be in sore need of 
French credit42. In the first place, he had to finance the expenditure of 
40 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, dossier 88.02.02.00 (B 608/11): memorandum con-
cerning the expenditure of the Pierlot government in Belgium and in France, 10 
May-15 August 1940, p. 1. This figure was endorsed by the Dutch envoy in Brus-
sels, who had kept a close track of the Belgian government during its peregrination 
through France: Ndl.BZ, London Archives 1940-1945, GA, G II, België n°2: letter of 
29.05.1940 from van Harinxma thoe Slooten (Poitiers) to van Kleffens (London). 
In 1941, the French authorities were even speaking of between two and three mil-
lion Belgian refugees (BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 
1397.1994.01/71: séance du 4 octobre 1940, relative à l’or belge.
41 Robert Vauchez, ‘Le Drame belge’, an article published in the newspaper Le Soir 
at the end of 1940, in which he wrote: ‘Aujourd’hui, le rapatriement (de France) de 
plus d’un million de belges est presque terminé’ (Ndl.BZ, Archives, dossier ‘London’: 
Belgium).
42 According to a memorandum drawn up during the summer of 1940, the Bank, 
as State cashier paid out a total of 1,692,142, 547.27 Belgian francs for account of 
the government between 10 May and 15 August: BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 
88.02.02.00 (B 608/11).
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the armed forces in France and also provide for the maintenance of the 
reserve of recruits, the tens of thousands of young men between the 
ages of sixteen and thirty-five who were not yet in the armed forces, but 
whom, during the first days of the invasion, the government had sent 
to the south of France, pending their joining the Belgian troops. More-
over, the government had granted the refugees a subsistence benefit and 
had to pay the salaries of the numerous officials who had fled to France. 
The government had also agreed to provide cash advances to persons 
who could prove that they had money in their post office account, and 
continued to pay pensions and invalidity benefits to refugees qualify-
ing for them43. Lastly, it had to build up an administrative structure in 
France, continue to maintain the diplomatic services abroad and con-
tinue to service foreign debt44.
In fact, the only major assets that the government could use as col-
lateral for credit were the gold deposit of the Bank and the quantity of 
foreign currency, gold pieces, securities and other valuables that refu-
gees and businesses had brought to France. There was, thus, a dual con-
cern of not allowing the gold deposit to shrink too much and of keeping 
private assets out of the hands of the French government.
The government and the Bank had also to take account of the fi-
nancial interests of the refugees, who were very unhappy about the ex-
change rate that had been accepted with the Franco-Belgian agreement 
of 14 May, i.e. 144.4 French francs to 100 Belgian, a parity considerably 
different to the market rate of 9 May, which was 173.04 French francs 
to 100 Belgian. The new situation, whereby the decrees of 10 May had 
abolished transactions on the free market, so that only the official rate 
continued to apply, was perceived by the refugees as a drastic devalua-
tion of the Belgian currency. As a result, they felt that they were suffer-
ing a considerable loss every time they exchanged money and that their 
government had let them down. On top of that, the Bank had agreed 
with the Banque de France on 18 May that, with effect from the follow-
43 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Plisnier Papers, dossier 2 b: note de M. Gutt 
sur l’activité financière du gouvernement belge, summer 1940.
44 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Plisnier Papers, dossier 2 b: letter of 27.07.1940 
from Smeers (Vichy) to Plisnier (Brussels). In this respect, see also: BNB, Archives, 
SD, London Archives: note de M. Janssen sur son activité entre le 10 mai et le 9 juil-
let 1940, n° 14.
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ing day, the conversion of Belgian money into French would be limited 
to 2,000 Belgian francs per person per fortnight, with a maximum of 
5,000 Belgian francs per household45.
Quite simply, Gutt and Janssen were between hammer and anvil. On 
the one hand, their aim was to keep the Bank’s gold deposit as intact as 
possible46 and to do that by keeping the conversion of Belgian money to 
a minimum. On the other, their unwillingness to ignore the interests of 
the refugees meant that the exchange rate of the Belgian franc had to be 
maintained, while scope had to be left regarding the amount of money 
to be converted. Neither of the two men was at the time fully aware of 
the extraordinarily high feelings and emotion that the government’s 
manipulation of the exchange rate was arousing among the refugees. It 
was an ignorance that later came to haunt them.
45 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6): memorandum of 
28.08.1942 from Dussart to Kauch. See also: BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les 
opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 3.
46 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 2. 
Chapter 3
France and the Monetary Crisis
The capiTulaTion and iTs moneTary consequences
The negotiations between France and Belgium to give definitive form 
to the provisional monetary agreement of 14 May were resumed on 20 
May1. Progress was slow and difficult, especially as Great Britain had 
to be taken into account in the three-country agreement conceived in 
Paris. Communication worsened by the day, particularly cross-Chan-
nel communication, and this decided Gutt to leave for London on 23 
May. He hoped for fruitful consultation there regarding the half-fin-
ished discussions in Paris over that agreement, but also wanted to take 
advantage of the occasion to conclude an Anglo-Belgian agreement, 
already hinted at during the Paris meetings.
The discussion in London went unexpectedly smoothly and on 24 
May, the day after his arrival, Gutt and Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, were able to sign a provisional Anglo-Belgian agree-
ment. This was a carbon copy of the provisional Franco-Belgian agree-
ment: the British government granted Belgium an interest-free line of 
credit of three million pounds sterling and the Belgian government 
granted Great Britain a reciprocal line of 360 million Belgian francs; 
the official exchange rate was to be that set in Paris, i.e. 1 pound sterling 
to 120 Belgian francs2.
During the night of 27/28 May, the Belgian armed forces capitulated. 
The news was announced over the radio by the French Prime Minister, 
Paul Reynaud, who branded the capitulation an act of treachery on the 
part of the King and, in virulent language, berated both him and the 
Belgian armed forces, sparing neither. In a radio address following this, 
1 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 3.
2 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 11, foot-
note 28.
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Pierlot, deeply stricken by the hostile attitude of his hosts, gave sup-
port to the French position, albeit adopting a somewhat more moderate 
tone, but nevertheless took the view that the King should be deposed3. 
The two radio addresses, particularly Reynaud’s, unleashed a wave of 
anger – generally verbal – throughout France against the Belgian refu-
gees4.
On 25 May, already, the French government had issued a decree 
freezing all the assets of Belgian companies that had taken refuge in 
France, a measure whose application extended to the assets (banknotes 
and securities) of the Bank placed in safe custody in the branches of 
the Banque de France at Mont-de-Marsan, Tarbes and Toulouse5. In 
consequence, nothing further could be withdrawn from the reserve of 
banknotes, a catastrophic situation for both the Bank and the Treasury.
On 28 May worse was to follow. Following the news of the Belgian 
capitulation, the Governor of the Banque de France, Fournier, decided 
unilaterally that, with effect from the next day, Belgian refugees would 
be permitted to exchange no more than 500 Belgian francs per person 
per fortnight (with a maximum of 1,000 Belgian francs per household)6. 
Likewise on 28 May, he informed Janssen that, according to available 
figures, the Belgian refugees had so far presented 1.2 billion Belgian 
francs’ worth of banknotes for exchange and in return had received an 
amount of 1,732.8 million French francs at the official exchange rate. 
The Banque de France was now demanding immediate settlement in 
gold and had decided to withdraw approximately 36,397 kilograms of 
fine gold from the Belgian gold reserves deposited in its branches at 
Libourne and Bordeaux.
3 According to constitutional experts, the King had not violated the constitution, 
because – as Commander-in-Chief of the army – he was not obliged to request a 
ministerial counter-signature: Ndl.BZ, London Archives, 1940-1945, GA G II, België, 
n° 2: letter of 29.05.1940 from van Harinxma thoe Slooten (Poitiers) to van Kleffens 
(London).
4 Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, pp. 264-269.
5 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, pp. 29-
30, and particularly: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, pp. 4-5, 
footnote 16.
6 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/ 6): memorandum of 
28.08.1942 from Dussart to Kauch.
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Janssen was seized by panic. He feared even tougher action on the 
part of the French in the immediate days ahead and, in this uncertain 
monetary situation, looked to see responsibility shared. That same day, 
28 May, he sent a telegram to the Belgian embassy in London, which 
read, ‘For Minister Gutt – stop – confirm: your presence here, with 
the briefest delay, appears to be indispensable’7. Gutt returned to Paris 
on 29 May and negotiations began the following day, promising to be 
hard. There were three main points on the agenda: the currency par-
ity, the mutual granting of credit and the disposition of the valuables, 
which the refugees had brought with them. It was clear from the outset 
that the French would be dictating the terms and would be giving little 
ground to the Belgians. ‘Evidently’, wrote Gutt to Theunis, ‘no more 
presents, no more declarations of Saint-Adresse, about war repara-
tions’8. The French took the view that the capitulation had put Belgium 
in an extremely weak position: she had lost the war and was now an 
occupied territory; her economy was in ruins and, under the occupa-
tion, would as a matter of course no longer be able to contribute to the 
Allies’ war effort9; lastly, the value of the Belgian franc no longer had 
an economic foundation and the currency was, in any case, overvalued 
against the French currency10.
The French therefore demanded that the value of the Belgian and 
French francs be equalized, which meant an exchange rate of 100 (no 
longer 144.4) French francs to 100 Belgian, a 30.75 per cent devalua-
tion of the Belgian currency against the French. In accordance with the 
provisional Franco-British-Belgian agreement of 14 May, sterling was 
required to be associated with this arrangement, so that there would 
7 BNB, Archives, SD, 49, dossier 8.13.11/ s. f. 1: telegrams of 30.05.1940 and 01.06.1940 
from Baudewyns to Ansiaux.
8 Quoted by J.-Fr. Crombois, Camille Gutt. Les finances et la guerre, 1940-1945, Brus-
sels, 2000, p. 75. The reference to the declaration of Saint-Adresse refers to the 
French government’s promise during the peace negotiations after the First World 
War to support the Belgian position regarding German war reparations.
9 This point of view was shared by Janssen: BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives: note 
de M. Janssen sur son activité entre le 10 mai et le 9 juillet 1940, n° 17. See also: BNB, 
Archives, AV, 26.08.1940 (memorandum of 26.08.1940 for Governor Janssen to use 
in his reply to Senator Van Dieren’s interpellation at the meeting of the general as-
sembly in August 1940).
10 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 6.
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also be a proportional devaluation of the Belgian franc against sterling 
from 120 to 176.625 Belgian francs to the pound. Conversion against 
these official rates would be conducted via the bodies or institutions 
authorized for that purpose: for France, the Fonds de Stabilisation; for 
Great Britain, the Exchange Equalization Fund; and for Belgium, the 
Bank in its capacity of State exchequer11.
The search for scapegoaTs
Who, in fact, was behind this demand for devaluation? Some mem-
bers of the Banque de France insinuated that it was Gutt and Janssen. 
The devaluation, they said, would make the French franc much more 
expensive for the Belgian refugees, discouraging them from buying 
French francs and thus contributing to limit the loss of Belgian gold. 
The insinuation, however, does not seem close to the truth. It is more 
than likely that the French imposed the adjustment of the currency 
parity on the Belgians and that the Belgians were unable to summon 
up any resistance to such an agreement. From both an ideological and 
a theoretical point of view, Gutt and Janssen were great champions of 
a stable currency and opposed as a matter of principle any form of de-
valuation. It is also very revealing that, immediately after the defeat of 
France, barely three weeks after the devaluation of 9 June, Gutt and 
Janssen attempted to have the devaluation declared void and, indeed, 
succeeded in their efforts.
As regards the provision of credit, it was agreed during the nego-
tiations that, for the duration of the war, the respective governments 
would grant each other interest-free lines of credit of respectively one 
billion French francs and one billion Belgian francs for purchases 
within France or the French empire and within Belgium or the Bel-
gian Congo. Any overrun would be offset by the transfer of Treasury 
bonds at 3 per cent for the amount of the overrun12. Similar conditions 
would apply between Great Britain and Belgium in respect of purchases 
within Great Britain and the British empire and within Belgium or the 
11 See article 3 of the Franco-Belgian and the Anglo-Belgian financial agreements of 
07.06.1940.
12 Article 4 of the Franco-Belgian financial agreement of 07.06.1940 (see below).
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Belgian Congo13. It was also agreed that the Belgian government would 
make a fair contribution to the financing of the war effort, whether 
with gold, dollars or foreign currency convertible to dollars14.
Belgium also agreed with France that half of all Belgian govern-
ment debt would be settled at the end of each month in gold, dollars 
or foreign currency convertible to dollars, the remaining half to be set 
against the agreed line of credit15. A similar arrangement was laid down 
in a separate agreement in respect of the cooperation between Belgium 
and Great Britain and both arrangements would be reciprocal.
Additionally, article 3 of the Franco-Belgian monetary agreement 
carried a hidden sting by way of a clause inserted stating that the con-
version of Belgian money into French by refugees fell outside the credit 
facility arrangement; in consequence, the Bank’s repurchases of Bel-
gian banknotes had to be funded entirely with gold16. In principle, there 
should also have been reciprocity in this matter, but the reciprocity 
clause was omitted from the implementing protocol signed by the two 
central-bank governors on 7 June 1940, with the result that the Banque 
de France was not later to feel itself bound by any such reciprocity17. 
Lastly, the Belgian government had to accept that Belgian banks should 
suspend their activities on French soil18.
When Deputy-governor Ingenbleek came to read the text of the 
agreements of 7 June, he was fiercely critical. In his view, the formula-
tion of the general clause was so vague and its practical application so 
13 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi, 
20.12.1943, p. 18.
14 Article 9 of the Franco-Belgian and the Anglo-Belgian financial agreements of 
07.06.1940 (see below).
15 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, dossier 88.02.02.00 (B 608/9): letter of 07.06.1940 
from Bouthillier to Gutt.
16 The Franco-Belgian agreements of 7 June regarding the exchange of money by Bel-
gian refugees in France and regarding Belgium’s contribution in gold, dollars and 
assimilated foreign currency to the war effort, insofar as settled before 25 June, 
were recognized as legal by the German occupiers in Brussels (Freiburg im Breis-
gau, Militär Archiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 37/277: Hofrichter, Abschlusz-
bericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, p. 85).
17 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, dossier 88.02.02.00 (B 608/9): BEB, DC, 09.07.1942 (ex-
tract for manager Bastiné).
18 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter 2, p. 7.
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broad that it threw open the door to downright plundering of the gold 
reserves by the French or British government, or even both.19. 
In respect of the final point of the agenda, i.e. the disposition of the 
refugees’ valuables, Belgium was able to score a degree of success in that 
both France and Great Britain declared that they would make no claim 
on them, indicating that the valuables could eventually be confiscated 
by the Belgian government20. Gutt attempted, unsuccessfully, to have 
the agreement extended to include the gold reserves frozen in France 
and Great Britain. He also demanded the unfreezing of the Bank’s as-
sets in the branches of the Banque de France at Tarbes, Toulouse and 
Mont-de-Marsan21, but to no immediate avail.
By 30 May, the major lines of the agreement had already become 
fairly clear22. All that had to be done immediately thereafter was to fill 
in the details, so that it would quickly be ready for signing. However, 
two unforeseen events now occurred to throw a spanner in the works. 
The first was the totally unexpected declaration by the Minister for the 
Colonies, Albert De Vleeschauwer, that he was opposed to the agreed 
exchange rates. He argued that the Belgian Congo was not a territory 
under military occupation and that, in consequence, there was no rea-
son for discussing a weakening of the international position of the Con-
golese currency.23.
The minister had contacted representatives of the Belgian colonial 
companies, many of whom had fled from Brussels to Bordeaux24. He 
19 … On a été jusqu’à permettre au Ministre des Finances, dans une convention qu’il 
fit avec son collègue de France, de disposer de l’or de la Banque, sans que le Comité 
de Direction… eût été consulté’: KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon 
journal de guerre, pp. 30-31.
20 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, pp. 7-8, 
15 and annex 17. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 4: 
Kauch, rapport au Roi, 20.12.1943, p. 14.
21 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 12, foot-
note 30, and p. 5, footnote 16.
22 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/3): précisions sur les négo-
ciations économiques et financières entre la France et la Belgique émigrée, mai-juin 
1940.
23 Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 289.
24 In his war diary, Minister De Schryver speaks of the representatives and manage-
ments of ‘hundreds’ of colonial companies, all of whom had fled to Bordeaux: De 
Schryver, Oorlogsdagboeken, 1940-1942, p. 73.
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had also consulted the representatives of the Banque du Congo Belge. 
The reaction was unanimous: no-one could agree to a devaluation of 
the Congolese franc. For the Banque du Congo Belge, a devaluation 
would lead to a drastic reduction in its operating funds in respect of 
its purchases abroad; for the colonial companies, it would mean a sud-
den increase in the price of the foodstuffs that needed to be import-
ed, thereby pushing up the cost of living for the indigenous workers. 
Against this, of course, was the fact that a lower value for the Congolese 
franc would help to boost exports, but this argument carried no real 
weight because international demand for raw materials was certain to 
rise in prevailing circumstances.
After a great deal of discussion, Gutt and Spaak won over De Vlee-
schauwer, who promised not to break the exchange-rate parity between 
the Congolese and Belgian currencies. The colony was thus set to fall in 
line with the motherland. It was at this moment that the second event 
occurred to prevent the agreement being concluded, namely the change 
of government in France that took place on 4-5 June. This necessitated 
a fresh round of talks, so that it was only by the evening of 7 June that 
the drafting of the Franco-Belgian and the Anglo-Belgian monetary 
agreements could be completed.
The Franco-Belgian agreement was signed in Paris by Gutt and 
by the new French Minister of Finance, Yves Bouthillier. The Anglo-
Belgian agreement was signed the next day, also in Paris, by Belgium’s 
ambassador to France, acting for the Belgian government, and by Sir 
Ronald Campbell, Great Britain’s ambassador to France, for the British 
government25.
emoTion and frusTraTion among The belgian refugees
The Belgian refugees, many of whom were in any case not well off, 
reacted angrily to the new monetary measures (‘the turmoil was 
considerable’)26. They not only had to suffer the distress of their ex-
ile and the hostile attitude of the French since the capitulation of the 
25 Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 289.
26 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11/s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi, 
20.12.1943, p. 17.
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Belgian armed forces, but were now faced for the second time with a 
drastic fall in the exchange rate. Complaints from people in financial 
difficulties poured in27 and everyone felt mounting disillusion with the 
authorities responsible. Ingenbleek, then in Mont-de-Marsan, spoke 
of a general consternation among Belgians, the devaluation being re-
garded as ‘a war tax of 44 (sic) per cent’, imposed on all refugees by the 
unilateral decision of government28.
The government and the Bank were shocked at the enormous emo-
tional reaction that the devaluation unleashed among the Belgians in 
France, and Gutt and Janssen set to work at once to undo its conse-
quences29. Their chance came after the defeat of France and the subse-
quent armistice arranged between France and Germany on 22 June. On 
25 June, Janssen and Gutt conferred about the strategy to be pursued 
in order to annul the devaluation of 7 June30. Both felt that there were 
convincing arguments for annulment. The French had posited that a 
devaluation of the Belgian franc was inevitable, because the German 
occupation of Belgium meant that the currency no longer had a sound 
economic and political basis. The same line of argument could now be 
used against France, as the French economy was in ruins. A second 
important line of argument was the French assumption that Belgium 
would for a long time remain economically and politically dependent 
on her if Belgian war efforts were to be continued from French territory 
had now likewise been overtaken by events.
The next day, 26 June, Janssen met Fournier at Bordeaux to elucidate 
the Belgian position, discussions being continued on 27 June by Smeers 
and Kauch31. The reasons why the parity agreed on 7 June had to be re-
voked were abundantly clear. It was a question not just of personal pres-
27 Numerous of these complaints can be found in: BNB, Archives, SD, ‘période de 
guerre’ (Mont-de-Marsan).
28 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, dossier 58: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, pp. 
17-18.
29 This can be clearly inferred from a letter of Gutt to Theunis, in which Gutt speaks 
of his satisfaction over the reversal of the devaluation of 7 June (ARA, Theunis Pa-
pers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 28.08.1940 from Gutt to Theunis).
30 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, p. 18, foot-
note 41.
31 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi, 
20.12.1943, p. 20.
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tige, but also of money: if the previous exchange rate of 144.4 French 
francs to 100 Belgian was reinstated, the Bank would have to pay out 
not 100, but only 69.25 Belgian francs for every 100 French francs that 
Belgian refugees presented for conversion on their return from France.
After major concessions from the Belgian side, the Banque de France 
was able to give its accord to the proposal to reinstate the previous par-
ity32. The agreement was signed by the respective Ministers of Finance, 
Bouthillier and Gutt, on 9 July as an appendix to the Franco-Belgian 
agreement of 7 June. By its terms, the Franco-Belgian exchange rate 
parity was restored to its level of 14 May, i.e. 144.4 French francs to 100 
Belgian. Refugees and officials returning to Belgium were permitted to 
exchange French money for Belgian, provided that the exchange took 
place in French banks in France33 and upon the simultaneous presenta-
tion of the declaration form, either completed at the time of crossing 
the border into France or regularized within eight days thereafter, as 
agreed at the time between the governments. That form was the neces-
sary proof that the French money had been purchased with Belgian 
banknotes or other foreign currency at the time of entry into France. 
Those unable to present such a declaration form were allowed to ex-
change up to a fixed maximum of 4,000 French francs per person (with 
a maximum of 10,000 French francs per household). A further stipula-
tion was that no more than two thirds of the quantity of French cur-
rency presented could be converted into Belgian banknotes; the bal-
ance had to be deposited in a frozen bank account in France. Lastly, 
it was also agreed that the Banque de France had the right to call an 
32 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11 / s. f. 8, échange de FF contre FB: 
letter of 03.07.1940 from Fournier to Janssen.
33 The re-exchange of French money in Belgium would be regarded as illegal and 
consequently that money would not qualify for repurchase by the Banque de France 
through the cession of gold (BNB, Archives, SD, Janssen Papers: letter of 30.07.1940 
from Janssen to Ingenbleek). The obligation to submit an application form came up 
against enormous difficulties. During the first weeks of en masse flight, and in the 
great confusion of the moment, very few refugees thought to request an application 
form: in the first place, because people were not aware of the obligation and, in the 
second, because only the branches of the Banque de France held forms and such 
branches were few and far between in the border zone: BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat 
Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/38, ‘or belge’: letter of 13.08.1940 from A. de Brouck-
ère (Pau) to the Banque de France (Châtelguyon).
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immediate halt to the conversion. It can be seen from all this just how 
substantial the concessions to the French were.
The actual instructions for implementing the agreement first ap-
peared on 21 July in the French Official Gazette, so that it was only then 
that a start was made in applying the new rate, with the emphasis on ‘a 
start’: practice was to show that, despite the instructions, it was applied 
only slowly and unevenly. France was now split into two zones: one 
occupied, the other unoccupied. Contacts between the two were sub-
ject to strict formalities and were consequently restricted. More over, 
the Germans were opposed to banknotes being brought over from the 
occupied to the unoccupied zone. On the instruction of the Banque de 
France, a large proportion of the Belgian banknotes exchanged by the 
refugees on entering France had been sent from all the various loca-
tions in France to its main branch in Bordeaux, a town later to be in-
corporated into the occupied zone. As those banknotes could then no 
longer be returned to branches in the unoccupied zone, there was now 
a severe shortage of Belgian banknotes for the exchange of French for 
Belgian money there34. 
The matter of re-exchanging French money was thrown into chaos 
by all these factors. Generally there were no Belgian banknotes availa-
ble, so that many refugees simply had to take their French money home 
with them. In Belgium, however, the conditions for re-exchange were 
downright poor, with an exchange rate of 200 French francs to 100 Bel-
gian initially being applied. It is true that the rate improved consider-
ably to 160 French francs to 100 Belgian with effect from 24 July, but it 
never became really favourable35.
34 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, annex 76 (letter of 
17.07.1940 from Rueff to Janssen).
35 Initially, only the Reichskreditkasse was authorized to exchange French money into 
Belgian, but this institution applied the Berlin Reichsmark rates for the French and 
Belgian currencies, i.e. 1 Reichsmark to 20 French francs and 1 Reichsmark to 10 
Belgian francs, which gave a cross-rate of 200 French francs to 100 Belgian francs 
(the actual rate was 200 French francs to 99.80 Belgian). With effect from 24 July, 
the re-exchange operation was taken over by the Banque d’Emission and by the 
banks licensed to deal in foreign currency for account of the Banque d’Emission, 
which, from then on, applied a rate of 160 French francs to 100 Belgian (BNB, Ar-
chives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, pp. 24-25).
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In this final stage of exchange-rate operations, which had gradu-
ally turned into a nightmare, the refugees felt that, yet again, they had 
been shamelessly duped. When, on their repatriation from France, they 
looked to exchange their remaining French money, they found that the 
Belgian franc had now become much more expensive. For the third 
time, they were losing money on an exchange transaction between the 
two currencies and, for the third time, they blamed the government 
and the Bank. When the President of the Belgian Red Cross arrived 
in France to help organize the repatriation and was asked what public 
opinion thought about the Belgian government in France, his answer 
was short and sharp: ‘Messieurs, on les vômit’ 36.
In part, from the point of view of the repatriated, the accusations 
levelled at the government and the Bank were probably justified, but the 
Bank, too, had suffered a considerable loss during the tragic adventure 
of the Belgian refugees in France. A provisional estimate drawn up on 
28 June 1940 by Bastiné indicated that, for the Franco-Belgian money 
exchange operations of May-June alone, the Bank had had to trans-
fer a total of about 2,308 million Belgian francs’ worth of gold to the 
Banque de France37. The situation was further compounded by the fact 
that there would be no settlement in gold by the Banque de France when 
the substantial amount of French banknotes from returning refugees 
was presented to it by the Bank.
Adjustment of the exchange rates for sterling and the Congolese 
franc to the new rate between the French and Belgian francs likewise 
led to difficulties. The Bank of England accepted the new rate of 1 pound 
sterling to 120 Belgian francs, but was not at all happy with this upward 
valuation of the Belgian currency, regarding it as ‘a thorn in the flesh’38. 
36 Dumoulin, Spaak, p. 198.
37 Bastiné estimated that, as at 28 June, 1,732.8 million French francs had been drawn 
down at a rate of 144.4 French francs to 100 Belgian. The Banque de France had set 
aside two provisions at the same rate, the first for an amount of 300 million French 
francs, and the second for 100 million French francs. On 18 June, two additional 
provisions were set aside, one for 200 million and the other for 800 million French 
francs, both at a rate of 100 French francs to 100 Belgian. This brought the total to 
2,932,800, 000 French francs in exchange for 2,307,750,000 Belgian (BNB, Archives, 
SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, annex 60).
38 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 17.08.1940 from Gutt 
to Theunis.
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The adjustment of the Congolese franc simply did not take place. De 
Vleeschauwer speedily refused to apply the agreement of 9 July to the 
Congolese franc and stuck to the equalization of the French and Con-
golese currencies and to the rate of 1 pound sterling to 176.625 Congo-
lese francs between the British and Congolese currencies, as fixed in the 
agreement of 7 June. Both rates were to be maintained for the duration 
of the war39.
De Vleeschauwer’s insistence on sticking to the devalued Congolese 
franc appeared at first sight to be totally at odds with the hard line he 
had taken a few weeks previously, when he had fiercely resisted a de-
valuation. However, since then the situation had changed. According 
to Ansiaux, the main reason for De Vleeschauwer’s refusal to accept an 
upward revaluation of the Congolese franc was the divergence of the 
exchange rate between the French and British currencies. After 7 June, 
the exchange rate that the two countries had fixed for their currencies 
could no longer be maintained on the free international market and, 
after the armistice, the French franc depreciated even further against 
sterling. The Belgian colonial companies feared being the dupe of this 
depreciation, which would undoubtedly have been to the advantage of 
their French competitors on the international markets, which is why 
they wanted the Congolese franc to continue to be held at parity with 
the French franc40.
Similar considerations played a part in respect of Great Britain. As 
things now stood, Belgian colonial companies viewed their export pros-
pects with gloom. Great Britain, the only one of the Allies still fighting 
the Germans, would certainly block the import of raw materials to the 
continent and would thereby seal off the traditional export markets for 
Belgian colonial goods. Exports to Great Britain were an option, and to 
39 Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 293.
40 At the beginning of August 1940, the cross-rate of the Belgian franc against sterling 
on the basis of the free rate of the French franc at Geneva resulted in a value of 1 
pound sterling to 250 Belgian francs. The colonial government and the colonial 
companies in the Belgian Congo felt that, under these circumstances, they could 
not justify a revaluation of the Congolese franc, as officially agreed for the Belgian 
franc on 9 July by the Belgian and French governments, namely back to 100 Belgian 
francs to 144.44 French or 1 pound sterling to 120 Belgian francs: BNB, Archives, SD, 
Ansiaux Papers, dossier A1: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to Janssen 
(Brussels).
 France and the Monetary Crisis 59
be able to compete against British colonial companies, which enjoyed a 
range of privileges in the mother country, there was only one weapon 
that the Belgian colony could wield: very low prices. A weak Congolese 
currency would thus underpin exports.
The bank under TuTelage
While Governor Janssen was in Paris with Gutt on 20 May, negoti-
ating a definitive Franco-Belgian monetary agreement, he also con-
ducted talks with his counterpart at the Banque de France, Fournier, 
on the practical organization of the Bank’s operation during its exile 
in France. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the initial contacts 
had taken place within a collegial atmosphere of mutual helpfulness, 
as was normal among central bankers. However, when it became clear 
that military reverses were being suffered and that Belgium, following 
the Netherlands, would be obliged to lay down her arms, the mood 
changed. On 25 May, without giving the slightest indication to the Bel-
gian government, the French government issued a decree whereby all 
deposits of money and other assets made in France by Belgian compa-
nies were frozen41. For the Bank, the decree came like a bolt from the 
blue. Without the slightest warning, it was placed under the tutelage of 
the French government and no longer had the power to dispose of its 
own assets; it was even denied access to its reserve of banknotes in the 
strongrooms of the Banque de France’s branches at Mont-de-Marsan, 
Tarbes and Toulouse.
It was a decision that came wholly unexpectedly, too, for the Belgian 
government, which relied on the Bank and on its services as State ex-
chequer and as State banker. Immediately after the signing of the Fran-
co-Belgian agreement of 7 June, Gutt consequently felt himself obliged 
to request the French government for a loan of 400 million French 
francs in favour of the Belgian Treasury42. However, not only did the 
Belgian government find itself in an impasse, there was also a complete 
cessation of the services provided by the Bank to semi-public institu-
tions, whose heads were now advised to approach the Treasury for fi-
41 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, pp. 12-13.
42 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, note sur les opérations de change, Chapter. 2, pp. 13-20.
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nancing. Shorn of its fundamental functions, the Bank was left with 
no more than its contact with the Banque de France and with finding 
a solution to the problems of converting Belgian money into French.
The French decree did, in fact, make provision for the freezing to 
be lifted, but for this to happen the special authorization of both the 
French and Belgian governments was required. Quite naturally, Gutt 
did all in his power to have it lifted as soon as possible for the Bank43, 
but it was not until 19 June that the matter was settled and the Bank 
regained the right to dispose of its assets. The reasons for this were the 
obvious ones of extremely poor communications, the chaotic military 
and political situation in the country and no doubt the irritation that 
was still felt by certain French authorities at the Belgian capitulation. 
At that time, there was no surplus of goodwill towards Belgium on the 
part of her southern neighbour.
43 BNB, Archives, SD: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, Chapter 
2, p. 26.
Chapter 4
A Rudderless Belgian Government
The evacuaTion of belgian gold from france
The French government’s headlong flight from Paris on 10 June trig-
gered an immediate and chaotic dash southward of all French central 
administrative services. The government installed itself provisionally 
at Bordeaux and in the vicinity, and was joined there a short time later 
by the Banque de France. By then, the Belgian government and its two 
to three thousand officials had already experienced a substantial per-
egrination. It had arrived at Poitiers on 23 May, hoping to be able to 
organize itself suitably there, but scarcely three weeks later had been re-
quested to move on to Sauveterre-en-Guyenne, a small village of barely 
750 souls in the region of the Gironde that lacked even the most ru-
dimentary infrastructure. The Treasury immediately commandeered 
the small village school, among whose benches it installed its payment 
office. As agreed in the monetary convention of 7 June, it ceased mak-
ing payments in Belgian francs and for the first time began to execute 
its transactions in French money1.
When the Belgian government had left Poitiers, Baudewyns had 
transferred the Bank’s services to Mont-de-Marsan2. As soon as the 
Banque de France moved on to Bordeaux, however, he followed. Jans-
sen himself, after departing from Paris, settled at Mont-de-Marsan and 
from 15 June on was making almost desperate attempts by telephone, 
telegraph and letter to contact Fournier at Saumur, in order to gain a 
1 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Plisnier Papers, dossier 2b: letter of 27.07.1940 
from Smeers (Vichy) to Plisnier.
2 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, p. 21. The 
Exchange Institute, which had been transferred on 10 June from Paris to Poitiers, 
left Poitiers on 19 June (BNB, Archives, SD, 36, Foreign Department, dossier 8.11.30/1: 
activité du service des changes et du service étranger, 10.05.1940 – 31.12.1941).
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degree of certainty about safeguarding the Belgian gold with the French 
central bank. Fournier could not be reached3.
At the beginning of June in Paris – before being evacuated –  Fournier 
had informed Janssen that the French government proposed to bring 
the Belgian gold to safety outside France4 and had asked him whether 
he could agree to this. Janssen gave his approval as a matter of course, 
but, as was later to appear, details of the transfer were not discussed at 
the time and there was seemingly even no mention of a country of des-
tination. Janssen must later have wondered about this summary treat-
ment of what was an extremely important matter and on 15 June sent 
Fournier a telegram on the subject’5. By then, the Banque de France, 
in consultation with the French Ministry of Defence, had already de-
cided to go ahead with evacuation and to move the Belgian gold abroad 
to safety, together with the Polish gold that had been deposited at the 
Angoulème branch, and with a proportion of the French gold reserves 
that were still at Brest.
The French Navy had been entrusted with the task of taking the gold 
abroad, but was prepared to accept the responsibility only if the gold 
was delivered to a naval port with a protected arsenal. Lorient had been 
selected and on 9 June, the Belgian and Polish gold (weighing about 275 
tonnes in total6) had been transported there by rail. The responsibility 
for the evacuation was formally accepted by the French Navy on 16 June 
and the gold was put on board the light cruiser Victor Schoelcher, load-
ing taking from the morning of 17 June to the evening of 18 June, when 
anchor was weighed7.
3 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives: note de M. Janssen sur son activité entre le 10 
mai et le 9 juillet 1940, n° 25.
4 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives: note de M. Janssen sur son activité entre le 10 
mai et le 9 juillet 1940, n° 21. 
5 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or, 1939-
1940, annexes 25 and 26 (telegram and letter of 15.06.1940 from Janssen to Fourni-
er).
6 On 18.06.1940, Captain Moevus confirmed in writing that he had taken 6,152 crates 
of gold on board: 4,944 Belgian and 1,208 Polish: BNB, Archives, SD, London Ar-
chives, dossier ‘or’, s. f.: chargements et transfert de l’or, Lorient-Dakar, note of 
18.06.1940.
7 The details of the various stages of the handling of the gold cargo can be found 
in the report of the vice-admiral of the squadron in the port of Lorient, in the 
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On leaving harbour, the captain of the Victor Schoelcher was in-
structed to set course for the open sea and await further instructions; 
according to him, he was at that time still unaware of the final des-
tination of his voyage8. When, the next day, he enquired about it, he 
received the order to head south to Casablanca and en route to join 
up with the convoy that had left Brest with 736 tonnes of French gold 
on board9. From Casablanca, the combined flotilla was to continue to 
Dakar in West Africa. It was here, on 28 June, that the cargo of gold was 
discharged10.
Why was the Victor Schoelcher ordered to sail to West Africa and 
not to the United States or Canada? Was it as a result of the discussions 
that took place in the French government on 14-15 June about a possible 
move to North Africa, in order to continue the struggle from there? 
Was there a connection with the victory of the Pétainistes on 16 June 
within the government and the announcement the next day by Mar-
shal Pétain that an armistice had been sought? Did the Pétainistes hope 
to be able to maintain an autonomous France, oriented more to the 
Afro-Asiatic empire than to the European continent: in other words, to 
achieve what they termed ‘paix en dignité’? Put in this context, it was 
certainly more interesting for the Minister of Finance, Bouthillier, and 
the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Darlan, two convinced Pétain-
report of Marot, manager of the Banque de France branch at Lorient, and in the 
report of the captain of the Victor Schoelcher (BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 
dossier ‘or’: chargements et transfert de l’or, Lorient-Dakar, reports of 14.06.1940, 
18.06.1940, 31.10.1940). See also: Lepotier, La bataille de l’or, pp. 181-199.
8 Th.G.J.M. van de Burgt, ‘Nazi-goud: een tussenstand’, in: Bank- en Effectenbedrijf, 
January-February 1998, pp. 10-12. According to Van de Burgt, Captain Moevus and 
the crew thought that, on putting to sea, their final destination would be the  island 
of Martinique in the Caribbean, then part of the French empire. According to 
Moe vus’ later testimony, he was unaware of the final destination until the morning 
of 19 June; it was only then that the captain was informed by the French Admiralty 
that he was to set course for Casablanca (Lepotier, La bataille de l’or, pp. 200-201.
9 France had already evacuated a large proportion of her own gold reserves to New 
York, London, Martinique and Casablanca. The French gold that had been trans-
ferred from Brest to Dakar was also said to include gold that had been deposited 
in safe custody at the Banque de France by the central banks of Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway and Czechoslovakia: Th.G.J.M. van de Burgt, ‘Nazi-goud: een tussen-
stand’, in: Bank- en Effectenbedrijf, January-February 1998, p. 11.
10 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, p. 165; and ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘cor-
respondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 29.12.1941 from De Schryver to Theunis.
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istes, to have the gold brought to safety in the African hinterland than 
sent to the United States. If that was the case, Fournier would no longer 
have been able on 18 June to send the gold to the United States, even if 
he had wanted to, because – with effect from 16 June – he had devolved 
full responsibility for the operation to the French Navy. Furthermore, 
he was not a member of the new core group making the decisions in 
France and, as was generally known, his relationship with Bouthillier 
was very strained. Indeed, he was relieved of his office by Bouthillier on 
31 August, although it is not known whether that had anything to do 
with the evacuation of the gold.
As soon as the Belgian government had moved from Poitiers to 
 Sauveterre-en-Guyenne, Janssen left for Bordeaux with Gutt, to re- 
establish contact with the French government and the Banque de 
France, from which they had heard virtually nothing since the flight 
from Paris on 10 June11. Tracking down the French government in a 
Bordeaux in chaos was no easy matter and time was pressing, because 
Gutt had not yet received the loan of 400 million French francs re-
quested on 9 June. It was only on 17 June, more than a week later, that 
he was able to reach the competent authorities and effectively obtain it; 
the loan was granted that same day: half to be made available as a line 
of credit and half to be settled in gold at the end of the month12. The 
amount was transferred immediately to the Bank’s account with the 
Fonds de Stabilisation. On that same day, too, Gutt and Janssen were 
able to agree with their French counterparts that the embargo on the 
Bank’s assets would be lifted, though this took effect only on 19 June13.
The most important question to be resolved was, naturally, the evac-
uation of the gold deposited in safe custody. Oddly enough, this ques-
tion was not addressed on 17 June, but on the following day. Had Gutt 
and Janssen been informed of the imminent arrival of Ansiaux by air 
from London, accompanied by a high-ranking British naval officer, and 
had they been informed of the instructions and powers that the two 
11 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 2, p. 27, footnote 37.
12 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Plisnier Papers, dossier 2 b, letter of 27.07.1940 
from Smeers to Plisnier.
13 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 2, p. 26.
 A Rudderless Belgian Government 65
were bringing with them? It is likely, but no tangible proof that this was 
the case has been found. The question nevertheless remains of what 
prompted Ansiaux’ sudden appearance. His eventful journey certainly 
requires some explanation14.
The dramaTic discussion of 18 June 1940 aT bordeaux
As soon as Ansiaux had arrived in London on 26 May, after his peril-
ous crossing in the coastguard vessel A4 from Ostend to Plymouth, he 
reported to the Belgian embassy. In company with the Belgian ambas-
sador Cartier de Marchienne and the Head of the Belgian Economic 
Mission to London, René Boël, Ansiaux conferred with the English 
government and the Bank of England15 and in joint discussions they 
concocted a plan to spirit the gold out of France. Ansiaux, provided 
with written authorization from the Belgian ambassador, was to fly to 
Bordeaux in a private aeroplane with the British naval officer, Onslow. 
Once there, he was to contact Janssen and Gutt to obtain their help 
in getting the gold out of France. Onslow had been authorized by the 
British Navy to requisition the British cruiser Arethusa, then moored 
at Le Verdon at the mouth of the Gironde, or any other British ship in 
the vicinity to transport the Belgian gold to Great Britain or the United 
States.
Ansiaux and Onslow arrived at Bordeaux on 18 June at 6 a.m. On-
slow at once reported to the British embassy, where the financial at-
14 Ansiaux’s journey from London to Bordeaux and his negotiations with the Banque 
de France and the French Ministry of Finance are given full coverage in his book 
(Ansiaux, Souvenirs) and in his interview (‘Entretiens avec Hubert Ansiaux; I. L’or 
et les valeurs de la Banque Nationale dans la tourmente de 1940’, in: Revue Géné-
rale, March 1985, pp. 13-14). More precise details are to be found in the memoran-
dum he drew up for the Bank’s legal proceedings against the Banque de France in 
New York (a memorandum intended for Theunis): BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, 
(A 320/6): Ansiaux, note relative à l’or de la Banque Nationale de Belgique, confié 
en dépôt à la Banque de France, 1939-1940, March 1942.
15 Initially, Boël considered allowing one or more Belgian mailboats to leave for Bor-
deaux under the command of Commander Grisar, but the idea was quickly aban-
doned (BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’, 1942, letter of 01.03.1942 
from Ansiaux to Theunis).
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taché, Norman Young, was seconded to him as assistant16. Ansiaux, for 
his part, reached the branch of the Banque de France around 8 a.m., 
there meeting d’Ambrière, who held responsibility for the Belgian gold. 
Ansiaux knew this man fairly well, as he had worked with him from 
November 1939 in respect of the evacuation of gold from Belgium to 
Bordeaux and Libourne. He briefed d’Ambrière about his mission, but 
to his astonishment was told that the gold was no longer being held 
in the strongrooms at Bordeaux and Libourne, but had been sent to 
a port other than Bordeaux, from where it was to be shipped overseas 
to safety. D’Ambrière would give no details of the port of loading, the 
name of the ship or the destination, and referred Ansiaux to the French 
Ministry of Finance.
After his meeting with Janssen and Gutt, Ansiaux went in search of 
Onslow, finding him shortly thereafter in company with Young. Con-
sultation followed and it was decided to go to the French Ministry of 
Finance and to submit both an explicit request for the custody of the 
Belgian gold to be lifted and authorization for it to be shipped, perhaps 
via Great Britain, to the United States by the British Navy. Minister 
Bouthillier was unable to receive them himself and had the matter dealt 
with by Deroy, one of his collaborators. Deroy claimed that he had no 
knowledge of any details of the evacuation, but that he had heard that 
no order to sail had yet been given; this would not occur before the 
Bank had given its formal agreement to its debt vis-à-vis the Banque 
de France being settled in gold. As indicated above, Fournier had, at 
the time of the Belgian capitulation of 28 May, obtained immediate 
settlement in gold of the 1,733 million French francs that, according 
to his figures, had up to that moment been paid out in exchange for 
the Belgian francs presented by Belgian refugees, and for 300 million 
French francs by way of a provision (the exact details of which had not 
yet been reported to the central services). During the subsequent mon-
etary negotiations, he had added an additional provision of 100 million 
French francs, likewise to be settled immediately in gold17. Now, Deroy 
announced that Bouthillier was prepared to consider the Belgian re-
16 For N. E. Young’s part in the negotiations, see his written testimony of 26.02.1942, 
also annexed to Ansiaux’s memorandum (see above).
17 In respect of the discussions concerning the monetary agreement of 09.06.1940, see 
above.
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quest to evacuate its gold only if, firstly, the Bank formally agreed to the 
‘immediate’ settlement in gold of half of the loan of 400 million French 
francs just taken up by the Belgian government (according to the con-
vention, settlement was required only at the end of each month) and, 
secondly, if the Bank gave instructions for an additional amount of 800 
million French francs to be paid immediately in gold as provision for 
any further exchange of Belgian francs for French and for any further 
loans drawn down by the Belgian government18.
Janssen viewed this gravely, but ultimately assented; too much was 
at stake and he felt himself to be totally boxed in. Early that afternoon, 
Baudewyns handed the Deputy-governor of the Banque de France, 
 Rueff, the official documents of cession for the release of the gold to 
that bank in accordance with the details already listed. This brought 
the total amount of gold ceded to the Banque de France by the Bank 
between 28 May and 18 June from its reserves in France to about 65,000 
kilograms, in large measure to cover provisions19. During a new meet-
ing, Deroy stated that Bouthillier was satisfied with the instructions 
and authorization given by Janssen20. This would have been welcomed 
as good news, had it not been for Deroy adding that he had been noti-
fied by the French Navy that the ship with the cargo of Belgian gold 
had just weighed anchor. He also said that the evacuation was now de-
finitively in the hands of the French Navy. Further questioning proved 
fruitless: neither the name of the ship nor her route or ultimate desti-
nation could be given; the entire operation fell within the scope of ‘le 
secret militaire’ 21.
Gutt would not admit defeat and went the same day to speak to 
Bouthillier personally. However, the French minister was nowhere to 
be found, upon which Gutt decided to go with Ansiaux to the restau-
rant where Bouthillier was accustomed to dine. They found him there 
18 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: chargements et transfert de l’or, 
Lorient-Dakar, letter of 18.06.1940 from Janssen to Fournier at Bordeaux.
19 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: chargements et transfert de l’or, 
Lorient-Dakar, letter of 18.06.1940 from Janssen to Fournier at Bordeaux.
20 In this respect, see the testimony of Young, 26.02.1942 (BNB, Archives, SD, London 
Archives, dossier ‘or’: annex).
21 See the testimony of Onslow, 26.02.1942 (BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dos-
sier ‘or’: annex).
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at table with a few of his staff. The discussion was short and tense, and 
Bouthillier did not even take the trouble to invite them to sit down. 
In a few words, Gutt once again outlined the matter and Bouthillier 
promised to contact Admiral Darlan the following day and request 
him to give Onslow a full briefing22. The next morning, Onslow went 
once more to the French naval headquarters to obtain the promised in-
formation, but was received extremely coldly and was given no details 
whatever. The same day, the naval attaché at the British embassy made 
a further attempt to obtain information, but he, too, came back empty-
handed from Admiral Darlan’s headquarters. Greatly disheartened, 
Onslow returned that day to England and the British cruiser left port 
the day after23. The whole matter had proved to be a serious disappoint-
ment to all who had devoted themselves to the task. Writing to Theunis 
a few weeks later, Gutt was very bitter about his negotiations with the 
French authorities during the period from mid-May to the end of July: 
‘I had to discuss with them endlessly, for weeks, their government ne-
gotiating in bad faith’24.
The shifts on the political and military chessboard now followed 
each other with increasing rapidity. On 17 June, Marshal Pétain had an-
nounced over the radio that he had begun negotiations with Germany 
for an armistice and a declaration of peace between their two coun-
tries. The question now concerned what path Great Britain would take. 
Would she continue the struggle or seek a compromise? This latter op-
tion was not totally excluded and the question was discussed at length 
during a meeting of the Belgian Cabinet on 18 June. It was known 
that there was a strong pacifist faction in the House of Lords in Great 
Britain, whose activity had led to a sharp exchange of words between 
Churchill and Halifax a few weeks earlier at the end of May25. Were the 
struggle to be continued, Great Britain would be standing alone, facing 
22 Gutt: interview in the newspaper Le Soir, 20.09.1970. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 
Ansiaux Papers, dossier 9.1/32: correspondance avec Gutt.
23 See the testimonies of Onslow and Young, 26.02.1941 (BNB, Archives, SD, London 
Archives, dossier ‘or’: letter of March 1942 from Ansiaux to Theunis, annexes).
24 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 18.08.1940 from 
Gutt to Theunis.
25 Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, pp. 309-312 and 362-363; De Schryver, Oor-
logsdagboeken, pp. 95-98.
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an enormous task that would also make extreme financial demands on 
her. Would this have repercussions for the safety of the gold that the 
Bank had deposited in safe custody with the Bank of England?
Janssen and Gutt felt a degree of unease about the situation – par-
ticularly because of the surprisingly bad treatment that Belgium had 
received at the hands of her French ally – and consequently deemed it 
opportune to dispatch Baudewyns and Ansiaux also on 18 June on a 
special mission to London. The task of these two emissaries was to se-
cure the Bank’s assets abroad and, in particular, the gold that had been 
deposited with the Bank of England, the Banque de France, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and the South African Reserve Bank. In-
deed, it was still in the minds of Gutt and Janssen to have the entire 
Belgian gold reserves taken to New York26. With a view to this, the em-
issaries were authorized to take all necessary protective and adminis-
trative measures, but only when the management of the Bank found 
itself unable to issue instructions27.
On 18 June, too, Janssen wrote to Fournier, reminding him of the 
arrangement that they had made together regarding the safety of the 
gold: ‘If the circumstances permit it, the Banque de France may fol-
low the instructions of the British Admiralty to transfer to the United 
States the gold which the Bank put into safe custody in the Banque de 
France. I also gave a mandate to the Bank of England for participat-
ing in these operations in view of concentrating in the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York all the Belgian gold, put into safe custody in France 
and in England as well’28. At that moment, thus, it was clearly Janssen’s 
intention to transfer the Belgian gold held by the Banque de France and 
26 At Laken on 26.06.1940, unaware of the decisions taken at Bordeaux, King Leopold 
requested colonel Kiewitz, Hitler’s adjutant to the King, to send a telegram to 
the Führer, requesting that, among other things: ‘it be immediately demanded of 
France that the Belgian State treasure (several billions in gold), in probably not an 
unknown hiding-place in France south of Bordeaux, be restored forthwith to Belgian 
hands’: d’Ydewalle, De Memoires, pp. 397-398.
27 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’, annex 30: appointment of 
Baudewyns, Ansiaux and Theunis, 18.06.1940. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, London 
Archives: note de M. Janssen sur son activité entre le 10 mai et le 9 juillet 1940, n° 
30.
28 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: annex 28: letter of 18.06.1940 from 
Janssen to Fournier.
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by the Bank of England to the United States29. In the event, the gold at 
the Bank of England did not go to New York, as Janssen had wished, 
but to Ottawa (Canada)30. Baudewyns later wrote to Janssen that Mon-
tague Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, was not keen for 
the gold to go to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, preferring a 
partner from the Commonwealth, which is why he ignored Janssen’s 
instructions and had the gold transported to Canada31.
Fournier, was later always to deny that Janssen had ‘formally’ re-
quested him on 7 June to lift the embargo on the Belgian gold and have 
the gold sent to New York. Once – on 18 June – Fournier became aware 
of the Bank’s ‘express’ wish for the gold to be evacuated to the  United 
States, and once – a few days later – information reached him that the 
French Navy was transporting the gold to a destination within the 
French empire, he attempted, in consultation with Janssen, to break 
the deadlock. According to the testimony he gave in 1941, he informed 
Janssen immediately of where the Belgian gold was now headed and to-
gether they sought a way of still meeting Janssen’s wish32. Fournier first 
proposed that a portion of the earmarked gold held under the Banque 
de France dossier at the Bank of Montreal be transferred to the Federal 
Reserve Bank dossier at Montreal, in the name of the Bank, and that it 
then be transported to New York at the first opportunity. After consult-
29 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: annex 37: telegram of 07.07.1940 
from Janssen (Vichy) to Baudewyns (London): ‘Usez de votre mandat pour assurer 
transfert fedreserve dépôts confiés Norman conformément ma lettre du 18 juin et 
éventuellement Fournier’. See also a letter of 09.07.1940 from Janssen to Baudewyns 
(BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, note relative au dépôt de l’or, n° 16). See 
also: BNB, Archives, DC (Mont-de-Marsan), 19.06.1940.
30 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) 
to Janssen (Brussels).
31 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, ‘correspondance, 1940-1941’: letter of 
26.04.1941 from Baudewyns (London) to Janssen (Brussels).
32 Fournier was formal in his statement: as soon as he was informed a few days after 
18 June of the final destination of the gold transfer, he notified Janssen and together 
they looked for a solution. Fournier strenuously denied Ansiaux’s allegation during 
the legal proceedings in New York that, during the days following the meeting of 
18 June, Janssen did not know where the gold was being taken to ( BdFr, Archives, 
Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/38, ‘or belge’: observations de M. Fournier 
sur les allégations formulées à l’encontre de la Banque de France à l’occasion de 
l’instance engagée à New York, 27.11.1941, and BdFr., Archives, Direction de la docu-
mentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83: rapport Janssen, n° 28).
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ing Gutt, Janssen agreed. The Federal Reserve Bank would naturally 
have to be asked whether it would accept such an arrangement and on 
26 June, via the American embassy, Janssen dispatched a telegram with 
such a request to New York33.
The American reply arrived on 5 July, but unfortunately was nega-
tive: ‘it is contrary to our policy to hold any of our own gold abroad and 
we would not wish to earmark gold belonging to other parties’34. The 
roundabout route via the Federal Reserve Bank dossier was necessary, 
because the Bank lacked its own dossier at Montreal. The creation of a 
dossier demanded a great deal of time and Janssen’s imminent depar-
ture from France for Belgium meant that the procedure could no longer 
be introduced. Other solutions proved to be equally unviable, including 
a transfer of gold under French dossier at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to the Bank dossier there, because the French gold there was 
embargoed35.
A final attempt to solve the problem also failed. Fournier had or-
dered one of his directors, Moreton, to join the convoy with the French, 
Belgian and Polish gold in the port of Casablanca, hoping to be able 
to maintain some sort of control to ensure the safe outcome of the ex-
pedition. He now contacted Moreton and instructed him explicitly to 
separate the Belgian gold from the rest of the cargo and at the first op-
portunity to conduct it to New York. With this aim, Moreton flew from 
Casablanca to Dakar on 6 July, but very soon telegraphed to announce 
that the Belgian gold could no longer be separated, as all the gold had 
become mixed. There matters remained for the time being36.
33 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/6: Ansiaux, note relatieve à l’or de la 
BNB confié en dépôt à la Banque de France, 1939-1940, March 1942.
34 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: annex 36, telegram of 05.07.1940 
from Cariguel (Banque de France, Clermont-Ferrand) to Janssen (Tarbes). See also: 
Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, pp. 166-167.
35 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to 
Janssen. The Germans asked the American government also to freeze the Belgian 
gold reserve deposited in New York. According to Plisnier, there was no response 
to the request: Plisnier, ‘L’or belge livré aux Allemands en 1940’, in: Revue Générale 
Belge, 52, February 1950, pp. 1-3. 
36 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/42: letter of 18.07.1940 
from Favre-Gilly (Paris) to Bélin (Paris). See also: Plisnier, ‘L’or belge livré aux Al-
lemands en 1940’, in: Revue Générale Belge, 52, February 1950, p. 16. That it was 
actually Fournier’s intention to have the Belgian gold transferred from Dakar to 
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a belgian governmenT in iTs deaTh Throes
The day the problem of the evacuation of the gold came to a head, i.e. 
on 18 June, France had just been defeated and negotiations for an armi-
stice had already been announced. The French government faced the 
greatest crisis in its history and was divided, but the situation in the 
Belgian government was also far from one of ‘in unity, strength’. Dis-
cussion was being conducted in a depressed atmosphere of frustration, 
indecision and discord; ministers were having quickly to take a series 
of extremely important decisions regarding the future, but were appar-
ently not able to do so. The situation was little better within the Bank 
and there were differences of opinion between the Governor and his 
Deputy-governor. The French embargo of 25 May had paralysed all ac-
tivity at the Bank for weeks, resulting in the staff becoming listless and 
discontented, and looking to return home; the little news that reached 
them from Belgium appeared to be less pessimistic than feared and 
many were saying that they had heard that the situation there would 
fairly rapidly return to normal. 
The armistice announced by Marshal Pétain on 17 June hit the 
French public like a bombshell. and its effect on the Belgian govern-
ment was equally dramatic. Discussion about leaving for Great Britain 
appeared to have been swept aside for good. At the Cabinet meeting 
on that day, the only person, even if a very convinced one, to advocate 
continuing the struggle from London was Jaspar, Minister of Public 
Health. The question was raised again the next day. The Prime Min-
ister, Pierlot, took the line that, in the circumstances, Belgium did not 
have the resources to continue the war. It did not make sense, therefore, 
to move to London. With the exception of three ministers – Jaspar, De 
Vleeschauwer and Gutt, the entire Cabinet agreed with Pierlot’s point 
of view. After the vote, not wishing to break ranks at such a crucial 
moment, De Vleeschauwer and Gutt declared themselves ready to ac-
the United States can be inferred from his instruction to Moreton to withdraw 
1,100 million French francs’ worth of gold in advance from the consignment, as 
settlement for the commission approved by Janssen, but not yet paid: BdFr, Ar-
chives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: note pour 
le Secrétariat à Paris (Clermont-Ferrand, 25.09.1940).
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cept the majority decision37. That same day, a telegram to the King and 
the Belgian ambassador in London was prepared, in order to announce 
that the Belgian government was breaking off hostilities, as the French 
had done. The telegram to the King also notified him that the ministers 
were placing their portfolios at his disposal, so as to give him the neces-
sary scope to negotiate a peace deal between Belgium and Germany38. 
The ambassador in London was required to notify the British govern-
ment of the telegram’s contents.
 At this juncture, abandoning their readiness to follow the majority 
decision, De Vleeschauwer and Gutt adopted the view taken by Jaspar 
that the struggle should be continued. One of the reasons that prompt-
ed them to do this may have been connected to the contacts that they 
had in Bordeaux during those days with representatives of the most im-
portant companies in the Belgian Congo. It was being rumoured that, 
were Belgium to drop out of the fight, Great Britain might well take 
control of the Belgian Congo. Was this being discussed with those con-
tacts? The colonial leaders were far from happy about such a prospect: 
they wanted no foreign rule, but for most of them, there was absolutely 
no question of Belgium continuing to fight Germany from the Con-
go, though this was nonetheless the standpoint that Pierre Ryckmans, 
Governor-general of the Congo, defended in a radio broadcast.
The representatives of the colonial companies suggested that the 
Minister for the Colonies, perhaps together with a few other minis-
ters, should go to Great Britain with a view to safeguarding Belgian 
sovereignty over the Congo. Pierlot responded by proposing that De 
Vleeschauwer be appointed Administrator-general of the colony and 
in that capacity go to London to defend the Congo’s status as a Belgian 
colony. The fact that De Vleeschauwer could not simply go to London in 
his capacity of Minister for the Colonies and apparently needed a new 
status for the mission had everything to do with the fear that, in the un-
37 After the defeat of France, the British government requested the Belgian govern-
ment to place the Belgian Navy and its ship’s crews at Great Britain’s disposal; no 
immediate response was given to the request, and it was later explicitly refused. 
Belgian pilots who fled with their planes to Great Britain were even condemned 
in their absence for desertion and theft by Belgian courts-martial in France: De 
Schryver, Oorlogsdagboeken, p. 115.
38 Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, pp. 361-365.
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certainty of the times, the solidarity of the government would somehow 
or other be broken. The government approved Pierlot’s proposal unani-
mously and De Vleeschauwer was able to leave for the British capital 
the following day, travelling via Lisbon39. During the subsequent days, 
the Belgian government returned repeatedly to the question of whether 
it should escape to Great Britain40, before at last definitely rejecting the 
idea.
The bank’s reTurn To brussels
As soon as the armistice between France and Germany was signed on 
22 June and the Belgian government had decided not to decamp to 
Great Britain, but to remain in France in the hope of returning to Bel-
gium, Gutt again sought contact with the Bank. He wished to discuss 
a number of urgent problems regarding the Treasury and was particu-
larly concerned about the problem of the conversion of French money 
to Belgian, a problem that had become very acute, now that the Bel-
gian refugees were seeking to return home. However, due to the general 
chaos at Bordeaux and probably also to Janssen’s uncertain health at 
that time, the meeting between Gutt and the Governor did not take 
place until 26 June. In respect of the money conversion, Janssen was 
required to begin negotiations as quickly as possible with the Banque 
de France and, moreover, to use the occasion to reverse the humiliating 
devaluation of the Belgian franc on 7 June. Janssen met Fournier that 
same day. An agreement in principle to the restoration of the previous 
rate of exchange was not ruled out and, concerning the gold, Fournier 
had even worked out the very attractive proposal involving Canada, as 
mentioned above41.
After the conclusion of the Franco-German armistice, the govern-
ment wished in any case to return as quickly as possible to Belgium 
and, in the absence of any reaction from the Court to its telegrams of 19 
39 J. Stengers, Léopold III et le gouvernement: les deux politiques belges de 1940, Brus-
sels, 1980, pp. 84-95.
40 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, pp. 34-35.
41 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 67: note de M. Janssen sur son activité du 
10 mai au 9 juillet 1940, Nos. 35, 36 and 37.
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and 24 June, delegated the diplomat Viscount Berryer to go to Brussels 
to investigate to what degree a return was possible and whether contact 
with the King could be restored42. When Janssen was informed of this, 
he thought it appropriate that a representative of the Bank also be sent 
and charged his private secretary, Kauch, with the task.
Meanwhile, Janssen sent a telegram to Thomas H. McKittrick, Chair-
man of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) at Basel, requesting 
him to sound out the Reichsbank about the Bank’s possible return to 
Brussels43. At the same time, Ingenbleek contacted the German Kom-
mandatur at Mont-de-Marsan and at Bordeaux to arrange the organi-
zation of a possible repatriation of the Bank’s operations and its assets 
to Belgium, but the German authorities in both places felt themselves 
unable to co-operate in such a matter44.
On 2 July, Janssen received a message from the Belgian embassy at 
Bordeaux saying that Bemelmans had come as the representative of the 
Société Générale de Belgique to sound out the situation and had brought 
a letter for him, enclosing the text of the ordinance for the establish-
ment of a temporary note issue institution, the Banque d’Emission à 
Bruxelles. The minutes of a meeting of the board of directors that same 
day recorded that, in a conversation with Gutt at Bordeaux, Bemelmans 
had made it clear that Galopin, Governor of the Société Générale, and 
de Munck, Chairman of the Banque de la Société Générale, would wel-
come Janssen’s return to Brussels, particularly in view of the immi-
nent establishment of the Banque d’Emission. On his conversation with 
Gutt, Bemelmans was later to note: ‘The Minister was of the opinion 
that Janssen had to return to Brussels the moment his health would al-
low’45. At a meeting of the board of directors on 4 July, Janssen reported 
on the meeting with Gutt and Bemelmans, which had probably taken 
place the day previously. The major points discussed were the return of 
the Governor and the transfer of the Bank’s registered office, central 
42 Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, pp. 419-320.
43 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 5, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A267): letter of 03.06.1945 from 
Ingenbleek to the chairman of the Commission of Enquiry (Banque d’Emission). 
See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers, La Banque Nationale pendant la 
guerre, pp. 11-12.
44 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, p. 38.
45 BNB, Archives, DC (Mont-de-Marsan), 02.07.1940. 
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services and assets to Brussels, to all of which Gutt gave his approval, 
on condition that the government also agreed46. 
It is manifestly clear that Janssen was impatient to return to Bel-
gium; indeed, he had every reason to be impatient. The events of the 
preceding weeks had served to reduce the Bank’s activities in France 
and the role played there by its governor to virtually nothing47; more-
over, he had enjoyed little cooperation from the French, rather the op-
posite. Whenever he turned to his government, he was confronted with 
a group of rudderless, often quarrelsome ministers, who gave more at-
tention to their personal household problems than to the interests of 
their country48. Against such a background, the prospect of a return to 
Brussels and the resumption of responsibility for such a respected insti-
tution as the Bank must have seemed irresistibly attractive: ‘I consider 
it my duty to return to Belgium, where I can be much more useful than 
here’49. Janssen realized that a heavy task awaited him under the Ger-
man occupation. It may also be that the heroic chord had been touched 
in him, as he ended his report to Ingenbleek on his latest meeting with 
Gutt half ironically: ‘I am going to be executed!’50.
It was agreed that, on Saturday 6 July, before his departure for Brus-
sels, Janssen would meet Gutt at Vichy, where the Belgian govern-
ment had meanwhile established itself. During this last consultation, 
the details of the journey were arranged and ideas exchanged about 
the negotiations still taking place on the monetary agreement with the 
Banque de France. Janssen requested Gutt to put the final touches to 
46 Janssen omitted to have the approval for his return confirmed in writing by Gutt 
and the entire government. In a letter of 17 July, he asked Ingenbleek to arrrange 
for this ‘pour la bonne forme’, but there was no response: BNB, Archives, SD, Janssen 
Papers, ‘correspondance 1939-1941’: letter of 17.07.1940 from Janssen to Ingenbleek 
(Mont-de-Marsan).
47 BNB, Archives, SD, dossier ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry: let-
ter of 03.06.1946 from Ingenbleek to the chairman of the Commission of Enquiry.
48 Gutt’s letters to Theunis from this period constantly refer to the wretched situation 
within the government (ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: let-
ters of June and July 1940).
49 BNB, Archives, SD, 40, liquidation of the Banque d’Emission, dossier 8.11.40/ 2 a: 
letter of 04.07.1940 from Janssen (Bordeaux) to Galopin (Brussels).
50 According to Ingenbleek, it was with these words that Janssen closed the account 
of his conversation with Gutt: KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon 
journal de guerre, p. 24.
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it and particularly to review the matter with his opposite number, the 
French Minister of Finance51. It was agreed that all Belgian government 
expenditure in the territories of the French and the British empires 
would be covered by loans granted by the French and British Treasuries 
respectively, half of which were to be settled in gold at the end of each 
month, as laid down in the monetary agreements of early June between 
France, Great Britain and Belgium. Servicing foreign debt in the United 
States and in Switzerland, as well as remunerating Belgian diplomats 
outside the French and British empires, would be by way of ceding gold 
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York52. For his part, Janssen would, 
from Belgium, continue his efforts to have the Belgian gold deposits in 
France and Great Britain transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.
The responsibilities of Deputy-governor Ingenbleek had also to 
be discussed. Provisionally, he would head the services at Mont-
de- Marsan. He would be responsible for the conversion in France of 
French money into Belgian for the Belgians who were returning to their 
country and would organize the repatriation of the Bank’s staff and its 
assets. Lastly, it was his approval that would be required for transac-
tions carried out on behalf of the Treasury at Vichy53, meaning that all 
important Treasury transactions to be conducted by the Bank as State 
exchequer in ‘unoccupied’ territories were dependent on Ingenbleek’s 
approval, even though he remained in ‘occupied’ France. This was a 
faulty arrangement that was to lead to great difficulties during the en-
suing months.
While the discussions between Janssen and Gutt at Vichy were 
being pursued, Kauch returned from Brussels. He arrived at Mont-
de- Marsan on 6 July, accompanied by two German officers, and left 
that same evening for Vichy in order to report to Janssen and Gutt on 
his talks with Goffin, Galopin and Louis Frédéricq, Secretary to the 
King, about the general situation in Belgium. On 8 July, in the name 
of the head of the military supreme command, General Alexander von 
51 See above.
52 BNB, Archives, SD, Janssen Papers, ‘correspondance 1939-1941’: letter of 17.07.1940 
from Janssen to Plisnier. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, note 
sur les opérations de change, p. 14, footnote 33.
53 BNB, Archives, DC (Mont-de-Marsan), 04.07.1940.
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Falkenhausen, the German officers asked Janssen if he wished to go 
back with them to Belgium, whether as governor of the Bank or as a 
private individual being entirely up to him. Janssen’s preference was 
to return as governor and he left for Belgium on 9 July under German 
escort, arriving at Brussels the following day54. The organization of the 
repatriation of the Bank’s staff and its assets was no trifling matter, but 
the entire operation was conducted without a hitch and represented an 
impressive effort on the part of all those involved55.
54 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 67: note de M. le Gouverneur sur son activité 
entre le 10 mai et le 9 juillet 1940, Nos. 49, 50 and 51. See also: KP, Archives, fonds 
Leopold III: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, pp. 40-42.
55 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/36: letter of 22.08.1940 
from Janssen (Brussels) to Fournier (Paris). 
Chapter 5
In the Aftermath of Belgium’s War 
Drama in France 
ingenbleek’s ‘finesT hour’
As stated in the previous chapter, Janssen transferred broad areas of 
competence to his deputy Ingenbleek, before he left for Brussels. The 
first concerned the conversion in France of French money into Belgian 
by Belgian refugees returning to their own country. Additionally, he 
was to act as State treasurer and State banker to the Belgian government 
at Vichy. Lastly, he was given responsibility for repatriating the Bank’s 
assets.
The conversion of French money into Belgian was beset by many 
difficulties to which both the refugees and the Bank fell victim. Con-
fronted by the virtually insuperable difficulties in exchanging their 
money and at last wearied by their sojourn in France, many refugees 
took their remaining French money to Belgium, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, in the hope of being able to convert it there. That hope 
was initially fulfilled by the Reichskreditkasse, even though conversion 
was at a very unfavourable rate. The task of conversion was soon taken 
over by the Banque d’Emission of Brussels and the accredited Belgian 
exchange banks, which at the same time improved somewhat the rate 
of exchange. However, the Banque de France deemed the transactions 
not to be in conformity with the monetary convention of 9 July signed 
by Gutt and Bouthillier, and therefore labelled them as illegal; on these 
grounds, it then refused to settle in gold with the Bank for the repur-
chase of the French banknotes involved1.
1 BNB, Archives, SD, Janssen Papers, dossier 2, ‘correspondance 1939-1941’: letters of 
30.07.1940 and 11.08.1940 from Janssen to Ingenbleek (Mont-de-Marsan).
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Janssen and Ingenbleek were severely dismayed and put out by the 
small-mindedness of the Banque de France, but had their backs to the 
wall – not for the first time in this perilous course of events – and won-
dered if the setbacks would never end. Ingenbleek requested Gutt to 
contact Bouthillier and find out whether he could induce the Banque 
de France to adopt a more flexible stance2, but there was no reaction to 
this. The exchange operation in France left the Bank with the frustrat-
ing feeling of having been duped by its friends, a feeling compounded 
by the heavy losses that the institution had sustained, which left deep 
scars, both financial and psychological.
The competence exercised by Ingenbleek as State treasurer and State 
banker to the Belgian government at Vichy was equally fraught with 
problems and was called into question by Kauch, among others, though 
rather in respect of a mistaken organizational measure than of criti-
cism of him as a person. To allow Ingenbleek and the central services 
of the Bank to remain in the occupied zone at Mont-de-Marsan while 
the government moved to Vichy in the unoccupied zone was asking for 
trouble. Kauch claimed that, since 29 June, when Mont-de-Marsan had 
come under occupation, Ingenbleek was no longer in a position to carry 
out the function he had been charged with. It was clearly laid down in 
law that, in times of war, the Bank should follow the government into 
unoccupied territory.
Ingenbleek, Janssen, Gutt and the entire Belgian government viewed 
the matter differently. The Belgian government had approved the re-
turn of the Bank’s registered office to Brussels, implying that the Bank 
was relieved of the obligation to establish its registered office at the 
place where the government found itself; indeed, that approval was 
in line with the government’s own intention to make a speedy return 
to Belgium3. The representation at Mont-de-Marsan, accredited to the 
lawful French and Belgian governments at Vichy, was therefore compe-
tent to continue to perform all acts of administration and even to take 
safeguarding and administrative measures regarding the Belgian gold 
2 BNB, Archives, SD, Janssen Papers, ‘correspondance 1939-1941’: letter of 01.08.1940 
from Janssen to Ingenbleek (Mont-de-Marsan).
3 BNB, Archives, SD, Janssen Papers, ‘correspondance 1939-1941’: letter of 17.07.1940 
from Janssen to Plisnier. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, note 
sur les opérations de change, p. 14, footnote 33.
 In the Aftermath of Belgium’s War Drama in France  81
deposited with the Banque de France in West Africa. The Banque de 
France in the unoccupied area of Clermont-Ferrand and the Reichsbank 
in Berlin shared this view and would continue to regard the Bank in 
Brussels as their partner in discussion at all times.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in what was at the time still 
a neutral United States, was more equivocal in its attitude towards the 
Bank. Initially, it refused to accept Baudewyns’s signature in London 
for foreign payment orders as, in its opinion, his mandate of 18 June did 
not extend to that domain. Basing itself on Janssen’s decision on his re-
turn to Belgium at the beginning of July, it was nevertheless prepared to 
accept the signature of Ingenbleek, who remained at Mont-de-Marsan. 
However, when in mid-August the Deputy-governor also returned to 
Belgium, it began demanding the signature of Janssen himself. Shortly 
thereafter, it changed tack again, now no longer accepting the Gover-
nor’s signature, its argument being that the board of directors of the 
Bank was no longer represented at the seat of government4.
The manner in which Ingenbleek in practice fulfilled his functions 
as State treasurer and State banker to the Belgian government likewise 
gave rise to serious problems. He did, indeed, adopt a very formal ap-
proach to procedure. In his view, the return of the Bank to Brussels 
implied the reinstatement in Brussels of the board of directors in its 
original competences; however, the occupation meant that recognition 
had to be given both to the Bank’s subjection to German tutelage and 
to the authority of Oscar Plisnier as Secretary-general of the Ministry 
of Finance. Consequently, Ingenbleek felt duty-bound to subject every 
major act of administration to the prior approval of not only the board 
of directors in Brussels – thus of Janssen and Goffin – but also to that 
of the German commissioner appointed for the Bank, as well as to that 
of the Secretary-general5.
4 On 21 August, via Fournier of the Banque de France, the Federal Reserve Bank 
asked Janssen whether he wished to confirm his payment order of 8 July in favour 
of the Chase National Bank in New York, so that payment could be made: BdFr, Ar-
chives, Direction de la Documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/71: letter of 21.08.1940 
from Fournier (Vichy) to Janssen (Brussels).
5 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers, dossier ‘direction Mont-de-Marsan’: letter of 
17.07.1940 from Ingenbleek (Mont-de-Marsan) to Janssen, 17.07.1940; KP, Archives, 
fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, pp. 45-46.
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Janssen agreed, certainly as regards his own role. Gutt was explicit 
about this, stating that Janssen thought he could organize everything 
from Brussels6. For their part, the German commissioner and the 
 Secretary-general took a fairly relaxed view of the matter, but their 
involvement in any case implied a bureaucratic procedure. With the 
added complication of the difficulty of communication at that time be-
tween Brussels, Mont-de-Marsan, Vichy and London, the exercise of 
the function of State treasurer and State banker to the Belgian govern-
ment at Vichy was reduced to a painful exercise of inertia and frustra-
tion for all concerned.
Theunis’s despair
Besides the responsibility he held regarding the financing of Belgian 
government expenditure in France, Ingenbleek also felt responsible for 
his government’s expenditure in foreign countries outside France. In 
this respect, too, the impossible stance he adopted led to serious fric-
tion that threatened the smooth operation of the Bank. On 16 July, he 
had telegraphed to Baudewyns and Theunis to inform them that the 
Bank could execute foreign payments in London and New York for the 
State only on instructions from himself, from Janssen, from Plisnier 
and from the German commissioner at the Bank.
In London, Baudewyns had been attempting since the beginning of 
July to implement the Anglo-Belgian monetary convention of 7 June 
and the financial agreement of 8 June between the Bank of England 
and the Bank, but without success7. Indeed, implementing the conven-
tion was never even started, indicating that it had been a miscalculation 
to count on a loan from the British government within its framework. 
Meanwhile, the situation regarding unsettled foreign debt had reached 
a critical stage. In the United States, the reserve of dollars previously set 
aside for the procurement of five aircraft had been released by Theunis 
to pay off part of the interest due on foreign debt, but that was a one-off 
6 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 18.08.1940 from 
Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York).
7 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, ‘correspondance 1940’, s. f. 7: letters of 
10.07.1940 and 12.07.1940 from Baudewyns (London) to Janssen.
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operation that could do nothing in the future to solve the problem of 
outstanding debt and current costs8. Complaints, indeed, were coming 
in thick and fast from the diplomatic and consular corps at the failure 
to pay salaries and representation costs9. 
For Theunis, the responsibility for the financial disarray confronting 
the Belgian government since its move to France lay with the Bank10. 
The return of Janssen to Brussels, moreover, was viewed by Theunis as 
a great mistake, as he had thereby left the government in the lurch at a 
dramatic moment. Theunis further accused him of not having prepared 
his departure with sufficient care and of not having made appropriate 
arrangements for payments. He wondered what had possessed Janssen 
to return to Brussels. His view was that the decisive factor in Janssen’s 
fatal choice had been the government’s decision at the end of June to 
give up the struggle and to return as quickly as possible to Belgium 
after the repatriation of the refugees. Gutt concurred with this opinion, 
but could not ignore the fact that he, too, bore a certain responsibility 
in the matter. After all, it was he who, as Minister of Finance, had au-
thorized Janssen to return and re-establish the Bank’s registered office 
in Brussels and had convinced the government to approve the decision 
to return. Gutt was later to qualify his stance by emphasizing the role 
played by Galopin in this matter, but to state that Galopin’s ‘express’ re-
quest was of decisive significance11, is to put a gloss on the facts that was 
not universally shared and that was emphatically rejected by Galopin 
himself12.
The British government had been following the evolving Belgian 
stance with increasing distrust. It was extremely sceptical about the 
Bank’s return to Brussels and was downright hostile to the Belgian 
government’s decision to sue for peace. For the British, Janssen’s idea of 
8 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 18.08.1940 from 
Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York); BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, ‘cor-
respondance 1940’, s. f. 7: letter of 10.07.1940 from Baudewyns to Janssen.
9 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, ‘correspondance 1940’, s .f. 7: letter of 
03.08.1940 from Baudewyns (London) to Theunis (New York) and Gutt (?).
10 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 20.08.1940 from 
Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London).
11 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 29.08.1940 from 
Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York).
12 See above.
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continuing the foreign activity of the Bank from Brussels and Mont-de-
Marsan was simply unacceptable: ‘It is evident’, wrote Ansiaux to Jans-
sen on 3 August 1940, ‘that your interventions can have effect only out-
side the dollar- and the sterling area ; in both areas orders from Brussels, 
and even from unoccupied France, will not be executed. I have received 
already a warning about it from the Bank of England, which is increas-
ingly suspicious about our contacts with Mont-de-Marsan and Vichy. 
Soon we will have to choose between not following your instructions or 
being interned’13. It was only after the formation of a Belgian Govern-
ment in London that there was a glimmer of a solution to this problem.
Ingenbleek’s third task at Mont-de-Marsan was to organise the re-
patriation of the Bank’s assets from France to Belgium. Initially, every-
thing went fairly smoothly, the majority of them being returned to Bel-
gium during the month of July. In early August, however, it was found 
that repatriation of the last part of the assets at Tarbes and Toulouse 
was prohibited. What lay behind this odd measure? According to insid-
ers, the German authorities had got wind at the end of July of the inten-
tion of Gutt, Pierlot and Spaak to set out for the Franco-Spanish border 
and to cross to England via Portugal. With that knowledge, it was but 
a short step to assuming that the purpose was to form a government in 
London and perhaps continue the struggle. Was this the real reason or 
was it rather the German authorities’ request to the French government 
not to recognize, with effect from the end of July, any foreign govern-
ment in exile at Vichy? The presumption is that both factors played a 
part. In any case, the Paris radio was announcing at the beginning of 
August that the three Belgian ministers had left for the Franco-Spanish 
border and the prohibition was therefore interpreted by many as being 
an immediate sanction aimed against their action14.
Following the advice of Deputy-governor Ingenbleek and Secretary 
Van Nieuwenhuyse, Janssen submitted a request on 22 August to the 
Banque de France and to the German commissioner at the Bank in 
Brussels for repatriation of the assets and holdings from Toulouse and 
Tarbes. On 29 August, Fournier, Governor of the Banque de France, 
13 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) 
to Janssen.
14 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, 58: Ingenbleek, mon journal de guerre, pp. 55-56; 
BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, dossier 88.02.02.00 (B 608/13): letter of 10.08.1940 
from Smeers (Vichy) to Sibille (Tarbes).
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indicated that there would be no further objection to repatriation, pro-
vided certain conditions were accepted. Ultimately, these concerned a 
few minor points in the dossier, so that Janssen was quickly able to put 
things to rights and official permission was received a few days later on 
15 October. Ingenbleek played no part in this closing phase of the repa-
triation. Since the German authorities had requested the Pétain govern-
ment to no longer recognize the Belgian government at Vichy15, French 
control over Belgian government expenditure had tightened by the day 
until finally it became virtually impossible to have orders executed in 
the dollar and sterling zones. Ingenbleek therefore perceived that his 
role at Mont-de-Marsan was played out and he returned to Brussels on 
12 August. Van Nieuwenhuyse was left to handle this last phase of the 
repatriation.
Final eFForts to evacuate the gold (august-september 1940)
On 5 July 1940, in London Baudewyns learnt that the Belgian gold de-
posited with the Banque de France was under military guard in the har-
bour of Dakar, news that was soon confirmed by British sources16. In 
London, it was known that most of those in authority in French West 
Africa recognized the Vichy government as legal or were at least posi-
tively inclined towards it. It could not therefore be excluded that, via 
Vichy, the Belgian gold might in time end up in German hands, and 
various ideas about how to prevent that happening were floated.
Ansiaux, in consultation with Baudewyns, Cartier de Marchienne 
and René Boël, came to the conclusion that the best course was for him 
to travel to Vichy, where, with the help of the Belgian government, he 
would attempt to persuade the Banque de France to return to the Bank’s 
instruction of 18 June and evacuate the Belgian gold deposit to the 
United States17. If the attempt were to fail, Ansiaux would then demand 
15 BNB, Archives, SD, dossier 8.11.43, Commission of Enquiry (Banque d’Emission): 
letter of 03.06.1946 from Ingenbleek to the chairman of the Commission of En-
quiry.
16 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/6: Ansiaux, note relative à l’or (New 
York, 17.04.1941), p. 11.
17 ‘Eté 1940. Les vagabondages de l’or et du gouvernement belge. Entretiens avec Hu-
bert Ansiaux, II’, in: Revue Générale, March 1985, pp. 3-15.
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restitution of the deposit and himself take it to the United States18. As 
Head of the Belgian Economic Mission in London, Boël had the Belgian 
Navy within his jurisdiction and would ensure that a ship was available 
in the Lisbon Roads, ready to take the gold to England or the United 
States19. For his part, Ansiaux, assumed that, with authorization from 
Baudewyns, he would have the requisite authority to carry out the plan 
successfully.
Ansiaux left London for Lisbon on 14 July, but difficulties in obtain-
ing a travel visa for France meant that he arrived at Vichy only on 29 
July, around midnight20. The next day, together with Gutt, he had a 
personal meeting with Fournier at the headquarters of the Banque de 
France at Clermont-Ferrand. Fournier acknowledged that, on 18 June, 
Gutt, Janssen and Ansiaux had given instructions that the Belgian gold 
be taken to the United States, but said that the French Navy was no 
longer ‘in a position’ on that date to observe those instructions, as an 
armistice had been requested the day before and military etiquette had 
not permitted the situation then existing to be changed while negotia-
tions were being conducted; it had happened that, just before the re-
quest for an armistice had been submitted, an order had been given to 
transport the gold to a French territory overseas, and Admiral Darlan 
had no longer been able to reverse that order. Ansiaux replied by asking 
whether, as the authorized agent of the Bank, he could not himself take 
charge of the Belgian gold deposit at Dakar and, at the Bank’s cost and 
risk, take it to the United States. In Fournier’s opinion, the Banque de 
France would have no objection to that proposal, but the indisputably 
political nature of such an operation meant that the French govern-
ment, too, would have to give permission.
Gutt and Ansiaux immediately demanded a meeting with the French 
Minister of Finance, Bouthillier, at Vichy, but that proved to be im-
possible, because the presence of the Belgian Minister of Finance there 
would be contrary to the Germans’ request on 27 July to the French 
18 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/6: Ansiaux, note relative à l’or (New 
York, 17.04.1941), p. 12.
19 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2, ‘correspondance 1940’, s. f. 7: letter of 
23.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to Baudewyns (London).
20 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/6: Ansiaux, note relative à l’or (New 
York, 17.04.1941), p. 11-19.
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government to sever all contacts with governments in exile at Vichy, 
including the Belgian. To add to this, Ansiaux found out on 31 July, a 
day after the meeting with Fournier, that Bouthillier had given written 
instructions for all French and foreign gold assets in French overseas 
territories to be frozen21. That same day, accompanied by Spaak and 
Pierlot, Gutt travelled to Le Perthus on the Franco-Spanish border to 
meet De Vleeschauwer, who had come over especially to persuade them 
to move as a government to Great Britain. Gutt declared himself willing 
to go immediately; indeed, he had already prepared for this decision, 
having on 30 July requested and obtained the authorization of the Cabi-
net to leave – even alone – for London as a member of the government. 
On 2 August, Bouthillier received Ansiaux and notified him that, 
for political reasons (almost certainly because of German pressure), the 
French government could not accede to his request for the restitution 
of the Belgian gold and his proposal for its transfer to the United States 
at the Bank’s cost and risk22. Undaunted, Ansiaux insisted on a second 
meeting, in order to pursue the matter further. Bouthillier agreed, but 
left the discussion to two of his officials. These sympathized to a certain 
degree with Ansiaux and suggested that he involve the Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Paul Baudouin, in the discussion. Ansiaux followed their 
suggestion and his persistence was rewarded by Baudouin instructing 
his political director, Rochat, to study the dossier.
A few days later, Rochat made known via his deputy that the French 
government had authorized the Banque de France to return the gold, 
but only under specific conditions. Because the Bank had now removed 
its registered office to Brussels, Ansiaux’s current mandate was deemed 
inadequate, both the French government and the Banque de France be-
lieving that the authority to request restitution now lay with the Bank 
in Brussels and not with Baudewyns in London. Authorization for res-
titution could thus be given only if Janssen directed an official letter to 
the Head of State, Marshal Pétain, in which (i) he requested restitution 
of the Belgian gold being held at Dakar, (ii) gave explicit authorization 
21 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, p. 168.
22 For an account of these negotiations, see: BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier 
A 320/6: Ansiaux, note relative à l’or (New York, 17.04.1941), pp. 14-18. See also: 
the supplementary memorandum ‘démarches faites à Vichy et Clermont-Ferrand, 
19.07.1940 – 15.12.1940’.
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to Ansiaux to take receipt of that gold and (iii) guaranteed that the gold 
would be transported to Argentina or to another neutral country. From 
Vichy on 11 August, Ansiaux wrote to Janssen in Brussels requesting 
his agreement with these conditions23, but letting Janssen know in 
strict confidence by courier that, once the gold was in his possession, he 
would ensure that it got to the United States24.
There was no immediate answer from Janssen and events conspired 
to ensure that an answer would not arrive in time. In fact, it never came. 
On 12 September, realizing that his permit to reside in unoccupied 
France was due to expire, Ansiaux undertook a last effort with Rueff, 
now Acting Governor of the Banque de France, following the dismissal 
of Fournier, but their meeting was brief and negative. It was, in fact, to 
be the final official meeting between representatives of the two central 
banks, aiming at an amicable settlement of the gold question. On 16 
September, Ansiaux sent a registered letter to the Banque de France, 
declaring that institution officially in default in the matter of restitu-
tion of the deposit of gold to the Bank, the legitimate owner. That same 
evening, he left Vichy and returned to London25.
Current events were now prompting a change of strategy. In a raid 
on Mers-el-Kébir at the beginning of July, the British had destroyed a 
number of French warships and merchantmen under the command of 
men faithful to the Vichy regime. An attempted landing in the vicinity 
of Dakar at the same time had come to nothing, but had sown great un-
rest in colonial government circles, the more so as British propaganda 
had achieved a degree of success in convincing French colonists in Sen-
egal to distance themselves from the defeatist Vichy regime and ally 
themselves with the British struggle against Germany. Moreover, the 
crisis had induced the authorities immediately to unload the French, 
23 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, dossier A 1, pp. 36-37: letter of 11.08.1940 from 
Ansiaux (Vichy) to Janssen.
24 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2, ‘correspondance 1940-1941’, s. f. 7: letter of 
23.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to Baudewyns (London).
25 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/6: Ansiaux, note relative à l’or (New 
York, 17.04.1940), pp. 16-17; Lepotier, La bataille de l’or, pp. 235-246. For a good 
and detailed survey of the transfer of the French, Polish and Belgian gold by con-
voy from Brest and Lorient to Casablanca-Dakar and from Dakar to Thiès and 
Kayes, see: BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/42: report of 
18.01.1941 from Gontier (Clermont-Ferrand) to Favre-Gilly (Paris).
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Belgian and Polish gold (about 1,130 tonnes) from the convoy that had 
just arrived at the port of Dakar and take it to the military base of Thiès, 
about seventy kilometres from Dakar, on the Dakar-Bamako railway 
line.
Internal tensions had kept the situation in the colonies agitated and 
confused. In the meantime, and together with the British, General de 
Gaulle had been preparing a large-scale attack on Dakar, with the in-
tention of bringing the whole of French West Africa under Allied con-
trol26. The French authorities had then found it safer to send the gold 
along the same railway line to the bastion at Kayes, 500 kilometres fur-
ther inland, on the border with Senegal and French Sudan27.
In July, three members of the Belgian armed forces, Captain Georges 
J. Truffaut, Second Lieutenant Floor and Sergeant Van den Eynden, had 
journeyed by ship from West Africa to Great Britain to join the Allied 
armed forces28. From their Polish companions on board, they had heard 
the details of the evacuation of the French, Belgian and Polish gold, and 
had given that information to the Belgian authorities in London, addi-
tionally offering their services to help attempt to move the gold from a 
French African to a British African territory. Gutt had only just arrived 
in London when he heard that the Polish government in exile – with the 
help, or at least with the cooperation of the British Navy – was organ-
izing an expedition to recover the Polish gold in Africa. Gutt’s thoughts 
had turned immediately to the Belgian gold there and he had obtained 
26 The idea came from Churchill. He had foreseen that Great Britain would rapidly be 
facing a shortage of gold, because British purchases of war material in the United 
States were on the basis of the ‘cash and carry’ system applied by the Americans. 
Churchill asked de Gaulle to devise a concrete plan and de Gaulle came up with 
Opération Menace. Churchill approved it and ordered British cooperation. Howev-
er, talks were accompanied by a sharp discussion about how, once it was recovered, 
the gold could be used. Would France, Poland and Belgium be able to use it for 
their own ends or would Great Britain be able to have recourse to it for use in the 
Allied cause, under her leadership? Ultimately, Allied solidarity won the day: J. De 
Launay, Histoire de la diplomatie secrète de 1914 à 1945, Verviers, 1966. See also: W. 
Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. 2; Ch. de Gaulle, Mémoires, Part I, p. 200; 
Lepotier, La bataille de l’or, pp. 242-245.
27 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, p. 167; BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: 
Kauch, note relative au dépôt d’or, n° 13.
28 E.C. Truffaut, Sauver l’or belge. La mission du capitaine Georges Truffaut en Afrique 
occidentale (août-septembre 1940), Tubize, 1997.
90 Chapter 5
permission from Churchill and Halifax for the three Belgians to join 
the Polish expedition29. These three he had charged with getting the 
gold to Bathurst in Gambia; at the same time, he had asked Baudewyns 
whether the Bank could not finance the attempt, with a little extra add-
ed on ‘to buy a conscience or two, if necessary’ in West Africa30.
The Polish-Belgian expedition had sailed on 22 August 1940 and on 
6 September had reached Bathurst, where the Belgians had attempted 
to work out an initial strategy. During the following days, Truffaut and 
Floor had been able to lay their hands on a copy of the bills of lading re-
garding the Belgian gold, a major first step, but thereafter the three had 
made no further progress31. Ultimately, they had decided that it would 
be better for them to link up with the expeditionary force that, under 
the command of de Gaulle and with the help of a Franco-British fleet, 
was preparing to launch an attack from Freetown (Sierra Leone) to seize 
Dakar; once at Dakar, the three would carry out their mission from 
there32. The attack took place on 23 September, but was completely beat-
en off. From a conversation with de Gaulle on 1 October at Freetown, 
the Belgians inferred that they ought not to count on a fresh attack for 
the time being33. During their visit to de Gaulle, they also learnt to their 
surprise that, with the support of the British Treasury and the Bank 
of England – and probably behind the backs of Gutt and Baudewyns 
– another Belgian officer, Louis Franck, had accompanied the expe-
ditionary force, with the aim of getting the Belgian gold to a British 
African territory34. Confusion reigned and on 8 October Truffaut let 
29 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, kabinetsraad: letter of 19.08.1940 from Gutt 
to (Baudewyns?); letter of 20.08.1940 from Gutt (London) to Halifax (London). See 
also: De Lovinfosse, Au service de Leurs Majestés, p. 119.
30 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, kabinetsraad: letter of 21.08.1940 from Gutt 
to Baudewyns (London); letter of 28.08.1940 from Gutt (London) to de Lantsheere 
(London).
31 De Lovinfosse, Au service de Leurs Majestés, p. 118.
32 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, kabinetsraad: letter of 24.09.1940 from Floor 
(Bathurst) to Gutt (London).
33 De Lovinfosse, Au service de Leurs Majestés, p. 118.
34 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, kabinetsraad: message of 08.10.1940 from 
Truffaut to Gutt via the British governor of Sierra Leone and to Waley of the Bank 
of England. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2, ‘correspondance 1940-
1941’: memorandum of 22.08.1940 by Baudewyns on the Truffaut mission; report 
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it be known from Freetown that he regarded his mission as failed35. Of 
Franck, nothing more was heard. The grand dream of recovering the 
Belgian gold had thus fairly quickly come to an inglorious end.
of 03.10.1940 from Floor to Gutt; general Truffaut-Floor report of 08.10.1940 (Free-
town) to Gutt.
35 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, kabinetsraad: general Truffaut-Floor report of 
08.10.1940 (Freetown) to Gutt. See also ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, kabi-
netsraad: letter of 13.12.1940 from Gutt (London) to De Vleeschauwer (Leopold-
ville).
Table 5.1:  Geographic breakdown of the BNB’s gold reserve and of the gold of third parties, 
held by the BNB in safe custody (situation as at 1 August 1940, in millions of 
Belgian francs)
1) BNB’s own gold reserve (estimate):
Gold reserve in Brussels
Gold reserve deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank (New York)
Gold reserve deposited with the South African Reserve Bank (Pretoria)
Gold reserve deposited with the Bank of England (London)







2) Gold of third parties, held by the BNB in safe custody (estimate):
Gold of third parties at the Banque de France:
– belonging to the Banque du Congo Belge
– belonging to the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg
– belonging to the Postal Cheque Office
Gold of third parties at the Bank of England:






Total amount of gold of the BNB and third parties, deposited by the BNB in safe cus-
tody with foreign central banks (less the reserve in Brussels):
 circa 21,906 million Belgian francs
Sources: BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, file 88.02.02.00 (B 608/11 and 14, D 609/1).
Freiburg im Breisgau, Military Archives, Militärverwaltung, file R.W. 36/277: Hofrich-
ter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, Part 1, 
pp.87-88.
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the cost oF the peregrination in France
What picture did the financial balance sheet reveal for the Bank once 
hostilities had ceased? On an interim estimate by the Bank, the gold re-
serve shrank by about 2,380 million Belgian francs between 10 May and 
1 August 1940, namely from 23,469 million Belgian francs to 21,088 mil-
lion, the reduction concerning chiefly the exchange of Belgian money 
into French by the refugees and by the government. Advances made 
by the Bank to the government between 10 May and 15 August totalled 
1,693 million Belgian francs, according to a provisional estimate by 
Smeers, the representative of the Treasury at the Bank, who transferred 
sixteen Treasury certificates for 100 million Belgian francs each to the 
Bank for the purpose.
Chapter 6
The Installation of the 
German Administration
dislocaTion and The ‘new order’
As indicated above, the evacuation of government departments had 
been poorly planned, if indeed there was any planning at all. Soon after 
the German invasion not only had the parliamentary representatives 
and the government quit the country, but they had been followed by 
many officers of the central administration, the sole exception being 
the magistrates, most of whom, both locally and centrally, remained 
at their posts1. The situation was repeated at the Bank and among the 
other semi-public institutions: many officials and white-collar workers 
had slipped across the border to join their institution in France. The 
officials of the Postal Cheque Office had even taken their book-keeping 
and other documents with them, but were forced to abandon every-
thing at a school in Kortrijk and hide them there before getting across 
the border just in time2.
The Belgian army by implementing the ‘scorched earth’ policy had 
destroyed many bridges, viaducts, tunnels and other infrastructural 
works all over the country. Rivers and canals had been made unnavi-
gable by the collapsed bridges and various public utility installations, 
such as telephone and telegraph networks, and even gasworks and elec-
tricity generating stations had been put out of action3. If it was not over-
1 BIS (Basel), Archives, dossier 7.18 (6), AUB 4/21: Struye, l’opinion publique de 
Belgique, p. 11.
2 It was only shortly before 13 June that the documents were recovered: SG, Archives, 
DC, 04.06.1940 and 13.06.1940.
3 BIS (Basel), Archives, dossier 7.18 (6), AUB 4/21: Struye, l’opinion publique de 
Belgique, p. 2; SG, Archives, DC, 22.05.1940 and 27.05.1940.
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whelming, the amount of material damage done during the Eighteen-
days Campaign nevertheless was still fairly substantial4.
The situation was aggravated by the lack of public administration 
and particularly by the acute shortage of money. It is true that the gov-
ernment had given local and provincial authorities additional powers 
to take emergency measures5, but the Committees for Public Assistance 
fairly quickly found themselves with no cash to provide support6. The 
evacuation of the Postal Cheque Office posed an even greater problem: 
because of the absence of the account books and a large proportion 
of the staff, the 442,000 account-holders were no longer able to make 
transfers, withdraw deposits or cash cheques7. When the Liège coal 
mines gradually resumed their activity, they found themselves obliged 
to pay their workers with their own emergency money8.
The discipline of the German army of occupation contrasted sharply 
with the chaos and anarchy rife among Belgian public authorities dur-
ing the first weeks of the war. The Germans did not behave arrogantly, 
but sought to give the impression that they wanted strictly to observe 
the international rule of law and more particularly the 1907 Hague 
Convention9. German attempts to build up a favourable image among 
the population received an indirect boost from an unexpected quarter 
after the armistice of 28 May. The disgraceful accusations levelled by 
the French government at Leopold III and the Belgian army, followed 
by a somewhat toned-down repetition of them over the radio by the 
Belgian Prime Minister, Pierlot, deeply offended Belgian people both at 
home and scattered abroad. Their view of matters was that the King had 
not committed any treasonable act and, in capitulating, had avoided a 
4 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 238/2, s. f. 4 a): estimation des 
dommages de guerre subis par la Belgique.
5 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 2, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6, s. f. 9): quelques 
rétroactes relatifs aux circonstances qui ont provoqué la création de la BEB (note de 
la Société Générale), 26.03.1943, pp. 3-4.
6 SG, Archives, DC, 15.05.1940.
7 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 2, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6, s. f. 9): quelques 
rétroactes relatifs aux circonstances qui ont provoqué la création de la BEB (note de 
la Société Générale), 26.03.1943, pp. 4-5.
8 SG, Archives, DC, 21.05.1940.
9 BNB, Archives, SD, 41, Commission of Enquiry (Banque d’Emission), dossier 8.11.43 
(n° 33): letter of 01.10.1940 from Rolin to Janssen.
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needless bloodbath; they stood four square behind him and against the 
government. Even greater castigation was heaped on the Belgian gov-
ernment by the refugees returning from France, who attributed their 
losses in the currency exchange operations to their government’s ‘mon-
etary manipulations’10.
Meanwhile, the feeling grew that the war would be of short duration 
and that Germany would in any case dominate the European conti-
nent for some time to come. Public opinion in Belgium, which included 
a number of prominent people in the country, hesitated between two 
possible outcomes: either total victory for Germany or a compromise 
peace between the two remaining belligerents11. Writing from Lisbon 
on 3 July to his minister in London, the Dutch envoy Bennert Philip van 
Harinxma thoe Slooten, who had kept close to the Belgian government 
from mid-May to the end of June, observed ‘I continue to look for a ray 
of hope for the British cause, but can find none and feel that there are 
few chances of England winning this war12. Somewhat later, from Vichy, 
Ansiaux wrote to Baudewyns in London: ‘Prevailing Belgian opinion 
is strongly in favour of the Germans.…Everyone is taken with the idea 
of a «European Peace»…Whatever happens, the old regime is finished, 
because the revolution, which has overtaken hearts and minds, is al-
ready too far advanced. Everyone is coming back – the rush to return 
to Brussels is as great as was the rush to leave it’13.
The occupation of Belgium, the Netherlands and France had been 
well prepared by Germany14. On 19 October 1939, with the experiences 
10 See above.
11 The German Luftwaffe’s failure in September-October 1940 to win control of British 
skies and thereby the Battle of Britain had already then raised serious doubts about 
the possibility of total German victory, though the possibility of a compromise 
peace was still alive: P. Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België. De Galopin-doc-
trine, de Emissiebank en de Belgische industrie in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Leuven, 
2000, pp. 31-32; BIS (Basel), Archives, dossier 7.18 (6), AUB 4/21: Struye, l’opinion 
publique de Belgique, pp. 7-8.
12 Ndl.BZ, London Archives, 1940-1945, GA GII, België, n° 4: letter of 03.07.1940 from 
van Harinxma thoe Slooten (Lisbon) to Van Kleffens (London).
13 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives: letter of 23.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to 
Baudewyns (London).
14 P.F. Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, Ann Arbor 
(Michigan), 1973, pp. 29-33. For Himmler’s unavailing attempts to install a Civil 
Government in Belgium, see: Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, pp. 329-330.
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in Poland in mind, Hitler had ordered the army to draw up a general 
plan for military administration in the occupied territories to the west. 
The plan worked out was twofold: governance would be strictly central-
ized and would not aim at any annexation. It would be geared to reviv-
ing the individual economies; scarce strategic raw materials, however, 
would be requisitioned and transferred to the German war economy15. 
Hitler approved the plan and on 5 November of that year a special com-
mission was set up under the presidency of the district president of 
Rhineland-Westphalia, Eggert Reeder, with the task of fleshing out the 
plan; the commission completed its work in January 1940.
On 14 May 1940, Hitler appointed Alexander von Falkenhausen as 
military commander for Belgium, Northern France and Luxembourg, 
though this last was removed from his authority a few weeks later on its 
annexation to the Reich in July-August 1940. Reeder was appointed as 
head of the Military Government and Harry von Craushaar as Deputy-
president16. The Military Government had various departments, includ-
ing an important economic department (Abteilung Wirtschaft). Within 
a sub-department for monetary and financial affairs (Gruppe VIII), a 
unit (the Bankaufsichtamt) was created to supervise private banking 
and the central bank; this sub-department was headed by Hans von 
Becker, with Dr. Helmuth Hofrichter as his deputy.
Von Falkenhausen (°1878) belonged to the old German aristocracy 
and had had a distinguished military career that had taken him to the 
Middle East, Japan and China. He was a highly cultivated man, open-
minded, correct and had an international outlook (‘ein ausserordentlich 
anständig denkender Mann’17). Conservative in his opinions, but nev-
ertheless with an independent spirit, he also steadfastly refused to join 
the Nazi Party. He was certainly not ill-disposed towards Belgium and, 
insofar as he could, attempted to defend Belgian interests, but could not 
and would not run foul of instructions from the Nazi government in 
15 Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, p. 44; Milward, Economy and Society, 1939-
1945, p. 132.
16 Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, pp. 38-39; BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 2, 
dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6, s. f. 7): indications relatives à certains membres du 
commissariat allemand, annex.
17 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 43.
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Berlin. He was dismissed on 18 July 1944 and shortly thereafter arrested 
by the Gestapo18.
Reeder (°1894) was a lawyer from Schleswig and had been a member 
of the Nazi Party since 1933. He, too, was independent-minded and, for 
example, never gave up his friendship with well-known non-Nazis, de-
spite pressure from the party. Prior to his appointment as head of the 
Military Government in Belgium, Northern France and Luxembourg, 
he, as a Prussian official, had occupied high office in Rhineland-West-
phalia. He was the epitome of the traditional Prussian bureaucrat: in-
telligent, purposeful, sober, demanding of himself and his colleagues, 
honourable and fundamentally honest. Standing by hierarchy and 
authority, he deemed it his duty to mobilize the Belgian economy to 
the fullest in the service of the German war effort. However, he never 
lost sight of the original purpose of the special commission that he had 
presided over in 1939, namely to promote the development of national 
economies in the occupied territories in order that a certain degree of 
prosperity should be maintained. Naturally enough, and indeed as a 
matter of priority, all efforts had to be in the service of the Reich19 The 
attitude of Reeder and von Falkenhausen thus contrasted clearly with 
that of the Nazis, whose purpose was simply a systematic plundering of 
conquered territories20.
Von Becker was made commissioner of the Banque d’Emission on 
26 June 194021. During the First World War, he had been deputy to the 
then German commissioner at the Bank, Karl von Lumm, in Brussels, 
and during the inter-war years had worked in a Berlin private bank. 
Despite these credentials, he was not regarded in the banking world 
18 M. De Vlaminck and L. De Vos, ‘De Belgische industriëlen tijdens de bezetting, 
1940-1944. Collaboreren om de bezetter te schaden, produceren met het oog op de 
naoorlogse periode’, in: Belgisch tijdschrift voor militaire geschiedenis, XXVI, 2 (June 
1985), p. 114.
19 J. Gérard-Libois and J. Gotovitch, L’An 40. La Belgique occupée, 1971, p. 151.
20 P.F. Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium, pp. 34-37; M. Rehm, Eggert 
Reeder (22 Juli 1894 – 22 November 1959): Preuszischer Regierungspräsident, Mil-
itärverwaltungschef, Staatsburger, 13 p.
21 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen 
in Belgien, Part 1; SG, Archives, DC, 14.06.1940; BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 2, dos-
sier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6 s. f. 7): Basyn, note relative à certains membres du commis-
sariat allemand, pp. 1-2.
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as being professionally competent. What he lacked in intelligence, he 
more than made up for in arrogance. He was, in the worst sense of the 
term, the bon vivant type and was chiefly out for money and honour. 
In August 1943, he was dismissed as commissioner at the Bank and the 
Banque d’Emission. A year later, in 1944, he was convicted of currency 
smuggling by a Berlin court and demoted22. With effect from 1 Decem-
ber 1943, he was succeeded by Reichsbank director Jost, a rather weak 
figure, suspicious and secretive.
Von Becker’s deputy, Hofrichter, was cast in an entirely differ-
ent mould. He was the driving force behind the control of the private 
banks, the strong man in the supervision of the Bank and the Banque 
d’Emission23. During the autumn of 1939, he had been involved in the 
reorganization of central banking in Poland, and this experience had 
led to his appointment in Brussels. A confirmed party member, with a 
number of typically Prussian traits, he was intelligent and well ground-
ed, not to say thoroughly expert, in banking matters. To cap that, he 
was a workaholic and a tough negotiator. 
Hofrichter was thus anything but well liked in Belgian banking cir-
cles or indeed among his own people, and was feared by all, a regu-
lar comment of his to his staff being, ‘One should not be loved, but 
feared’24. On the other hand, it was said of him that, aside with a few 
exceptions, he was fundamentally correct in his dealings with people 
and that, as the war progressed, he became less acerbic. He was in any 
case upright, although it undoubtedly took courage and intelligence to 
oppose him; in fact, the only persons in the Bank who could face up to 
him were governor Janssen, the chief inspector François Cracco, and 
later also the director Robert Vandeputte.
A man of action and tenacious, Hofrichter was to play an important 
part in 1940-1941 in getting the Belgian gold from Dakar to Berlin. At 
22 BNB, Archives, SD, service étranger, dossier 8.11/32, ‘rapports sur l’activité de la BEB, 
1940-1944’ (September 1944): création de la BEB, texte revu par Basyn, passage sur 
von Becker.
23 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, pp. 28-29. See also: BNB, Archives, 
Studiedienst, 2, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A247/6, s. f. 7): Basyn, note relative à certains 
membres du commissariat allemand, pp. 2-5.
24 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 29.
 The Installation of the German Administration 99
the end of 1943, however, he fell out of favour, the victim, probably, of 
an internal German power struggle. He was sent to Poland, where he 
died25. His dominant role in Brussels was taken over by a Reichsbank 
director, Dr. Hoppe, a competent jurist. Unlike Hofrichter, however, he 
was cunning and untrustworthy, maintaining close relations with the 
Gestapo in Brussels. A sinister figure, the Bank had great difficulty in 
dealing with him.
Another member of the Bankaufsichtamt, Dr. Herbert Prack, was 
something of an odd-man-out. He had been born in Austria and before 
the war – as secretary to the governor of the Austrian central bank – 
had got to know the Belgian financial expert, Maurice Frère, whom the 
League of Nations had sent to Vienna. The friendship they had struck 
up at first meeting was continued during the war, when Frère was 
Chairman of the Banking Commission and a member of the board of 
directors of the Banque d’Emission. Prack was an Austrian nationalist, 
who had a great deal of sympathy for Belgium and was clearly anti-
Nazi. However, he was not a fighter and was chary about any strategy 
of direct confrontation, seeing more benefit in serious negotiation and 
cautious, but obstinate, obstruction. His function in Gruppe VIII was 
a subordinate one, but he spoke reasonable French, which resulted in 
him attending most meetings of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission26. 
As staff numbers thinned in the course of the occupation, so his influ-
ence grew, as did his nerve. Through him, the management of the Bank 
were made more and more aware of affairs within the Gruppe and of its 
strategy, intentions and ulterior motives.
Although ruling over a population of at least 11.5 million, the Mili-
tary Government was poorly manned. At its peak, in September 1941, 
the German staff numbered no more than 1,16627, a sharp contrast with 
the figure of about 10,000 during the First World War. In December 
1940, if the low-ranking staff who carried out purely clerical tasks are 
excluded, there were barely 700. Later, numbers were reinforced a little, 
but they began to fall again from the autumn of 1941 to the point where, 
25 These final details are drawn from later conversations with von Falkenhausen, ex-
tracts of which have been published by Jo Gérard.
26 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24/ 1 and 2: travaux préparatoires à la créa-
tion de la BEB (comptes-rendus).
27 P. Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, p. 62.
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in 1942, the Military Government in Belgium and Northern France was 
being run by a staff of just 47028. This low level helps to explain the 
rather limited deployment of the Military Government and its reliance 
on the cooperation of the country’s civil service, the world of business 
and banking in order to be able to function effectively29.
‘le Temps des noTables’30
On 16 May 1940, the doors of the Bank were closed, the only persons left 
at their posts by Goffin being the conciërge, the chauffeur and a team of 
security guards. The following day – Friday, 17 May – Brussels was oc-
cupied by the Germans and on 20 May, the bank specialists of the Mili-
tary Government Dr. Möckel and Dr. Heppert, two former officials of 
the Reichsbank, started discussions with Goffin31. Right from the start, 
the Germans made Goffin reopen the Bank and resume all its normal 
activities32. For both legal and practical reasons, Goffin was not able to 
comply. Legally, his authority was limited to taking conservatory meas-
ures33, while, in practice, the Bank no longer had the necessary materi-
als, its banknotes, printing presses and dies having been sent abroad34.
As soon as Goffin heard what the two representatives of the Military 
Government had to say, he informed the top man of the Société Géné-
rale, Alexander Galopin, who from 19 May had begun to have daily 
meetings with Max-Léo Gérard, Chairman of the Banque de Bruxelles 
and, later, with Fernand Collin, Chairman of the Kredietbank. Acting 
at the request of Ministers Gutt and Spaak, Galopin extended the small 
group, inviting prominent people from various fields to join; together 
they would consult about the decisions to be taken, which promised to 
28 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium, p. 82.
29 M.G. Haupt, Der ‘Arbeitseinsatz’ der belgischen Bevölkerung während des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges, 1970, p. 12.
30 Term applied by Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch in their book L’An 40.
31 BNB, Archives, SD, BEB, dossier 8.11.24/11: mémoranda des réunions, 12.06.1940, 
19.06.1940, 03.07.1940 and 10.07.1940. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 
8.11.24/f. 13: protocole allemand du 21.05.1940.
32 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24/11: memorandum of 12.06.1940.
33 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, AS, dossier 14-15, a: conversation (de Goffin) 
avec Heppner, 11.06.1940.
34 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter 3, p. 37.
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be very tough, and share the consequences. Among those brought into 
the trusted circle were ex-minister Paul Tschoffen, a lawyer practising 
at Liège, Baron Raymond Vaxelaire, a Brussels businessman, Willy de 
Munck and Albert Goffin, Albert-Edouard Janssen, Chairman of the 
Société Générale de Banque, and, from 16 June, Léon Bekaert, a Flemish 
industrialist. Occasionally, ex-minister Emile Van Dievoet, professor of 
Civil Law at Leuven, was invited to join them35. The group itself came to 
be known as the ‘Galopin Committee’, Galopin indeed being its driving 
force and dominant figure.
The bankers’ immediate focus of attention was the general short-
age of hard cash. During the initial days of the occupation, the Banque 
de la Société Générale (the only private bank still with a cash reserve) 
advanced more than 200 million Belgian francs to municipalities and 
various public services, to enable them to pay benefits to the needy 
and the unemployed. On 29 May, moreover, in cooperation with the 
Caisse Générale d’Epargne et de Retraite and a number of other private 
banks, it also created an Association Nationale d’Assistance to organize 
bank help more systematically. Lastly, pushed by Galopin, the bankers, 
in collaboration with the business world, set up a Société Coopérative 
d’Avances et de Prêts to facilitate the financing of industrial recovery36.
Galopin quickly became convinced that the passive resistance that 
had determined Belgium’s stance, when occupied during the First 
World War, would now be inappropriate37. He had heard from his 
 Deputy-governor who had attended meetings at the American embassy 
between 20 and 24 May, that large-scale food aid from the United States 
on the lines organized by Hoover during the First World War would 
face virtually insurmountable problems38. Churchill was determined 
to keep the blockade of the continent watertight; any aid to civilians 
in occupied territory being aid to the enemy. In consequence, in the 
absence of outside help, Belgium would have to find food stocks as best 
she could.
35 Brion and Moreau, La Société Générale, 1822-1997, p. 334; Nefors, Economische col-
laboratie in België, p. 40.
36 LLN, Archives, A.-E. Janssen Papers, dossier 200 B, 11: BEB, letter of February 1947 
from H. Velghe to A.-E. Janssen. See also: Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Gene-
rale Bank, p. 253 (the CAP project was set up, but the establishment of the Banque 
d’Emission prevented the institution from ever playing an important part).
37 SG, Archives, CD, 24.05.1940.
38 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, pp. 246-247.
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Furthermore, industrial recovery had not simply become a necessity 
as regards employment, it was also being demanded by the Germans. 
As soon as the Military Government had been installed, the managing 
directors of the Société Générale heard that the Germans were planning 
to get work under way again in the mining and metalworking sectors in 
the Provinces of Liège, Hainault and Limburg39. In early June, the chief 
engineer of the metal works at Hoboken reported on his recent visit 
to the Netherlands, a report that Galopin summarized in the commit-
tee of managing directors as follows: ‘In the Netherlands the adminis-
tration is functioning normally, although the government is based in 
London… The private banks and even the central bank (with its gold 
outside the country) are at work. All industries are operating...and you 
have to take a very long view to understand whether their work is legal 
or illicit’ 40. All the information coming in contained just one message: 
work had to be resumed.
What the preceding comments indicate is that, even before the oc-
cupation became total, Belgian bankers and holding companies did not 
question the policy of passive resistance. For them, the linkage between 
stocks, employment and exporting to Germany was all part of a logical 
whole. Of course, aid to the enemy, which was what ‘exporting’ im-
plied, would be kept to a minimum, but it was acceptable in principle. 
This was an attitude on which everyone, including the members of the 
Galopin Committee, was agreed; at this moment, although it was to 
lead to enormous problems in the four years to come, the attitude dove-
tailed easily with the policy of ‘accommodation’ that, it was claimed, 
was working reasonably well in the Netherlands41. Nevertheless, in or-
der to relieve any unease in people’s minds, additional opinions were 
requested from the lawyer Paul Struye and from Professor Léon-Hugo 
Dupriez on 18 and 28 June respectively; both opinions were positive 
39 SG, Archives, DC, 27.05.1940.
40 SG, Archives, DC, 04.06.1940.
41 H.A.M. Klemann, Nederland, 1938-1948. Economie en samenleving in jaren van oor-
log en bezetting, Amsterdam, 2002, pp. 67-70; J.C.H. Blom, Crisis, bezetting, herstel. 
Tien studies over Nederland, 1930-1950, The Hague, 1989, pp. 67-69; Joh. de Vries, De 
Nederlandsche Bank van 1914 tot 1948. Trips tijdvak, 1931-1948, onderbroken door de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog, The Hague, 1994, pp. 238 ff.
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about the acceptance of a policy of economic accommodation42. In fact, 
there was no real rational choice open to Belgium.
Certain historians, among them the American, John Gillingham, 
have asserted that the leaders of the Belgian holding companies and 
banks were impatiently lining up to collaborate with the Germans, in 
order, with their help, to reduce the influence of the trade unions, but 
no proof of this is provided by the minutes of meetings from that pe-
riod; if anything, the contrary was the case. It is true that the bankers 
and industrialists were fairly quick to agree to resume work; for most 
of them, however, 60 per cent of pre-war production appeared to be 
an acceptable level of output43. Furthermore, they were initially hesi-
tant about exporting to Germany and it was only gradually that they 
reached agreement on that point. There were naturally many factors to 
be considered in the decisions, which had to be taken: among these were 
keeping their businesses going, ensuring employment, and the fear of 
reprisals both on the part of the occupier and on account of article 115 
of the Belgian Penal Code, which decreed severe punishment for eco-
nomic collaboration. In the summer of 1940, they were all faced with 
the hardest decision of their professional careers, and they approached 
it with different priorities. It is not for the historian, however, to make a 
judgment on their motives.
The bankers’ iniTiaTive for a bank of issue
The initiative of the bankers in setting up an institution for new issues 
during the first weeks of the occupation has, in the first place, to be seen 
within the context of public opinion at the time, which was gradually 
coming round to the idea of a policy of accommodation as this was 
42 SOMA, Archives, V 16 (dossier 1375), politique de production en Belgique occupée, 
n°1: consultation de M. Struye du 18.06.1940; étude de L.-H. Dupriez du 28.06.1940.
43 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 1-2, g, ‘Société Générale memorandum’: ob-
servations relatives à la création éventuelle d’une Banque d’Emission, 27.06.1940. 
In respect of Gillingham’s hypothesis, see. J. Gillingham, Belgian Business in the 
Nazi New Order, Ghent, 1977. For a refutation of this hypothesis, see: H. Van der 
Wee, ‘L’économie belge au cours de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale et le problème de 
la collaboration industrielle’, in: Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 57, 2 (1979), 
pp. 397-409.
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being crystallized within the Galopin Committee. A look back at the 
pre-war years may throw some light on the influences and motives that, 
while not being prominent, were nevertheless present in the obscure 
background to this extremely complex event. During the 1930s, the 
bankers had taken a few hard knocks, and their image had not been im-
proved by the bank crisis in the early part of that decade, the attendant 
insolvencies in the bank sector and the disastrous ‘government of the 
bankers’ (1934-1935). In addition, the influence of the private banks in 
the public sphere had been seriously curtailed by the establishment of 
the Banking Commission in 1935 and the restriction in 1937 of the pow-
ers of the supervisory council of the Bank. The dirigisme of the Minister 
of Finance De Man and the vigilance exercised by Janssen, Chairman 
of the Banking Commission until he became Governor of the Bank, 
over the strict application of the new banking regulations had, to put 
it mildly, often irritated the bankers44. Consequently, there might have 
been a whiff of revenge in the air, now that the bankers found them-
selves being called upon to take an active part in the public sector once 
again, something that they did not entirely shy away from.
Shortly after the occupation of Brussels on 17 May, de Munck, Chair-
man of the Banque de la Société Générale contacted Director Goffin to 
discuss the problem of issuing money45. The idea of reactivating issues 
via the Bank – one that the Military Government had been pushing 
from the outset of the occupation – was not considered, as the Bank 
at that moment was officially still established in France. The Germans 
could, of course, set up a new issue institution themselves and in fact, in 
the opinion of the jurists Paul Tschoffen and Henri Rolin, had the right 
as an occupying power to do so on the basis of the Hague Convention46. 
Such a solution would be all the worse, because control of monetary 
policy in Belgium would then become solely a German affair47.
44 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, p. 237.
45 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 3, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi, 
20.12.1943, pp. 26 ff.
46 Krijgsauditoraat, Archives, CI 47/44, dossier 3: rapports sur l’activité de la BEB, 
farde 4 (dépositions, 15 décembre 1944 – 28 novembre 1945: declaration n° 9 de W. 
de Munck). See also: KB, Archives, Collin Papers, dossiers B, ‘banques (BEB 1940-
1945)’: note sur la Banque d’Emission, 30.01.1945, p. 5; BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise 
Papers, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi, 20.12.1943, p. 32, n° 32.
47 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, p. 250.
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Also excluded was any tolerance of the Reichskreditkassenscheine 
that were circulating. These were cash credit vouchers denominated in 
German marks, paper money that was used by the German army as a 
temporary means of payment in occupied territories. They were not le-
gal tender in Germany and, even if introduced as a temporary measure, 
could seriously affect the circulation of money in Belgium and generate 
a feared spiral of inflation. The spectre of the German marks circulat-
ing during the First World War and the baleful consequences of this 
after the conclusion of peace were still very much alive in many peo-
ple’s memory48. For the German occupier, the system naturally had the 
advantage of an almost hidden war tax, but, from a Belgian point of 
view, the system was to be condemned; indeed, the quantity of marks 
brought into circulation would not be fixed and the increasing volume 
would, as a ‘subterfuge money’ (‘une monnaie anesthésiante’), encour-
age the country’s plundering49.
De Munck and Goffin felt that, ultimately, there was only one vi-
able solution, which was for the Belgians themselves to establish a new 
issue institution as an autonomous private bank according to Belgian 
law and with Belgian capital, in which all other Belgian private banks 
would participate50. Once the idea was accepted, Goffin immediately 
gave instructions to the Bank’s research department to work out a plan 
on these lines.
A first version of the plan was presented to de Munck and Goffin 
on 20 May by two members of that research department, Jean-Jacques 
Vincent and Ferdinand Aspeslagh51. The plan proposed the establish-
ment of an office belge d’émission in the form of a Belgian limited com-
pany with share capital, to be subscribed by private banks and private 
individuals. The institution would be headed by a director and a deputy 
director, under the supervision of an auditor whose appointment and 
dismissal would be subject to the approval of the military commander. 
48 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 3-4, a: Th. Basyn, note relative à l’origine de 
la Banque d’Emission à Bruxelles, 08.11.1944.
49 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 1-2, g, ‘Société Générale memorandum’: 
observations relatives à la création éventuelle d’une Banque d’Emission, 27.05.1940.
50 Krijgsauditoraat, Archives, CI 47/44, enquête BEB, dossier 3: rapports sur l’activité 
de la BEB, farde 4 (dépositions, 15 décembre 1944 – 28 novembre 1945: declaration n° 
9 de W. de Munck).
51 NBB., Archives, SD, 30, création de la BEB, dossier 8.11.24/2: office belge d’émission.
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However, it is noticeable that, probably at the suggestion of the bank-
ers and of the Bank itself, no supervision on the part of the Ministry 
of Finance was envisaged in the plan; apparently there was a fear that 
the Belgian government would be too dirigiste, which suggests that the 
points of difference of the pre-war years between the private and public 
financial sectors were still in evidence.
The new issue institution was to take over the Bank’s traditional ac-
tivity in Belgium for the duration of the war and integrate the activity 
of the Postal Cheque Office. This second task was wholly to the advan-
tage of the private banks, as the Postal Cheque Office had become a 
formidable competitor through its giro payment system. Moreover, that 
system had given the government free access to an appreciable mass 
of money on deposit, money that could be used for the government’s 
short-term credit requirements; it had also entailed the private banks 
missing out on a potential market at a time when lending in the private 
sector was at a low ebb. Another question dealt with in the plan was 
that of backing for the issues. They would be covered by instruments 
of debt arising from discounting, loans and advances; four fifths of un-
covered circulation would have to be covered by banknotes of the Bank, 
withdrawn from circulation.
During the ensuing discussions with the Germans the impression 
prevailed that they had been won over to the idea of a Belgian issue 
institution. A few days later, however, during a meeting with de Munck 
on 5 June, Heppner was saying something entirely different. According 
to him, there was no question of a new Belgian issue institute being set 
up, it was the issue activity of the Bank itself that had to be restored. 
This made it patently clear that there were serious differences of opin-
ion within the Military Government about the matter and that no-one 
had so far been able to resolve them52.
Meanwhile, something of a commotion had been created at the 
Ministry of Finance. During a meeting there, Regierungsdirektor Dr. 
Witt had reminded Secretary-general Plisnier of his duty to assume re-
sponsibility for the note issues53. Shortly afterwards Plisnier contacted 
52 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Part 1, p. 13.
53 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Secretariat-general, dossier 417, farde 12/13.
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Goffin, asking to have a look at the outlines of the plan for the new 
institution.
The request took the bankers somewhat by surprise and in their 
haste during the meeting of the Galopin Committee on 4 June they ap-
proved the insertion of a special article reading as follows: ‘The Secre-
tary-general…will be present, when he judges this to be appropriate, at 
the meetings of the Board of Directors and of the General Assemblies. 
His voice will be consultative’. Plisnier received the amended text from 
Goffin the following day. His reaction was immediate and indignant. 
He demanded unlimited control of all activities of the institution, as 
well as a right of veto on all decisions that might contravene Belgian 
law and be against the interests of the country. The bankers acquiesced 
and on 7 June, in Plisnier’s office, de Munck, Goffin, M.-L. Gérard and 
A.-E. Janssen approved a new text that not only met Plisnier’s demands, 
but also considerably reduced the authority of the representative of the 
Military Government54.
54 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24/ 2: office belge d’émission (3e et 4e pro-
jet). The competence of the Bankaufsichtamt was redrafted as follows: Art. 12, ‘Un 
délégué du pouvoir d’occupation reçoit à l’intervention du Secrétaire général…tous 
renseignements, états ou copies des documents que ce délégué jugera nécessaires pour 
exercer une surveillance sur l’office belge d’émission’.

Chapter 7
The Establishment of the 
Banque d’Emission
The decisive negoTiaTions
In retrospect, the negotiations with Möckel and Heppner appear to 
have been no more than an initial exploration of the terrain on the part 
of the Germans, pending the long-term organization of the Bankauf-
sichtamt that was to be set up at Brussels. Instructions for this were be-
ing awaited from the Reichsbank in Berlin and finally arrived on 9 June, 
the Reichsbank also announcing the leadership of the new body. It was 
to be headed by von Becker, with Hofrichter as his deputy1. The two had 
received concrete instructions from the Reichsbank2 which they laid be-
fore a delegation of Belgian bankers on 13 June. Central to the discus-
sions was the establishment of a new issue institution at Brussels, on the 
lines envisaged by the German authorities3. Von Becker and Hofrichter 
invited the bankers to study the text and submit any comments at a 
meeting planned for 15 June4.
The fact that Hofrichter was involved in the setting-up of a new bank 
of issue in Poland suggests that the bank of issue in Brussels was de-
signed on the Polish model, with many points of similarity5. The plan 
1 The ordinance setting up the Bankaufsichtamt and confirming the appointment of 
von Becker and Hofrichter dated from 14.06.1940: BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: 
report of the Commission of Enquiry (published text, 1946), Part 1, p. 13.
2 Nefors, Economische collaboratie in België, p. 53.
3 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24, f. 1 and 2: travaux préparatoires relatifs à 
la création de la BEB, minutes of the meeting of 13.06.1940.
4 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 3, p. 39.
5 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Part 1, pp. 17-18; BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24, f. 3: ordon-
nance relative à la Banque d’émission en Belgique.
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was nevertheless for it to be established in the form of a Belgian limited 
company with a large capital, to be subscribed by the private banks, a 
concession to the proposals of the Belgian bankers. However, the actual 
organizational structure was very different. The bank was to be man-
aged by a chairman who would wield practically all the power and who 
would be assisted by two managing directors. The board of directors 
would in principle be reduced to an advisory body, its power of deci-
sion limited to approving the balance sheet and the management of 
discounting transactions.
Clearly, underlying the entire organization chart was the Führer 
principle. The competence of the general meeting was kept to a mini-
mum and was in fact limited to the appointment of the main office 
holders; those appointments were further subject to the approval of the 
military commander, who also had the right to dismiss office holders. 
Additionally, a German commissioner at the new institution was to be 
kept fully informed of its activity and his authorization was required 
for all important decisions, authorization that he could retract as and 
when he thought fit. The proposed bank of issue was also removed from 
the control of the Belgian Banking Commission and there was thus no 
place in the organizational structure for a Belgian government com-
missioner.
It was the intention that the Bank should place its premises, staff 
and printing equipment at the disposal of the new institution and that 
the banknotes of this institution should be the only legal tender cir-
culating in the country. The banknotes of the Bank would have to be 
exchanged and the Reichskreditkassenscheine would have to be taken 
out of circulation6. Besides these two activities of exchange and with-
drawal, the bank of issue would also be empowered to discount com-
mercial paper, but not government paper, such as Treasury certificates 
issued by the State, the provinces, the municipalities or other public 
institutions; nor would it be authorized to grant loans or advances with 
such government securities as collateral. Note issues would thus be cov-
ered by claims arising from commercial discounting transactions, by 
banknotes exchanged, by Reichskreditkassenscheine and by other assets 
at the Reichskreditkasse, the Reichsbank and the Verrechnungskasse in 
6 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 3 – 4: Th. Basyn, note relative à l’origine de 
la BEB et aux résultats de son activité, p. 2.
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Berlin. An additional guarantee would be provided by a general mort-
gage on real estate in Belgium.
The spokesmen of the Belgian banks at the meeting of 15 June were 
Goffin, Galopin, de Munck, A.-E. Janssen, M.-L. Gérard and Collin7. 
They had many points to raise about the German proposal. In the first 
place, in their opinion, the proposed legal structure was unacceptable: 
the entire procedure of nomination and granting virtually exclusive 
power to the chairman were in fact irreconcilable with Belgian legisla-
tion on limited companies. Moreover, the bye-laws ought to make no 
reference to regulations in the law on limited companies, but to regula-
tions in the bye-laws of the Bank, which was an institution sui generis8. 
Finally, the capital of the new bank of issue did not need to be as large 
as proposed by the Germans and no more than 20 per cent needed to be 
paid up on the bank’s formation. In their original project, the bankers 
had proposed a figure of 100 million Belgian francs by way of capital, 
but were nevertheless prepared to increase this to 150 million.
There followed a discussion about the constitutionality and the ex-
tent of the proposed mortgage: the imposition of a mortgage on the 
population was contrary to articles 6 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution. 
The Belgian bankers also argued that the extent of the mortgage was 
too great, but were unable to persuade the Germans of this. The sugges-
tion that the Bank’s premises, staff and printing equipment be placed 
at the disposal of the new bank of issue also ran into a legal problem. 
Goffin had, in fact, no authority to take any decision in this respect, but 
it was thought that a solution could be provided by a requisition order 
from the Secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance; consequently, 
von Becker arranged to speak to Plisnier on 17 June about the matter.
The big stumbling-block for the bankers was the article prohibit-
ing the new bank of issue from granting advances against government 
securities or discounting them. Ultimately, the payment of salaries and 
pensions by the central, provincial, municipal and other public authori-
ties, compensation for war damage, and benefits paid out to the un-
employed, the families of military personnel and those on poor relief 
7 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24, f. 1: travaux préparatoires relatifs à la 
création de la BEB, minutes of the meeting of 15.06.1940.
8 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24 / 15: consultation de maître Tschoffen, 
25.06.1940.
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– were financed by the banks on the basis of government debt instru-
ments. Moreover, there would be no less need for cash by the public sec-
tor – on the contrary – and tax income would lag behind government 
expenditure for some time to come, certainly with the costs of occupa-
tion, an alarming prospect. The banks simply could not raise sufficient 
cash to continue to finance all this. The only way to solve the problem 
was to allow them to mobilize government securities at the new bank 
of issue. Von Becker understood the problem, but wished to consult the 
Reichsbank about whether he could grant this concession9.
The final major point concerned the circulation of the Reichskredit-
kassenscheine. In the German project, they formed one of the assets 
acting as backing for the new banknotes. In his comments, von Becker 
stated that their issue had been provisionally set at 1 billion Reichs-
marks, although that figure could, of course, be increased as necessary. 
Galopin and de Munck immediately saw the danger: an uncontrolla-
ble issue of banknotes would prompt a spiral of inflation. Moreover, 
the Scheine were circulating as legal tender in Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Northern France besides Belgium, and it was not un-
thinkable that masses of this paper money would flow in from those 
countries, particularly as the Germans were concentrating troops in 
Belgium and Northern France, with a view to an invasion of Great 
Britain. The spokesmen of the Belgian banks therefore enquired about 
the terms and conditions that would accompany the withdrawal of the 
Scheine; but von Becker declined to answer, as there was a political as-
pect to this question that was outside his remit. Together with Hofrich-
ter, he was leaving for Berlin on 17 June to report to the Reichsbank 
on the discussions and hoped on his return to be able to present new 
instructions that would take account of Belgian proposals.
On 27 June, Goffin, Galopin, de Munck, A.-E. Janssen and M.-L. 
Gérard convened at von Becker’s invitation at his offices at the Bank, 
being joined towards the end of the meeting by Plisnier. The new plan, 
as approved by Berlin, was laid before the bankers10 and it took some ac-
count of the objections raised at the meeting of 15 June. The concept of 
a simple limited company in Belgian law had been adopted; capital was 
9 SG, Archives, DC, 26.06.1940.
10 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 3, p. 40.
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set at 150 million Belgian francs, with 20 per cent to be paid up immedi-
ately. The idea of a general mortgage on real estate in Belgium as a sup-
plementary guarantee had been dropped; and discounting government 
paper, including its negotiation, as well as granting advances against 
such paper, had been accepted as a normal activity for the new institu-
tion, although time to maturity was not to exceed one year11. For both 
the bankers and Plisnier, these amendments represented an important 
concession on the part of the German authorities.
Against this, not an inch had been yielded on the matter of the con-
ditions regarding cover. German means of payment and Reichsmark 
credit balances with German institutions remained as valid backing, 
as did commercial and public securities and other claims by the Bank. 
The Germans were nevertheless prepared to do their best to withdraw 
the Reichskreditkassenscheine from circulation, perhaps in exchange 
for Belgian banknotes12. No account was taken of Plisnier’s demand for 
inclusion of a right of control for the Ministry of Finance13. All that 
the secretary-general gained was authorization to attend the meetings 
of the board of directors, at which he could obtain information and 
give advice. Lastly, the new institution would not be established as the 
‘Banque d’Emission de Belgique’, the name originally previewed, but as 
the ‘Banque d’Emission de Bruxelles’, in order to avoid any confusion 
with the Banque Nationale de Belgique (the Bank)14.
The spokesmen of the Belgian bankers were given a quarter of an 
hour to consult with one another, but it was now a question of taking 
the text as it stood or leaving it. There was thus no option but to ac-
cept it, the alternative being a note-issuing institution under full Ger-
man control. The order for establishment was signed and promulgated 
that same day, and was published in the German Official Gazette of 
6 July 1940, the deed of incorporation being executed before notary-
public Hubert Scheyven at Brussels on 13 July 1940. The Bank’s premises 
and staff, as well as its equipment for printing the new banknotes were 
11 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Part 1, pp. 17-18. See also: SG, Archives, DC, 27.06.1940.
12 SG, Archives, DC, 27.06.1940.
13 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 3, p. 40.
14 SG, Archives, DC, 27.06.1940.
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requisitioned by Plisnier on 27 June and all placed at the disposal of 
the Banque d’Emission15. Goffin was appointed as chairman of the new 
institution, and the Bank’s Treasurer, Sontag, and the head of the staff 
department, Deputy General Manager Pirsoul, were appointed as its 
managing directors16.
It appeared that all parties believed that they had done well out of 
the final arrangement. The Germans felt that the Banque d’Emission 
could not be regarded as the product of German coercion (eine deutsche 
Zwangmasznahme). At the same time, they were convinced that the ad-
justments made in Berlin would enable them to bend the new institu-
tion to their will 17. For his part, Goffin was satisfied that the Bank itself 
had been able to steer clear of direct German interference18. Plisnier 
was relieved that a solution had been found to finance the costs of oc-
cupation and the government deficits. Lastly, the bankers felt that their 
caution had won the Banque d’Emission a certain degree of independ-
ence from both the occupier and the Belgian government19. Emile Puhl, 
Deputy-chairman of the Reichsbank, had travelled to Brussels from 
Berlin to give added lustre to the occasion of the Banque d’Emission’s 
establishment and had been reassuring in his language20.
What the bankers found very significant was the German conces-
sion in accepting government paper as cover for the banknotes. Since 
the crisis of the 1930s, income from credit to the private sector had been 
at a low ebb and this situation was most unlikely to change in the im-
mediate future. Consequently, the banks had to turn to income from 
15 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24/ 14, ‘réquisition du personnel et des lo-
caux de la BNB’: letters of 17.06.1940, 26.06.1940 and 27.06.1940 from Plisnier and 
Tschoffen.
16 SG, Archives, DC, 27.06.1940; BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque 
Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, pp. 40-41; ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, 
Secretariat-general 1914-1945, dossier 11/ 7, ‘banques (BEB)’: letters of 06.07.1940 and 
13.07.1940 from Goffin to Plisnier.
17 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 3, p. 43.
18 NBB, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24/ 11: memorandum of 03.07.1940.
19 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 247/6, s.f. 9), ‘Société Générale 
memorandum’: quelques rétroactes relatifs aux circonstances qui ont provoqué la 
création de la BEB, 26.03.1943.
20 SG, Archives, DC, 29.06.1940; BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24/ s. f. 5, ‘cor-
respondance diverse’: letter of 28.06.1940 from von Becker to Goffin.
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the provision of credit to the various government bodies; in this re-
spect, interesting prospects were offered by the purchase of Treasury 
certificates and their possible mobilization at the Banque d’Emission. 
From France, on 4 July, Janssen declared his agreement with the set-
ting-up of a bank of issue, but saw it solely as a means to provide the 
country with cash resources until the Bank’s return21.
The bank and The banque d’emission 
Shortly after his return to Brussels, on 11 July, Janssen was received by 
von Becker, head of the Bankaufsichtamt, who indicated that Janssen 
could resume his function in Brussels as Governor and even offered 
him the chairmanship of the Banque d’Emission. Von Becker also had 
no objection to the Banque d’Emission making way for the Bank, as 
Janssen envisaged, provided that the Bank returned to Brussels quickly, 
though dissolving the newly established bank would naturally depend 
on authorization from Berlin22. Janssen, on his part, was looking to 
chair the meeting of the general council of the Bank, fixed for 15 July 
to give consent to the re-establishment of the Bank’s registered office at 
Brussels, but von Becker indicated that this would not be possible. He 
pointed out that officials and prominent persons who had fled abroad 
at the time of the invasion could resume their functions in Belgium 
or exercise new functions there only on the authorization of the com-
petent reintegration committee of the Belgian administration and the 
Military Government, following investigation of their dossiers. Goffin 
would chair the meeting. This was a first disappointment for Janssen 
and a clear sign that times had changed in Brussels23.
The general council of the Bank, which comprised the board of di-
rectors, the supervisory council and the board of scrutineers, met in 
Brussels on 15 July as planned. Goffin opened the meeting by announc-
21 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 243/4), ‘inspection générale’: let-
ter of 04.07.1940 from Janssen (Bordeaux) to Galopin (Brussels).
22 Krijgsauditoraat, Archives, CI 47/44, dossier 3: rapports sur l’activité de la BEB, 
farde 4 (dépositions, 15 décembre 1944 – 28 novembre 1945: declarations Nos. 37 
and 47 of P. Kauch).
23 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 243/ 4), ‘inspection générale’: 
meeting of 13.07.1940 between von Becker, Hofrichter and Janssen.
116 Chapter 7
ing that the board of directors at Mont-de-Marsan had resolved to re-
turn the Bank’s registered office to Brussels, to return there itself and 
to restore all the Bank’s administrative, management, supervisory and 
advisory bodies to their normal operations. With the exception of the 
gold reserves, which remained beyond the Bank’s control, the repatria-
tion of the Bank’s assets was in full swing. Goffin also indicated that the 
Minister of Finance and the entire Belgian government at Vichy had 
approved the transfer and repatriation. The general council took note of 
the return and ratified the resolutions passed. Goffin also notified the 
council of the establishment on 13 July of the Banque d’Emission, under 
his chairmanship. Its establishment would be no obstacle to the Bank 
continuing to pursue all its traditional activities, as long as they did 
not impinge on the exercise of the right of issue24. The two institutions 
would exist side by side, but would be able to co-operate to the full, as 
the management was in joint hands.
Before the banknotes of the new Banque d’Emission got into circu-
lation, the Bank’s important stock of their own notes had arrived in 
Brussels from Mont-de-Marsan and consumers had begun spending 
the money that they had been hoarding. On July 15 Janssen was able 
to obtain from the German authorities a suspension of the plan for 
the immediate exchange of banknotes: for the time being, those of the 
Bank would remain in circulation and only when the time came for a 
new issue would those of the Banque d’Emission be called into use25.
On 23 July, Janssen informed the governors of the Bank of England 
and the Banque de France that the registered office and the manage-
ment of the Bank were once again established in Brussels and that the 
decision of 15 May concerning the transfer of the registered office and 
the move of the management abroad was annulled. He also contacted 
McKittrick, Chairman of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
at Basel, to request him likewise to notify the change to the other cen-
tral banks that were members of that institution26.
24 BNB, Archives, AR, 15.07.1940. 
25 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Part 1, pp. 25 ff.: letter of 15.07.1940 from Janssen to Galopin. See also: 
BNB, Archives, SD, dossier 03.00.00 (G 792/5): Association belge des banques, min-
utes, 01.08.1940.
26 Janssens, De beheerders van ons geld, p. 136; BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 
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When Janssen effectively resumed the leadership of the Bank – until 
his official reinstatement, the governorship had been exercised by von 
Becker ad interim27 – he was faced with a depleted board of directors 
consisting solely of himself and Goffin. Baudewyns was to remain in 
London for the duration of the war and Ingenbleek was still operating at 
Mont-de-Marsan. The fourth place on this committee, previously held 
by Mahieu, who died on april 1940, was left open. In addition, there was 
Van Nieuwenhuyse who, on his return from France in August, resumed 
his function as Secretary to the Bank.
During their meeting with Janssen on 20 July, von Becker and 
Hofrichter indicated that changes had to be made to the composi-
tion of the Bank’s board of directors and particularly to the Banque 
d’Emission’s management, as there was too great an imbalance be-
tween the Dutch-speaking members and the French-speaking mem-
bers. Attention turned first to the Banque d’Emission. The bankers 
who were behind its founding and who had subscribed to its capital 
were, in any case, members of the board of directors and no objection 
to them was raised by the Military Government. The bank’s bye-laws 
envisaged a  twenty-member board; to the nine founder-bankers, thus, 
a further eleven members had to be added. Names suggested by the 
bankers were Plisnier,  Secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance, 
Leon Bekaert, Robert Brasseur, Jacques Desoer, Léopold Dumont de 
Chassart, Leopold  Frateur, Lucien Graux, André Huyssens, Georges 
Laloux, Arthur Mulier, Leopold Nuyens and Fernand Van Goethem28. 
To provide a flexible way of increasing the number of Dutch-speaking 
members, the Germans issued an ordinance on 19 August increasing 
the membership of the board of directors to thirty.
The management of the Banque d’Emission was exclusively French-
speaking and the Military Government felt that change was required 
here too. On a unanimous vote in the board of directors, the Secretary 
to the Bank, Van Nieuwenhuyse, was chosen as Dutch-speaking candi-
date. He seemed the perfect choice: he came originally from Bruges and 
01.02.01.70 (A 320/ 6).
27 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers, 2: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen in Belgien, 
10 Mai 1940 – 31 Dezember 1940. B: Die Notenbanken.
28 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Part 1, passim.
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had served the Bank extremely well before the war and especially dur-
ing the invasion and the flight to France; he was ‘in-house’ and knew 
the techniques of the business. His candidacy was supported uncon-
ditionally by Janssen and all the bankers. The Military Government, 
too, appeared to be in agreement, but at the last moment withdrew 
its support for him in favour of a candidate from outside the Bank: it 
preferred a deutschfreundliche candidate and its choice fell on Pierre 
Berger, manager of the Kredietbank branch at Antwerp. It was he who, 
at an extraordinary general meeting of the Banque d’Emission held on 
25 November 1940, was appointed managing director.
The principal acTors of The Two banks
Before detailing the confrontations between the German and Belgian 
authorities, it is perhaps appropriate to introduce the chief actors on 
the Belgian side, the previous chapter having briefly discussed the main 
personalities on the German side. Those persons naturally include the 
directors and managing directors of the two banks, but mention should 
also be made of the bankers who, as founders of the Banque d’Emission, 
were to play a prominent part in events, particularly after the death of 
Janssen, as well as of the most important advisers, members of the su-
pervisory council and secretaries-general.
Until his death on 9 June 1941, Janssen remained the inspired leader 
of the two banks. Once he had returned from France and resumed the 
governorship of the Bank in Belgium, adding to that the chairmanship 
of the new issue institution, he identified himself wholeheartedly with 
the problems of daily life in a country under occupation29. He worked 
energetically for the resumption of economic activity; in doing so, he 
won for himself a dominant role in shaping the country’s monetary 
policy. He was, nevertheless, well aware of the limits the new situation 
imposed on him, writing on 17 July to Ingenbleek: ‘I resumed my ac-
tivities, without claiming, however, that I am again in full control of 
everything that I controlled before 10 May’30.
29 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 28.07.1940 from 
Gutt (Vichy) to Theunis (New York).
30 BNB, Archives, SD, Janssen Papers, f. 2 j: letter of 30.07.1940 from Janssen (Brussels) 
to Ingenbleek (Mont-de-Marsan).
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Through his intelligence and single-mindedness, authoritarian man-
ner, boldness of action, courage and genuine patriotism, Janssen over-
shadowed the other members of the two managements, who were only 
too happy to leave things to his judgement when it came to taking deci-
sions31. Even the bankers who, as founders of the Banque d’Emission, 
dominated its board of directors seldom took a leading part in decision-
making, generally preferring to leave initiatives to the chairman32.
Janssen also gained the respect of the German administration. Prack, 
in his memoirs, wrote frankly that Janssen was the most important and 
strongest personality he had come across in Belgium during the oc-
cupation. Hofrichter, with whom Janssen had numerous momentous 
confrontations, likewise respected him. Their meetings could become 
pretty heated and on one occasion, when Hofrichter spoke threatening-
ly to the Governor and in the same breath also opposed all the leaders 
of the two banks, Janssen answered that it was he alone who bore re-
sponsibility for monetary policy in Belgium and that, if anyone should 
hang for it, that person could only be him, adding somewhat cynically: 
‘I can lose only one head’33. On the other hand, Janssen could be very 
charming and circumspect in his dealings with the Military Govern-
ment, besides exhibiting great diplomatic skill. His intuition (Finger-
spitzengefühl) found an admirer in Prack34 and often enabled Janssen to 
score a success when arguing a point.
The others in the management – Deputy-governor, Ingenbleek, Di-
rectors Goffin and Berger and Secretary Van Nieuwenhuyse – came 
across less strongly. Ingenbleek had hoped to be appointed a manag-
ing director of the Banque d’Emission, which was what Janssen had in 
fact suggested in a letter to him at Mont-de-Marsan35, but the appoint-
ment had been vetoed by the Germans36. During the initial years of the 
31 BNB, Archives, RR, 12.06.1941: addresses by A. Goffin and L. Smeers on the occasion 
of Janssen’s death on 09.06.1941.
32 BNB, Archives, SD, 37, enquête BEB, dossier 8.11.34: note des fondateurs relative à 
l’origine de la BEB et à ses résultats (1943).
33 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: letter of 24.01.1986 from Prack (Vienna) to Cracco.
34 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, pp. 13-14.
35 BNB, Archives, SD, 37, Janssen Papers, f. 2 j: letter of 30.07.1940 from Janssen (Brus-
sels) to Ingenbleek (Mont-de-Marsan).
36 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen in Belgien. B: 
Notenbanken, 1a. Direktion.
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occupation, Ingenbleek, in conversations with Germans, allowed it to 
be seen that ‘he tried to understand the German point of view’, while 
also showing little, if any, sympathy with the British37. This stance gave 
him access to Military Government circles and enabled him to mediate 
behind the scenes when conflicts arose. He also maintained good rela-
tions with Plisnier, with whom he had been a friend for years38.
Goffin was a conscientious official of both banks. Somewhat taci-
turn, he displayed little decisiveness; even when Governor of the Bank, 
in succession to Janssen, he was unable to put his stamp on policy. He 
shrank from taking responsibility and, lacking a firm personality, came 
increasingly to rely on Galopin, the strong man in the board of direc-
tors of the Banque d’Emission39. As director of the Bank and managing 
director of the Banque d’Emission, Berger carried greater clout. Berger 
certainly had a more forceful character than Goffin; moreover, he owed 
his appointment to the direct intervention of the Military Government 
and was thus able to count on German goodwill, which gave him a de-
gree of leverage in matters of monetary policy40. However, the longer 
the occupation lasted and the more acute the problems became, the 
more it became clear that he was not equal to the task or capable of 
actually standing up to the German authorities41.
37 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 19. Ingenbleek was also branded 
as an anglophobe in the documents of Belgian State Security in London: BNB, Ar-
chives, SD, London Archives, dossier 9.1/25, ‘période de guerre’, s. f. 1, documents du 
haut Commissariat à la sécurité de l’Etat: Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1943-1944.
38 Brutsaert, La nuit ne durera pas toujours. Oscar Plisnier, passim.
39 Prack himself claimed that he had several times urged Goffin to adopt a somewhat 
harder attitude towards the Military Government: SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, 
dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. Persönliche Erinnerungen von 
Herbert Prack, p. 19.
40 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belg-
ien. Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 21. Belgian State Securi-
ty in London described Berger as follows: ‘Esprit réactionnaire qui, au début de 
l’occupation, ne câchat pas ses sympathies pour un régime autoritaire semblable à 
celui de l’occupant. N’a cependant pas tardé à modifier son attitude, lorsqu’il a pu 
en apprécier les inconvénients’: BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 9.1/25, 
documents de guerre, s.f.a, documents du haut Commissariat à la sécurité de l’Etat: 
Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1943-1944.
41 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen in Belgien. B: 
Notenbanken, 1a. Direktion.
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A few top officials likewise played a major part in the affairs of the 
two institutions during the Second World War. The most remarkable 
of them were Kauch and Cracco. Kauch, an excellent legal historian, 
trained at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, was the private secretary 
and confidant of Janssen, who entrusted him with a number of delicate 
tasks. He put his influence down chiefly to the large number of ana-
lytic and advisory memoranda that he prepared for Janssen, in which 
he showed himself a shrewd jurist and a well documented and forceful 
writer, exhibiting however a Francophile bias and a priori distrust of 
the private bankers. Janssen’s confidence in Kauch was not shared by 
the other members of the management. Baudewyns spoke scathingly 
of him and he was no more persona grata with the rest of the man-
agement. The private bankers disliked him, too; their distrust of him 
was so strong that, after the death of Janssen, he was removed from the 
Banque d’Emission as private secretary to the chairman. 
The second of these remarkable men, Cracco, was a civil engineer 
and economist of the Leuven School, who began his career at the Bank 
in the research department. When the clearing system imposed by 
the German administration came into effect on 10 July 1940, he was 
charged with its management, insofar as the Bank was involved. At the 
end of 1940, he was appointed by Janssen to head a foreign department 
to be set up within the Banque d’Emission. Until then, he had not at-
tracted any particular notice in the Bank, but in this new function he 
became an authoritative senior official. Through his intelligence, tech-
nical knowledge, force of argument and self-confidence, his authority 
influenced both the management and the German Bankaufsichtamt. 
Following Janssen’s death, it was the memoranda and reports of Cracco 
that set the tone in the determination of Bank policy. Hofrichter and 
his staff were impressed by him, finding him to be a formidable debater. 
Vandeputte joined Cracco as managing director at the beginning of 
1943, to replace Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse. Vandeputte, a jurist, 
was appointed on the recommendation of the bankers, who had come 
to appreciate him as secretary of their association. A hard worker, very 
efficient, making demands both on himself and on those around him, 
he displayed right from the start an exceptional talent for organization. 
After Cracco’s arrest by the Germans he became the central figure in 
the Bank and the Banque d’Emission in contacts and negotiations with 
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the Bankaufsichtamt. He knew his briefs thoroughly, and this, com-
bined with his correct, but firm, attitude, made him a difficult person 
for the occupier to deal with, even though they held him in the greatest 
respect42.
The board of directors of the Banque d’Emission was dominated by 
the big Belgian bankers and industrialists, with Galopin the undis-
puted leader. After Janssen’s death, he virtually drove decision-making 
at the Banque d’Emission and, via Goffin, drove much of that at the 
Bank, too. Galopin was a civil engineer by training and immediately 
after the First World War had successfully accomplished the reorgani-
zation of the Liège metalworking industry and the modernization of 
the entire heavy industry sector43. He had served as deputy-governor of 
the Société Générale de Belgique from the beginning of the 1930s, and 
had been made governor in 1935; in those two functions, moreover, he 
had piloted the most powerful of Belgium’s holding companies safely 
through the world depression. Not only in Belgium, but far beyond, 
too, he was recognized as one of the country’s most prominent figures.
Galopin’s prestige rose even further when, as chairman of the com-
mittee bearing his name, he succeeded, with his policy of resuming 
work and getting the Belgian economy restarted during the general 
confusion of the first months of the occupation. Until mid-1942, he en-
joyed the confidence of the Belgian government in London44, which, 
with good reason, regarded him as a confirmed and authoritative pa-
triot45. Thereafter, doubt arose in Belgian government circles in London 
about the policy he was pursuing, even though he had always regarded 
the government at Vichy and subsequently in London as the sole, legiti-
mate government of Belgium and had always acted accordingly46. Ga-
lopin never favoured the acerbic or aggressive approach in discussion, 
preferring instead to argue logically in the belief that, although some-
42 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen in Belgien. B: 
Notenbanken. 1a Direktion.
43 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, p. 132.
44 Van de Voorde, De penningmeesters van de Wetstraat, pp. 142-145.
45 See the testimony of Goetz, directeur of the Dresdner Bank, regarding his request 
to the bankers in August 1940 for close economic cooperation with Germany: ‘ je 
sentais un vif et incontestable sentiment de résistance chez Galopin, au contraire 
chez de Launoit’ (Krijgsauditoraat, Archives, CI 47/44, BEB dossier, 1).
46 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 43-45.
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times demanding great patience, this would lead to persuasion and 
consensus47. He was nevertheless conscious of his prestige and was not 
altogether free from authoritarian and even dictatorial traits48. Where 
problems arose at the meetings of the board of directors of the Banque 
d’Emission, he generally allowed everyone to have their say, before him-
self concluding with a short and pertinent intervention that was more 
often than not approved by all members present49. After his assassina-
tion in February 1944, the strenght of the board was broken.
Deputy-governor of the Société Générale de Belgique and Chairman 
of the Banque de la Société Générale, de Munck, was a jurist by training 
and was, in fact, Galopin’s right hand, his expert and adviser in financial 
matters. He was a cultivated, calm and discerning man who never lost 
sight of the interests of his bank and holding company50.  Undeniably a 
heavyweight, he was highly respected by the German authorities51.
A.-E. Janssen, Chairman of the Société Belge de Banque, was less in 
the limelight, but no less active for all that. The great authority that 
he wielded as former Minister of Finance, as the central figure in the 
resolution of the crisis surrounding the Farmers’ League (Boerenbond) 
in 1934-1935 and as banker of the Antwerp diamond trade gave him the 
necessary authority to mediate in reconciling differences of opinion52. 
With Galopin, moreover, he was the only member of the board to main-
tain contact with the Belgian government in London; the fact that he 
47 BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, s. f. 6: note sur la réunion du comité de rédaction 
de la BEB, 19.09.1941.
48 See the testimony of Goetz, director of the Dresdner Bank, Krijgsauditoraat, Ar-
chives, CI 47/44, BEB dossier, 1.
49 See the testimony of Prack, who attended most meetings of the board of directors: 
‘Im Verwaltungsrat der BEB entschied seine Stellungnahme, die er in der Regel nach 
anhören der Debatte kürz abgab, das Votum des Gremiums ziemlich diktatorisch’ 
(BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen. B: Noten-
banken. 1 a. Direktion.).
50 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, p. 228.
51 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinneringen von Herbert Prack.
52 Comtesse Plater-Zyberk, Albert-Edouard Janssen, raconté par sa fille, 1976. See 
also: Van der Wee and Verbreyt, Mensen maken geschiedenis. De Kredietbank en 
de economische opgang van Vlaanderen, 1935-1985, 1985, pp. 71-112; SOMA, Archives, 
Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. Persönliche 
Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 22.
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was able to do so throughout the war and at the same time retain the 
government’s confidence enabled him to give the board useful advice53.
M.-L. Gérard, Chairman of the Banque de Bruxelles and also a 
former Minister of Finance, was likewise an active and influential 
member of the board of directors, his effectiveness being enhanced 
by his long friendship with Galopin. His most important contribution 
was as mediator between the Banque d’Emission and the Ministry of 
Finance at times of tension between the two. Plisnier, the Secretary-
general of the Ministry, and Gérard were old friends and it was, in fact, 
partly through Gérard’s support that Plisnier owed his appointment to 
that post in 193754.
Collin, a Dutch-speaking jurist, Chairman of the Kredietbank and 
professor at the University of Louvain, was initially distrusted by Ga-
lopin; very quickly, however, the two bankers came to appreciate each 
other55. In 1941, as an expert in penal law and at Galopin’s request, Collin 
prepared an opinion on the application of article 115 of the Penal Code 
to economic collaboration, an opinion that contributed substantially 
to the reformulation of the Galopin doctrine on the politics of accom-
modation56. Of other figures, Maurice Frère, Chairman of the Banking 
Commission, had become a member of the board at Janssen’s insist-
ence57; apart from the occasional foray, he kept himself in the back-
ground. He resigned at the end of 1942. Much more active was Léon 
Bekaert, an important industrialist from West Flanders, who was also 
a member of the supervisory council of the Bank. He was a strong per-
sonality and came from the circles of the General Christian Association 
of Employers; his businesslike and pertinent interventions exercised an 
unmistakable influence on discussions in the council58.
53 A.-E. Janssen was also active in the financing of the Resistance and, via that avenue, 
had additional contacts with the government in London (see below).
54 Brutsaert, La nuit ne durera pas toujours. Oscar Plisnier, pp. 35 ff.
55 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, p. 41.
56 A. Collin, ‘De politiek van tewerkstelling tijdens de bezetting’, in: Mededelingen 
van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van 
België, Klasse der Letteren, XXXIX, 1977, n° 1.
57 Krijgsauditoraat, Archives, CI 47/44, BEB dossier, n° 3: rapports sur l’activité de la 
BEB (déclarations 15 décembre 1944 – 28 novembre 1945: testimony No. 50 of M. 
Frère).
58 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 23.
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Lastly, Oscar Plisnier and Victor Leemans were the two secretaries-
general having most dealings with the Banque d’Emission and the Bank 
during the war. Plisnier was an economist and held a doctorate in ad-
ministrative sciences from the Université Libre de Bruxelles, where he 
subsequently held the chair in public finances59. He was a cultivated 
man and had a sense of social responsibility; a hard worker and self-
assured, he was rather stand-offish and authoritarian towards his staff. 
Throughout the war, he showed great devotion to duty and was toler-
ated by the Military Government at Brussels, but not really highly re-
garded. In Berlin, he was held in even less esteem and there was pressure 
for him to be replaced, although this was not pursued by the Military 
Government for fear of resistance within the Belgian administration. 
Oddly enough, Plisnier also had a poor reputation in London as well 
as among the Belgian magistracy, being accused of being too accom-
modating to the occupier. His cooperation with the Banque d’Emission 
and the Bank was at first smooth, but ultimately ended in dramatic 
conflict60.
Leemans was cut from altogether different cloth and the two secre-
taries-general did not have a comfortable relationship, Plisnier regard-
ing him as a rival who undermined his authority and actions. Leemans 
was a self-made man from East Flanders who had gained a teaching 
diploma and then gone on to study in Paris, Berlin and Munich, finally 
obtaining a doctorate in sociology in Paris61. A young conservative, with 
a Christian-corporatist ideology, he was a moderate Flemish national-
ist, a Germanophile and was initially convinced of a German victory. 
He had been appointed Secretary-general of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs by the Military Government, taking the place of Baron Snoy et 
d’Oppuers who had fled to France at the time of the invasion.
As Secretary-general, Leemans played an important part in setting-
up the production centres (Warenstellen) that the Military Govern-
ment established from July 1940 for organising industrial production, 
which gave him easy access to Reeder and other top German officials. 
59 Brutsaert, La nuit ne durera pas toujours. Oscar Plisnier, passim.
60 See Chapter 13.
61 O. Boehme, ‘Tussen de fronten. Het jong-conservatisme van Victor Leemans’, in: 
Wetenschappelijke Tijdingen, 58 (1999), 3, pp. 131-153; O. Boehme, ‘Academici en de 
revolutie van rechts tijdens het Interbellum’, in: Wetenschappelijke Tijdingen, 57 
(1998), 1, pp. 45-58; Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 57-61.
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Galopin distrusted him at first, but came increasingly to value him as 
the occupation continued. Experience showed that he took a moderate 
and even fairly independent line with the German administration and 
never lost sight of the interests of his country. He was, consequently, a 
valued intermediary for the bankers, the industrialists and the Banque 
d’Emission alike when tension with the Military Government led to 
deadlock or threatened to erupt in conflict.
Chapter 8
The Politics of Accommodation 
in Daily Reality
The disTribuTion of responsibiliTies
At its establishment on 27 June 1940, the Banque d’Emission was given 
a wide range of competences, in line with the view of the German ad-
ministration and the founding fathers, who envisaged it as Belgium’s 
central bank for the duration of the war. However, the return of the 
governor of the Bank from France on 10 July and the repatriation of 
the substantial stocks of banknotes of the Bank from the strongroom 
at Mont-de-Marsan placed a check on the original plan for the Banque 
d’Emission. As the Banque d’Emission was not wholly ready with its 
new banknotes by the time its deed of incorporation was executed on 
13 July1, Janssen, as was already said before, was able to persuade the 
Military Government to allow it to make provisional use of the notes 
of the Bank.
One of Janssen’s first moves was to try to get the Banque d’Emission 
rapidly liquidated, but the German authorities rejected his proposal; 
according to the Bankaufsichtamt in Brussels, the veto came from Ber-
lin, the Reichsbank being unwilling to go back on its original decision. 
Janssen consulted the jurist Rolin about the matter, but Rolin’s assess-
ment was formal: the Banque d’Emission had been validly established 
and the return of the Bank from France did nothing to change the situ-
ation2. The only course in Rolin’s view was to adopt a pragmatic stance: 
accept the co-existence of the two institutions and search for a division 
of responsibilities that was as much in the Bank’s favour as possible.
1 W. Pluym, ‘Jaarverslagen’, in: Tijdschrift voor het personeel NBB, 2001, pp. 3-10.
2 BNB, Archives, SD, dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 13: note résumant l’entretien 
du 24 septembre 1940 entre M. le Gouverneur et M. Henri Rolin; consultation de 
M. Henri Rolin (undated).
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Janssen drew up a general proposal for the distribution of tasks and 
presented it to the Military Government in a memorandum of 29 July. 
Now that the Bank had returned to Brussels and the dire shortage of 
banknotes and coins had been resolved, the Bank should resume its 
traditional competences and functions. The Banque d’Emission, how-
ever, ought not to disappear, as legally it had broader powers than the 
Bank and could focus its activity on those areas for which it had legal 
competence and the Bank did not.
At the time of the Banque d’Emission’s establishment, nothing had 
been formally settled concerning the notes of the Bank being made 
available to the new institution. Janssen wanted to have this matter 
sorted out and suggested that the Banque d’Emission employ credit 
operations with the Bank to ensure itself of the requisite banknotes. 
However, he was unable to present any concrete proposals regarding an 
arrangement for clearing and for resolving the issue of dual circulation; 
these were matters that the Germans would have to decide.
It took until 20 August 1940 for the Military Government to re-
spond to Janssen’s general proposal3, but the situation was made im-
mediately clear when it did. Janssen was not to think that he could treat 
the Banque d’Emission as a subordinate department of the Bank; the 
Banque d’Emission was and remained the country’s sole issue institu-
tion: it was true that, to that end, it was using the notes of the Bank, but 
this was purely a temporary arrangement that had a psychological pur-
pose, namely to ensure the confidence of the population in the fiduciary 
money4. Moreover, the Banque d’Emission was competent to pursue a 
fully open-market policy and, of its own accord, to conduct all credit 
operations permitted by its bye-laws; consequently, it was not obliged to 
go through the Bank, as Janssen proposed.
Lastly, the Military Government confirmed the allocation of other 
important tasks to the Banque d’Emission. The Belgo-German clearing 
account at the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse in Berlin would remain in 
its name, meaning that the management and the pre-financing of all 
3 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24. 7, and SD, 41, ‘enquête BEB’, dossier 
8.11.43/31: memorandum, adressé par le commissaire allemand au président de 
la BEB, définissant les attributions respectives des deux instituts d’émission, 
20.08.1940.
4 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale, (unpublished 
text), Part 1, Chapter. 5, pp. 68-70;
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clearing operations would fall within its responsibility. It would also 
continue to manage third-party deposits at the Postal Cheque Office 
and would henceforth assume in full the function of State exchequer; 
in addition, it would be required to expand its activities in the prov-
inces and advertise its presence clearly to the public by means of explicit 
notice-boards in all the Bank’s branches.
The German memorandum of 20 August thus threw Janssen’s sug-
gestions into total confusion. In the opinion of the Bankaufsichtamt, 
the Bank’s chief task was ultimately to make its reserve of banknotes 
available to the Banque d’Emission. The Bank was also to concentrate 
on securing the repatriation of the gold it had placed in safe custody 
abroad. It would be permitted to manage its other assets and settle its 
current transactions, but no longer to attract new deposits or undertake 
new transactions.
The challenge To legal compeTence
The reorganization of the Postal Cheque Office was, in fact, the result 
of a long and exhaustive discussion set in train by the private bank-
ers, a discussion prompted by the great confusion that arose from the 
flight of that public institution’s management abroad at the time of the 
German invasion and from the temporary misplacing of documenta-
tion. The situation was made use of by the private bankers to begin a 
campaign for rearranging the functions of the Office. Their most im-
portant arguments were psychological and financial. In their opinion, 
during the preceding months the population had lost confidence in it5. 
Furthermore, it was procedurally unacceptable for the Treasury to have 
a right of free and unlimited access to the third-party deposits of the 
Office; consequently, there was an urgent need for a clean split between 
State and private accounts. In an agreement of 3 August between the 
Ministry of Finance, the Bank and the Banque d’ Emission, the Military 
Government closed the discussion by transferring the management of 
the third-party deposits to the Banque d’Emission.
5 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen, 10 Mai 1940 
– 31 Dezember 1943, A. Grundlagen. II, 7: Ingangsetzung des Postcheckamtes.
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The ensuing months saw a new and acute problem in connection 
with competences. On the Banque d’Emission’s establishment in June, 
the Military Government had included the function of German com-
missioner in the bye-laws and had clearly defined his area of compe-
tence. However, nothing had been determined with regard to a com-
missioner at the Bank. In the discussions at Wiesbaden in the autumn 
in respect of the gold deposited with the Banque de France, von Becker 
had acted as the Bank’s representative, but did so wrongly, claimed 
Janssen, because he did not have the authority to do so, as his compe-
tence was limited to the Banque d’Emission. This problem was resolved 
on 16 December by the Military Government issuing an ordinance 
declaring that the competences of the commissioner at the Banque 
d’Emission extended to the Bank. It was announced at the same time 
that the commissioner could legally represent the two institutions both 
at home and abroad, and on behalf of both could perform all legal acts 
and take measures of disposition6.
A similar dispute with regard to competence emerged in respect 
of the Weisungsrecht. Did the occupying power have the right to di-
rect the Banque d’Emission to execute certain transactions? According 
to the bye-laws, the military commander was entitled to make use of 
that right where a conflict between the Military Government and the 
Banque d’Emission led to a deadlock. Such situations actually occurred 
occasionally from 1941 on, but when the commissioner at the Banque 
d’Emission looked to apply the Weisungsrecht, the management each 
time refused to fall in line, arguing that the bye-laws laid down that 
only the military commander or his representative, Reeder, had that 
right, and then exclusively in an actual situation of deadlock; in formal 
terms, the commissioner had no competence in the matter. The Mili-
tary Government was extremely irritated by this stance on the part of 
the management, but never directly quarrelled with it and – reluctantly 
needless to say – always respected the procedure laid down. Application 
of the Weisungsrecht was to remain a bone of contention for both par-
ties throughout the period of the occupation7.
6 BNB, Archives, RR, 23.12.1940. See also: BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Das Währungs-, 
Geld- und Bankwesen in Belgien, 10 Mai 1940 – 31 Dezember 1943.
7 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Das Währungs-, Geld- und Bankwesen in Belgien, 10 
Mai 1940 – 31 Dezember 1943. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, 
La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, Chapter. 3, pp. 43-45.
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The distribution of tasks between the two institutions, as official-
ly restated by the occupying power on 20 August 1940, continued to 
rankle with Janssen, who could not accept the subsidiary role thereby 
accorded to the Bank. Meanwhile, though, in the autumn public opin-
ion had begun visibly to turn against the occupier, whose true face was 
gradually being revealed by the requisitioning of all types of goods, the 
imposition of mandatory declaration of holdings of gold and foreign 
currency, the burden of billeting, the high costs of occupation, the in-
creasing shortage of food, rationing, the restriction of freedom, the in-
troduction of the curfew and other wartime measures. The German 
‘New Order’ was losing its initial attraction. Furthermore, the idea of 
German military superiority was being undermined by the Germans’ 
failure to prevail in the Battle of Britain and tenacious British resist-
ance. The depression felt by the conquered was giving way to optimism, 
albeit cautious. The Belgian people had begun to rediscover their osten-
sibly lost patriotism and their solidarity in the struggle against a com-
mon enemy, the hated occupier8.
The Bank, too, was not unsusceptible to a similar change of mental-
ity, though that is not to say that Janssen’s patriotism had ever wavered; 
right from the moment of his return, it had been central to everything 
he undertook and to all his decisions. During the summer of 1940, how-
ever, it was expressed chiefly in leaning towards the policy of accom-
modation, which was initially directed at the recovery of the economy 
and the expansion of employment.
As a result of the first sharp disagreements with the Military Gov-
ernment and the realization that a compromise peace was becoming 
increasingly unlikely, Janssen came to fear – intuitively, perhaps – that, 
however honourable the intentions, the policy of accommodation in-
volved great risks for the Bank’s future. Certain competences could, in 
fact, lead to activities that were contrary to the institution’s purpose, 
an instance of this being cooperation in obtaining the repatriation of 
the Belgian gold from France, which the German authorities insisted 
on. Consequently, in the autumn of 1940 Janssen began to work even 
harder to protect the Bank from German interference, making a fresh 
effort to adjust the distribution of tasks between the Bank and the 
Banque d’Emission. He submitted a proposal to bring the distribution 
8 BIS (Basel), Archives, dossier 7.18 (6), AUB 4/ 21: Struye, l’opinion publique de 
Belgique après sept mois d’occupation, February 1941.
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more into line with the way the war economy was actually evolving9. 
The Military Government approved the proposal on 28 February 194110.
In accordance with the new arrangement, the Banque d’Emission 
would make use of the notes of the Bank for the duration of the war; 
there was thus no further prospect of it issuing its own banknotes, so 
that the Bank need have no worries about its own issue privilege, and 
the danger of having both types of banknote in circulation in Belgium 
was averted. The Banque d’Emission would continue to be responsible 
for all foreign transactions: more particularly, clearing operations and 
their pre-financing in Belgium, the purchase of foreign currency and 
gold belonging to private individuals, and all financial and monetary 
transactions with German authorities, German organizations and 
German banks active in Belgium. Lastly, it would continue to manage 
third-party deposits at the Postal Cheque Office11. For its part, the Bank 
would take care of all credit operations in respect of the Belgian pri-
vate sector, State, provincial and local authorities, public bodies and all 
other public institutions; it would also continue carry out its traditional 
function of State exchequer12.
This new distribution of tasks represented a substantial victory for 
Janssen. The Bank regained virtually all its pre-war functions and at 
the same time was able to shed all activities linked to the occupying 
power and pass them to an institution set up solely for the duration of 
the war. In this way, Janssen hoped to protect the Bank against any di-
rect relationship with the enemy, as it had been during the First World 
War, and be able to pilot it safely through the war, without its role be-
ing compromised13. The comparison with the First World War was not 
entirely correct, as – during that conflict – the Bank had ceased its is-
sue activity and the Société Générale de Belgique had used one of its 
9 BNB, Archives, DC, 28.02.1941.
10 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 28.02.1941.
11 The distribution of general costs between the two institutions was to be settled at 
the end of each year. Each institution would bear the costs regarded as specific to 
itself and a set formula would be applied to the distribution of other common gen-
eral costs: BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 02.01.1942.
12 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 2, pp. 46-48.
13 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 3-4: Basyn, note relative à l’origine de la BEB 
et aux résultats de son activité (08.11.1944).
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own departments to issue banknotes of its own. Now, the Bank was 
making its banknotes available to the Banque d’Emission. However, the 
arrangement had not been settled in law. In fact, it could be regarded 
as granting advances by the Bank to the Banque d’Emission for financ-
ing the costs of occupation, the clearing operations and German pur-
chases in Belgium on the black market and elsewhere. The Bank thus 
remained involved in all these transactions with the occupier and could 
not entirely escape the implications ensuing from the Belgian policy of 
accommodation14.
On the side of the Military Government, there was satisfaction with 
the outcome. The use of the notes of the Bank exerted a favourable psy-
chological effect on circulation. Moreover, it gave the Military Gov-
ernment much greater influence over the Banque d’Emission. It also 
 enabled the Belgian economy to be more easily involved financially 
in the German planned economy and in the German war effort15. The 
bankers and big industrialists were naturally aware of the unfavourable 
implications for them of the compromise that had been reached, but 
they lodged no protest: Janssen was not used to sharing his authority 
with others. For that reason, the bankers sensibly held themselves aloof 
at meetings of the board of directors. Furthermore, Janssen had the 
reputation of being a confirmed patriot, which was an excellent guaran-
tee of the Banque d’Emission’s political integrity. At the same time, he 
displayed a very co-operative attitude towards the matter of financing 
clearing operations16, which was the essential component of the policy 
of accommodation and the employment policy being pursued by the 
bankers and the big industrialists.
14 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 2, p. 48.
15 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished 
text), Part 1, Chapter. 2, p. 43. BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 2, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 
247/6, s.f. 9): H. von Becker, L’évolution du crédit en Belgique depuis l’occupation 
allemande (address at Cologne in 1941). See also: H. von Becker, ‘Die Kreditwirt-
schaftliche Entwicklung in Belgien seit der Deutschen Besatzung’, in: Bank-Archiv, 
1941, 1, pp. 11-13.
16 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 3-4: Basyn, note relative à l’origine de la BEB 
et aux résultats de ses activités (08.11.1944).
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The economic, social and poliTical conTexT in 1940 and 1941
When they invaded Belgium in 1940, the Germans were well aware that 
the country boasted a progressive economy and that half of the active 
population was employed in industry and mining, and could thus be of 
great service to the German war machine. The Nazi doctrine of a Euro-
pean Groszraumwirtschaft, however, was one directed towards concen-
trating all major industries in the fatherland and leaving the production 
of raw materials and of any simple or half-finished manufactured goods 
to the periphery. For the exploitation of Belgium, this meant stepping-
up the production of coal with a view to its direct export to Germany 
or indirect export in the form of the electricity it could generate. In 
other industrial sectors, the German Ministry of Economic Affairs im-
mediately went in search of stocks of scarce raw materials necessary for 
the conduct of war; when identified, these were requisitioned forthwith 
and transferred to Germany17. The occupier’s hand was felt even more 
 heavily in the transport sector, where, during the first two years of the 
occupation, about 1,000 locomotives and more than 50,000 railway 
wagons were seized and sent to Germany18.
The Military Government had totally different ideas about how Bel-
gian industry was to be incorporated into the German war effort. The 
intention of von Falkenhausen and Reeder was to use a vigorous, diri-
giste policy to get the Belgian economy working efficiently again and to 
give the Belgian population a tangible share in the economic recovery. 
A certain degree of prosperity in an occupied territory could serve only 
to encourage the commitment of the population and ultimately enable 
a greater contribution to be made to German war production. Designed 
to be the cornerstone of this policy were the twelve (subsequently in-
creased to sixteen) Warenstellen for the organization of industrial pro-
duction, under the direction of the Belgian Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs19.
With his decree of 26 August 1940, Goering, who was directing 
the Four-year Plan for the German economy, more or less went along 
17 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, pp. 12-25.
18 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, p. 29.
19 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 57-66.
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with the Military Government’s strategy. In his view, Belgian industry 
should contribute to the German war economy by way of orders from 
Germany. Furthermore, there should be merging of capital (Kapitalver-
flechtung) between big German and Belgian companies, which would 
give an additional boost to the contribution from Belgian industry.
In formal terms, the Military Government was the highest authority 
in the occupied territory of Belgium and Northern France. In practice, 
however, its authority in economic matters was compromised by the 
action of all types of other German bodies. The resulting tendency to-
wards a fragmentation of economic authority did nothing to make the 
incorporation of the Belgian economy into the German war effort more 
efficient20.
According to its advocates – the members of Belgium’s financial and 
industrial establishment – the policy of accommodation was the best 
way in which to get the economy in Belgium back on the rails, follow-
ing the military defeat, and particularly to get employment back to a 
proper level. However, this general programme concealed other aims, 
which included maintaining the management of business in Belgian 
hands, preventing the dismantling of the factories (as happened during 
the First World War) and opposing the deportation of labour (partic-
ularly of the unemployed in the secondary sector) to Germany. Like-
wise a priority concern was the import of food and raw materials; this 
could be resolved only by exporting coal, electricity and manufactured 
goods to Germany and her satellites. Conceived at a time when many 
still anticipated or feared a compromise peace and German dominance 
of continental Europe, the policy of accommodation certainly had a 
degree of common ground with the ideas of the Military Government 
about how the Belgian economy could best be incorporated into the 
German war effort.
The key question, however, concerned the extent to which that pol-
icy could stretch. With not only the interests of his group in mind, but 
also, as a confirmed patriot, feeling responsible for the general interest, 
Galopin initially took a very cautious line in his pronouncements about 
this problem. His memorandum of 15 July 1940 indicates that a recovery 
of industrial production to 60 per cent of its pre-war level ought to be 
20 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, pp. 43 and 82.
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sufficient to keep the policy of accommodation within safe limits21. This 
view was endorsed by the Christian employers’ organizations, which 
also emphasized that, in any case, the production of arms had to be 
excluded, as had any expansion of production in no matter what firm. 
Making extra profit was equally excluded and production was required 
to be directed as much as possible towards supplying the Belgian mar-
ket. Lastly, employers were not to take advantage of the dissolution of 
the trade unions to reverse the social progress made during the preced-
ing decades22.
Speaking for the Belgian government in London, Gutt, with certain 
reservations, agreed with the doctrine of the Galopin Committee. On 
22 February 1941, he could still write to Cattier, who had met Ansiaux in 
Lisbon: ‘que quand on a faim, il fallait manger; que pour manger il fallait 
acheter de la nourriture; que quand on n’en avait pas assez à l’intérieur, 
il fallait l’acheter à l’extérieur; que pour l’acheter à l’extérieur, il fallait 
des devises; que pour avoir des devises, il fallait vendre à l’extérieur’ 
(‘when you are hungry, you have to eat  ; for eating you need food ; if 
the country does not produce enough food, you have to buy it abroad ; 
buying abroad has to be done with foreign currency, which can only 
be obtained by exporting goods’. However, his assent to the policy of a 
resumption of work and exporting to Germany was conditional. In a 
letter to Hannecart, Gutt expressed his reservation as follows: ‘le tout 
est dans la façon dont on le fait et dans les rapports avec les Allemands’ 
(‘Crucial is the way how your exports to Germany and how your rela-
tions with the Germans are organized’) 23.
Not all Belgian industrialists behaved moderately. Some chose to 
co-operate as closely as possible with German industry and at first ap-
peared little inclined to take much notice of the advice of the Galopin 
Committee24. This contrasted with the attitude of the big industrialists 
from the Société Générale de Belgique group and many others, who ob-
served strict restraint. Attitudes among medium-sized enterprises were 
similarly divided: many held to the Committee’s view, others used the 
21 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 46-48.
22 De Vlaminck and De Vos, ‘De Belgische industriëlen tijdens de bezetting, 1940-
1944’, pp. 117-122.
23 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, 9. 1/32: letter of 23.12.1946 from Gutt to Ansiaux.
24 E. Verhoeyen, Les grands industriels belges entre collaboration et résistance, passim.
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occasion to restore their finances25. Numerous Belgian industrial firms 
had suffered heavy losses during the world depression of the 1930s and 
were still in a precarious position on the eve of the German invasion; 
for some of them, there was a great temptation to use collaboration to 
regain their place in the sun.
The picture of fragile recovery was confirmed by industrial produc-
tion figures. Despite the special attention given by the occupier to coal-
mining, coal output in 1940 and 1941 was 10-15 per cent below its level 
for 1939. The situation was much worse in the iron and steel industry, as 
only half of the forty-four blast furnaces operating in 1939 were still ac-
tive in 1940 and 1941, and things were little better in the metalworking, 
non-ferrous and textile sectors, due chiefly to the lack of raw materials.
In agriculture, adjusting the acreage under cultivation led to a con-
siderable increase in the production of rye and potatoes, at the expense 
of the production of meat and dairy. After a time, it proved possible 
to cover the full requirement for potatoes and three-quarters of that 
for bread, although this result was achieved to the detriment of other 
agricultural products, such as meat and dairy produce, and the calcula-
tions were made on the basis of poor, insufficient rations. The country 
was thus still dependent on the import of grain26. In this respect, Ger-
many was anything but co-operative, the autumn of 1941 even seeing a 
temporary stop being placed on the export of grain to Belgium27. Prices 
on the black market rocketed and there was a great deal of hunger in 
the winter of 1940-1941, especially in the towns. The situation of wage-
earners was made hopeless by the prohibition on wages being adjusted 
and all this led to widespread strikes in May 1941. By then, already, the 
members of the Galopin Committee and their supporters had realized 
that, as regards the provision of supplies, the fragile policy of accom-
modation, from which they had hoped for so much, had failed. Simply, 
the export of manufactured goods to Germany had not been offset by 
adequate imports of foodstuffs and raw materials, as had been agreed28.
25 D. Luyten, Burgers boven elke verdenking? Vervolging van economische collaboratie 
in België na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Brussels, 1996.
26 BNB, Archives, AV, 30.06.1945: report by the board of scrutineers for the 1940-1944 
financial years, prepared on behalf of the supervisory council, pp. 27-33.
27 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, pp. 69-72.
28 Nefors, De industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 92-93.
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No real progress was made as regards unemployment either. It is 
true that there was a resumption of work, but between 1 July 1940 and 
31 May 1941 something like 15,000 workers a month left voluntarily for 
Germany29, attracted by higher wages and particularly by better ra-
tions. Indeed, moving to Germany became even more attractive after 
the revaluation of the Reichsmark against the Belgian franc on 22 July 
1940 (from 1 Reichsmark to 10 Belgian francs to 1 Reichsmark to 12.50 
Belgian francs).
These negative developments created a sense of malaise within the 
Galopin Committee. It was all very well that the policy could be justified 
on legal and ethical grounds, but it had not served its purpose in those 
early months: insufficient food had been brought into the country in 
exchange for Belgian exports, and the resumption of work had proved 
unable to prevent the exodus of workers to Germany. The Committee 
was faced with finding a means to change the situation and Galopin 
saw only one possibility, i.e. raising industrial production from 60 to 
80 per cent of its previous level; this would improve Belgium’s hand in 
negotiations with Germany regarding food imports and immediately 
create more jobs on the domestic market30.
The German ordinance of 1 August 1940 had prohibited any increase 
in salaries and wages, ostensibly to stabilize the cost of living. On 29 
May 1941, however, following the hard winter of 1940-1941 and the 
strikes in that same month, the Military Government authorized an 8 
per cent rise, though this was far from what was required. At this time, 
like all wage-earners in Belgium, the staff of the Bank and the Banque 
d’Emission were finding it extremely difficult to get by on their income, 
which is why both institutions put various social measures in place 
that were to prove successful in the longer run. In the first place, they 
themselves made an adjustment to salaries and wages, albeit indirectly. 
Additionally, they gave help in kind31, the most important instance of 
this being a mid-day meal, provided six times a week on the premises 
of the Bank at a minimum price and without ration coupons having to 
be surrendered.
29 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, pp. 140-141.
30 De Vlaminck and De Vos, ‘De Belgische industriëlen tijdens de bezetting, 1940-
1944’, pp. 123-127: Galopin, note relative au comportement de l’industrie belge pen-
dant l’occupation du pays (30.06.1940).
31 See, among others: BNB, Archives, DC, 20.11.1941.
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money circulaTion
The policy of bringing about a resumption of work gradually reduced 
the payment difficulties experienced during the initial months of the 
occupation. June 1940 saw the lifting of the restrictions of 13 May on the 
withdrawal of deposits from the private banks and, at the end of July, 
the clearing houses began to operate again, under the leadership of the 
Bank. The moratorium on the payment of due invoices and matured 
securities was ended on 19 August and the Brussels, Antwerp and Liège 
Stock Exchanges opened their doors again with effect from 21 August32. 
The Postal Cheque Office, too, resumed normal operations: more par-
ticularly from 22 July for giro transactions and from 8 August for the 
withdrawal of deposits.
Together with the scarcity of goods, the increase in the overall mon-
ey supply formed a breeding-ground for feared price inflation. That in-
flation had no effect on rationed goods, as the price of these was set by 
the government and was stable. On the parallel black market, however, 
prices went up sharply, although major regional differences and a lack 
of information make it virtually impossible to give accurate figures.
The withdrawal of the Reichskreditkassenscheine from circulation 
was without doubt the biggest monetary problem faced by the Banque 
d’Emission at the beginning of the occupation. The central adminis-
tration of the Reichskreditkasse, set up in September 1939, had created 
32 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hofrich-
ter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, pp. 
46-48.
Table 8.1:  Total money supply, 10 May 1940 to 1 January 1942  










































Source: BNB Archives, AV, 30.06.1945: general report prepared on behalf of the supervi-
sory council by the board of scrutineers for the 1940-1944 financial years, p. 11.
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local cashier offices in the occupied territories, whose purpose was to 
provide the armies in the field with money. In fact, they operated as 
mini central banks in their particular areas, using their Scheine to pro-
vide the soldiery with cash and also to finance army requisitioning and 
procurement.
The Scheine were not at all welcome in Belgium33. Fresh in everyone’s 
mind were the bad memories of the mass circulation of Reichsmarks 
during the First World War. In Janssen’s view, the Reichskreditkassen-
scheine in 1940 represented a similar danger. First and foremost, their 
issue was totally uncontrollable and could result in the country falling 
prey to inflation; secondly, they were an instrument of plunder on a 
massive scale, to which Belgium had no defence; thirdly, there was no 
guarantee whatsoever that there would be a proper financial settlement 
after the war. From the moment of his return from France, therefore, 
Janssen gave the elimination of the dual currency circulation priority in 
his negotiations with the occupying power34.
On 26 July 1940 Plisnier, Secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance, 
received a request from the Military Government to transfer 3 billion 
Belgian francs to its account at the Banque d’Emission, as prepayment 
for occupation costs, yet to be agreed. Janssen viewed this as an oppor-
tunity to request the withdrawal of the Reichskreditkassenscheine from 
circulation35. He accepted Plisnier’s proposal to join him in discussion 
on the occupation costs, to be held on 9 August with Reeder, President 
of the Military Government; this would give Janssen the opportunity to 
raise the question36. During the discussion with Reeder, Janssen argued 
that Belgium had the right to demand the withdrawal of the Scheine, as 
the Belgian government had agreed in principle to pay occupation costs 
33 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Ingenbleek, La vie en Belgique sous l’occupation, 
pp. 16-17.
34 BNB, Archives, SD, 36, Foreign Department, dossier 8.11/32 (RKKS): la question des 
Reichskreditkassenscheine.
35 The chairman of the Nederlandsche Bank, Trip, had already received an undertak-
ing in July 1940 from the army that it would not disburse any more Reichskreditkas-
senscheine in the Netherlands: Klemann, Nederland 1938-1948, p. 132.
36 BNB, Archives, AR, 17.08,1940. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 33, dossier 8.11.27/4, 
‘divers’: Plisnier, mémoire relatif à l’indemnité réclamée à la Belgique au titre des 
frais d’occupation, 20.12.1940.
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to the German authority. Failure to withdraw them would in fact mean 
Belgium paying twice for the same purpose.
Janssen went on to emphasize the monetary disadvantages of a dual 
circulation; no conditions had been fixed for the size of the issue, which 
could cause inflation. In accordance with article 49 of the Hague Con-
vention, moreover, the Reichskreditkassenscheine, and indeed the occu-
pation costs, were required to be used exclusively for the maintenance 
of the local occupying power. The costs for troops concentrated in Bel-
gium and Northern France in preparation for an invasion of Great Brit-
ain or for army divisions passing through or resting in Belgium did not 
qualify as occupation costs to be paid by Belgium37; those extra costs 
could be financed with Belgian francs in exchange for Reichsmarks that 
Belgium could use to purchase foodstuffs and raw materials in Germa-
ny. Janssen set out his arguments in two memoranda of 28 September 
and 21 October 1940 respectively, and ensured that, in each case, they 
were delivered to Commissioner von Becker just before he left for Berlin 
to conduct discussions with his superiors38.
The memoranda produced results. With effect from the end of Sep-
tember 1940 already, the local Reichskreditkassen ceased to place new 
Scheine in circulation. On 3 February 1941 Janssen proposed that the 
Banque d’Emission would assume responsibility for the withdrawal of 
the Scheine still in circulation, provided that there was an agreed ceil-
ing of 3-4 billion Belgian francs; any balance above that would have to 
be financed by the Kassen themselves. It was also proposed that the 
Scheine cease to be legal tender not only in Belgium, but also in North-
ern France and in the Netherlands, and, lastly, that the Scheine acquired 
37 Reeder disagreed with the first argument. In his view, the Reichskreditkassenschei-
ne represented a claim on Germany for the disbursement of the pay of the ‘con-
quering’ troops and for the purchases of equipment by the army: consequently, 
they had nothing to do with the costs of occupation. However, Reeder and von 
Becker were able to agree with the second argument and eventually with the 
third. For the reasons stated, they regarded the withdrawal of the Scheine even 
desirable, but withdrawal had to be gradual: BNB, Archives, SD, ‘Association des 
Banques Belges’ Papers, dossier 08.00.00.00 (C 783/4): circulaires, Plisnier, frais 
d’occupation (memorandum of 17.08.1940 from Plisnier concerning the meeting 
with Reeder and von Craushaar on 09.08.1940); BNB, Archives, BR BEB.
38 BNB, Archives, SD, 36, Foreign Department, dossier 8.11/32 (RKKS): la question 
des Reichskreditkassenscheine. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 14, dossier 8.11/4, s. f. 3 
(RKKS): retrait des Reichskreditkassenscheine (période 21 octobre 1940 à mars 1941).
142 Chapter 8
by the Banque d’Emission be used in Germany for the purchase of food 
and raw materials39.
The Military Government reacted to Janssen’s proposals during 
a meeting on 26 February 1941 and a month later in a memorandum 
of 25 March, saying that it was prepared to accede to the request for 
the Scheine to be withdrawn from circulation, on condition that the 
Banque d’Emission grant an unlimited and interest-free line of credit 
to the central administration of the Reichskreditkassen. Janssen viewed 
the proviso with scepticism and consulted the jurists Marcq, Rolin and 
Struye. Their opinion was unanimously negative40: the free granting of 
an unlimited line of credit to the Kassen would be in contravention of 
article 115 of the Penal Code, which formally prohibited financial help 
being given to the enemy.
Janssen refused to comply and total deadlock ensued. However, the 
Bank continued to accept the Scheine presented at its counters and ex-
change them for their full value. It also transferred the Scheine it re-
ceived to the central administration of the Reichskreditkassen, which 
withdrew them from circulation in exchange for Belgian money. By 
the beginning of September 1941, 3,566 million Belgian francs’ worth 
of Scheine (the equivalent of 249,323,812 Reichsmarks) had been trans-
ferred and taken out of circulation41. On 1 August 1941, meanwhile, an 
agreement had been concluded between the Military Government and 
the Ministry of Finance, whereby the value of Scheine subsequently 
presented to the Bank would be offset against the occupation costs to 
be paid of 50 million Belgian francs per month. However, few further 
Scheine were presented and the problem of dual circulation seemed to 
have disappeared. On 5 November 1941, Plisnier concluded the matter 
by granting the Banque d’Emission a State guarantee for the amount of 
what the withdrawal of the Scheine had cost42.
39 BNB, Archives, SD, 36, Foreign Department, dossier 8.11/32 (RKKS): la question des 
Reichskreditkassenscheine.
40 SOMA, Archives, Paul Struye Papers, dossier 4: consultations BNB et Finances 
(crédit à l’occupant).
41 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier 88.02.01.00 (B 608/4): retrait des Reichskre-
ditkassenscheine.
42 BNB, Archives, SD, 36, Foreign Department, dossier 8.11/32 (RKKS): la question des 
Reichskreditkassenscheine.
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The cosTs of occupaTion and Their financing
The costs of occupation were yet another bone of contention between 
the Belgian administration and the Military Government. They also 
concerned the Bank, as they exerted a direct effect on public financ-
es and thereby on the Bank’s provision of credit to the government. 
When, on 26 July 1940, Plisnier was requested to transfer 3 billion Bel-
gian francs by way of prepayment of prospective occupation costs, he 
immediately turned to the jurists Marcq, Rolin and Struye for advice. 
Their opinion was that the Hague Convention entitled the Germans 
to demand such costs from Belgium, but that the extent and terms of 
those costs were subject to strict conditions; only the costs of adminis-
trating the occupied territory and of maintaining the local occupation 
authority were admissible. As Belgium continued to be responsible for 
the administration of the country and for maintaining public order, 
only the maintenance costs for the occupying troops could be taken 
into account. The jurists concluded that the amount demanded by the 
Military Government was excessive and not to be accepted43.
Accompanied by Janssen44, on 9 August Plisnier went to discuss the 
matter with Reeder, basing his arguments on the opinion of the three 
jurists. He accepted the ‘principle’ of occupation costs, but wanted to 
come to a fixed agreement with Reeder about their extent. He also had a 
number of pertinent questions to ask regarding the term that would be 
covered by the prepayment demanded, whether a detailed list of costs 
could be provided and what the estimate was for overall occupation 
costs. Furthermore, he pointed out to Reeder that excessive occupation 
costs would totally derail the Belgian economy, while it was precisely 
the German administration’s express intention to get that economy up 
43 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘Association Belge des Banques’ Papers, dossier 08.00.00.00 
(C 783/4): AV, minutes, 17.08.1940 (see also the letter of 05.08.1940 from Plisnier to 
A.-E. Janssen, chairman of the association).
44 Plisnier valued Janssen’s cooperation extremely highly:‘….tous mes remercie-
ments pour l’aide précieuse que vous m’avez apportée en les moments difficiles que 
l’Administration des Finances vient de traverser. J’en profite….de vous dire….com-
bien j’apprécie les sentiments de patriotisme éclairé et de dévouement à la chose pub-
lique qui vous ont guidé en ces circonstances’ (BNB, Archives, SD, 33, dossier 8.11.27/4, 
‘divers’: letter of 20.08.1940 from Plisnier to Janssen).
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and running again. Reeder took the point, but nevertheless demanded 
that the amount demanded be paid by 20 August45.
Plisnier had little choice but to accede to Reeder’s demand and im-
mediately began consultations with Janssen and the private bankers to 
arrange the financing. By 20 August, the Banque d’Emission would dis-
count 3 billion Belgian francs’ worth of renewable Treasury bonds at 
four months and the private banks would subscribe for a total of 500 
million Belgian francs. To consolidate the resulting debt, the Treasury 
would, from the end of September, issue a ten-year government loan 
of 3 billion Belgian francs at 4 per cent per year, to be organized by the 
Bank. In a consortium, the banks immediately underwrote 500 million 
Belgian francs46. At the request of the Military Government, Plisnier 
agreed to increase fiscal pressure in order to finance the interest charges 
and to redeem the debt, and new taxes set to bring in about 2.5 billion 
Belgian francs were imposed in October 1940 and at the beginning of 
1941. The fact that agreement was reached so smoothly suggests that 
everyone, i.e. Plisnier, Janssen and the bankers, were convinced that the 
occupation would be short-lived and that the problem of occupation 
costs would be resolved in the not too distant future.
However, the dust had barely settled around the prepayment of 3 
billion Belgian francs when, in a letter of 27 November 1940, the Mili-
tary Government demanded a further prepayment of 2.5 billion Belgian 
francs, to be transferred before 10 December. In his letter, Reeder added 
that, after consultation with the government in Berlin, a long-term ar-
rangement would be worked out, with fixed amounts per month. Plis-
nier was furious and requested a meeting. This took place on 11 Decem-
ber and again Plisnier was accompanied by Janssen. From what was 
said, both could infer that the new demand was intended as cover for 
the occupation costs for November and December. If an arrangement 
for a fixed amount was put in place in January, as was more or less being 
mooted, a monthly payment of about 1.25 billion Belgian francs could 
be expected.
45 BNB, Archives, SD, 33, dossier 8.11.27/4, ‘divers’: Plisnier, mémoire relatif à 
l’indemnité réclamée à la Belgique au titre de couverture des frais d’occupation, 
20.12.1940. See also: BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 17.08.1940.
46 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘Association Belge des Banques’ Papers, dossier 08.00.00.00 
(C 783/4): AV, minutes, 17.08.1940.
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Plisnier and Janssen were shaken by such exorbitant demands and 
put forward several counter-arguments, in order to move Reeder to 
take a more reasonable line. The new demands, they argued, were clear-
ly beyond the country’s budgetary and fiscal capacity. In addition to the 
occupation costs, the government had to finance the costs of economic 
recovery and of reconstruction; at the same time, it had to cope with 
the gap in tax income during the first months of the invasion, as well 
as with the weak growth of that income thereafter. Furthermore, the 
government was faced with claims from towns and municipalities for 
providing extra services to the occupier, such as billeting. Finally, there 
was the gloomy outlook for government income; the government loan 
issued in September had been a downright fiasco, with barely 1.4 billion 
of the projected 3 billion Belgian francs being subscribed to and, despite 
an extension of the subscription period, little more could be expected. 
With a winter of hunger in prospect, it was certainly not the moment 
to introduce new tax levies, as suggested by the Military Government. 
Nor was anything to be expected from windfall taxing of war profits, as 
these generally stemmed from illegal transactions on the black market 
and thus completely escaped tax.
However real the arguments, they had no effect whatsoever on the 
Military Government, which stood by its demand for a further 2.5 bil-
lion Belgian francs. Plisnier and Janssen nevertheless received an un-
dertaking that the monthly amount for the costs of occupation would 
be set in January 1941 and that there would be no further issue of 
Reichskreditkassenscheine. Plisnier resigned himself to the decision and 
an initial tranche of 500 million Belgian francs was transferred on 12 
December, the balance being paid in four equal tranches every ten days 
from 20 December47. Over time, however, the strongly founded argu-
ments of Plisnier and Janssen bore fruit. In January 1941, the monthly 
amount for the costs of occupation were at last fixed at 1 billion Belgian 
francs, lower than originally feared, and payable with effect from 1 Feb-
ruary.
47 In January 1941, Plisnier invited twenty prominent figures from the world of fi-
nance, administration and politics and from the magistrature to exchange ideas on 
this question. The meeting approved Plisnier’s stance (BNB, Archives, SD, dossier 
8.11.27/ 4, ‘divers’: report of the meeting, 22.01.1941).
146 Chapter 8
Where was the Belgian administration to get those enormous sums? 
Because of the war it could not count much on rising tax income. In 
1938, 63 per cent of government expenditure was covered by tax re-
ceipts, but that figure fell to 36.6 per cent in 1940 and was to fall further 
to a low of 29.3 per cent in 194348. In fact, the only way to bridge the ris-
ing deficit of the administration‘s budget was by loans and the issue of 
paper money.
As already mentioned, long-term government loans, such as that 
launched in September 1940, failed to attract the public49. The prefer-
ence was clearly for short-term investment and it was this preference 
that the management of the Bank, as well as the private bankers, urged 
the Treasury to exploit by offering short-term Treasury certificates to 
the wider public50. The Treasury declined to take that step, arguing that 
the wider public was too fickle; it preferred to keep its short-term cer-
tificates exclusively for the banks, with which it had a more rational 
business relationship and which were more susceptible to pressure51.
The private banks, for their part, became increasingly interested in 
Treasury paper. In a surprisingly short time, they had gone from a situ-
ation of tight liquidity to an equally unhealthy one of a growing surplus 
of deposits that were bringing no return. Demand from business for 
investment funds was at a virtual standstill and, in the uncertainty of 
the war years, few private individuals were prepared to risk taking up 
consumer credit from their banker. It was a situation where the Treas-
ury’s need of money and the bankers’ search for profitable investments 
came together. By the autumn of 1941, the private banks had 12.7 billion 
Belgian francs’ worth of 4-month Treasury certificates at 2.75 per cent 
in portfolio. 
48 BNB, Archives, SD, Goffin Papers, f. 2: considérations relatives à la politique 
d’emprunt, memorandum of January 1944.
49 A comprehensive analysis can be found in a memorandum prepared by Dupriez, 
Vincent and Kauch: BNB, Archives, SD, Goffin Papers, f. 2: considérations relatives 
à la politique d’emprunt. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La 
Banque Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, Chapter. 5, p. 86.
50 BNB, Archives, SD, Goffin Papers, dossier 2: Société Générale, memorandum of 
21.10.1940; memorandum of 02.09.1941 from Kauch.
51 BNB, Archives, SD, Goffin Papers, dossier 2: report of the meeting of governor Gof-
fin with government commissioner Smeers, 10.09.1941.
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Table 8.2:  Development of the BNB’s portfolio of government paper, 1940-1941
(in millions of Belgian francs)
Date
Short-term Treasury 

















































Source: BNB Archives, SD, Malaise papers, 2, file 9.5.6.: Aspeslagh, de Nationale Bank 
van België en haar monetaire functie, 24.12.1941, p. 24.

Chapter 9
The Policy of Accommodation 
Put to the Test
The commandeering of gold and foreign currency
The Currency Protection Office (Devisenschutzkommando) was noti-
fying the Belgian civilian population as early as 21 May 1940 that free 
access to the hired safe-deposit boxes in the strong-rooms of the private 
banks was temporarily suspended. The hirers were requested to present 
themselves and, by appointment, to open their safe-deposit box in the 
presence of a representative of the Kommando, who would verify the 
contents and list them. Should the hirers not appear, members of the 
Kommando would force the boxes and, after verification, draw up an 
authenticated inventory of the contents. Gold, foreign currency and se-
curities would be deposited in safe custody with the bank in question, 
cash placed on a blocked current account and jewellery placed in an 
envelope that would then be sealed and entrusted to that bank1.
However, the occupier’s search for gold, foreign currency and for-
eign securities went further than the inspection of safe-deposit boxes in 
banks. On 17 June 1940, the Military Government issued an ordinance 
prohibiting the population and other authorised persons in the occu-
pied territory from having free disposition of gold, foreign currency or 
foreign securities; anyone in possession of them was required to de-
clare them to the nearest local office of the Reichskreditkasse. Further 
instructions were to follow in an eventual total of twelve decrees that 
were promulgated subsequently2.
1 BNB, Archives, Hoofdkas, dossier ‘BEB’: ordonnances en matière de devises: régle-
mentation relative aux coffres-forts, annex 4.
2 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 3, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi 
(20.12.1943), p. 100.
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On 2 August, in a first decree, gold, gold coins, US dollars, Swiss 
francs and Swedish kronor were required to be declared and offered for 
sale to the Banque d’Emission, from where they would be transferred 
on a weekly basis to the Reichsbank in Berlin. It is to be noted that in the 
decree nothing was formally ‘assessed’, but great pressure was exercised 
on owners to sell3. Later, this requirement was expanded to include oth-
er metals, such as platinum and silver. A decree of 27  August, concern-
ing all foreign shares, bonds and government securities, as well as other 
assets held abroad, explicitly emphasized that Congolese shares and 
securities were also to be regarded as ‘foreign’. Lastly, the requirement 
was extended to include virtually all European and Latin-American 
currencies, plus the Canadian dollar and the Japanese yen4. Apparently, 
and somewhat oddly, there was no interest in sterling holdings, though 
this situation was to change in February 1943, when these, too, had to 
be declared and offered for sale5.
It was not only the numerous holders of precious metals, hard cur-
rency and foreign shares who were affected by the decrees; the Bank, 
too, felt itself targeted. Janssen informed von Becker that the decree 
of 17 June and the implementing decree of 2 August had hit the Bank 
hard, as it removed any possibility for the Bank in the future to build 
up a gold reserve or a portfolio of foreign reserve currencies, over and 
above its holdings of Reichsmarks; the country was in desperate need 
of such reserves to buy foodstuffs and raw materials. Further, he asked 
whether it would not be better to allow the Banque d’Emission to keep 
the gold and foreign currency it had purchased and use them as an ex-
change reserve, rather than sending them to the Reichsbank in Berlin6. 
3 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 3, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi 
(20.12.1943), pp. 101-107. See also: Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, Militärver-
waltung, dossier RW 36/281: Hofrichter, Abschluszbericht, Militärverwaltung in 
Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, pp. 26-28.
4 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (unpub-
lished text, 1946), Part 1, pp. 158 and 160. See also: BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 02.10.1940 
and 16.10.1940.
5 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/281: Hofrich-
ter, Abschluszbericht, Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, pp. 26-
27.
6 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 9, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 240/6): letter of 29.08.1940 
from Janssen to von Becker.
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In its answer of 11 September, the Bankaufsichtamt rejected this sug-
gestion, arguing that the general centralization of these assets in Berlin 
was necessary in order to secure their efficient use in the interests of the 
‘European’ economy7.
Bad blood was likewise created by the ordinance of 27 August con-
cerning the declaring and offering for sale of foreign shares, bonds and 
government securities. Janssen turned again to Rolin for advice8. The 
centralization of foreign currency in a special Banque d’Emission ac-
count at the Reichsbank and the refusal to allow the Banque d’Emission, 
to dispose of it, were in Rolins view against art. 52 and 53 of the Hague 
Convention: the Reichsbank could, if deemed necessary, always com-
mandeer the contents of the account, thereby giving the occupier the 
disposition of some private Belgian assets in the event of a European 
emergency. The Bank and the Banque d’Emission therefore ought not 
to acquiesce in this disguised confiscation or actively participate in vol-
untary or compulsory purchase operations, nor in the centralization of 
the purchased items, nor in their transfer to Berlin. Any active partici-
pation would imply giving financial assistance to the enemy and would 
fall under article 115 of the Belgian Penal Code9.
Janssen, Plisnier and the private bankers brought a great deal of 
pressure to bear on the Bankaufsichtamt to tone down the measures. 
Their efforts produced a response: the Military Government agreed to 
exempt colonial shares and securities from the obligation to declare 
and offer them for sale. This came as a great relief, particularly for the 
Société Générale de Belgique, though also for the many Belgian private 
individuals, holding companies, businesses and institutions that had 
traditionally invested in such valuables10. There was also a second con-
7 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 16.10.1940. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report 
of the Commission of Enquiry (published 1946), Part 1, p. 159.
8 BNB, Archives, SD, 30, BEB, dossier 8.11.24 s. f. 16: note de L.H. Dupriez (sur la quat-
rième ordonnance relative aux devises étrangères du 27 août 1940), 09.09.1940; BNB, 
Archives, SD, dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 13: note résumant l’entretien du 
mardi 24 septembre 1940 entre M. le Gouverneur et M. Henri Rolin, 01.10.1940.
9 BNB, Archives, SD, dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 13: note résumant l’entretien 
du 24 septembre entre M. le Gouverneur et M. Henri Rolin, 1 octobre 1940 (in ad-
dendum: letter of 08.10.1940 from Rolin to Janssen).
10 BNB, Archives, Contentieux: nota, 12.09.1940; BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 
dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi (20.12.1943), pp. 107-109.
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cession concerning foreign securities, which now were no longer re-
quired to be offered for sale, though they still had to be declared11.
However, neither of the two concessions was mentioned in a new 
implementing decree; rather, they were communicated verbally and 
Janssen took it upon himself to use the press to announce them to the 
public. It was also a fact that no further mention of the two original ob-
ligations was made on the declaration forms. Privately, and aside from 
any ordinance, transactions in foreign shares and securities were still 
taking place between Belgian and German civilians and institutions, 
this period seeing numerous Belgian assets in Eastern and Central 
 Europe being sold to German firms and private individuals. In general, 
these arose from participating in banks, companies and buildings that 
had given Belgian investors little satisfaction, particularly during the 
1930’s, when profits were frozen for years or the repatriation of invested 
capital prohibited. The Germans, looking to increase their sphere of 
influence in those regions, were very avid buyers. The transactions also 
fitted in extraordinarily well with Goering’s policy of economic inte-
gration, which was only gradually under way in the rest of the occupied 
territories12.
For precious metals and foreign currency, the obligatory declara-
tion and offer for sale remained in force. Janssen ultimately assented 
to the measure and was also prepared to accept the role of the Banque 
d’Emission in centralizing the purchases and in transferring them to 
Berlin. It is probable that he still nurtured the hope that his good per-
sonal relationship with Puhl, Deputy-chairman of the Reichsbank, 
would lead to the Banque d’Emission retaining some say in whether the 
valuables could be used for the purchase of foodstuffs and raw materi-
als13.
Rolin was not happy with the accommodating stance adopted by 
Janssen in the planned announcement on the matter, and particularly 
with the acceptance of the role of the Banque d’Emission in centralizing 
11 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi 
(20.12.1943), pp. 104-105.
12 H. James, ‘The Deutsche Bank and the Dictatorship, 1933-1945’, in: L. Gall et al., 
The Deutsche Bank, 1870-1995, London, 1995, pp. 330-333. See also: Van der Wee and 
Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, 1822-1997, pp. 254-256.
13 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 16.10.1940.
 The Policy of Accommodation Put to the Test 153
and transferring gold and foreign currency to Germany. Janssen took 
account of Rolin’s opinion and corrected his original text, the new ver-
sion of which he submitted to the board of directors. There was unani-
mous agreement for the role of the Banque d’Emission in transferring 
gold and foreign currency to Berlin, but under the explicit condition 
that the value they represented be used solely for financing the import 
of foodstuffs and raw materials to Belgium.
What prompted the Military Government to go some way to meet-
ing the demands from the Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the pri-
vate banks for the ordinance of 27 August to be watered down? It may 
well have been that it was sensitive to the argument that the measures 
contravened the norms of international law: during the Second World 
War, the German authorities, indeed, tried as much as possible to keep 
their actions legitimate within national legislation and within the in-
ternational arrangements and conventions then in force14. The Belgian 
leadership was often struck by the occupier’s concern with legality and 
had learned to use it to their own advantage: if German demands were 
thought to be excessive, the leadership argued against them on the basis 
of legal principles and attempted first to demonstrate that the proposed 
measures contravened national or international law.
The Bank also attempted to take a more subtle line in resisting the 
dictates imposed on it and to incorporate a certain ‘leisureliness’ into 
its cooperation, which proved relatively successful in dealing with the 
declarations about foreign assets15. Declarations and offers for sale 
poured in during the summer and autumn of 1940. The declarations 
led to a total of about 400,000 dossiers being created, but no additional 
help to those who had to handle them was forthcoming from the Bank. 
The Bankaufsichtamt became impatient and indeed suspicious, and 
laid down that priority be given to the declarations concerning gold 
and foreign currencies. Between July 1940 and August 1944, the Banque 
d’Emission transferred to the Reichsbank 210.9 million Belgian francs’ 
14 Commission d’études sur le sort des biens des membres de la communauté juive de 
Belgique, final report (final evaluation, conclusions and proposals), Brussels, 2002, 
p. 455.
15 In respect of what follows, see the memorandum from R. Simonis regarding the 
interview granted to W. Pluym in 1998: ‘Quelques souvenirs de la période de guerre 
à la Banque’.
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worth of gold and 94.7 million Belgian francs’ worth of foreign cur-
rency, the greater part before the end of 194016.
Another aspect of the commandeering of gold, money and other 
valuables, one in which both the Bank and the Banque d’Emission were 
involved, concerned the persecution of the Jews17. Belgian Jews and 
Jewish firms had to open their safe-deposit boxes in the same way as 
all other Belgians, but from October 1940 they were subject to a series 
of additional measures. With effect from 28 October, for example, all 
Jews were required to have their names recorded in the Jewish register 
and all Jewish firms were required to enrol with a special registration 
service. It was then but a short while before the Military Government 
focused its attention on the Jewish community’s financial assets, an 
ordinance of 31 May 1941 obliging all Jews and Jewish firms to notify 
their banking institution that they were Jewish, to transfer their de-
posits to an account at one of the recognized exchange banks and to 
deposit their holdings of Belgian and foreign securities with that same 
exchange bank.
The Bank found itself caught up in this measure, as fifty or so of 
its clients – individuals and firms – holding a current or a custody ac-
count gave notification that they were Jewish. Not having the legal sta-
tus of a recognized exchange bank, the Bank was consequently obliged 
in principle to transfer their credit balances. It nevertheless obtained 
the right to retain the accounts. In the autumn of 1942, however, the 
Military Government decided to centralize all Jewish bank and cus-
tody accounts at the Brüsseler Treuhandgesellschaft, a management 
company in Belgian law, under German control; this company in turn 
demanded that all those accounts be transferred before 31 January 1943 
to its account at a French institution under German control, the So-
ciété française de banque et de dépôts in Brussels. The Bank allowed 
the investigations into the exact amount of the balances to drag on and 
16 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/281: Hofric-
hter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, pp. 
27-28; BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (pub-
lished 1946), Part 1, pp. 162-169.
17 In respect of what follows, see: J. Makart, ‘Les avoirs des Juifs pendant la guerre, 
1940-1945’ (memorandum of 21.01.2002 from Makart, provided to the authors). See 
also: W. Pluym, ‘Rekeningen van verdwenen mensen. De Bank stelt de joodse ge-
meenschap schadeloos voor verloren tegoeden tijdens Wereldoorlog II’, in: Connect 
(NBB staff magazine), July-August 2002, pp.10-13.
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it was only in the spring of 1943 that the credit balances of seventeen 
accounts were transferred, most of which did not even amount to 300 
Belgian francs; all the other accounts showed a negative balance which 
precluded any transfer.
The fraudulenT clearing sysTem
By the time the Second World War broke out, the monetary world or-
der had already moved a long way from the gold standard. During the 
depression of the 1930s, many countries had scrapped not only their 
currency’s gold convertibility, but also its linkage to gold. Most of them 
had then introduced a system of floating currencies, sometimes with 
the national currency floating against all other currencies and some-
times with the national currency as part of a group of currencies – as 
in the case of the sterling zone – with fixed exchange rates against each 
other, but floating against all other currencies. Other countries that had 
abandoned the gold standard introduced a bilateral system of fixed ex-
change rates, linked to a strict commercial policy.
Until the German invasion, the Belgian government maintained 
the gold convertibility of the Belgian franc and foreign payments re-
mained in principle unrestricted. Clearing accounts were nevertheless 
opened at the Bank for countries that officially permitted foreign trans-
actions only on that basis. With the occupation of Belgium, the situa-
tion changed: the Belgian franc was now in the German Reichsmark 
zone and Belgian foreign payments would consequently be integrated 
into the German clearing system. On 10 June 1940, immediately after 
the occupation had become a fact, an official of the Bankaufsichtamt 
met Goffin to discuss the situation, but Goffin pointed out that such 
arrangements fell within the competence of the Ministry of Finance. 
Plisnier was then brought into the matter and authorized the Bank to 
co-operate in the implementation of the German clearing system18.
The definitive arrangement was published in a notice of 10 July 1940 
in the German Official Gazette. All payments from Belgium to German 
creditors were required to be transferred to an account in the name of 
18 BNB, Archives, SD, 31, Malaise Papers, dossier 8.11.25, s. f. 10, ‘entretiens’ (meeting 
between Goffin and Flad, 10.06.1940).
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the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse at the Bank in Brussels; conversely, all 
payments from Germany to Belgian creditors would be transferred to 
an account in the name of the Bank at the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse 
in Berlin; payments would be at a fixed exchange rate of 1 Reichsmark 
to 12.50 Belgian francs. The arrangement was, in fact, similar to the 
method current during the 1930s in the countries within the German 
sphere of influence, as indicated above; it was no longer the market, but 
the government, in cooperation with the central banks, that would en-
sure bilateral equilibrium in international payment transactions within 
the zone.
On his return from France on 10 July, Janssen had no choice but 
to accept the German arrangement just announced, as it was simply 
imposed on Belgium by the occupier. He found nevertheless that the 
system also offered certain advantages, creating an institutional frame-
work for both the export of Belgian manufactured goods to Germany 
and the import of what to Belgium were essential foodstuffs and raw 
materials. Furthermore, the centralization of all Belgian international 
payments ought normally to give the Bank the opportunity to control 
them. However, Janssen was undoubtedly aware of the difficulties that 
cooperation in clearing could create for the Bank, should it later have to 
justify its wartime activities. Shortly after his return, therefore, he nego-
tiated with the Bankaufsichtamt to have the Bank relieved of its clearing 
task and to transfer this to the Banque d’Emission. On 4  August 1940, 
the Military Government acceded to Janssen’s request19, but the change 
was greeted with mixed feelings by the founder-bankers of the Banque 
d’Emission. On the one hand, they were satisfied that they now had a di-
rect say in the country’s foreign transactions. On the other, they feared 
unfavourable implications in the longer term, though against this was 
Janssen’s integrity and their own ‘patriotic caution’20.
Janssen was also able to convince Plisnier that the financing of ex-
ports was in fact linked to the import of foodstuffs and raw materials 
so vital for the country, and that the general and the private interest 
19 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 2, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 2, ‘renseignements BEB, n°4’: 
the decision of 4 August was published as a notice in the Verordnungsblatt (Ger-
man Official Gazette), 07.08.1940.
20 BNB, Archives, SD, 41, dossier 8.11.42 b, ‘enquête BEB’: memorandum of 22.01.1945 
from Plisnier.
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thereby coincided. Consequently, providing a State guarantee against 
the risks involved in clearing was in the general interest. Plisnier ac-
cepted this reasoning and on 19 July authorized the Treasury to issue 
Treasury certificates for the purpose, up to a maximum amount of 1 
billion Belgian francs, and to pass them to the Bank21. From 4 August 
on, the certificates were handed over to the Banque d’Emission.
Janssen found this procedure too complicated and suggested a sim-
plification. The Bank would make the necessary banknotes available 
to the Banque d’Emission, the Ministry of Finance granting the latter 
a State guarantee up to an amount of 1 billion Belgian francs for any 
losses that it might incur22. On 20 November 1940, at Janssen’s insist-
ence and after a great deal of quibbling, the guarantee was raised to 
1.5 billion Belgian francs23; almost a year later, on 5 November 1941, an 
unlimited State guarantee was granted24.
Although Janssen had accepted the clearing system as such, he was 
not happy with the conditions that the arrangement of 10 July 1940 im-
posed on Belgium. In accordance with the pre-war procedure, putting a 
clearing system in place was a matter of a voluntary agreement between 
two sovereign states and had to be based on full equilibrium between 
mutual imports and exports in terms of value; no imbalance could be 
tolerated for more than a limited period. The system imposed on Bel-
21 BNB, Archives, SD, 31, dossier 8.11.25, s. f. 10, ‘divers’: entretiens. See also: BNB, Ar-
chives, Studiedienst, 6, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 237/ 1, s. f. 11): projets d’arrêté minis-
tériel relatif à la garantie de l’Etat (memorandum of 31.07.1940 from Smeers to Plis-
nier).
22 Published in the Belgian Official Gazette of 12-13.09.1940: BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 
18.09.1940; Brutsaert, Oscar Plisnier, pp. 84-85. See also: Krijgsauditoraat, enquête 
BEB, dossier 3-4: A. Heilporn, E. Guyot, E. Desutter, rapport d’expertise en cause de 
la BEB, Part 1, pp. 14-16.
23 Krijgsauditoraat, enquête BEB, dossier 3-4: A. Heilporn, E. Guyot, E. Desutter, rap-
port d’expertise en cause de la BEB, Part 1, pp. 15-17. See also: BNB, Archives, RR, 
20.11.1940; BNB, Archives, SD, 12, notes (conférences), dossier 8.11.25.
24 Krijgsauditoraat, enquête BEB, dossier 3-4: A. Heilporn, E. Guyot, E. Desutter, 
rapport d’expertise en cause de la BEB, Part 1, pp. 15-18. In Plisnier’s opinion, the 
State guarantee nevertheless remained subject to certain conditions: ‘Si cette ga-
rantie couvrait le risque global que l’Institut d’Emission courait, elle ne couvrait 
aucune opération individualisée du clearing…’ For Plisnier, it was also clear that 
the ultimate beneficiary of the State guarantee was the Bank, and not the Banque 
d’Emission (NBB, SD, 41, dossier 8.11.42 b, ‘enquête BEB’: memorandum of 22.01.1945 
from Plisnier).
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gium ignored those elementary pre-war rules25; it was established by 
unilateral decision of the Germans, leaving Belgium unable to make 
any suggestions to amend it. Worse, the arrangement of 10 July 1940 
stated that Belgian exports of goods and services to Germany were not 
subject to any limitation and that there was no compulsion for there 
to be countervailing exports from Germany to Belgium26, a regulation 
that was to give rise to insurmountable problems in the future.
Belgian exporters were able to demand payment as soon as the 
amount due had been transferred to the Banque d’Emission’s account at 
the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin. Should the Banque d’Emission refuse 
financing, the German commissioner, and indeed the German Minis-
ter of Finance in Berlin, were empowered to order payment. By this ar-
rangement, the Banque d’Emission was put entirely at the mercy of the 
occupier’s whim; it could, in principle, be forced to finance every claim 
on Germany, without being able to exercise any ‘prior’ verification of 
the legality of that claim. Its competence was, in fact, limited to a pos-
teriori verification of the documents submitted27. The arrangement was 
not at all to Janssen’s liking and though he still nurtured a faint hope 
that the Germans would not abuse the arrangement, he felt no certainty 
about this.
Janssen turned to seeking a way of circumventing the disadvantages 
of the system and to that end contacted the Reichsbank in Berlin with 
the intention of concluding a separate agreement between the respec-
tive German and Belgian issue institutions, in order to counter the 
danger of having to comply with arbitrary instructions from the au-
thorities in Berlin. It was in that spirit that, on 16 August 1940, on behalf 
of the Banque d’Emission, he signed a convention that was endorsed a 
day later by the Reichsbank. The Banque d’Emission undertook to ex-
change into Belgian francs, without let or hindrance, all Reichsmarks 
presented by the Reichsbank; for its part, the Reichsbank undertook to 
exchange into Reichsmarks, without let or hindrance, all Belgian francs 
presented by the Banque d’Emission.
25 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 2, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 2: ‘clearing’.
26 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 5, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 409/ 2): mémorandum relatif 
à l’accord du 16-17 août 1940 (20.05.1941).
27 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 3, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 4,: Kauch, rapport au Roi 
(20.12.1943), pp. 65- 76.
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The convention harked back to the method introduced by Germany 
in the 1930s to have all international payments pass compulsory and 
exclusively via the central banks, the purpose being to enable those 
banks to control all financial operations with other countries and 
thereby maintain full equilibrium in bilateral payment transactions. In 
Janssen’s view, the convention would be to Belgium’s advantage28, as it 
would give the Banque d’Emission autonomous scope to use the receipts 
from Belgian exports to Germany for purchases of German foodstuffs 
and raw materials, and to gear those purchases to Belgium’s import re-
quirements. Moreover, the two central banks would constantly moni-
tor equilibrium in the clearing system between the two countries: the 
convention thus was, in his view, ‘an instrument to counter any abuse, 
which could arise from the arbitrary and unilateral character of the 
system, imposed on 10 July’ 29.
Janssen’s hope proved idle. The convention of 16-17 August was a 
non-starter and was even to be used by the German authorities against 
the Bank. In the first place, it was not with the Reichsbank that Ger-
man customers were required to settle their debts, but with the Verrech-
nungskasse in Berlin, which was in no way accountable to the Reichs-
bank. Consequently, the Reichsbank had no authority to interfere in 
respect of the growing imbalance in clearing between Germany and 
Belgium. Furthermore, the freedom of action of both the Reichsbank 
and the Banque d’Emission was restricted by the German regulations 
governing the import and export of goods, services and capital; there 
were no restrictions whatever on exports from Belgium – the more, the 
better – but exports from Germany were limited to such an extent as to 
amount to virtually a complete embargo on them. Lastly, the Banque 
d’Emission had neither free disposition of its foreign currency account 
at the Reichsbank, in order to be able to purchase foodstuffs and raw 
materials in Germany or elsewhere abroad, nor free access to its credit 
balances at the Verrechnungskasse. Janssen quickly realized that what 
was seen as a German concession in the convention remained a dead 
28 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
1946), Part 1, p. 174.
29 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 2, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 2, ‘renseignements BEB’: re-
port of the Commission of Enquiry, Part I: Clearing. Chapter 1: La réglementation 
allemande.
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letter as far as Belgium was concerned. During a meeting in September 
1941, Collin was even to claim that the convention was a weapon the 
Germans authorities could use to force the Bank to co-operate in the 
inflationary monetary policy30.
The clearing system put in place on 10 July 1940 between Germany 
and Belgium was followed by similar bilateral agreements between Bel-
gium and a number of other countries31, but these were concluded by the 
Military Government, not by the Belgian administration. The agree-
ments were fairly quickly integrated into a multilateral system, the hub 
of which was the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin. The measure was justi-
fied by the theoretical argument that multilateralization would remove 
the limitations inherent in the requirement for bilateral equilibria. In 
the prevailing circumstances, however, the measure was simply a pre-
text to lay hands on foreign currency: ‘a one way system, imposed upon 
all occupied countries in Europe and even upon a neutral country such 
as Switserland’ 32.
The firsT crisis of The clearing sysTem
Towards the end of the exceptionally harsh winter of 1940-1941, fam-
ine, especially in the towns, became a feature of daily life. Janssen, the 
Galopin Committee and many other people in authority rightly looked 
for recourse to the clearing agreement, asking why, if the Banque 
d’Emission had such an exceptionally positive credit balance at the Ver-
30 BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, s. f. 6: minutes of the meeting of the editorial 
committee for the drafting of the motion of 24.09.1941. 
31 In 1940, clearing agreements were signed on 2 August with the Netherlands, on 24 
September with Italy, on 27 September with Sweden, on 1 October with the Protec-
torate of Bohemia-Moravia, on 7 October with Switzerland, on 1 November with 
Finland, on 13 November with Yugoslavia, on 9 December with Bulgaria, on 18 De-
cember with Norway, on 23 December with Hungary, on 9 December with Greece; 
and in 1941, on 21 January with Denmark, on 27 January with France, on 28 Febru-
ary with Rumania, on 11 June with Slovakia, on 23 April (until 22 June) with the 
Soviet Union, on 18 September with Serbia and on 20 October with Croatia.
32 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 7, pp. 5-6. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 2, dossier 
9.5.11, s. f. 2, ‘renseignements BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry, Part I: 
Clearing. Chapter 1: La réglementation allemande. See also: BIS (Basel), Archives, 
jaarverslag, 1943, p. 285.
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rechnungskasse in Berlin, the promised supply of food had not material-
ized. At the meeting of the Bank’s supervisory council on 13 November 
1940, indeed, Janssen had already indicated that the credit balance had 
risen to nearly 1 billion Belgian francs33.
However, the Germans showed little willingness to supply food-
stuffs, something that put Janssen severely out of countenance: he had, 
after all, invested a great deal of his energy and even prestige in the 
clearing system’s operation. On top of this came the news that, at the 
beginning of March 1941, the Banque d’Emission’s credit balance has 
suddenly increased by about 700 million Belgian francs34. During a 
meeting of the institution’s board of directors on 5 March, Commis-
sioner von Becker let slip that the increase was due mainly to financial 
transactions, namely to payments made by German private individuals 
and institutions for participations they had taken in Belgian companies 
and, most of all, to payments for German purchases of Belgian foreign 
investments35. Belgian holding companies and banks had, in fact, been 
able to rid themselves of their Central and Eastern European assets, 
blocked since the 1930s, by selling them to German banks. Addition-
ally, German law obliged holding companies and banks to divest them-
selves of their assets in Luxembourg – now German territory – through 
sales to German residents or companies36. Those who had sold shares, 
whether under compulsion or not, were now looking to use the clear-
ing mechanism of the Verrechnungskasse and the Banque d’Emission to 
convert their Reichsmark receipts into Belgian money.
This was not the first time that payment for financial transactions 
had been made in Belgium to the beneficiaries, and Janssen, who had 
taken complete control of the clearing operations since July 194037, had 
indeed always sanctioned the payments38. Now, however, exception-
33 BNB, Archives, RR, 13.11.1940.
34 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 05.03.1941.
35 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
1946), Part 1, Chapter. VII, p. 175. 
36 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank 1822-1997, pp. 255-256; Van der Wee 
and Verbreyt, Mensen maken geschiedenis. De Kredietbank 1935-1985, pp. 171-178.
37 BNB, Archives, DC, 10.07.1941.
38 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 14.03.1941; BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the 
Commission of Enquiry (published 1946), Part 1, Chapter. VII, pp. 174-176.
162 Chapter 9
ally high amounts were involved, so that even the maximum limit of 
the State guarantee was exceeded. Certain members of the Banque 
d’Emission’s board of directors also found it unacceptable that the in-
crease was the result not of commercial activities, but of purely finan-
cial transactions, and many among them could not help but feel uneasy 
about such operations.
There was no room here for the argument that the operations were 
necessary for imports of foodstuffs, because the credit balance from 
commercial activities was more than sufficient to ensure food imports 
for Belgium. What made matters worse, however, was that the sale of 
Belgian assets abroad served to increase the economic power of Ger-
many; any Banque d’Emission involvement would be punishable in Bel-
gian law. These considerations prompted the board to call a temporary 
halt to payments in respect of financial transactions and to contact Sec-
retary-general Plisnier to obtain his advice and cooperation in finding 
a solution39.
On 7 March 1941, Janssen and certain members of the board, gath-
ered together with Plisnier and two representatives of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, to discuss the problem of payments regarding finan-
cial transactions and to determine the extent to which, in this context, 
the State guarantee could be extended. Plisnier was formal: payment 
for financial transactions could not be advanced as an argument for 
increasing the amount of the State guarantee. He was nevertheless pre-
pared to cover an overrun of the limit, provided it was temporary and 
the consequence of payments for commercial transactions40.
The next day, on 8 March, the board of directors, taking into ac-
count the results of the meeting with Plisnier, decided to maintain the 
suspension of payments regarding financial transactions. Von Becker 
reacted by issuing the same day a formal payment order (Weisung) of 
275 million Belgian francs. After long discussions the board, in the end, 
decided to execute the order, acknowledging that at that very moment 
a fair amount of foodstuffs and raw materials had been sent from Ger-
many to Belgium, or were to be sent shortly. Consequently the disequi-
librium in the clearing account was reduced substantially.
39 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
1946), Part 1, Chapter. VII, pp. 174-176.
40 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 14.03.1941.
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Meanwhile, von Becker had left for Berlin, in order to explore the 
possibility of finding a satisfying solution for the Belgians with respect 
to the problem of payments for financial transactions. He returned with 
some positive results. In a letter of 21 March 1941 he set out a concrete 
proposal for the separation of commercial and financial transactions 
with Germany. Belgian claims from commercial transactions would 
continue to be regulated by transfer to the Banque d’Emission’s account 
at the Verrechnungskasse and those transactions would be covered by 
the State guarantee. However, Belgian claims from financial transac-
tions would be regulated within the framework of the convention of 16-
17 August 1940, signed by the Reichsbank and the Banque d’Emission, 
and would be entered on the Banque d’Emission’s special account at 
the Reichsbank in Berlin, opened a few days later on 20 August. These 
transactions would cease to be covered by the State guarantee. Ac-
cording to this proposal, equilibrium in respect of that special account 
would be secured by the Banque d’Emission investing in German secu-
rities, as was the case at the Nederlandsche Bank41.
Janssen and the directors of the Banque d’Emission accepted von 
Becker’s idea of separating transactions, but not his proposal that the 
credit balances of the special account at the Reichsbank be invested in 
German government paper. Intensive negotiations therefore followed 
and it was not before 22 April 1941 that a final agreement was reached. 
The separation of the two types of transaction was approved and came 
into effect on 1 May 1941; additionally, the Banque d’Emission was per-
mitted to decide autonomously for what financial transactions it would 
pay, as well as the form the payouts would take. The suggestion that 
credit balances on the special account be invested in German govern-
ment paper was set aside42.
41 BNB, Archives, SD, 14, dossier 8.11/ 4, ‘Reichskreditkassenscheine’: memorandum of 
21.03.1941. See also: BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 5, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 409/ 2): 
mémorandum relatif à l’accord du 16-17 août 1940 (20.05.1941).
42 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 5, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 409/2): mémorandum relatif à 
l’accord du 16-17 août 1940 (20.05.1941).
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Janssen and The german occupier
In an a posteriori assessment of the first crisis of the clearing system, the 
questions arise of why Janssen accepted the German order of 8 March 
1941 to pay out 275 million Belgian francs, why he requested the board 
of directors of the Banque d’Emission to approve the payments and why 
he did not choose that moment to resign. It must already have been 
crystal clear to him that the wartime clearing system was collapsing 
and that the German occupier would not hesitate to bend the conven-
tion of 16-17 August 1940 to its own advantage, even – displaying great 
arrogance – to legitimizing its own abuse of power43.
The reasons behind the stance he adopted are complex. In the first 
place, he was well aware that the arrangement of 10 July 1940 gave von 
Becker the right, in case of refusal, to compel the Banque d’Emission to 
make payment. Janssen had hoped that, if the refusal could be justified, 
the occupier would not have recourse to that right, but that was a first 
miscalculation. Secondly, he was convinced that his own personality 
and authority were the best guarantees for the continued protection of 
the interests of the Bank, the Banque d’Emission and the country. His 
conviction would have been reinforced by events in the Netherlands, 
where the President of the Nederlandsche Bank, L.J.A. Trip, had re-
signed in March 1941 and had been promptly replaced by the Nazi sym-
pathizer Rost van Tonningen44. In Janssen’s opinion, something similar 
would befall Belgium were he to follow Trip’s example and resign.
Thirdly, he was extremely concerned about Belgian food supplies 
and, above all, feared that famine would strike, which is why he had 
subscribed to the Galopin Committee’s policy of a resumption of work 
and had accepted the clearing system imposed in July 1940. In all this, 
it should not be forgotten that the Banque d’Emission’s credit balance 
at the Verrechnungskasse remained relatively modest until the summer 
of 1941, with the imbalance remaining more or less within acceptable 
43 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 3, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi 
(20.12.1943), p. 74. BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 2, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 2: ‘renseig-
nements BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry, Part I: Clearing. Chapter 1. La 
réglementation allemande.
44 Joh. de Vries, De Nederlandsche Bank van 1914 tot 1948, pp. 278-280.
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limits; in the spring of 1941, moreover, there was the fact, and future 
prospect, of major imports of foodstuffs and raw materials45.
In the same way as Plisnier, Janssen attempted to obtain the maxi-
mum from his constant negotiations and compromises with the occu-
pier. Inevitably, it was a thankless task that brought failure and dis-
appointment with it, but Janssen was undoubtedly convinced, as was 
Plisnier, that they were patriotic and courageous in their behaviour46.
45 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
1946), Part 1, Chapter.1, p. 82.




The Looting of Gold
The prelude
On 20 August 1940, during the negotiations of the Franco-German 
 Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, Richard Hemmen, head of the 
German delegation for economic affairs, found out that the Belgian 
gold had been evacuated to Dakar in Senegal1. He immediately sig-
nalled the news to Brussels and Paris, and requested that steps be taken 
to have the gold repatriated as soon as possible2. In this, the Germans 
skillfully played the safety card, touching the Bank’s governor in one of 
his most sensitive spots. At that time, no-one could doubt that Europe 
was a safer place than Senegal, as the situation in French West Africa 
had become very tense since the attack on Mers-el-Kébir on 3 July.
On 6 September von Becker wrote Yves Bréart de Boisanger, the 
new governor of the Banque de France, to have the gold transported 
from Dakar to Brussels3. The demand tallied entirely with the German 
strategy of getting control of gold, wherever it was, but the determina-
tion with which the German authorities attempted to chase down the 
Bank’s gold, even before they were in total control of the territories they 
1 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France, 1939-1940 (annex 49: letter of 02.09.1940 from 
Schäfer, Commissioner at the Banque de France, to the secretary-general). See also: 
BdFr, Archives, Sécrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/37: ‘or belge’: letters of 
02.09.1940 and 06.09.1940 from Favre-Gilly (Paris) to Schäfer (Paris).
2 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hof-
richter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 
1940-1944, Part 1, pp. 88-89.
3 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: 
copy of a letter of 05.09.1940 from Janssen (Brussels) to de Boisanger (Clermont-
Ferrand); copy of a letter of 05.09.1940 from Janssen (Brussels) to von Becker (Brus-
sels); memorandum of 24.09.1940 from Jost.
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had just conquered, suggests that they feared being thwarted. The un-
certain political situation in West Africa and Ansiaux’s negotiations at 
Vichy and Clermont-Ferrand were two very disquieting signals and it 
is therefore not surprising that von Becker was already asking Janssen 
on 3 September to provide him with a letter addressed to the Banque de 
France and requesting the restoration of the Belgian gold to the Bank4.
Janssen acquiesced, but not without reservations. He stated that it 
was on the instructions of the Belgian government that the gold had 
been deposited in safe custody with the Banque de France and that, in 
consequence, he could not act on his own authority in the matter: more 
particularly, he required authority from the government, in this case 
from the Secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance5. 
Janssen contacted Plisnier forthwith. Both were minded to approve 
von Becker’s demand, provided that two conditions were satisfied. First, 
that repatriation be under the responsibility of the Banque de France; 
second, that the Bank should have free and autonomous disposition of 
the repatriated gold. In fact, this was a matter for the Belgian govern-
ment to approve, but at that moment the government was in complete 
disarray at Vichy6 and, since the end of July, had ceased to be recog-
nized by the French as a government. Plisnier therefore felt himself 
competent to give approval on behalf of the government, particularly 
as the matter was one on which the occupier was demanding a rapid 
ruling. The provisional text was put before the supervisory council of 
the Bank on 4 September and approved as such7.
Janssen, no doubt, was so ready to accede to von Becker’s demand be-
cause he had stipulated free disposition of the gold as a conditio sine qua 
non. Since his return from France, he had been extremely concerned 
about the problem of food and raw material supplies in the country, 
which also explains the affinity he felt with the Galopin Committee 
4 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militär Archiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hof-
richter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 
1940-1944, Part 1, p. 88.
5 NBB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au depot d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France, 1939-1940 (annexes 61-62).
6 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letters of 26.07.1940, 
28.07.1940, 08.08.1940 and 29.08.1940 from Gutt to Theunis.
7 BNB, Archives, RR, 04. 09.1940
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and with the secretaries-general8. ‘Gold’ was the only reliable weapon 
against shortages of foodstuffs and raw materials, and the only weapon 
against hunger and unemployment. In that context, it was understand-
able that he reacted positively, albeit conditionally, to von Becker’s de-
mand.
At that moment of extreme tension, the question of whether Janssen 
was competent to submit a request for the gold’s repatriation was not 
really relevant. He himself was convinced that he was and Ansiaux’s 
letter of 11 August to Janssen requesting authorization for transferring 
the Belgian gold to the United States likewise implied recognition of 
his competence. Ansiaux was, in fact, to confirm this later in a letter to 
Baudewyns9.
Janssen misled
The conditions set by Janssen for the repatriation of the gold – i.e. that 
the Banque de France remain responsible for the gold and for its resto-
ration to Brussels, and that the Bank have free disposition of that gold 
– were not well received by the German authorities. They had wanted 
the request to the Banque de France to be unconditional10.
The question of responsibility was not a difficult one and the Ger-
mans would solve it themselves11. There remained the condition of 
free disposition. Von Becker thought that here, too, a solution could 
be found and argued that the matter should be discussed between the 
Military Government and the Bank, and not between the Bank and the 
Banque de France. Moreover, he gave the impression that, in principle, 
the German authorities would have no objection to it. Using these ar-
guments, he was able to persuade Janssen to write two separate letters. 
8 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank 1822-1997, pp. 246-248.
9 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2, ‘correspondance 1940’, s. f. 7: letter of 
23.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to Baudewyns (London).
10 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militär Archiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hof-
richter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwalting in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 
1940-1944, Part 1, p. 89.
11 Plisnier, ‘L’or belge livré aux allemands en 1940’, in: Revue Générale Belge, 52, Feb-
ruary 1950, p. 4.
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In a first letter of 5 September, Janssen requested the Banque de France 
to repatriate, under its own responsibility, the Belgian gold from Dakar 
to Brussels. In a second letter of the same day to von Becker, he set out 
his two conditions, expressly adding that the letter to the Banque de 
France could be sent only after the German authorities had accepted 
the second condition12. Besides writing to von Becker, Janssen also en-
trusted his letter to the Banque de France to him.
After the war, the Chief Military Prosecutor was to condemn Jans-
sen for writing the letters and having entrusted them to von Becker13. 
Did the Bank at that time have a similar perception of the question? Not 
at all. Janssen had clearly made his conditions known to the occupier 
and felt completely covered. Furthermore, Plisnier and the supervisory 
council were in immediate agreement with the content of the letters. 
The entrusting of the letters to a man like von Becker was, equally, not 
regarded at the time as being wrong: postal services in Europe were so 
disorganized that correspondence with other countries could be con-
ducted safely only via the German authorities.
Von Becker’s intrigues during that September served to show the 
Germans in their true light, which was not at all the credible image 
of disciplined and correctly behaved occupiers that they had sought to 
project during the first months after the invasion, even in contacts with 
the Bank. It was von Becker who conceived the ingenious plan of send-
ing only copies of Janssen’s two letters to Paris, the first one, addressed 
to the Banque de France, containing the full text of the original, but 
the second one, addressed to him, deleting the passage stating that the 
first letter could be handed to the Banque de France only after the Ger-
man authorities had officially recognized that the Bank should have 
free disposition of the gold14. Von Becker then approached Hemmen to 
12 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France, 1939-1940 (annex 57 and annex 58); BNB, Archives, 
SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11, s. f. 4: Kauch, rapport au Roi, 20.12.1943, p. 42.
13 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/6: letter of 18.07.1956 from the mili-
tary prosecutor Ganshof-van der Meersch to Kauch. See also: P.Kauch, Le vol de l’or 
de la Banque Nationale par les nazis (1940-1943), Brussels, 1956.
14 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: 
letter of 05.09.1940 from Janssen (Brussels) to de Boisanger (Clermont-Ferrand) 
(copy doctored by the Germans, with German annotations, and a full copy, prob-
ably provided later to Bolgert by Kauch).
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put pressure on Governor de Boisanger, who was chairing the French 
delegation at the Wiesbaden negotiations, for having the Belgian gold at 
Dakar returned to Europe with all haste, given the unsettled situation 
in West Africa15. In this roundabout way, the matter of the repatria-
tion of Belgian gold landed on the negotiating table16. On 13 September, 
von Becker returned the two original letters to Janssen and announced 
that the Military Government could not accept the conditions that had 
been set17, adding that the question would be discussed at Wiesbaden 
and that Janssen would have an opportunity there to defend his stand-
point18.
The Banque de France was now caught between two fires. Ansiaux 
had returned to Vichy during the first half of September, still looking to 
bring about the evacuation of the Belgian gold, but Janssen had mean-
while requested that the gold be repatriated to Brussels. Which course 
was to be followed? Into the bargain was the delicate position that de 
Boisanger personally found himself in, as he owed his recent appoint-
ment as governor to Bouthillier, the Vichy Minister of Finance, who, 
with most of his colleagues, wished to do as much as possible to go 
along with the Germans.
The dilemma was resolved the day after Ansiaux’s departure from 
Vichy to England on 17 September (see supra), the French government 
now authorizing the Banque de France to accede to Janssen’s request to 
repatriate the gold to Brussels19. In its answer of 23 September to Jans-
sen, the Banque de France agreed to restore the gold, but refused any 
15 Freiburg im Breisgau, Archives, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hofrichter, 
Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Frankreich, 1940-1944, p. 
89.
16 R. Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 1940-1944. Parijs 1954, pp. 315-316. In this respect, see 
also: BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or 
belge’: telegram of 10.09.1940 from Wiehl (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin) to 
Hemmen (Wiesbaden).
17 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 63)
18 Krijgsauditoraat, Plisnier, fonds 77, depot 3.033: letter of 14.09.1940 from Janssen to 
Plisnier; Plisnier, ‘L’or belge livré aux allemands en 1940’ in: Revue Générale Belge, 
52, February 1956, p. 5.
19 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, pp. 171-17; BdFr, Archives, Sécrétariat 
Général, dossier 1060.2001.01.37, ‘or belge’: note pour Monsieur le Sécrétaire 
Général, 19.09.1940.
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liability for the risk in transporting it from Dakar to Brussels and de-
manded settlement in advance of its outstanding gold claims against 
the Bank20.
Janssen prepared himself for his visit to Wiesbaden to defend his 
standpoint regarding the gold, but the visit never took place. With-
out informing him, von Becker and Hofrichter themselves travelled 
to Wies baden and there, on 4 and 5 October, negotiated on behalf of 
the Bank about all the questions still pending between the two cen-
tral banks21. The German delegation found it normal for the Bank to 
be represented by the commissioner and his deputy during the Fran-
co-German negotiations, and not by the governor; after all, Belgium 
had capitulated and consequently did not fall under the system of a 
contractual armistice. In Hemmen’s opinion, in those circumstances 
the Military Government in Brussels had the right to undertake the 
representation22.
However, the governor of the Banque de France was, indeed, at the 
negotiations and, as the chairman of the French delegation, was able 
to set out his position in detail. It was a discrepancy that apparently 
prompted reactions in the corridors, which would explain why, at the 
opening of the second day of negotiations, Hemmen explained that 
Janssen would normally have been present, but that illness prevented 
him. At the same time he declared that the ongoing negotiations were 
only ‘preparatory’ discussions and that Janssen would certainly be 
present in mid-October at their conclusion and the definitive signing 
of the agreement.
On the opening day, 4 October, Hemmen stated that the discussions 
would be limited to three matters: 1) the amount of gold to be restored; 
2) the exchange of banknotes, irrespective of whether they were French 
or Belgian; and 3) the repatriation of the Belgian assets stored at Tou-
20 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: 
note pour M. le Sécrétaire Général, 21.09.1940; dossier 1397.1994.01/84, ‘or belge’: 
letter of 23.09.1940 from Favre-Gilly to Schäfer; letter of 23.09.1940 from Favre-
Gilly (Paris) to Janssen (Brussels).
21 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: 
note pour M. le Sécrétaire Général 21.09.1940; dossier 1397.1994.01/84, ‘or belge’: let-
ter of 23.09.1940 from Favre-Gilly to Schäfer; letter of 23.09.1940 from Favre-Gilly 
to Janssen.
22 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, pp. 172.
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louse and Tarbes. This last matter was sorted out immediately, everyone 
agreeing to an immediate repatriation, but negotiations on the first two 
proved difficult23.
Acting as representatives of the Bank, von Becker and Hofrichter 
naturally had every interest in repatriating as much gold as possible to 
Belgium and therefore obstructed the French demand to add a further 
27,307.8 kilos of fine gold to what was already being withheld from the 
Belgian deposit in settlement of the provisions charged in June and July 
1940 (as referred to above). Von Becker and Hofrichter contended that 
those provisions had never been transposed into real transactions and 
had never been entered into the Bank’s accounts. The French replied 
that Janssen had given a signature of endorsement and had agreed that 
their value should be deducted from the deposited gold24.
The discussion about the exchange of French banknotes was equally 
sharp. At the outset, von Becker and Hofrichter demanded that settle-
ment for the French money that had been exchanged back into Belgian 
francs on the return of the refugees should be made fully in gold by 
the Banque de France. In this respect, they referred to what had hap-
pened in a similar situation in the spring and summer of 1940, when 
the exchange of Belgian into French francs by Belgian refugees had at 
all times been honoured in gold by the Bank. The Banque de France 
had no intention of acceding to this demand: one of its directors at 
Clermont-Ferrand had in fact entered ‘A exclure’ in the margin of an 
internal memorandum, next to the paragraph raising the question of a 
possible settlement in gold25.
The first line of argument adopted by the French representatives was 
that Banque de France had scrapped the reciprocity clause from the im-
plementing protocol of the Franco-Belgian monetary convention of 7 
June 1940. The second was that Belgian refugees had brought a great 
23 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/71, ‘or belge’: 
convention de Wiesbaden, comptes-rendus des séances du 4 et 5 octobre relatives 
à l’or belge, 04.10.1940, 05.10.1940. See also: BdFr, Archives, Sécrétariat Général, 
dossier 1060.2001.01/36, ‘or belge’: projet germano-belge remis à la délégation 
française, 05.10.1940.
24 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: 
note pour M le Sécrétaire-Général, Paris (Clermont-Ferrand), 25.09.1940.
25 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: 
note pour M. le Sécrétaire-Général, 21.09.1940.
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quantity of French banknotes into France in May 1940 which they had 
acquired on the free market at a rate of around 170 French francs to 100 
Belgian, whereas the official rate was 144.4 French francs. At that time, 
the currency controls instituted by the French government prohibited 
the import of banknotes purchased on the free market; to bring them 
in amounted to a fraudulent, illegal import that absolutely precluded 
any settlement in gold.
The final matter for discussion was the restoration of the Belgian 
gold by the Banque de France. There is no trace of any discussion to be 
found in the minutes, probably because both parties had assumed that 
the Bank endorsed the restoration. Von Becker informed Janssen on 7 
October about the result of the negotiations and asked him to give his 
overall opinion as soon as possible, after viewing the documents26.
Jansen disapproved of the way in which the preliminary negotia-
tions had been handled and was not prepared to accept a number of 
the French proposals. He wished, therefore, to go in person to Wies-
baden to argue his case with the French delegation, but his health let 
him down. Via Kauch, he asked whether the final negotiations might 
not be postponed, only to be informed by von Becker on 9 October that 
Hemmen had refused the request, on grounds of urgency. Von Becker 
nevertheless assured Janssen that he and Hofrichter would work stren-
uously to defend Belgian interests27.
Janssen submitted his comments on the draft texts on 10 October in 
a four-page memorandum 28, but during the final round of negotiations 
on 14-16 October, no account was taken of his remarks. The French were 
later to claim that they had never even been shown the memorandum29. 
First up for discussion were the Franco-Belgian exchange rates, with 
von Becker and Hofrichter tabling a demand for a rate of 160 French 
francs to 100 Belgian. This was unacceptable to the French: a devalu-
26 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier 01.04.04, s. f. 2 (A 320/12): letter of 07.10.1940 
from von Becker to Janssen.
27 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier 01.04.04, s. f. (A320/ 12): letter of 09.10.1940 
from von Becker to Janssen.
28 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 2, dossier 88.02.02.00 (B 610/7), ‘convention de Wies-
baden’: remarques du gouverneur Janssen, 10.10.1940.
29 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt confié par 
la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 81, letter of 23.10.1940 from Kauch to Janssen).
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ation against the Belgian franc would further dent France’s already 
battered image and would not be good in economic terms, either. It 
would inter alia push up the price of coal, large quantities of which 
were imported at that moment from Belgium. A solution acceptable 
to both parties was ultimately arrived at, whereby the exchange rate 
would remain at 144.4 French francs to 100 Belgian until 10 December, 
after which a rate of 160 French francs would apply.
The main focus of discussion was the amount of gold that was to 
be returned to Belgium30. Three points remained to be resolved. Were 
the provisions endorsed by Janssen on 28 May and 18 June effectively 
to be settled in gold or not? Were the French banknotes held by the 
Banque d’Emission to be honoured in gold by the Banque de France 
or not? Were the loans of the French and Belgian governments to each 
other, and registered at the two central banks via a current account, 
to be settled in gold or not? Discussion became heated, but here, too, 
both parties relaxed their demands until a compromise was reached. 
Von Becker and Hofrichter acknowledged the Bank’s endorsement of 
28 May for a provision of 100 million French francs to be settled in gold. 
For its part, the Banque de France accepted that the provision of 800 
million French francs conceded on 18 June be scrapped from the list of 
French demands; it also agreed to a compromise arrangement whereby 
the loan of 400 million French francs granted to the Belgian Treasury 
and effectively drawn down was to be repaid in banknotes and not set-
tled in gold.
There was no further discussion of the principle of repatriation and 
restoration of the gold, but the French held stubbornly to their posi-
tion on certain points regarding the actual implementation of what 
had been agreed. One example was the refusal to accept the proposal 
for German planes to be used to transport the gold from Kayes and 
Algiers to Marseilles. Another was the Banque de France’s insistence 
that the gold be transferred into the hands of legally accredited Belgian 
representatives of the Bank, to which Hofrichter replied that the Ger-
man commissioner at the Bank had the requisite authority to accept 
30 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/71, ‘or belge’: 
convention de Wiesbaden, comptes-rendus des séances, 13.10.1940, 15.10.1940, 
16.10.1940; dossier 1397.1994.02/13: convention de Wiesbaden, compte-rendu de la 
séance, 14.10.1940.
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the transfer. Nonetheless, the Banque de France continued to assert that 
legal considerations prevented any change in its position and the Ger-
mans apparently resigned themselves to this.
A draft agreement was initialled on 17 October by Heinrich Hartlieb 
and Maurice Couve de Murville on behalf of the German and French 
governments respectively, and by Hofrichter and Bolgert on behalf of 
the two central banks31. It was officially signed on 29 October as the 
Wiesbaden Convention, on behalf of the German and French govern-
ments respectively by Hemmen and de Boisanger, the chairmen of the 
delegations, and on behalf of the two central banks respectively by von 
Becker and Schäfer, the German commissioners at Brussels and at Paris 
respectively32. 
The convention was favourably received among the new French lead-
ers as a whole and a gesture of goodwill towards the occupier was soon 
forthcoming. At the request of the Banque de France, therefore, a first 
aircraft with 2,400 kilos of the Bank’s gold left Kayes on 4 November – 
less than a week after the official signing of the convention – bound for 
Marseilles; a second, carrying approximately the same weight, followed 
in mid-November33.
The wiesbaden convenTion (29 ocTober 1940)
The Wiesbaden Convention of 29 October was an attempt to achieve, 
under German supervision, a general compromise that would resolve 
all the Franco-Belgian problems that had arisen in monetary and public 
finance affairs since the German invasion. With some of the arrange-
ments Janssen could agree, such as the repatriation of the banknotes 
and securities, which the Bank had been left behind in Toulouse and 
31 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 4, p. 60.
32 BNB, Archives, AR, notulen, 30.10.1940; SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 
965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert 
Prack.
33 BdFr, Archives, Sécrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/42: letter of 09.11.1940 
from the Minister for the Colonies to the Banque de France, 09.11.1940; telegram of 
14.11.1940 from Rousseau (Clermont-Ferrand) to Lacroix (Dakar). See also Kauch, 
Le vol de l’or, p. 39.
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Tarbes, but the big stumbling-block remained the repatriation and res-
toration of the gold.
The convention’s sting, indeed, was in the tail. Article VIII stated that 
the Banque de France ‘accepted’ to restore the deposited gold to the 
Bank, but that the cost of repatriation was to be borne by the Bank. 
Moreover, restoration would completely release the Banque de France 
from its responsibility as custodian.34.
Janssen could not understand that the Banque de France would 
have given its fiat without taking account of the conditions set by the 
Bank on 5 September. Without informing the Germans, he therefore 
sent his private secretary, Kauch, on 21 October to Paris and Clermont-
Ferrand to inform the Banque de France personally about the Belgian 
point of view. Kauch had difficulty in convincing the few directors he 
could meet that, in fact, Janssen had requested the Banque de France 
not to restore the gold, unless his conditions had been accepted by the 
Germans. The French reacted in astonishment’35. They acknowledged 
that Janssen’s absence during the negotiations at Wiesbaden had raised 
eyebrows, but the reference to his health had been taken at face value; 
furthermore, the French delegation had even insisted on the presence 
of a Belgian representative of the Bank.
The directors of the French central bank explained why they had not 
made any effort to contact the Bank directly to discuss what, after all, 
was a very serious matter: they had accepted the copy of Janssen’s letter 
of 5 September in good faith and had regarded it as a valid and normal 
request for the gold to be restored. They showed Kauch the copy, which, 
as he wrote to Janssen in his report of 22 October, left him dumbfound-
ed: ‘And what did I learn and see? In a letter of 5 September you yourself 
asked the governor of the Banque de France to repatriate the Belgian 
gold from Dakar’.
The directors also explained to Kauch that they could not retract 
their signature of 17 October, but promised that it would not automati-
cally lead to repatriation and restoration. Indeed, their acceptance of 
the French government’s request for restoration had been only on the 
34 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 86).
35 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 81: letter of 22.10.1940 from Kauch to Jans-
sen).
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understanding that certain conditions were met: the convention had 
to be signed by the governors of the two central banks (on 29 October, 
the Banque de France nonetheless accepted the signature of von Becker, 
who ‘claimed’ to have Janssen’s authorization) and restoration had to 
be into the hands of the legal representatives of the Bank. Furthermore, 
German aircraft would not be allowed to pick up the gold at Dakar and 
this would allow delaying tactics to be employed. There would also be 
strict adherence to the normal procedure of placement in safe custody 
and restoration. Lastly, the French gave a verbal undertaking – repeated 
on 30 October – that the Banque de France would proceed to restora-
tion of the gold only when the Bank expressly requested it36. 
Janssen was now fully informed of how von Becker, Hofrichter and 
Hemmen had abused his trust and completely misled him, but he was 
in an extremely delicate position. He baulked at offending von Becker 
by accusing him of an abuse of trust, deeming it the wrong time to get 
caught up in an open conflict with the occupying power. For Janssen, 
too, there was a personal and somewhat painful aspect to the breach of 
trust, in that he could hardly accuse von Becker openly without admit-
ting that he himself had been unforgivably and even incomprehensibly 
naïve and imprudent in his approach to the entire question. For this 
reason, he resolved to use legal arguments in attacking the provisional 
convention of 17 October.
To this end, Janssen had already submitted two critical memoranda 
to von Becker on 21 and 25 October. He declared his acceptance of the 
repatriation and restoration of the gold, now deemed inevitable, but at 
the same time attempted to demonstrate that the occupier had no legal 
grounds for laying claim to the Belgian gold. After all, the Bank’s gold 
was itself inviolable, as it served as cover for the issue of Belgian ban-
knotes37.
Janssen had also enlisted the help of the jurists Marcq and Rolin, 
whose opinion of 28 October put the Bank’s arguments on a different 
36 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, rapport au Roi (20.12.1943), pp. 45-46; 
see also BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1497.1994.01/83, ‘or 
belge’: letter of 24.10.1940 from Bolgert to Couve de Murville.
37 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt confié par la 
BNB à la Banque de France (annex 89: letter of 30.10.1940 from Janssen to Frédéricq, 
private secretary to the King). 
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tack38. Their view was that von Becker could make no claim to having 
competence to act in the Bank’s name in initialling the draft conven-
tion of 17 October and signing the convention itself. It was true that, in 
accordance with the original German decree, the commissioner of the 
Bankaufsichtamt had been granted an extraordinary power of control 
over the Banque d’Emission, but that did not apply to the Bank. As a re-
sult, the Bank was subject to the normal German supervision to which 
all Belgian banks were subject. That normal supervision excluded the 
German authorities from exercising any power of disposition. A second 
argument put forward by Marcq and Rolin was that the Military Gov-
ernment had entrusted the administration of occupied Belgium to the 
national administrative bodies and that this excluded the Bankaufsicht-
amt from any interference in matters regarding the management of the 
Bank. Yet a third argument stated that, as the gold reserves and the as-
sets belonged to the Bank, whose incorporation under private law was 
not in question, it could be concluded that the occupier was precluded 
by the Hague Convention from disposing them.
The opinion of the jurists was formal: the Bank had the fullest right 
to regard the Wiesbaden Convention as not binding. Basing himself on 
the opinion of the jurists and on his own arguments, Janssen wrote to 
von Becker on 18 November to notify him officially that the Bank could 
not recognize the Wiesbaden Convention39.
The supplemenTary proTocol of 11 december 1940
Concerned always to cloak its illegal actions in a guise of legality, the 
Military Government found itself totally stymied. To escape from the 
impasse, new initiatives were required, not just for Belgium, but also 
for France40. From Berlin at the beginning of November, a new strategy 
was rapidly developed, whose aim was to transfer the contract for safe 
38 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 84 and annex 85, opinions of 28.10.1940 
from R. Marcq and H. Rolin).
39 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt confié par la 
BNB à la Banque de France (annex 91: letter of 18.11.1940 from Janssen von Becker).
40 In respect of the French impasse, see: BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documenta-
tion, dossier 1397.1994.01/71, ‘or belge’: letter of 06.11.1940 from Schäfer (Paris) to the 
embassy adviser von Campe (Wiesbaden).
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custody from the Banque de France to the Reichsbank and to ensure 
that the Belgian government would authorize the Bank to accept the 
transfer41.
The new strategy was explained to von Falkenhausen by von Beck-
er on 16 November. Direct negotiations with the Belgian secretaries- 
general would be set in train and an accommodation on the costs of 
occupation would be used to persuade the Belgian administration to 
come to an agreement on the question of the gold42. It took little time 
for the military commander to give the go-ahead and on 19 November 
Reeder wrote to Alexandre Delmer, Chairman of the Belgian Com-
mittee of Secretaries-general, requesting that Janssen be authorized 
to release the Banque de France from its responsibility for the Belgian 
gold. The Banque de France would undertake to transfer the gold as 
quickly as possible to Marseilles, where the Reichsbank would receive it 
on behalf of the Bank. Reeder added that Janssen had agreed to assist in 
the operation, provided he received authorization from the secretaries-
general43.
The Committee of Secretaries-general met on 21 November. Asked 
to clarify the problem, Plisnier stated that the committee was not com-
petent to grant that authorization to the governor: the committee did 
not, in fact, replace the Belgian government and it was only in their 
own particular domain that the secretaries-general had been author-
ized to take necessary decisions of a current nature, as was also the 
case for him as secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, 
the law of 10 May 1940 forbad him to act against a decision of the legal 
government of Belgium, and it was the government that had decided to 
41 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 44.
42 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militär Archiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hof-
richter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 
1940-1944, p. 90. See also: SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre 
Besatzungszeit in Belgien. Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 44.
43 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/12: letter of 19.11.1940 from Reeder 
to Delmer; BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt 
d’or confié par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 93: letter of 19.11.1940 from 
Reeder to Delmer, chairman of the Committee of Secretaries-general). In a letter 
to Reeder, Janssen had written: ‘Si l’autorité belge compétente en décide ainsi, il 
(Janssen) ne ferait pas d’opposition à la rentrée de l’or’) (quoted by Plisnier: ARA, 
Krijgsauditoraat, Plisnier, 1, dossier c: Committee of Secretaries-general, minutes, 
30.11.1940).
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evacuate the gold to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy. All 
members of the committee present declared their agreement with this 
position44.
As all means to prompt the Banque de France to restore the gold via 
the normal procedure now appeared to be exhausted, the German Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin resolved to switch action to the politi-
cal front and on 23 November instructed Hemmen to travel to Vichy to 
put pressure on Minister Laval and the French government45. At their 
meeting, which took place on 29-30 November46, Hemmen pointed out 
that, in return for its cooperation, the French delegation at Wiesbaden 
had already received a reduction in the costs of occupation and added 
that new concessions in that respect were being mooted. Even the re-
lease of 150,000 French prisoners of war was being considered, as was 
– utopian as it may have seemed – the formal return of Alsace-Lorraine 
and permission to rearm. A gesture on the part of the French govern-
ment over the Belgian gold would be, if not decisive, at least a welcome 
signal in efforts to achieve positive cooperation between France and 
Germany47.
The ministers Laval, Bouthillier and Baudouin went along with the 
German proposals, promising to persuade the Banque de France to re-
patriate the Belgian gold to Marseilles and then transfer it to the Reichs-
bank. Hemmen was able on 30 November to telegraph von Ribbentrop, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, that Laval and the French gov-
ernment had accepted the German proposals48.
Schäfer now went to Bolgert in Paris to inform him about that ac-
ceptance and to submit the attendant draft protocol. Immediately 
thereafter, Bolgert left for Clermont-Ferrand to discuss the text with 
44 ARA, Krijgsauditoraat, Plisnier, 1, dossier c: Committee of Secretaries-general, 
minutes, 30.11.1940.
45 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/7, ‘or belge’: en-
tretien de M. Hemmen et M. de Boisanger, 23.11.1940. 
46 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.994.01/71, ‘or belge’: 
note pour le gouverneur (négotiations relatives à l’or belge, 12.02.1941).
47 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, pp. 176-177; M. Margairaz, ‘Introduction. 
1. La Banque de France et l’occupation; 2. La Banque de France et ses partenaires’, 
in: M. Margairaz, ed., Banques, Banque de France et Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 
Paris, 2002, pp. 1-37. In this respect, see also: Velaers and Van Goethem, Leopold III, 
pp. 553-554.
48 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, pp. 178-181 
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Governor de Boisanger and the other directors of the Banque de France. 
He also addressed an accompanying memorandum to the Governor, 
in which he expressed his great unease about the entire situation. In 
the Wiesbaden Convention, the Banque de France had made its agree-
ment concerning the restoration of the Belgian gold conditional on 
that gold being transferred into the hands of the accredited Belgian 
representatives of the Bank. The agreement between Laval and Hem-
men simply ignored the existence of that clause. Bolgert found that the 
entire construction was degrading for the Banque de France. His sug-
gestion, therefore, was that the Banque de France should demand that 
the government bring in a special law whereby the institution would be 
‘forced’ to implement the restoration49.
De Boisanger was not prepared to take that step. However, the board 
of directors of the Banque de France resolved to submit a letter of pro-
test to the French Minister of Finance, which again emphasized that the 
institution could accept to restore the gold only if a ‘voluntary’ request 
for restoration was received from the Bank. In reply, Bouthillier said 
that he could subscribe entirely to the board’s legal arguments, but that 
there were greater interests at stake at the moment. The board submit-
ted, but nevertheless sought to give itself additional cover. In the first 
place, it demanded that the transfer take the legal form of a ‘substitu-
tion of depositary’ (‘substitution de dépositaire’), a formula whereby they 
hoped to envelop the transfer in the tradition of loyalty among central 
banks and thereby exert moral pressure on the Reichsbank to honour 
its obligations vis-à-vis the Bank and the Banque de France. Secondly, 
it demanded a State guarantee for the risks it was exposed to; this was 
granted by letter of 12 December from Bouthillier. The supplementary 
protocol was signed on 11 December by Hemmen and de Boisanger, 
representing the German and French governments respectively, and by 
Schäfer and von Becker, representing respectively the Banque de France 
and the Bank50.
49 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.02/13, ‘or belge’: 
Bolgert, note pour le Gouverneur, 30.11.1940.
50 BNB, Archives, DC, 11.12.1940: additional memorandum on the protocol of 
11.12.1940. See also: Freiburg im Breisgau, Militär Archiv, Militärverwaltung, dos-
sier RW 36/277: Hofrichter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und 
Nord-Frankreich, 1940-1943, Part 1, p. 90.
 The Looting of Gold 183
In Belgium, meanwhile, the Military Government was also resort-
ing to political means to gain its end. On 14 December, von Becker in-
formed Janssen of the content of the supplementary protocol, as well as 
that of the text of an ordinance to be issued by von Falkenhausen two 
days later. The ordinance stated that, besides his function as commis-
sioner of the Banque d’Emission, von Becker would exercise an identical 
function at the Bank. During this meeting von Becker asked Janssen 
whether the Bank would accept the supplementary protocol or refuse 
all cooperation regarding the repatriation of the gold. He demanded an 
answer by 6 p.m. and threatened dismissal should Janssen continue to 
resist51.
After taking fresh advice from the jurists Marcq and Rolin, Janssen 
wrote to von Becker on 18 December stating that the supplementary 
protocol was unacceptable to the Bank and explaining why52. The pro-
tocol did not supplement the Wiesbaden Convention, but fundamental-
ly changed it: now, the gold would be handed over not to the accredited 
representatives of the Bank, but to representatives of the Reichsbank; 
from a legal point of view, such a change was even less admissible than 
what had been laid down in the convention.
Under private law, furthermore, there was no justification whatso-
ever for the substitution: the Bank had neither been involved, nor le-
gally represented, in the drawing-up of the protocol. There was also no 
justification under international law for the transfer of the gold to Ger-
many. All that could be commandeered were State securities held in the 
occupied territory, and then only insofar as that was urgently necessary 
for the maintenance of the army of occupation. This was not the case 
here, and transferring the gold to Germany was consequently unlawful.
While all this was unfolding, repatriation of the Belgian gold had 
actually got under way. An initial consignment of 1,199 crates with a 
combined weight of approximately 60 tonnes was to be transported by 
51 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relatif au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 103: ordonnance du 16 décembre 1940). 
See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 12, dossier 8.11/2: note confidentielle sur l’entretien 
d’Ingenbleek avec Hayoit de Termicourt, 10.04.1942.
52 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relatif au dépôt confié par 
la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 108: letter of 18.12.1940 from Janssen to von 
Becker).
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train from the military base at Kayes to Dakar. From there, it would be 
shipped to Casablanca, freighted by train to Oujda in Marocco, on to 
Oran and then on to Algiers53. Transporting the remaining 3,652 crates 
proved even more difficult and in fact turned into a spectacular adven-
ture. Patrolling British and American ships had made the sea route un-
safe, so that a land route had to be sought. The crates left Kayes by train 
in April 1941, bound for Bamako, from where they were to be trans-
ported upstream on the Niger in three separate convoys to Bourem 
in what was then the French Sudan. However, persistent drought had 
substantially lowered the water level, so that keeping the boats afloat 
proved to be a feat of strength requiring the enlistment of 160 local 
men. In consequence, it was three weeks before all the convoys reached 
Bourem. Once there, the crates were loaded on to trucks of the Compag-
nie Transsaharienne, which, in scorching heat, had then to work their 
way right across the Sahara to Colomb-Béchar in Algeria. The journey 
was a nightmare, burst tyres having to be repaired with whatever was 
to hand, and failed engines requiring enormous ingenuity to be coaxed 
back to life; in comparison with this, the present-day Paris-to-Dakar 
rally is little more than a school run for teenagers. At Colomb-Béchar, 
the crates were transferred to rail for Algiers.
By the end of November 1941, no more than 2,013 out of the 4,944 
crates had arrived in Berlin. Becoming impatient, Hemmen insisted in 
December that the French take more effective measures, but there was 
little positive that he could draw from the reaction to his criticism. In 
the first place, they had no more than a few old bomber aircraft availa-
ble, to carry the gold and for these they no longer had any stock of spare 
parts. Moreover, fuel had now become a problem, though this was to be 
taken care of by the occupier54. Much worse, however, was the danger of 
flying over the Mediterranean Sea, where the airspace was constantly 
alive with Allied aircraft. It was only at night that any flying could be 
undertaken without too great a risk, but this meant that no more than 
53 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/71, ‘or belge’: 
note pour le gouverneur (négociations relatives à l’or belge, 12.02.1941). BNB, Ar-
chives, Boekhouding, 2, dossier 88.02.02.00 (A 610/7), ‘convention de Wiesbaden’: 
Kauch, note pour M. le Gouverneur, 03.02.1941.
54 Archives, Sécrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/42, ‘or belge’: transport de 1292 
caisses de Kayès à Marseille.
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five tonnes of gold per week could be flown from Algiers to Marseilles. 
The task was completed on 26 May 1942. Under pressure from Berlin, 
the Vichy government had meanwhile given the order for the Polish 
gold also to be delivered to Germany. This left Kayes in the autumn of 
1941, but was intercepted en route by the Allies and transported to the 
United States55.
Because a number of the crates in the first convoy of Belgian gold 
had been damaged in transport, the Reichsbank decided to verify the 
entire delivery56. To that end, the Bankaufsichtamt requested Janssen 
on 6 January 1941 for further cooperation, though on a more limited 
scale, with just a few of the Bank’s officials travelling to Berlin to act as 
simple ‘witnesses’. However, the tone of the request was again threaten-
ing, the formulation being that of an order: a new refusal would be re-
garded as an act of sabotage and the Military Government would have 
the Governor court-martialled and request the judges to condemn him 
to deportation57.
Janssen consulted the jurist Marcq who gave his opinion that there 
was nothing against complying with the order, as this could in no way 
derogate from the Bank’s refusal to recognize the legality of the con-
vention and the protocol. Furthermore, it involved no more than a ma-
terial presence in Berlin, not active cooperation, and responsibility for 
the gold in any case rested with the Banque de France58. Initially, Jans-
sen felt that he should stick by his refusal, but the other members of the 
board of directors were able to persuade him otherwise59. 
55 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/78, ‘or belge’: 
communiqués from Algiers and Marseille, February 1941; Secrétariat Général, dos-
sier 1060.2001.01/42, ‘or belge’: reports on the transportation of the gold through 
the Sahara, 1941-1942.
56 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militär Archiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hof-
richter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 
1940-1944, Part 1, p. 92.
57 BNB, Archives, SD, 12, dossier 8.11/2: note confidentielle sur l’entretien d’Ingenbleek 
avec Hayoit de Termicourt, 10.04.1942.
58 Plisnier, ‘L’or belge livré aux allemands en 1940’, in: Revue Générale Belge, 52, 
 February 1950, pp. 12-13.
59 BNB, Archives, SD, 12, dossier 8.11/ 2: note confidentielle sur l’entretien d’Ingenbleek 
avec Hayoit de Termicourt, 10. 04.1942
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The afTermaTh of The repaTriaTion
Meanwhile Janssen was taking steps to obtain certainty about the 
Banque de France’s continuing liability regarding the Belgian gold. His 
first chance to find out more came at the end of December 1940. Au-
guste Callens, a director of the Société Générale de Belgique, was travel-
ling to France on business and, at Janssen’s request, contacted the di-
rectors of the French central bank. Its governor, de Boisanger, formally 
declared to Callens that the Banque de France still regarded itself liable 
for the Belgian gold60. 
A little later, Janssen had an opportunity to go deeper into the ques-
tion of liability, making use of a trip by Kauch to France in January 1941 
to have him deliver a letter to de Boisanger, in which Janssen explic-
itly underlined that, in accordance with the rules of acceptance into 
safe custody, and notwithstanding the transfer of the gold to Berlin, 
the Banque de France remained responsible for the deposit vis-à-vis the 
Bank61.
However, there was more to Kauch’s mission than simply delivering 
a letter to de Boisanger. His main purpose was to obtain a ‘written’ dec-
laration from de Boisanger, officially confirming the Banque de France’s 
continuing liability vis-à-vis the gold62. Kauch returned to Brussels on 1 
February and the day after reported on his meeting with de Boisanger63. 
With the approval of the French government, the Banque de France was 
prepared – should Janssen request it in a letter or a memorandum – to 
give a written declaration that it remained fully liable vis-à-vis the Bank 
in respect of the Belgian gold.
60 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, p. 185.
61 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 116: letter of 15.01.1941 from Janssen to de 
Boisanger).
62 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annex 117: letter of 18.01.1941 from Kauch to Jans-
sen).
63 ‘M. de Boisanger se déclare prêt à nous remettre un écrit …précisant les responsa-
bilités de la Banque de France, à condition que la BNB lui adresse une lettre ou une 
note sollicitant directement ou indirectement cette déclaration’...: BNB, Archives, SD, 
London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt confié par la BNB à la Banque 
de France (annex 120, memorandum of 02.02.1941 from Kauch to Janssen).
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Kauch went back to Paris on 5 February and, during his visit to the 
Banque de France on the following day, handed over Janssen’s written 
request. De Boisanger stated that he wished to fulfil the agreement of the 
previous week and they discussed a draft text of the declaration, agree-
ing that Kauch should return the next day to pick up the document. 
However, his reception was not what he expected when he announced 
himself at the Banque de France in the afternoon of 7 February. That 
same morning, the Pariser Zeitung and several foreign newspapers had 
carried news about the question of the Belgian gold, reporting that, in 
the Bank’s name, Theunis, minister plenipotentiary of Belgium in the 
United States, had obtained a Supreme Court order for sequestration of 
the Banque de France’s gold in deposit and registered under dossier at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The news of the action taken in New York had barely been made 
known before de Boisanger went back on his concessions of the previ-
ous days. No written declaration could be given to Kauch as agreed. 
According to de Boisanger, the text had to be amended in any case, as 
the institution could not risk having to restore the gold twice: once in 
New York and again in Europe64.
What prompted Theunis to apply to the American court on 5 Feb-
ruary in the Bank’s name and with the authorization of the Belgian 
government in London was a telegram to him in New York sent on 
26 January from Toulouse by Kauch: ‘Santé Janssen bonne; situation 
mauvaise. Famille Jaunet (Belgian gold) en route de Cayès par Alger 
et Oran via Marseille vers famille Germain (Berlin) par Air France. Il 
faudrait retenir branche française famille Jaunet (French gold registered 
under dossier) à New York. Espoir en vous. Kauch (Banque de France, 
Toulouse)’65. The question is whether the telegram was sent by Kauch on 
his own initiative or on Janssen’s instructions.
Cattier, another director of the Société Générale de Belgique, who in 
February had a conversation with Ansiaux in Lisbon, could not believe 
that Janssen would have charged Kauch with sending the  telegram. 
64 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 2, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A247/6, s. f. 4): Kauch, note pour 
gouverneur, 09.02.1941; BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 
1397.1994.01/83, ‘or belge’: Bolgert, entretiens avec M.K., 20.03.1941.
65 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 27.01.1941 from The-
unis (New York) to Gutt (London).
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In his opinion, Kauch had acted on his own initiative66. However, 
Baudewyns, who knew the structure of authority at the Bank intimate-
ly, was convinced that Janssen was the person responsible67.
Why would Janssen have decided to send the telegram? Why, after 
the telegram had been sent, would he have allowed Kauch to push ahead 
with negotiations in Paris about obtaining the written declaration? 
These are difficult questions and their answers can only be guessed at.
The first is probably the less difficult. The initial major delivery of 
Belgian gold had arrived in Berlin at the beginning of January 1941 and 
a last-ditch proposal from Janssen to the Reichsbank for the gold to be 
transferred to the BIS in Basle, made during the same month, had been 
ignored. Furthermore, the attempt to use an amended version of that 
proposal to obtain some sort of power of decision over the Belgian gold 
in Berlin was likewise appearing to be a hopeless rearguard action. By 
involving the United States, which was then still neutral, Janssen would 
thus have been looking to hedge his bets.
As to the second question, Janssen probably allowed his secretary 
to continue negotiating in order to obtain an additional guarantee. 
There was no a priori certainty that there would be legal proceedings 
in the United States or that any such proceedings would succeed, and 
it is therefore likely that Janssen regarded the telegram as a means of 
putting pressure on the Banque de France to obtain the written declara-
tion and even to move it to make further concessions. 
Despite the proceedings that had been instituted in New York, or 
even perhaps because of them, the Banque de France indeed continued 
to push for an amicable settlement. Everything points to Janssen also 
thinking along those lines. He now proposed reconsideration of a sug-
gestion put forward on 10 July 1940 by Fournier, the former governor of 
the Banque de France, namely a transfer of gold registered under dos-
sier, this time from the account of the Banque de France to an account 
of the Bank or to a joint Bank-Banque de France account at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. In exchange, the Bank would suspend the 
proceedings in New York. The fact that the accounts there were frozen 
66 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2: report from Ansiaux on his meeting with 
Cattier in Lisbon, 26-27.02.1941.
67 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives: letters of 06.03.1941, 14.03.1941 and 24.03.1941 
from Baudewyns (London) to Ansiaux (Lisbon).
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ought not to be an obstacle, because the arrangement applied to both 
central banks and would resolve itself after the war68.
Fresh negotiations were set in train by Kauch and, at the end of 
February, Cattier was informing Ansiaux in Lisbon that the prospects 
for a settlement were not developing unfavourably69. The Banque de 
France remained prepared – insofar as French government agreement 
was forthcoming – to give a written declaration of its continuing li-
ability, in exchange for the halting of the proceedings initiated in New 
York. However, it insisted that the written declaration would be given 
only after the action had been withdrawn and the proceedings stopped. 
The ‘New York transfer’ proposed by Janssen was a step too far for the 
French, though discussions continued. Janssen then suggested that the 
‘transfer’ be replaced by the French gold being ‘given in pledge’ in New 
York, but this suggestion, too, was rejected, the Banque de France refus-
ing to go any further than a general written declaration of its obligation 
to the Bank regarding the gold.
Viewed from London, the discussions on the continent appeared 
to be too much of an uphill struggle and to be progressing too slowly. 
Baudewyns and the Belgian government remained suspicious70, fear-
ing that the long-drawn-out series of proposals and counter-proposals 
between the Belgian and French central banks would compromise the 
legal proceedings in New York71. Were that to happen and the negotia-
tions on the continent to end in nothing, Belgium would be left empty-
handed. It is probable, too, that the Belgian government was being in-
fluenced by its financial and monetary entourage in London, which was 
extremely distrustful of anything French and thus of the French central 
bank, as well. When, furthermore, Baudewyns and the Belgian gov-
68 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt d’or confié 
par la BNB à la Banque de France (annexes 123 and 124).
69 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2: report from Ansiaux on his meeting with 
Cattier in Lisbon, 26-27.02.1941.
70 Janssen regretted the suspicion of Gutt, Baudewyns and Theunis, and hoped that 
his negotiations with Paris, via Kauch, would normalize relations. BdFr, Archives, 
Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/84, ‘or belge’: letter of 02.04.1941 
from Kauch to Bolgert, memorandum of 02.04.1941, with ‘suggestions de M. Jans-
sen’.
71 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 1941, 2: letters of 06.03.1941 from Baudewyns 
and Spaak (London) to Ansiaux (Lisbon).
190 Chapter 10
ernment heard at the beginning of March 1941 that a delegation from 
the Banque de France had taken ship for New York72, their minds were 
made up and they went ahead with the legal action73.
Even then, as Kauch was to testify, negotiations did not cease74. 
Without the knowledge of the board of directors, he continued his 
discussions and involvement even after Janssen’s death. Ansiaux and 
Baudewyns, Bank people to the core, also continued to hope that Kauch 
would achieve an acceptable agreement with the French central bank, 
so that legal proceedings could ultimately be avoided75. Via Kauch, the 
Banque de France did, in fact, later contact Goffin, the new Governor 
of the Bank, to try to reach an amicable settlement, now declaring itself 
prepared to give written confirmation of its liability regarding the Bel-
gian gold and even agreeing to give French gold in pledge in New York, 
in return for the legal proceedings to be halted76.
In Brussels, the board of directors – never enthusiastic about the ef-
forts of Janssen and Kauch to negotiate a solution – resolved to consult 
the jurist Marcq about the new proposal. His opinion, submitted on 15 
November, was clear: the proposal could not be accepted by the Bank’s 
management in Brussels, as such matters now were outside its compe-
tence, that competence lying with the appointed members of the Bank 
abroad77. Endorsing Marcq’s opinion, the Bank wrote to the Banque de 
France on 17 November 1941 that both the legal proceedings and the 
proposed pledging arrangement implied decisions being made in unoc-
cupied territory and that, pursuant to the Law of 2 February 1940, such 
decisions did not fall within the competence of the board of directors 
72 ARA, Pierlot Papers, ‘correspondance’: letter of 04.03.1941 from Theunis to Gutt.
73 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives (p. 40): letter of 20.03.1941 from Baudewyns 
(London) to Ansiaux (Lisbon).
74 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 1941, 2: letter of 15.04.1941 from Kauch (Paris?) 
to Baudewyns (London).
75 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 1941, 2: letters of 24.03.1941, 15.04.1941, and 
30.05.1941 from Ansiaux (New York) to Baudewyns (London).
76 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: note relative au dépôt de l’or con-
fié par la BNB à la Banque de France (annexes 127 and 128: draft of 31.10.1941 of a 
letter and of a pledging by the Banque de France to the Bank).
77 BNB, Archives, Contentieux, dossier ‘Miomandre’: letter of 15.11.1941 from Marcq to 
Goffin.
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in Brussels78. With this, the matter of the gold was closed for the Bank 
in the occupied area.
The resToraTion of luxembourg’s gold
Within the context of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union (estab-
lished on 25 July 1921), and following the Belgo-Luxembourg monetary 
convention of 23 May 1935, the Caisse d’Epargne du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg had deposited 357 gold bars in safe custody at the Bank 
during the immediate years before the German invasion. The gold, 143.3 
million Belgian francs’ worth, together with a number of Luxembourg 
securities, in fact acted as security for the drawdown of advances from 
the Bank. In May 1940, the Bank evacuated that gold to France, along 
with the final shipment of Belgian gold. In legal terms, however, the 
Bank was, and remained, the sole depositary of the Luxembourg gold; 
all that the Banque de France was responsible for was the Belgian gold79.
With the incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg into the 
German Reich in the course of August 1940 came a Luxembourg Civil 
Administration. On 27 August, it issued an ordinance requiring all 
residents and legal persons of the Grand Duchy – including the Caisse 
d’Epargne – to declare the gold they possessed and offer it for sale to 
the Reichsbank, and to do so before 15 September80. On 30 August, con-
sequently, the Caisse d’Epargne requested the Bank for the return of 
its gold. Janssen replied that the Bank was in neither a practical nor a 
legal position to comply, since the gold was overseas, beyond the Bank’s 
reach. Additionally, he pointed out that article 7 of the Belgian decree 
of 7 February 1940 had, in any case, deprived the board of directors in 
78 BNB, Archives, Contentieux, dossier ‘Miomandre’, annex 130: letter of 17.11.1941 
from Goffin to de Boisanger.
79 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militär Archiv, Militärverwaltung, dossier RW 36/277: Hof-
richter, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 
1940-1944, Part 1, p. 96.
80 In respect of what follows, see the detailed review of P. Kauch: BNB, Archives, 
Studie dienst, 8, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 240/5, s.f. 1): note relative aux rapports entre 
la BNB et le Grand-Duché et principalement au dépôt d’or confié à la première par 
la Caisse d’Epargne du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.
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Brussels of the authority to take executive measures, such as the return 
of the Luxembourg gold81.
In a letter of 5 February 1941, the Caisse d’Epargne authorized or, 
rather, instructed the Bank to transfer the gold bars it had deposited 
with the Belgian central bank to the Reichsbank in Berlin under the 
same legal formula, i.e. as a deposit in safe custody. It added that, once 
the instruction had been carried out, the Bank could demand from the 
Reichsbank a certificate of full discharge from its responsibility as de-
positary. The German commissioner acting as intermediary in the ne-
gotiations left no doubt that the instruction was not a simple request, 
but a formal order implying immediate execution. Janssen wondered 
whether he was, in fact, empowered to comply with the order without 
the express authorization of the Luxembourg government in exile in 
London. But he had to take account of the ordinance of 16 December 
1940 issued by the Military Government in Brussels, whereby the com-
missioner had been given the authority to take all such measures on 
behalf of the Bank82.
In weighing up the various arguments, Janssen apparently decided 
that he could not ignore the Brussels ordinance and consequently could 
no longer hinder the transfer to Berlin, responsibility for which he felt 
he could shift onto the Banque de France83. In a letter of 17 April 1941 to 
the French central bank, Janssen declared that the Bank had no objec-
tion to the Caisse d’Epargne approaching the Banque de France directly 
for restoration of the Luxembourg gold84.
The Banque de France realized which way the wind was blowing and 
knocked the ball back into the Belgian camp, informing the Bank on 13 
May that any withdrawal of gold from the deposit and its transfer to the 
Reichsbank was a matter for the Bank. The Bank therefore had to give 
the Banque de France the necessary instructions and authorizations to 
81 Ib., note de Kauch: letter of 05.09.1940 from Janssen to the Caisse d’Epargne du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.
82 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.5./ s.f. 2: note de E. Miomandre 
(livraison de l’or détenu pour compte de la Caisse d’Epargne du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg), memorandum of 21.02.1941.
83 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers, rapports 1.1, s. f. 1: letter of 28.09.1944 from 
Ingenbleek to Theunis.
84 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers, rapports 1.1, s. f. 1: letter of 28.09.1944 from 
Theunis to Ingenbleek.
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identify the gold bars in question and, moreover, explicitly mandate it 
to execute the transfer to Berlin.
The Caisse d’Epargne drew no benefit from the dispute between the 
Belgian and French central banks and consequently changed its tack. 
In a letter of 11 June 1941, it requested the Bank to have the gold trans-
ferred directly to itself and not made available to the Reichsbank. A re-
ply stated that the requisite signatures from the Luxembourg side were 
lacking for the instruction to be given to France. These were prompt-
ly forwarded, in conformity with the institution’s bye-laws, but were 
found to be of directors who at the time were managing the institution 
with the approval and under the control of the Germans. Consequently, 
they had not acted of their own free will. Pursuant to a decree of the 
Luxembourg government in exile in London, issued on 5 February 1941, 
they no longer even had dispositional power85. The Bank, nonetheless, 
acknowledged the signatures and, in a letter of 11 July, signed by the 
acting governor Ingenbleek86 after Janssen’s death in June, instructed 
the Banque de France to place the 357 Luxembourg gold bars at the 
Caisse d’Epargne’s disposition and to discharge the Bank from its re-
sponsibility for the deposit. The Banque de France promised to execute 
the instruction as quickly as possible after the necessary identification 
process, not forgetting to add that it was not the Banque de France, 
that should discharge the Bank from its responsibility, but the Caisse 
d’Epargne, since the Bank and not the Banque de France was legally the 
depositary of the Luxembourg gold87.
In September 1941, the Banque de France received and immediately 
executed an order from the Caisse d’Epargne to place the gold at its 
disposition. The beginning of 1942 saw the Bank repeatedly requesting 
the Caisse d’Epargne to be discharged of its responsibility as depositary. 
Discharge was finally granted on 16 June of that year, bringing all the 
necessary formalities to an end.
85 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 320/5): memorandum of 
29.05.1943 from Rolin.
86 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers, rapports 1.1, s. f. 1: letter of 26.09.1944 from 
Kauch to an unnamed director of the Bank.
87 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: entretien 
avec M. Schroeder (Luxembourg) à la Banque de France, 21.07.1941; Direction de la 
documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/79, ‘or belge’: visite de M.K., 25.07.1941.

Chapter 11
In the Shadow of Janssen’s Death
The problem of The succession
Janssen’s death on 6 June 1941 thoroughly dislocated the operation of 
the Bank and the Banque d’Emission, of which he was respectively gov-
ernor and chairman. Although Belgian government circles in London 
certainly valued him as a person, they, nevertheless, had become in-
creasingly critical of his policy and had taken particular exception to 
the stance he had taken in the question of the gold, which they regard-
ed as a very grave error1. After the war, because of the courage he had 
shown and his old friendship with Gutt, all these errors, however, were 
to be treated tactfully.
The death of Janssen immediately prompted a wave of speculation 
about the succession, the Dutch-language newspapers in particular cir-
culating the names of a series of former ministers, university profes-
sors and leading figures in banking2. All the while, busy discussions 
were taking place in Brussels behind the scenes. Playing a central role 
in the discussions was the Deputy-governor, Ingenbleek, now acting 
governor, whose chief concern was to prevent an outsider predisposed 
towards the Germans being appointed to the vacant governorship. In 
normal circumstances, the governor of the Bank would be appointed 
by the King, on the proposal of the Minister of Finance, but Ingenbleek 
took the view that the current circumstances of war required the new 
governor to be appointed by the Secretary-general of the Ministry of 
Finance, with the approval of the military commander of the occupy-
ing forces3. Secretary-general Plisnier took the same line4.
1 In this respect, see: BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/6: letter of 
18.07.1956 from the military prosecutor Walter Ganshof-van der Meersch to Kauch.
2 See the newspaper Volk en Staat, 18.06.1941.
3 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, farde 243: note (de Capelle) pour le Roi, 10.06.1941.
4 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers: letter of 12.06.1941 from Ingenbleek to Plis-
nier. In respect of the special competences of the secretaries-general during the 
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For Plisnier, the obvious candidate was Ingenbleek. However, he de-
clined the invitation, stating health grounds5. In turn, he proposed the 
French-speaking Goffin, who was from Brussels and a director of the 
Bank. This meant that the governorship would again be in the hands 
of a French speaker, though that imbalance would be offset by the 
Dutch-speaking Van Nieuwenhuyse, succeeding Goffin in the board of 
directors. This arrangement found consensus within the Bank and ulti-
mately Plisnier, too, gave it his blessing. Galopin found it an acceptable 
proposal, having no liking for the idea of a Dutch-speaking governor 
and even less for a banker drawn from the competition6.
Von Becker and Hofrichter felt that Ingenbleek was the proper can-
didate for the governorship. Should he decline, however, the Military 
Government’s choice would fall on the recently appointed director, 
Berger, above Goffin7. Ingenbleek vigorously opposed that choice, ar-
guing that Berger’s appointment would leave a bad impression among 
leading circles of the country and that his earlier appointment as di-
rector, against the candidate of the Bank and the entire financial and 
industrial world, had been forced on the Bank by the occupier. Now to 
appoint him as governor would be unacceptable and be regarded as a 
‘coup de force’ on the part of the occupying authority. With that, the 
Germans dropped their candidacy of Berger and accepted Ingenbleek’s 
suggestions.
On 16 July 1941, by order of Secretary-general Plisnier, and with the 
approval of General von Falkenhausen, Goffin was appointed gover-
nor8. The general meeting of 23 August appointed Van Nieuwenhuyse as 
director9 and, on 25 August, Basyn as secretary10. Finally, on 3 Septem-
war, see also: SOMA, Archives, CRE, 7 B5: Commission d’enquête des secrétaires 
généraux (Commission Tschoffen), rapport Plisnier, dossier 44, p. 60 ff. See also: 
ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Secretariat-general, 1940-1945, dossier 725: 
letter of 17.12.1945 from Plisnier to J. Duquesne de la Vinelle, chairman of the BEB 
Commission of Enquiry.
5 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers: letter of 12.06.1941 from Ingenbleek to Plis-
nier.
6 See the newspaper Le nouveau journal, 19.06.1941.
7 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, farde 243: note (de Capelle) pour le Roi, 10.06.1941. 
See also: Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 112-113.
8 BNB, Archives, RR, 23.07.1941.
9 BNB, Archives, AV, 25.08.1941.
10 BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, s. f. 6: note de Basyn relative à sa nomination de 
secrétaire de la BNB, 01.09.1941.
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ber during an extraordinary general meeting of the Banque d’Emission, 
Goffin was chosen as that institution’s chairman, Van Nieuwenhuyse 
being appointed as managing-director to replace him, and Basyn as 
secretary11. This settled the question of Janssen’s succession.
a new adminisTraTion
Following his return to Brussels in July 1940, Janssen had taken vir-
tually sole control of both the Bank and the Banque d’Emission, the 
other leaders having practically no part of any significance to play, but 
Janssen’s death brought a total turnaround in the way the Bank was 
led. Goffin, the new governor was the very opposite of his predeces-
sor, eschewing leadership and decision-making, and feeling secure in a 
resolution only if it had been reached collectively by the board of direc-
tors12. In addition, Goffin accepted as a matter of course the tutelage of 
Galopin, who, via the board of directors of the Banque d’Emission, now 
clearly asserted his dominating influence13. Ingenbleek, who, as acting 
governor, had come more to the fore during the interregnum, now opt-
ed to act chiefly behind the scenes as an éminence grise14.
From Janssen, Berger had inherited the portfolio of foreign relations. 
This heavy responsibility reinforced his authority and made him a key 
player in the management of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission. Van 
Nieuwenhuyse initially kept himself in the background, but after a brief 
period of settling in to his task, he became more active in matters of 
general management and even took the lead in the hard position adopt-
ed against the excessive demands of the occupier.
Kauch became Goffin’s private secretary, but only in respect of the 
Bank, not the Banque d’Emission15. Whether this was a sign of distrust 
11 BNB, Archives, AV BEB, 03.09.1941.
12 BNB, Archives, London Archives, dossier 9.1 /25, s. f. 1: documents du Haut Com-
missariat à la sécurité de l’Etat, Banque Nationale de Belgique.
13 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, p. 18.
14 Belgian State Security in London described Ingenbleek as follows: ‘Appartient à 
la catégorie de ceux qui depuis 1940 se sont cantonnés dans une attitude prudente 
et expectative. Anglophobe.’ (BNB, Archives, London Archives, dossier 9.1 /25, s. f. 
1: documents du Haut Commissariat à la sécurité de l’Etat, Banque Nationale de 
Belgique).
15 Krijgsauditoraat, dossier CI 47/44, ‘BEB’, 3, farde 4: 64 dépositions entre le 15 décem-
bre 1944 et le 28 novembre 1945 (n° 25: Kauch).
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on the part of the bankers and industrialists or of Goffin himself is 
difficult to say, but the argument could be made for both possibilities. 
On the one hand, the bankers and industrialists on the board of direc-
tors of the Banque d’Emission considered Kauch as a Bank man who 
was not really behind them16; on the other, Goffin and the members of 
the Bank’s board of directors felt that Janssen had placed too implicit 
a trust in a person that did not entirely merit it17. Whatever the truth 
of the matter, Kauch’s influence on the management and his impact on 
the policy of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission clearly waned after 
Janssen’s death18. This contrasted with the substantial rise in the pres-
tige and authority of Cracco, head of the Foreign Department19, whose 
impressive memoranda on the development of clearing and its mon-
etary implications served as a guideline for the management.
Janssen’s death also brought considerable changes in the power 
and management structures of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission. 
The banker-founders of the Banque d’Emission now abandoned their 
policy of standing aloof and took control of the institution, as well as 
of the Bank. Henceforth, they – Galopin, M.-L. Gérard, A.-E. Janssen, 
de Munck, Collin and Paul de Launoit – regularly convened separate 
meetings with the directors of the Bank and managing directors of 
the Banque d’Emission, where they set out the guidelines for policy 
that were later submitted for discussion and approval by the supervi-
sory council of the Bank and the full board of directors of the Banque 
d’Emission, on which body the German commissioner von Becker and 
Secretary-general Plisnier also sat. The strong man in the new power 
structure was Galopin, while Goffin, in spite of being respectively gov-
ernor and chairman, clearly played second fiddle20.
16 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text).
17 Baudewyns Family Archives: letter of 16.06.1941 from Baudewyns (London) to his 
son (Oxford).
18 BNB, Archives, London Archives, dossier 34: letter of 21.08.1941 from Ansiaux (New 
York) to Baudewyns (London); BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier A 320/12: 
note de Kauch du 15 mai 1942, relative aux documents demandés par Ansiaux.
19 Baudewyns Family Archives: letter of 16.06.1941 from Baudewyns (London) to his 
son (Oxford).
20 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Vier Jahre Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack, pp. 18-19. See also: BNB, Archives, 
SD, 12, dossier 8.11/1, s. f. 5, ‘période de guerre’: note de couverture, 04.12.1941 (la 
Banque Nationale…sa soumission aux banques privées est lamentable).
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Cooperation between the Banque d’Emission and the Ministry of 
Finance languished and the focus of attention diverged. Plisnier felt 
less concern about the policy of resuming work, as his main concern 
was to reduce the costs of occupation, even if that meant getting them 
shifted to the area of clearing. The priorities of Galopin and the Banque 
d’Emission were precisely the opposite, being increasingly to limit pay-
ments via the clearing system to the settlement of solely bona fide com-
mercial transactions and to get all payments of a political nature and of 
a more doubtful commercial character transferred to occupation costs. 
The mutual understanding and solidarity between the Ministry of Fi-
nance and the Banque d’Emission, therefore, began to show cracks that 
would ultimately become a dramatic rift between what were two of the 
country’s key bodies21.
The change was no less fundamental at a second level. Among the 
secretaries-general Plisnier lost influence to his colleague Leemans, 
Secretary-general of the Ministry of Economic Affairs22. As soon as the 
administrative organization of the country began to operate more or 
less reasonably again, the Military Government evinced greater interest 
in the economy, looking to integrate Belgian industry as fully as pos-
sible into the German war effort. Leemans had successfully organized 
the German system of the Warenstellen and their Gruppen in Belgium: 
it made him very much ‘their man’ in the eyes of the Military Govern-
ment.
The new organizations that came into being under the aegis of the 
Warenstellen-system began to share out the industrial orders for Ger-
many among Belgian companies, at the same time providing them 
with the necessary raw materials. Initially, Galopin and his colleagues 
viewed this new, Germany-oriented industrial dirigisme with great sus-
picion, but gradually came to realize that they could hardly disregard it 
if they were to achieve their own economic agenda. They also saw that 
here was a means of shifting responsibility for possible economic col-
laboration by ‘individual’ companies’ onto impersonal organizations 
within the system of the Warenstellen. Maybe this was an answer to 
why, even though initially shunned, Leemans eventually became less 
distrusted by the Brussels financial establishment?
21 See Chapters 18-19.
22 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 57-59.
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The increasing influence exercised by the founder-bankers on 
Banque d’Emission and Bank policy created a sense of unease – 
 sus picion, even – among the members of the board of directors and 
 supervisory council, respectively, who did not belong to the closed circle 
of the founders-bankers. One of the first to ask the pertinent questions 
that were in the minds of many of his colleagues was Maurice Frère, 
Chairman of the Banking Commission since 1938 and – on Janssen’s 
proposal –  appointed director at the Banque d’Emission at the end of 
1940.  Although the Bankaufsichtamt had assumed many of the Bank-
ing Commission’s tasks, Frère had been able to maintain his authority 
in the financial world, thanks to his strong personality and, in part, to 
his contact with his friend Prack, who fed him vital inside information.
During a meeting of the board of directors of the Banque d’Emission 
on 20 August 1941, Frère raised certain important questions about the 
responsibility of the directors23. Pursuant to the bye-laws, the directors 
were required to ‘advise’ the managing directors. In order to carry out 
their task properly, however, the directors had to have comprehensive 
and correct information. According to Frère, this was not the case, 
though this was a deficiency not so difficult to repair. The main prob-
lem, however, lay in the limits and the content of the responsibility. 
Where did the advisory task of the directors begin and where did it 
end? How was their responsibility to be understood? In Frère’s opinion, 
the responsibility was not clearly set out in the bye-laws and conse-
quently more clarity was needed. Galopin and M.-L. Gérard, the two 
leaders of the bank’s founder-bankers, felt they had to respond to this. 
Galopin himself spoke mainly about the question of responsibility, stat-
ing that there was no split between board of directors and managing 
directors: responsibility had to be borne in a spirit of cooperation be-
tween the two.
The firsT greaT disillusions
In early 1941, it was rumoured that certain government circles in Ber-
lin were planning to integrate Belgium, the Netherlands and Northern 
France fully into the German economy by means of a customs union 
23 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 20.08.1941.
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linked with, or followed by, a monetary union24. It was also being said 
that Hofrichter was completely won over by the plan25. In the opinion of 
the bankers, such a policy of Gleichschaltung would be catastrophic for 
the country, destroying entirely its monetary, industrial and financial 
autonomy.
At the beginning of April, Galopin made a secret trip to Berlin, hop-
ing to use his contacts in the banking world to find out more about the 
plan and to halt its implementation insofar as Belgium was concerned26. 
He knew that he had a fair amount of backing at home, in that he could 
count on the support of the Military Government: both von Falken-
hausen and Reeder were marked opponents of any form of customs or 
monetary union, and the secretaries-general were likewise against; in-
deed, Leemans himself had gone to Berlin at the end of March to get 
the German government to drop the idea. In Berlin, the two Belgians 
were reassured by their hosts that the decision rested for the time being 
with the Military Government, which was their partner in the matter. 
Galopin and Leemans made use of their visit to set out the advantages 
of a policy of contract work (Auftragsverlagerung), whereby German 
industrial orders would be placed increasingly in Belgium; in return, 
the German authorities would undertake to discourage the emigration 
of Belgian labour to Germany and to ensure a better supply of food and 
raw materials from Germany to Belgium27.
The argument for a policy of Auftragsverlagerung was not an easy 
one to make; there was indeed a major pitfall, such a policy requiring 
a readiness to increase Belgian industrial production in favour of Ger-
many. Galopin realized that he could not take responsibility for such a 
major decision alone, but Gutt’s letter of the end of February – sent via 
Lisbon to the Société Générale de Belgique and expressing the minis-
24 Joh. de Vries, De Nederlandsche Bank van 1914 tot 1948. Trips tijdvak, 1931-1948, pp. 
244-255 and 273. See also, Klemann, Nederland, 1938-1948, pp. 143-145.
25 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 237/ 1, s. f. 10): memorandum of 
24.03.1941 from Leemans for the secretaries-general (report: journey to Berlin, 19-
23.03.1941).
26 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, Direction, Galopin Papers, letter of 
30.08.1945 from Dubois-Pélerin to the Military prosecutor Wilmart.
27 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 92-95; BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 
dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 237/1, s. f. 10): memorandum of 24.03.1941 from Leemans for 
the secretaries-general (report: journey to Berlin, 19-23.03.1941).
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ter’s understanding for the export of industrial products to Germany 
in exchange for food – perhaps gave him the courage to take on the 
challenge of getting the policy introduced, in the conviction that he 
had sufficient, though vague, approval from the Belgian government in 
London28.
On 1 April 1941, reassured by this, Galopin convened a meeting at 
the Société Générale de Belgique in Brussels of leading figures from the 
magistracy and the legal profession, as well as from the monetary, fi-
nancial and industrial world, to discuss the problem of economic col-
laboration. How was Belgian business to react to Germany’s unwilling-
ness during the previous winter months to give help of any substance 
in solving the problem of food shortages in Belgium? Ought the export 
of industrial goods from Belgium to Germany consequently be halted 
or scaled back? Or ought the exports to be continued so as to hinder 
the emigration of labour to Germany and to put greater pressure on 
Germany to supply more food and raw materials29?
In preparation for that meeting, Galopin had obtained the legal 
opinion of the jurists Marcq and Hermans, and had also asked Collin, 
who combined his chairmanship of the Kredietbank with a professor-
ship in penal law, to prepare a memorandum on the scope of article 
115 of the Penal Code, in respect of economic collaboration30. In strict 
terms, according to the three jurists, any exports to Germany, and a 
fortiori any increase in them, was regarded as a form of economic help 
to the enemy; all exports, thus, fell within the scope of application of 
article 115. However, its application could be escaped through the in-
troduction of the ‘state of emergency’ and in view of the concept of ‘the 
policy of the least evil’. Galopin had the impression that, in light of the 
state of emergency, there was sufficient consensus in the meeting for 
the policy of work resumption to be retained as acceptable and even to 
be continued. In a memorandum of 24 June 1941 he suggested that the 
28 LLN, Archives, A.-E. Janssen Papers, dossier 5: letter of 22.02.1941 from Gutt (Lon-
don) to Cattier (via Ansiaux at Lisbon).
29 Van der Wee and Verbreyt, De Generale Bank, 1822-1997, pp. 270-271. See also: Ne-
fors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 99-100.
30 Collin, ‘De politiek van tewerkstelling tijdens de bezetting’, in: Mededelingen van 
de Koninklijke Academie van België. Klasse der Letteren, 39/1, 1977, pp. 3-10. See 
also: Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, p. 99.
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country’s total industrial production be raised from 60 to 80 per cent 
of the pre-war level31.
The sense of crisis and unease during the spring of 1941 was fed fur-
ther by the alarming development regarding the costs of occupation. 
From the outset, they had been high – too high, even – and had given 
Plisnier, as Secretary-general for the Ministry of Finance, responsible 
for their payment, nightmares. To be able to finance them, he regularly 
called on the Bank for the necessary resources, which were provided 
in the form of advances to the Treasury. In the beginning, accord-
ing to the Military Government, there were particular reasons for the 
costs of occupation and billeting to be high. In June 1940, Belgium and 
Northern France represented the springboard for the German army’s 
further conquest of France and, after this had been completed, for the 
planned conquest of England, for which a million soldiers had been 
assembled in the territory. Plisnier and Janssen had argued that assault 
troops could not be classified as part of the army of occupation and 
that, in accordance with the Hague Convention, their costs could not 
be charged. Studies made by the Ministry of Finance, the Bank and the 
Société Générale put the monthly cost of the occupation at a maximum 
of 400 million Belgian francs, but much more than double that amount 
was being demanded32. Resistance, however, was in vain, as von Falken-
hausen and Reeder argued that they could not go against formal orders 
from Berlin.
The definitive abandonment of the invasion of England (Operation 
Sea Lion) in the spring of 1941 and the preparations for the attack on the 
Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) reduced the number of German 
troops quartered on Belgian soil to about 40,00033. During talks with 
31 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 94-95; De Vlaminck and De Vos, ‘De 
Belgische industriëlen tijdens de bezetting, 1940-1944’, in: Belgisch Tijdschrift voor 
Militaire Geschiedenis, 26, 2 (June 1985), pp. 117-122.
32 SG, Archives, Direction, Galopin Papers, dossier 64: aide-mémoire pour la réunion 
restreinte du 7 janvier 1942 chez Mr. Plisnier (rappel à la réunion du 12 novembre 
1941 chez Mr. Plisnier).
33 Ndl.BZ, Archives, dossier 5512 GA: letter of 04.10.1941 from the Dutch agent at Lis-
bon to his Minister of Foreign Affairs (London) (account of a conversation at Lis-
bon of Luns, attaché to the legation, with P. Heymans, chairman of the Belgian 
food aid campaign Winterhulp).
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Plisnier34, the Military Government now indicated that it was looking35 
to be able to grant a reduction in the occupation costs and at the same 
time set a ceiling for them36, but nothing came of either initiative. All 
that resulted from Plisnier’s efforts was that the costs imposed were sta-
bilized at 1 billion Belgian francs for the third quarter of 194137; even 
so, this did not stop the Military Government from feeling obliged to 
demand an additional 250 million Belgian francs for that quarter, as an 
advance on subsequent monthly charges.
All this left Plisnier utterly disillusioned. On 1 August 1941, follow-
ing Galopin’s example, he invited a number of leading Belgian figures 
to the Ministry of Finance for consultations about the question of oc-
cupation costs38. At the meeting, he asked whether they would agree 
to his using his resignation as a means of obtaining a reduction in the 
costs. Those present advised him most strongly against adopting such a 
course: resignation would achieve nothing and serve only to exacerbate 
the problem; furthermore, the German authorities would simply ap-
point someone tractable to their measures in his place. Galopin felt that 
Plisnier ought to continue to argue for a reduction, but to use strong and 
concrete arguments, such as a comparison with the costs of the Franco-
Belgian occupation of the Rhine during the 1920s. Plisnier ought also to 
point out that the occupation costs were putting the economy under so 
much pressure that ultimately there could be no question of any further 
industrial help being given to Germany by Belgium.
Plisnier set to work and produced a memorandum on 9 August. 
In this, he forecast that the costs of occupation and billeting for 1941 
would exceed 14 billion Belgian francs. This was a higher amount than 
the country’s tax receipts, estimated at 13 billion Belgian francs, which 
naturally had to serve to finance not only the occupation costs, but also 
34 BNB, Archives, RR, 09.07.1941; BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 17.09.1941.
35 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier 1: Zweiter Jahresbericht des Kommissars bei 
der Nationalbank von Belgien (Mai 1941-Mai 1942), Brussels, 26.05.1942, p. 3.
36 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, dossier RW 36/277: Hofrichter, Abschlusz-
bericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, Part 1, pp. 11-12.
37 BNB, Archives, SD, 12, dossier 8.11/2: notes confidentielles diverses (memorandum 
of 09.08.1941 from Plisnier).
38 At the meeting were Jamar, Davignon, Gesche, Goffin, Heymans, Hayoit de Termi-
court, Galopin, Ingenbleek, A.- E. Janssen, de Launoit, M.-L. Gérard, Lippens and 
O. Gérard.
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normal State expenditure. Quite simply, Belgium’s public finances were 
in a pitiable state. According to Plisnier, the distress caused by the war 
virtually excluded any increase in taxation, so that the Treasury would 
necessarily have to turn to advances from the Bank and to loans from 
the banks and the public39.
The Military Government was uncomfortable with the occupation 
costs. Both von Falkenhausen and Reeder, in fact, also considered them 
to be excessive and hoped to be able to have them reduced, following 
the move of military activity to the Eastern front. However, Berlin de-
cided otherwise. With operations on the Eastern front demanding so 
much more additional resources, German needs were rising spectacu-
larly and a range of specialized German procurement agencies began to 
purchase goods in Belgium on an increasing scale, even unashamedly 
scouring the parallel or ‘black’ market there40. All those purchases were 
initially entered as occupation costs, which is why, instead of declining, 
those costs went up in the course of 1941 and why the Military Govern-
ment found itself obliged to raise them by 50 per cent with effect from 
1 October, i.e. from 1 billion to 1.5 billion Belgian francs per month41.
occupaTion and economy (may 1940-may 1942)
The high costs of the occupation and the payment of the clearing bal-
ances were chief factors in a spectacular expansion of the money sup-
ply, as Table 11.1 shows clearly. 
The expansion of the money supply naturally had an effect on the 
economy as a whole. Industrial companies, retail businesses and small 
tradesmen were now swimming in cash, but cash that could not be in-
vested in either stocks or technical equipment42, so that much of it was 
39 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 8, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 240/5, s. f. 5): situation 
 financière, économique, alimentaire et sanitaire de la Belgique après 20 mois 
d’occupation (beginning of 1942).
40 BNB, Archives, SD, Prack Papers: Zweites Jahresbericht des Kommissars bei der 
 Nationalbank von Belgien (Mai 1941-Mai 1942), Brussels, 26.05.1942, p. 3.
41 BNB, Archives, DC, 01.10.1941.
42 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 4, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 239/7): notes de Kauch pour 
M. le Directeur Berger, 04.08.1941.
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simply deposited with the banks. At the time, however, there was no 
private-sector demand for bank credit and so the banks saw the mas-
sive credit requirements of the State as a welcome investment alterna-
tive, even though they had to be satisfied with low rates of interest: for 
example, 1 15/16 per cent per year for 4-month Treasury certificates43.
Together with a general shortage of goods, the expansion had a clear 
effect on the level of prices. Officially, these were subject to strict regu-
lation and remained stable, but they soared on the parallel or ‘black’ 
market, particularly from 1942 on. As already mentioned, German 
procurement agencies were active on a large scale on the Belgian black 
market, but they were not alone, because much of the population was 
necessarily also having recourse to it. The Belgian ration of barely 1,300 
calories per adult per day (compared to 2,000 calories in Germany and 
1,750 calories in the Netherlands) was clearly inadequate, so that every 
household, within the limits of what it could afford, was obliged to re-
sort to an alternative source44.
43 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers: Zweiter Jahresbericht des Kommissars bei der Na-
tional Bank von Belgien (Mai 1941-Mai 1942), Brussels, 26.05.1942, p. 28.
44 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 8, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 240/5 s. f. 5): situation fi-
nancière, économique, alimentaire et sanitaire de la Belgique après 20 mois 
d’occupation (beginning of 1942), pp. 8-12.
Table 11.1:  Development of the money supply in Belgium 
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Chapter 12
The Gold Cover and the Clearing 
System under Discussion
The dilemma concerning cover for The noTe issue
The growing circulation of banknotes during 1941 placed the Bank in a 
dilemma regarding the legal requirement to hold a minimum quantity 
of gold – 40 per cent – as cover for its direct obligations to pay cash. 
That requirement dated back to 1850, the date of the institution’s es-
tablishment, when the minimum quantity was set at 30 per cent. That 
minimum had been raised to 40 per cent in 1926 and had been reaf-
firmed in article 7 of royal decree of 24 August 19391.
With the occupation, the question of the cover requirement surfaced 
again. Within a very short time, the issue of banknotes had expanded 
to an unprecedented degree. A prime reason for this was the enormous 
amounts that the Bank was advancing to the Treasury to pay the costs 
of occupation; another lay in the fact that the clearing balances and 
the conversion of Reichskreditkassenscheine had to be settled in Belgian 
francs. As a result, the Bank was forced to provide a continuous flow of 
banknotes, thereby skewing the cover percentage2. With the outlook for 
the months ahead certainly offering no improvement, Goffin, the new 
governor, decided to place the problem on the agenda of a meeting of 
the board of directors3.
The board found the matter too complicated and its implications too 
far-reaching for an immediate decision to be made4, deferring the de-
cision until it had obtained opinions from the jurists Marcq and Van 
1 Van der Wee and Tavernier, De Nationale Bank van België, pp. 198-199, 308.
2 BNB, Archives, AR, 24.09.1941.
3 BNB, Archives, DC, 27.08.1941.
4 BNB, Archives, DC, 06.09.1941.
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Dievoet, as well as from economists, in this instance Professor Dupriez 
and Jean-Jacques Vincent, head of the Bank’s Economic Research De-
partment. Furthermore, the director Berger would consult the Bank-
aufsichtamt and Ingenbleek would take up the question with Raoul 
Hayoit de Termicourt, Advocate-general of the Court of Cassation.
Three aspects of the problem were examined during the consul-
tations: legal, economic and ethical. The legal aspect could itself be 
viewed from a logical or from a formal standpoint. Logically, follow-
ing the suspension of the Belgian franc’s gold convertibility on 10 May 
1940, the Bank was no longer subject to the cover requirement; indeed, 
convertibility was the raison d’être for the requirement: suspension of 
one meant that there was no sense in the other. In May 1940, however, 
the government had omitted to abolish the cover requirement. Thus, 
in formal terms the requirement was still in force. Insofar as it was 
considered possible for the Bank to continue to issue banknotes, it was 
up to the administration to find a legal measure to solve the problem. 
The economic aspect involved the threat of inflation: whether the Bank 
continued to issue banknotes or if the issue was taken over by another 
institution, money circulation would continue to expand, and price in-
flation with it. The ethical aspect, finally, involved criminal law and 
centred on the question of whether the continued issue of banknotes by 
the Bank or their issue by another institution did not imply the provi-
sion of financial aid to the enemy; again, article 115 of the Penal Code 
was hauled out for examination5.
There were three possible options to be explored, following a deci-
sion to halt the issue of banknotes by the Bank and to have that issue 
continued by another institution6. The first was a reintroduction of the 
Reichskreditkassenscheine: the board was chary of this, feeling that it 
left the door wide open for an uncontrolled plundering of the country. 
The second was for a proposal to the Military Government that it re-
introduce the Reichsmark as legal tender. The reaction of the Board was 
also unanimously negative7.
5 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 1, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 242/ 6), ‘circulation’: Kauch, 
note relative à la couverture légale, December 1942, pp. 5-6.
6 BNB, Archives, DC, 10.09.1941.
7 BNB, Archives, SD, 12, dossier 8.11/ 1, ‘période de guerre’, s. f. 5: la situation financière 
et monétaire aux Pays-Bas (memorandums of 08.12.1941 and 12.12.1941).
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The third option was to bring into circulation the banknotes of an-
other Belgian institution, one that was not subject to the legal require-
ment of the cover percentage. Ingenbleek8 initially appeared to be in 
favour of this option and certain members of the supervisory council 
were definitely so. They continued to defend the idea, arguing that the 
issue function would thereby remain in Belgian hands and thus ensure 
Belgium of at least some control. It would also enable the Bank to meet 
its legal obligations and maintain intact its image as an independent in-
stitution9. Furthermore, a separate note issue agency within the Société 
Générale de Belgique had brought similar banknotes into circulation 
during the First World War and the formula had not led to any criti-
cism after hostilities had ended.
If at first there was no immediate agreement within the Bank’s board 
of directors about whether to accept or reject the third option, a clear 
consensus to reject it emerged, nevertheless, after far-reaching discus-
sion and at Berger’s prompting10. The board took the view that to have 
the Banque d’Emission issuing banknotes would create a situation of 
dual currency circulation, something that had more than once been 
proved to lead to monetary chaos.
The position adopted by the board of directors found support in 
the advice of the economists. Dupriez was very explicit: the popula-
tion would regard Banque d’Emission banknotes or, as the case might 
be, Reichsmarks, as being inferior wartime money and that, in accord-
ance with Gresham’s Law (bad money drives out good), their circula-
tion would encourage people to hoard the notes of the Bank. To keep 
the circulation of banknotes at a proper level, hoarding would have to 
be countered by additional quantities of banknotes of other origin be-
ing brought into circulation. After the war, that additional issue would 
represent a potential danger of inflation and give rise to psychological 
8 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers: Ingenbleek, problèmes de la vie sous 
l’occupation (X: La dépêche de M. Gutt à Galopin), p. 35.
9 BNB, Archives, RR, 14.01.1942; BNB, Archives, SD, 13, dossier 8.11/ 3, ‘couverture’: 
memorandum from the supervisory council, incorporating a report of two infor-
mal meetings of the board of directors and a few members of the supervisory coun-
cil, 23.02.1942 and 25.02.1942.
10 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 1, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 242/ 6), ‘circulation’: Kauch, 
note relative à la couverture légale, December 1942, p. 11-12.
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confusion and monetary chaos, thereby seriously hindering currency 
reform11. 
The legal aspect of the matter was discussed during a meeting be-
tween Berger and Hofrichter on 10 September 1941. Both were agreed 
that, as the cover percentage had been imposed by law, it was only by 
a new law that it could be abolished, lowered or suspended. In the cir-
cumstances of war, with the Belgian government abroad, the measure 
would normally have to be taken by the Secretary-general of the Min-
istry of Finance. 
In his opinion of 20 September 1941, the jurist Marcq assessed the 
competence of the Secretary-general to act as legislator in this matter 
in the place of the Belgian government in London. Basing himself on 
the arguments stated in the Court of Cassation’s judgement (arrêt) of 
7 April 1941, Marcq felt that the Secretary-general did indeed have that 
competence: ‘si l’on reconnait aux secrétaires généraux un pouvoir lé-
gislatif limité, l’on peut reconnaître au secrétaire général des finances le 
pouvoir de prendre la mesure envisagée, pour autant qu’il y ait urgence’12. 
Consulted by Ingenbleek in December 1941, Hayoit de Termicourt 
spoke in similar terms13.
Towards a confronTaTion wiTh The minisTry of finance
The option for a single currency in circulation implied shifting respon-
sibility onto the Secretary-general’s shoulders. Contacts with the Min-
istry indicated that Plisnier could in no way reconcile himself to the 
Bank’s option. He certainly regarded himself as having the legal com-
petence to suspend the article on coverage by decree, but considerations 
of professional ethics prevented him from doing so14.
In Plisnier’s view, there was, first of all, no economic argument what-
soever to justify such a measure: economic production and activity had 
11 BNB, Archives, DC, 12.09.1941 (Basyn, annexe au procès-verbal du comité de direc-
tion).
12 BNB, Archives, Contentieux, Miomandre Papers, dossier ‘Marcq b’: letter of 
20.09.1941 from Marcq to Goffin.
13 BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6: opinion of 03.11.1941, Hayoit de Termi-
court.
14 Archives, SD, 13, dossier 8.11/ 3, ‘couverture’: annexes 3, 17 and 18.
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slowed to such a degree that the amount of currency in circulation 
ought to be reduced rather than increased, if it was to be commensurate 
with economic development. Secondly, there was a social argument to 
justify his refusal, in that suspension would open the floodgates for in-
flation and the hardest hit by it would again be salaried staff, wage-
earners and pensioners: in short, all those people on a limited and fixed 
income.
Plisnier had a third, more tactical reason for refusing, one that for 
him was very pertinent. In the run-up to the opening of the Eastern 
front, the Military Government had held out the prospect of a reduc-
tion in the costs of occupation and he was looking to open discussions 
in order to tie that reduction to a concrete figure; maintaining the cover 
percentage appeared to him to be a valuable means of applying pressure 
in his confrontation with the German authorities.
By the end of November 1941, the cover percentage had fallen to about 
45 per cent and was being projected to fall to the minimum level of 40 
per cent within a further three months. At this point, Goffin wrote offi-
cially to Plisnier to inform him of the alarming situation and to request 
him after all to promulgate the measure suspending the cover percent-
age15. Plisnier answered that, until the occupier granted a reduction in 
the costs of occupation, he would refuse to proceed with the measure16.
The Bank, having initially thought that mutual discussion could iron 
out the difference of opinion with the Secretary-general, now began to 
see that Plisnier was not prepared to give way: not only was there no 
prospect of a reduction in the costs of occupation; on the contrary, they 
had just been increased. Thus, for the Bank only one option remained, 
i.e. the issue of banknotes by the Banque d’Emission. On 9 January, the 
Bank therefore resolved to propose that the Banque d’Emission begin 
printing its own banknotes under the signature of Goffin17.
The Military Government was very put out by Plisnier’s contin-
ued refusal and the government in Berlin even more so, regarding his 
stance as a sign of unacceptable obstruction and even considering his 
15 BNB, Archives, DC, 21.11.1941. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 13, dossier 8.11/ 3, ‘couver-
ture’: letter of 26.11.1941 from Goffin to Plisnier.
16 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 1, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A242/ 6), ‘circulation’: Kauch, 
note relative à la couverture légale, December 1942, p. 13. See also: BNB, Archives, 
DC, 08.01.1942.
17 BNB, Archives, DC, 09.01.1942. See also: BNB, Archives, DC, 31.01.1942.
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dismissal. Von Falkenhausen and Reeder did not wish to go that far, 
as they feared that revoking his appointment would provoke a wave of 
resistance in Belgian public circles; as always, they were against stirring 
up public opinion, preferring order and calm, and no friction or tension 
in the occupied territory that could have a negative effect on economic 
cooperation with Germany and fuel fresh criticism from Berlin of the 
Military Government’s handling of policy in Belgium: increasingly 
they came to favour the idea of an ordinance obliging the Bank to con-
tinue issuing banknotes18. By 5 February 1942, the cover percentage had 
fallen to 42.48 per cent and two days later the Bank decided to make a 
final attempt to persuade Plisnier to revise his stance19. 
Goffin put a clear choice before Plisnier. Both the Bank and the Min-
istry of Finance preferred a single currency to remain in circulation. 
For that principle to be maintained in the circumstances, article 7 of 
the royal decree of 1939 had to be amended or suspended and that could 
be done only by a decree of the Secretary-general or a by German or-
dinance. It was for the Secretary-general to decide. At the same time 
Goffin proposed that a number of leading figures from the Bank, the 
Banque d’Emission and the Ministry of Finance should meet to make a 
final attempt to reach a compromise20. Plisnier agreed to a meeting on 
27 February.
During the intervening period, Plisnier was besieged by various 
prominent figures, each attempting to break the deadlock by personal 
discussion. The gulf, at first, appeared to be unbridgeable, but time – 
that indefatigable ally of compromise – accomplished its work. The 
negotiators, indeed, did manage to extract a not unimportant compro-
mise from the Secretary-general: at an informal meeting of the board of 
directors with members of the supervisory council on 25 February 1942 
Smeers, the Government Commissioner at the Bank, let a few words 
drop that came as an enormous relief to all of them and opened the 
door to a solution: ‘le refus de M. Plisnier d’intervenir lui-même par un 
arrêté n’exclut pas une autorisation accordée à la Banque d’obtemperer à 
18 SOMA, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier JP 965: Die Besatzungszeit in Belgien. 
Persönliche Erinnerungen von Herbert Prack.
19 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 1, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 242/6), ‘circulation’: Kauch, 
note relative à la couverture légale, December 1942, pp. 15-18.
20 BNB, Archives, DC, 17.02.1942.
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une ordonnance allemande…’ (‘the refusal by Mr. Plisnier to issue a de-
cree him self, does not exclude a consent, given to the Bank for comply-
ing to a German order’)21. Now, at the formal meeting of 27 February, 
Goffin and Plisnier were able to declare without loss of face that, in the 
higher interest of the country, they were both prepared to accept a pos-
sible German ordinance suspending the cover requirement. Responsi-
bility for implementing the ordinance would rest with the Bank22. The 
jurist Marcq also allied himself with this consensus23.
At its meeting of 5 March 1942, the supervisory council endorsed the 
agreement that been reached and authorized the board of directors to 
continue to issue banknotes. Next day, the cover requirement of 40 per 
cent was suspended by order of the military commander, von Falken-
hausen24. On 9 April, the cover percentage fell below that requirement, 
but the Bank nevertheless continued to issue its banknotes25. The inci-
dent was closed. The wound probably healed, but the scar remained.
The clearing sysTem in discrediT
Over and above the questions of the occupation costs and the cover per-
centage, a third and by no means minor problem confronted the Bank 
and the Banque d’Emission in the summer of 1941. It concerned the 
rapidly growing imbalance in the clearing operations with Germany 
and, to a less extent, with France and the Netherlands.
With the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the 
war entered a new phase, one of total war, with German propaganda 
21 BNB, Archives, SD, 13, dossier 8.11/ 3, ‘couverture’: RR, 25.02.1942 (report of two in-
formal meetings, 23.02.1942 and 25.02 1942).
22 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 1, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 242/ 6), ‘circulation’: Kauch, 
note relative à la couverture légale, December 1942, pp. 19-20.
23 BNB, Archives, SD, 13, dossier 8.11/ 3, ‘couverture’: letter of 28.02.1942 from Goffin to 
Plisnier; letter of 03.03.1942 from Plisnier to Goffin; supervisory council decision, 
05.03.1942 (with a report of the meeting between Ingenbleek and Marcq concern-
ing the agreement reached).
24 BNB, Archives, SD, 13, dossier 8.11/ 3, ‘couverture’: decision of the supervisory coun-
cil, 05.03.1942; ordinance of 06.03.1942 of the military commander.
25 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 1, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 242/ 6), ‘circulation’: Kauch, 
note relative à la couverture légale, December 1942, p. 20.
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claiming that the opening of the Eastern front ought to be recognized 
by the entire civilized world as a ‘crusade against evil’: who would 
want to avoid the sacrifices necessary to defend the ‘values of the West’ 
against such a pernicious soviet regime? Convinced or not, occupied 
Europe would be obliged to contribute to the struggle. For Belgium in 
particular, this had serious consequences for the flow of payments be-
tween her and Germany.
Plisnier saw the opening of the Eastern front differently. For him, 
it meant a considerable reduction in the number of German troops in 
Belgium26; consequently, there could be a sharp cut in the costs of oc-
cupation. Even the Military Government had to concede – reluctantly, 
it is true – that he was right27. Moreover, Reeder had been offering the 
prospect of a reduction since the spring of 1941. Aware of Belgian dis-
content at the high costs of occupation, in August 1941 the government 
in Berlin began to insist that certain transactions for the Wehrmacht be 
withdrawn from the sphere of occupation costs and be settled via the 
clearing system28.
Belgian exports to Germany were not subject to the normal require-
ment of a licence from the Clearing Office at the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. As a result, control of what was being exported was possible 
only a posteriori, after the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin had demanded 
payment by the Banque d’Emission and invoices had been presented. 
Verification of the whole process was the responsibility of the inspec-
tion service at the Bank’s Foreign Department, headed by Cracco.
In a memorandum of 1 August, Cracco drew the attention to the 
‘alarming’ development within the Belgian clearing system and to the 
‘plundering’ – there was no other word for it – of occupied Belgium29. 
He submitted a further memorandum on the same subject on 25 Au-
gust, together with a statistical review of clearing operations from July 
26 Ndl.BZ, Archives, dossier 5512 GA: letter of 04.10.1941 from the envoy in Lisbon to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs (London).
27 Ndl.BZ, Archives, dossier 5512 GA: letter of 04.10.1941 from the envoy in Lisbon to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs (London).
28 BNB, Archives, DC, 29.07.1941. See also: Krijgsauditoraat, dossier GI 47/44 (BEB, 1): 
Hopchet, note au sujet des banques allemandes, 25.06.1945.
29 BNB, Archives, SD, 32, Cracco Papers, dossier 8.11.26/ 2: Cracco, note relative aux 
clearings, 01.08.1941.
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1940 to July 1941. He emphasized that the Belgo-German clearing sys-
tem in force no longer had anything to do with the system of tradition-
al offsetting agreements, which did not permit long-term imbalances. 
Clearing operations were now taking on the form of the provision of a 
line of credit ‘de telle manière que la mesure du crédit est fixée non plus 
par le donneur, mais par le preneur de crédit’. Moreover, the attendant 
risk was no longer being borne by the original private creditors, but by 
the entire community, which made the clearing system: ‘un véritable 
complément de contribution de guerre’30.
Table 12.1:  Development of Belgian clearing accounts (total of Belgian balances) 
(in millions of Belgian francs)
Balance as at 31 October 1940
Balance as at 30 November 1940
Balance as at 31 January 1941
Balance as at 31 March 1941
Balance as at 31 May 1941
Balance as at 31 July 1941
Balance as at 2 August 1941
Balance as at 17 August 1941










Source: BNB, Archives, SD, Cracco Papers, file 8.11.26/2: memorandum of 25.08.1941; 
BNB, Archives, DC, 04.09.1941.
Analysis of the credit balance as at 31 July 1941 enabled Cracco to con-
clude that just 37 per cent of the total stemmed from visible trade, 24 
per cent from invisible trade and 32 percent from capital transactions. 
This last figure was extremely disquieting. Initially, the balance had re-
sulted from the transfers of gold and foreign currency from the Banque 
d’Emission to the Reichsbank. Since November 1940, however, the in-
creasing balance was due chiefly to the proceeds from the sale of Bel-
gian and foreign shares by Belgian companies to German buyers: the 
foreign securities apart, much of the sale had to do with the disposal 
of Belgian assets in South-eastern Europe, in the Balkans and in the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, now annexed by Germany.
30 BNB, Archives, SD, 32, Cracco Papers, dossier 8.11.26/ 2: Cracco, quelques observa-
tions fondamentales sur le clearing (les enseignements d’une année d’expérience), 
25.08.1941.
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The credit balance in the sector of invisible trade resulted primarily 
from the transfer of savings by Belgians working in Germany to their 
families in Belgium. That in the sector of visible trade was the largest in 
absolute figures, but in fact fairly modest in relative figures, due to the 
large volume of both imports and exports at the time. Heading exports 
were textile products, coal, crude steel, semi-finished steel products, 
and goods from the metalworking industry, including locomotives, 
railway wagons and ships. Heading imports until July 1941 were grain 
and other foodstuffs, followed by raw materials for the textile and metal 
industries31.
In the course of August 1941, the imbalance in the Belgo-German 
clearing system took a new and very inauspicious turn. The direct cause 
was the derailing of an agreement that Janssen had concluded on 17 
April 1941 with the central administration of the Reichskreditkassen 
in connection with the settlement of credit balances in Reichsmarks 
held by the Banque d’Emission at the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels. The 
credit balances originated largely from transfers in Reichsmarks made 
by branches of German banks in Belgium that were looking to receive 
Belgian francs in return. The banks wanted to pass on those francs to 
German procurement agencies, who had purchased goods or services 
in Belgium for the armed forces and who needed Belgian money to pay 
their Belgian suppliers32. At first, Janssen had not opposed this prac-
tice33. After all, it provided the Banque d’Emission with foreign cur-
rency in the form of Reichsmarks that he felt could be used eventually 
to purchase foodstuffs and raw materials abroad. In addition, the pay-
ments concerned were deductible from the costs of occupation.
The arrangement had already begun to go wrong in the summer 
of 1941. As indicated above, there was a rapid increase particularly in 
31 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 03.09.1941. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11/ 5, 
‘clearing’: commandes en carnets à destination de l’Allemagne, 26.09.1941 (‘La 
cadence actuelle dans le secteur de la construction métallique laisse prévoir une 
moyenne annuelle de 5 à 6 milliards de francs de commandes (36 pourcent locomo-
tives, 43 pourcent bataux, 21 pourcent matériel de chemin de fer), dans le secteur de 
l’industrie de la sidérurgie, grosso modo 1 milliard de francs, dans l’industrie des 
charbonnages approximativement 1,5 milliard de francs’).
32 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 03.09.1941; BNB, Archives, RR, 06.08.1941, 04.09.1941.
33 BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11./ 5, ‘clearing’: extrait du procès-verbal de la séance 
du CD, 17.04.1941.
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German procurement for the Eastern front, generating an alarming 
rise in the Banque d’Emission’s credit balance at the Reichskreditkasse 
in Brussels. When, on 5 August, it came to settling the transactions 
for July (valued at 461 million Belgian francs in favour of the Banque 
d’Emission), Hofrichter notified Berger, who was responsible for for-
eign operations since Janssen’s death, that the Reichskreditkasse was no 
longer in a position to settle such credit balances from the proceeds of 
occupation cost payments34 and therefore demanded that the procedure 
be revised. He pointed out that most purchase transactions were not 
for procurement for the German army of occupation in Belgium stricto 
sensu, but for the army in general and for the army on the Eastern front 
in particular. In consequence, those transactions could no longer be 
offset against occupation costs, but ought to be settled via the clearing 
system.
Berger had no option but to accept both the logic of Hofrichter’s ar-
gument and its consequences. The Banque d’Emission was now faced 
with taking immediate action to curb any increase in its credit bal-
ance at the Reichskreditkasse and to prevent any further derailing of the 
clearing system.
The moTion of 24 sepTember 1941
In his discussions of 5 and 6 August, Hofrichter indicated that the fi-
nancial administration of the Military Government was checking to 
see what past expenditure, entered as occupation costs, was in fact to 
be regarded as reimbursement for German purchases made in Belgium, 
but with a foreign destination. On 11 August, the Reichskreditkasse in-
formed the Banque d’Emission that, in accordance with the new ar-
rangement, 40 million Reichsmarks had been transferred to its ac-
count35, soon followed by two more transfers of respectively 25 and 40 
million Reichsmarks (for an overall equivalent of 1,312.5 million Belgian 
francs)36.
34 BNB, Archives, DC, 05.08.1941.
35 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 11.08.1943.
36 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 25.08.1941.
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The managing directors now felt that matters were getting out of 
hand and refused to make payment in Belgian francs for the last trans-
fer, even after von Becker’s threatening telephone call of 25 August de-
manding payment before noon the following day37. The management 
remained resolute, arguing that the transfer of part of the costs of occu-
pation to the clearing system had a political bearing and that the Com-
missioner’s demand could be acted upon only after consultation with 
and authorization from the Ministry of Finance.
Plisnier feared that an outright refusal would weaken his position 
in the negotiations then being conducted with von Falkenhausen on 
a possible reduction of the occupation costs, and therefore advised the 
managing directors to bite the bullet and make the payment38. Never-
theless, he pointed out that the amounts in question should be reim-
bursed by the Military Government to the Ministry of Finance, since 
Belgium would otherwise be paying twice: once as a part of the occupa-
tion costs paid by the Ministry and now again via the clearing system in 
Berlin. But he agreed with the management that the Banque d’Emission 
could make payment to the Reichskreditkasse only if ordered in writ-
ing to do so and – also importantly – provided the operation did not 
recurr39.
The supervisory council of the Bank and the board of directors of 
the Banque d’Emission had followed the adverse development of Bel-
gium’s clearing balance in Berlin intently. Some of their members had 
already been sharply critical when Cracco’s memorandum of 1 August 
revealed that, since November 1940, the distortion of the balance had 
been due mainly to the sale of Belgian foreign assets to German buyers. 
The council and the board were even more shocked when the opera-
tions to purge the occupation costs resulted in a new sudden rise in the 
clearing balance in Berlin40, implying an increase in the payments to be 
made by the Banque d’Emission in Belgium. In a fresh memorandum 
on 11 September, Cracco wrote that concrete measures were required 
37 BNB, Archives, RR, 04.09.1941.
38 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 26.08.1941: report of the midday session, at which Ingen-
bleek set out the result of his discussions with Plisnier (in the morning).
39 BNB, Archives, RR, 04.09.1941.
40 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 03.09.1941.
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from the Banque d’Emission41. Three demands should be put to the oc-
cupying power: 1) that a clear distinction be made between occupation 
costs and clearing operations; 2) that all imports and exports of goods 
be subject to approval by the Ministry of Economic Affairs or the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Supply; and 3) that, in respect of capital trans-
actions, transfers be subject to a licence from the Clearing Office of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This office would determine whether 
there could be any offsetting and, if not, reimbursement would be in 
Belgian government paper.
One of directors, A.-E. Janssen, proposed that, in line with Cracco’s 
suggestion, a motion should be drawn up for submission to the Mili-
tary Government. In that motion, the board of directors would set out 
its view on the measures to be taken to curb inflation and to achieve a 
reduction in occupation costs. 
The directors convened on 24 September to approve the definitive 
text of the motion. This referred in the first place to the inflationary ef-
fect of many measures taken by the occupier. It went on to say that the 
occupying power was shamelessly abusing article 13 of the bye-laws by 
obliging the Banque d’Emission to accept German Reichsmarks with-
out distinction and with no limit as cover for the issue of banknotes by 
the Bank. Belgian law had laid down that only foreign currency freely 
convertible into gold could be considered as alternative cover to gold. 
The occupier was required to respect that law. In the same way as the 
Bank, the Banque d’Emission was a Belgian institution whose specific 
public task was to pursue a sound monetary policy. Demands by the 
German authorities that led directly to uncheckable inflation prevented 
the Banque d’Emission from fulfilling that task adequately42.
The motion also demanded a clear and absolute separation of occu-
pation costs from clearing operations. To guarantee that separation, a 
mixed committee was proposed that would have executive powers and 
in which the occupying power, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the Banque d’Emission would be represented. 
The motion also proposed that Belgo-German goods trade be subject to 
41 BNB, Archives, DT, 1, dossier 02.02.01.03 (D. 537/ 8), ‘notes’: Cracco, addendum à la 
note du 25 août 1941, relative aux clearings, 11.09.1941.
42 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 24.09.1941.
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a system of quota restrictions and licences, and that government securi-
ties be used to settle payments in respect of capital movements43.
The Military Government was impressed by the motion. There was 
therefore no coincidence in Reeder inviting Leemans, Secretary- general 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, for a discussion on 25 September 
with Dr. Landfried, State Secretary for Economic Affairs in Berlin, who 
was visiting Brussels44. Landfried opened the discussion with an as-
surance that the heavy burden of costs laid on Belgium would only be 
temporary and was dictated by the exceptional circumstances of the 
moment.
Leemans aired Belgian unhappiness about the state of affairs during 
the preceding months and, as regards Belgo-German trade, pointed to 
the contrast between the sharp increase in the Belgian clearing balance 
and the recently announced export embargo in Germany. He added 
that Belgium could not even obtain authorization to import freely from 
other countries and that all these restrictions placed a heavy burden on 
the development of Belgium’s clearing balance. He asked for counter 
measures: exports to Germany and the Netherlands (at that moment 
accounting for 95 per cent of Belgian exports) to be subject to prior 
licensing by the Clearing Office at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, so 
that the credit balance in favour of Belgium could be brought down to 
normal proportions. Furthermore, Belgium should be allowed to trade 
freely with other countries. Lastly, there ought now to be compensa-
tory imports of foodstuffs from France for the imposed export of coal 
to that country – without any compensation – which had caused a lot 
of resentment, the more so as it had led to coal-rationing in Belgium.
Landfried adopted a placatory approach. Reeder would work out a 
system with Leemans to improve Belgian control of foreign trade and 
would also commence discussions with France to ensure that, in fu-
ture, Belgian exports of coal would be offset by imports of grain. Time 
proved Landfried’s fine words hollow, as nothing ever came of them.
43 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 24.09.1941.
44 BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11/ 5, ‘clearing’: report of 25.09.1941 by Leemans on 
his meeting with Landfried (see also: letter of 29.09.1941 from Leemans to Goffin, 
concerning the dispatch of the report).
 The Gold Cover and the Clearing System under Discussion 221
The moTion of 7 January 1942
On 29 September 1941, the Banque d’Emission was notified that the gov-
ernment in Berlin had transferred a fresh amount of 30 million Reichs-
marks to the Banque d’Emission’s account at the Verrechnungskasse, as 
settlement for purchases in Belgium destined for Germany and wrong-
ly charged to occupation costs. The notification was accompanied by a 
request for the equivalent amount in Belgian francs to be transferred to 
the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels. It was stated in addition that a final 
transfer amounting to 35 million Reichsmarks would follow, complet-
ing the regularization of the erroneous charging of occupation costs to 
the value of 145 million Reichsmarks, the equivalent of 2,182.5 million 
Belgian francs45. The leaders of the Banque d’Emission were upset by 
the news and suggested that the managing directors should respond: 
a limit had to be placed on the provision of banknotes to the Banque 
d’Emission; for the time being, however, this remained just a sugges-
tion46.
The month of October brought a new disenchantment, this time re-
garding Franco-Belgian payment flows. For as long as men could re-
member, Belgian seasonal labourers had worked on the big farms in 
Northern France and later as frontier workers in industry, but their 
numbers had of late begun to increase, particularly since the Wehr-
macht’s recruitment of labourers in Belgium to build fortifications 
along the French coast. At the same time, the Wehrmacht had com-
menced purchasing goods in Belgium for use in France. So far, the 
Reichskreditkasse in Paris had financed all expenditure in this respect, 
recouping it from the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels via mutual offset-
ting. For its part, the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels financed its pay-
ments to Paris with receipts from the Ministry of Finance for settling 
occupation costs.
On 8 October the Bankaufsichtamt informed the Banque d’Emission 
that the mutual offsetting arrangement between the Paris and the Brus-
sels Reichskreditkasse was abolished47 and that, henceforth, the Franco-
45 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 29.09.1941 and 01.10.1940. See also: BNB, Archives, SD, 15, 
dossier 8.11/ 5, s. f. 7: ordres de paiements, 29.09.1941, 01.10.1941.
46 BNB, Archives, RR, 01.10.1941. See also: Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, p. 
112.
47 BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11.5/ s. f. 9, ‘virement des RKK’: letter of 08.10.1941 
from von Becker to Goffin, 08.10.1941.
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Belgian clearing agreement concluded at Wiesbaden on 18 December 
1940 and ratified by the protocol of 11 January 1941 would apply. That 
agreement laid down that all Franco-Belgian payments were to be con-
ducted via the clearing system in Berlin, so that all remuneration for 
purchases in Belgium by the Wehrmacht that were destined for France 
and all payments for the provision of Belgian services in France48 
were now required to be settled by means of transfers to the Banque 
d’Emission’s account at the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin49.
The letter also announced that the new arrangement would be ap-
plied retroactively and that, in consequence, the German government 
had transferred 43.25 million Reichsmarks to the Banque d’Emission’s 
account at the Verrechnungskasse, with the request that the equivalent, 
amounting to 540 million Belgian francs, be paid to the Reichskredit-
kasse in Brussels.
The managing directors were outraged. In their reply they declared 
their agreement with an arrangement via the clearing system in Ber-
lin limited to purely commercial transactions with France. However, to 
apply the arrangement not only to remuneration for goods purchased 
by the Wehrmacht in Belgium and destined for France, but also to re-
muneration for work performed by Belgians in France, on behalf of the 
Wehrmacht, was going too far. Such remuneration, the managing di-
rectors argued, should be regarded as coming under occupation costs 
and consequently should be borne by the country where those costs 
were incurred, in this case by France and certainly not by Belgium. 
They therefore proposed a different, more suitable arrangement, where-
by the Banque de France would open a special French franc account 
in the name of the Banque d’Emission, in exchange for Belgian franc 
payments by the Banque d’Emission. The Belgian government would 
be able to use that account to purchase food and other goods in France, 
free of quota restrictions. If the proposal was not accepted, the Banque 
d’Emission would refuse to pay out the amount of 540 million Belgian 
francs to the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels50.
48 BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11.5/ s. f. 13, ‘main d’oeuvre belge en France’: letter of 
03.11.1941 from Hofrichter to Goffin, 03.11.1941.
49 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 21.01.1942.
50 BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11/ 5, ‘clearing’: note sur les virements des RKK en 
Belgique et en France, 23.09.1942.
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The Vice-president of the Military Government, General Harry von 
Craushaar, now invited Plisnier and Goffin to a meeting with Hofrich-
ter and a number of other German members of the Military Govern-
ment, in order to have an open discussion about these difficulties51. 
Von Craushaar first addressed the question of the occupation costs and 
repeated the proposal that had already been aired with Plisnier on 10 
October: if the announced increase in occupation costs from 1 billion 
to 1.5 billion Belgian francs a month was unacceptable to the Belgian 
population, those costs could be reduced to 1.25 billion Belgian francs, 
provided that the Bank granted the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels a 
credit line of 250 million Belgian francs a month. Goffin immediately 
replied that the Bank could not accept that solution. Providing credit in 
that form was contrary to the bye-laws and moreover came within the 
scope of article 115 of the Penal Code52. Von Craushaar therefore left the 
matter at 1.5 billion Belgian francs a month.
As regards the Franco-Belgian payment flows, von Craushaar stated 
that the Banque d’Emission’s repayment of the amount of 540 million 
Belgian francs to the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels was a non-recurring 
operation to rectify what had happened in the past and that there would 
be no recurrence. What happened in the future would be governed by 
the arrangement of 8 October 1941. This arrangement would remain in 
force until 30 April 1942, after which the situation would be reviewed. 
The Military Government nevertheless indicated that it would make 
a particular effort to keep Franco-Belgian transactions for the Wehr-
macht to a minimum and even completely eliminate them, if possible. 
In the event of any new requests for payment in this respect, the Banque 
d’Emission could ultimately charge the amount against Belgian occu-
pation costs53.
Plisnier sought to play safe regarding the acceptance of the increase 
in the occupation costs. In the first place, he drew up a memorandum 
to be sent to Reeder that summed up the grievances in respect of those 
51 BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11.6, ‘clearing’: entretien avec von Craushaar, 
04.11.1941.
52 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.5 / s. f. 2: résumé des consultations 
juridiques, relatives au clearing (in this respect, see particularly the opinion of 
23.10.1941).
53 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 21.01.1942, 11.02.1942.
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costs and bluntly set out the Belgian protest against them. Then, on 12 
November, he invited a number of leading figures to a meeting at the 
ministry to examine whether it was better to reject the increase and re-
sign or to accept it, while voicing strong protest. With the exception of a 
few hardliners, most of those present opted for the second course, some 
also declaring their approval of the Military Government’s proposal 
that Plisnier go himself to Berlin to argue the case54. Galopin and the 
other founder-bankers of the Banque d’Emission were rather distrust-
ful of Plisnier’s strategy and his planned journey to Berlin, fearing that 
his arguments there for a reduction in the costs of occupation would be 
at the Banque d’Emission’s expense, i.e. through transfers of a political 
or military nature being foisted onto the clearing system55.
The question of the payment of the 540 million Belgian francs to set-
tle the problem of Franco-Belgian payments dragged on, the stumbling 
block appearing to be the opening of a special account at the Banque 
de France in the name of the Banque d’Emission. Op 23 December, von 
Becker issued an ‘order’ for the Banque d’Emission to make the pay-
ment, bringing tension to a peak. Among the managing directors, Van 
Nieuwenhuyse and Berger argued for refusal: in their view, Belgium 
could not be forced to assume a part of French occupation costs and 
they threatened resignation if this happened56. Ingenbleek and Galopin 
found this stance too extreme and talked Van Nieuwenhuyse and Berg-
er out of their planned action57. At the meeting of the board of directors 
on 24 December, the majority of the members indicated that they felt 
it preferable to obey the order. Nevertheless, everyone was agreed that 
payment should be accompanied by a new motion even more resolute 
than that of 24 September. It was also resolved that Cracco’s statistical 
memorandum concerning the recent development of the Belgian clear-
ing balance should be appended to the motion58.
54 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, pp. 111-112.
55 SG, Archives, Direction, Galopin Papers, dossier 50: remarks of Galopin on Plis-
nier’s memorandum of 14.11.1941.
56 SG, Archives, Direction, Galopin Papers, dossier 64: aide-mémoire pour la réunion 
restreinte du 7 janvier 1942 chez M. Plisnier, p. 3. See also: Général Van Overstrae-
ten, Léopold III, prisonnier de guerre, pp. 166-167.
57 SG, Archives, Direction, Galopin Papers, dossier 64: aide-mémoire pour la réunion 
restreinte du 7 janvier 1942 chez M. Plisnier, p. 3; BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 23.12.1941.
58 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 23.12.1941; BR BEB, 24.12.1941; DC BEB, 27.12.1941.
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The new motion was submitted to the Military Government on 7 
January 194259. It stated that, between the end of August and the end 
of December 1941, the war taxes imposed by the Germans had gone up 
by 8.9 billion Belgian francs from 22.2 billion to a total of 31.1 billion. 
From the beginning of June 1940 to the end of August 1941, the average 
monthly charge for those taxes was 1.48 billion Belgian francs; from the 
beginning of September to the end of December, 2.21 billion, an average 
monthly rise of 730 million that was due not only to the increase in the 
occupation costs imposed, but also to the expanding clearing balance.
According to the motion, the growth of the clearing imbalance was 
the result primarily of higher exports and a gradual decline in imports, 
a divergence that concerned chiefly Belgo-German flows of goods, but 
increasingly Belgo-French and Belgo-Dutch flows, as well60. A second 
reason was that it was caused by ever increasing numbers of Belgians 
working in Germany, France and the Netherlands, whose savings – 
 deposited in German, French and Dutch currencies and credited to the 
Banque d’Emission’s account at the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin – the 
Banque d’Emission was obliged to pay out in Belgian francs.
The motion emphasized that all the costs destined for France and 
the Netherlands, were in most cases on behalf of the Wehrmacht and 
consequently ought to be considered as French and Dutch occupation 
costs. In conclusion, the motion pressed for urgent work to be made of 
implementing the motion of 24 September of the previous year.
The mission To berlin (24-28 march 1942)
The ink was barely dry on the motion of 7 January 1942 before a new row 
broke out over Franco-Belgian payment flows. It concerned the Mili-
tary Government’s demand on 8 January for the Banque d’Emission to 
pay out once again 86.25 million Belgian francs for Belgian transactions 
on behalf of the Wehrmacht in France. This was promptly rejected by 
the Banque d’Emission, which based its action on the meeting of 4 No-
vember with von Craushaar.
59 BNB, Archives, SD, 15, dossier 8.11/ 5, ‘clearing’: motion of 07.01.1942 (with a statisti-
cal annex from Cracco: note relative à l’évolution des clearings, 01.01.1942).
60 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 24.12.1941.
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Both the demand and the reaction appeared to make an impression, 
causing the Military Government to cast around to see what conces-
sions could be made to calm the situation. In the first place, these con-
sisted of the Bankaufsichtamt announcing that the 86.25 million Bel-
gian francs could be charged against Belgian occupation costs61 and of 
Reeder notifying Plisnier on 16 January that the visit to Berlin, planned 
in the previous autumn, would now definitely take place and that he 
should make concrete preparations for it62.
The motion of 7 January 1942 also had an auspicious effect on the 
problem of financial transfers. In September 1941, acting on the advice 
of the Banque d’Emission, Plisnier had submitted a draft decree to the 
German authorities for approval: its substance being that the proceeds 
from sales of Belgian shares and of Belgian participations abroad, as 
well as the proceeds from sales of other assets of a financial nature, 
should be paid out in the form of a special type of Treasury certifi-
cate, to be held at the Ministry of Finance for account of the Banque 
d’Emission and payable no earlier than three months after the conclu-
sion of peace63. At the end of January, the Military Government in-
formed Plisnier that his draft decree concerning financial transfers had 
been approved (on 3 February 1942 the decree was promulgated)64.
All attention now passed to the preparations for Plisnier’s trip to 
Berlin. As the natural head of the Belgian delegation these preparations 
centred on Plisnier. The Bank and the Banque d’Emission immediately 
realized that they had been sidelined; indeed, the Military Government 
initially spoke only of a three-man delegation: Plisnier, Leemans and 
Galopin; no leader from either bank was included65. The conclusion was 
very quickly drawn that the Bank and the Banque d’Emission would 
have to seek closer contacts with the Ministry of Finance, even at the 
cost of some autonomy. They would have to co-operate more with the 
Secretary-general and form a united front66. The changed attitude on 
61 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 21.01.1941.
62 Nefors, Industriële collaboratie in België, p. 111.
63 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 06.09.1941, 25.10.1941.
64 Published in the Belgian Official Gazette, 06.02.1942
65 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 03.02.1942.
66 BNB, Archives, DS, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 7, p. 17.
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the part of the two institutions had its first result in the inclusion of 
Goffin in the delegation.
Plisnier had drawn up a guideline for the delegation’s negotiations 
and a first version was circulated on 4 February; second and third re-
vised versions followed on 25 and 27 February. The core of the text com-
prised recommendations to the German government on ways to help 
Belgium financially and economically, and to make an additional effort 
in respect of supplies67. Unbeknown to anyone, however, at the end of 
December 1941 Ingenbleek had reported fully to the Court about the 
tensions between the Belgians and the Military Government, as well 
as about the possible resignation of an entire swathe of leading Belgian 
figures. When further tension arose after the Military Government’s 
demand of 8 January, Ingenbleek was able to persuade the King, via his 
aides, to address a personal letter to Hitler, setting out the problems of 
the country and particularly the great need for food and coal, and also 
urging that special measures be taken to provide relief for Belgium. The 
letter was delivered personally to Hitler on 9 February by Werner Kie-
witz, German adjutant to the King68.
Hitler was incensed by the royal letter. He found the tone arrogant, 
felt humiliated by the reference to the hunger being suffered, and made 
the government in Berlin aware of his anger at the letter’s contents. The 
upshot was an order from the Fuhrer’s headquarters that the Belgians’ 
planned trip was to be put off indefinitely. In the end, however, ruf-
fled feathers were smoothed and the trip was once again placed on the 
agenda, though not for February, as originally planned, but for the end 
of March69.
In the meantime, Galopin met the Advocate-general of the Court 
of Cassation, Hayoit de Termicourt, to examine whether the visit to 
Berlin could actually be justified in the given circumstances, bearing 
in mind that few, if any, results could be expected. Hayoit de Termi-
67 BNB, Archives, SD, 17a, dossier 8.11/ 7, ‘clearing’, (sous-farde 5): voyage à Berlin, 24-
28.03.1942 (letters of 04.02.1942, 25.02.1942 and 27.02.1942 from Plisnier to Goffin).
68 Général Van Overstraeten, Léopold III prisonnier de guerre, pp. 160, 167-168, 173. See 
also: KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, secretariat (Capelle Papers), dossier XVG.A, 232 
band 296.
69 Krijgsauditoraat, Plisnier, dossier 36: letter of 12.02.1942 from Plisnier to Reeder.
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court thought it was a patriotic necessity and demanded ‘une politique 
de présence active aux postes de commandes’70.
The managing directors and the board of directors of the Banque 
d’Emission were now also looking – though somewhat late in the day 
– to contribute to the success of the Berlin trip. They provided Goffin 
with the motions of 24 September 1941 and 7 January 1942, adding a 
third, which had been approved the day before the delegation’s depar-
ture. This pressed the German government to set a monthly maximum 
in respect of both clearing transfer payments and occupation costs; 
moreover, it urged that those maxima should take account of Belgium’s 
economic potential. Finally, as regards the clearing transfers, it request-
ed that a detailed description of the type of transaction be given, as well 
as the names of the ‘real’ beneficiaries71.
The delegation departed for Berlin on 24 March, taking the night 
train and being accompanied by a number of top officials from the 
Military Government. Schlumprecht, head of the Gruppe Wirtschaft, 
sought out the members of the delegation on the train, advising them 
not to argue for more food aid from Germany, as such a request would 
be badly received. The Russian conquests had not, as expected, resulted 
in greater imports of grain; on the contrary, food shortages in Ger-
many had increased sharply in recent months. Hitler abhorred any-
thing, exports included, that might exacerbate the shortages, which 
would demoralize the German population – a risk that had absolutely 
to be avoided. Schlumprecht stated that it would be better to press for 
the food supply systems in France, Belgium and the Netherlands to be 
equalized, which could be brought about by internal redistribution. On 
industrial matters, he thought it advisable to argue for an extension of 
the Auftragsverlagerung or contract work system. In respect of financial 
matters, his advice was not to insist on a simultaneous reduction in oc-
cupation costs and clearing operations, as that would stand no chance 
70 SG, Archives, Direction, Galopin Papers, dossier 50: conversation Galopin-Hayoit 
de Termicourt sur le voyage de Berlin, 15.01.1942. Galopin had surmised correctly. 
At the beginning of March, Funck, Minister of Economic Affairs in Berlin, wrote 
to von Falkenhausen: ‘ je dois de toute nécessité décevoir leurs espérances dans le do-
maine des frais d’occupation et de monnaie ... je les recevrai donc seulement pour des 
motifs psychologiques’ (Krijgsauditoraat, Plisnier and Crispiels, 1: French transla-
tion of German documents, letter of 09.03.1942 from Funck (Berlin) to von Falken-
hausen (Brussels)).
71 BNB, Archives, BR, 24.03.1942.
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and would create bad feeling. A positive result was more likely from 
talking solely about a reduction in occupation costs and by dropping 
the matter of cutting clearing balances. In fact, those balances repre-
sented a claim, whereas occupation costs could be regarded as being 
lost72.
The delegation’s reception in Berlin was courteous, but the refusal of 
the Minister of Supply to meet some of the members was a clear signal 
that nothing was to be expected from Germany as regards food aid. 
Even the attempt to obtain an internal redistribution for the available 
food supplies between France, Belgium and the Netherlands met with a 
refusal on political grounds. The proposal to increase the export of Bel-
gian manufactured goods to third countries in exchange for foodstuffs 
also aroused suspicion; the proposal was accepted in principle, though 
hesitantly and on the express condition that Germany should in no way 
be disadvantaged by such exports.
Somewhat more success was gained over financial matters. During a 
meeting at the Reichsbank, Dr. Puhl, Deputy-president, told Goffin that 
an effort would be made to achieve a better separation between occupa-
tion costs and clearing operations. As far as clearing operations were 
concerned he would do his best to exclude the use of the clause ‘laut 
besonderer Mitteilung’, although adding in confidence that the Reichs-
bank had little say in that particular matter.73.
The Belgian delegation returned to Brussels on 29 March and con-
vened the following day at the Ministry of Finance to evaluate its mis-
sion74. Everyone was agreed that little positive, if anything, had come 
out of the visit. Nevertheless, Galopin praised the spirit of solidarity 
shown by the delegation members on both the government and the 
banking side; the united front had apparently had its effect. That there 
was a united front was not entirely true. During the journey back from 
Berlin, Goffin, Galopin and M.-L. Gerard held a confidential discussion 
72 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Plisnier Papers, dossier 2, f: entretien avec 
M. Schlumprecht, 24.03.1942.
73 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Plisnier Papers, dossier 2, g: note de synthèse 
du voyage de la délégation belge à Berlin, mars 1942. For more precision on the 
clause “laut besonderer Mitteilung”, see Chapter 16.
74 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, Plisnier Papers, dossier 2, j: réunion au cabi-
net de M. Plisnier, 30.03.1942.
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with Hofrichter and Schlumprecht75. In that discussion, the bankers 
stated flatly that the systematic use of the description ‘laut besonderer 
Mitteilung’ had prevented the clearing system working properly. They 
suggested that all non-commercial and unjustified commercial trans-
actions be filtered out from the system, even if that meant higher oc-
cupation costs.
During the delegation’s meeting on 30 March, Galopin made two 
interesting remarks. The first concerned the general situation in Ger-
many. Although the delegation was greatly disillusioned by the Ger-
man refusal to offer any concession on food aid, the reason for that 
refusal had become obvious to all during the trip. Within a span of just 
a few months, to everyone’s surprise, the food supply and the psycho-
logical climate in Germany had manifestly worsened and it was there-
fore no wonder that the German authorities were not keen to augment 
food rations in the occupied territories. The second remark was focused 
on the Military Government, which had so often appeared demand-
ing and intransigent during discussions in Brussels. It was now very 
clear to all members of the delegation how correctly and impartially 
the Military Government had been informing the German government 
in Berlin about the actual situation in Belgium and about the justified 
complaints against the regime of occupation. Von Falkenhausen and 
Reeder had consistently defended Belgian interests with the Nazi gov-
ernment in Berlin. Although this had generally been in vain, it put the 
leaders of the Military Government in Belgium in a new light. At the 
same time, suspicion was strengthened within the delegation that ten-
sion between the Military Government in Belgium and the Nazi gov-
ernment in Berlin was sharp and that Belgium could easily be affected 
by the fallout from any open conflict between the two.
Lastly, M.-L. Gérard brought up the question of ‘filtering’ the clear-
ing system. This drew a rapid and curt response from Plisnier, who de-
clared that, although he was also in favour of purging the clearing sys-
tem of inappropriate transactions, this could not be done at the expense 
of his own ministry, which was responsible for paying the occupation 
costs. Very slowly, dangerous cracks in the united front began to ap-
pear.
75 BNB, Archives, SD, 17, dossier 8.11/ 7, ‘clearing’: entretien de M. Goffin avec M. Puhl 
à Berlin pendant les journées du 24 au 29 mars 1942.
Chapter 13
The Installation of the 
Banque Nationale de Belgique 
in London
The esTablishmenT of a belgian governmenT in london
After the French defeat in June 1940, the British government was greatly 
disappointed by the decision of the Belgian ministers to give up the 
struggle against Germany and to return to Belgium, if possible. The 
British had few illusions about the help that could be expected from 
occupied Belgium and her vacillating government, but were concerned 
about the Belgian Congo. No later than 20 June, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Halifax, had informed the Belgian ambassador, Cartier 
de Marchienne, that Great Britain could not countenance the Belgian 
Congo falling within the German sphere of influence. Was this a warn-
ing shot across the bows? A memorandum from J.G. Ward, a senior 
official at the Foreign Office, left nothing to the imagination about the 
mood in certain British circles: ‘It is of crucial importance to maintain 
Belgian Congo in a state of war against Germany… We must… envisage 
to intervene in the Congo to safeguard our vital interests, even at the cost 
of a correct constitutional procedure’’1.
The Governor-general of the Belgian Congo, Pierre Ryckmans, 
shared the British view and announced his intention of continuing the 
struggle against Germany in a radio broadcast. In doing so, he put him-
self in opposition to his own government and sent an unmistakeable 
signal. Now that Belgian sovereignty over the Congo was at stake, the 
1 J.C. Williame, ‘Le Congo dans la guerre: la cooperation économique belge-alliée 
de 1940 à 1944, in: Le Congo Belge Durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Receuil 
d’Etudes, Brussels, 1983, p. 214.
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Minister for the Colonies, Albert De Vleeschauwer, requested the Cabi-
net to send him to the Congo and was allowed to go as ‘Administrator 
of the Belgian Congo’, but not as a minister, in case the government 
were to resign and he were thereby to lose his ministerial competence2.
He set out for Lisbon, arriving there on 24 June 1940, only to be 
advised by various prominent people not to travel immediately to the 
Congo, but to go first to London to take stock of the situation3. On his 
arrival there on 4 July, his path having been smoothed by the Belgian 
ambassador, he gained direct access to Churchill and other members of 
the British government. In his capacity as Minister for the Colonies and 
as Administrator-general of the Belgian Congo, he placed the entire 
production of all raw materials at the disposition of Great Britain in her 
fight against Nazi Germany4. This gesture was certainly appreciated, 
but the British felt that it was not wholly adequate for a government to 
be represented by just a single minister and asked whether he could not 
persuade some of his colleagues to join him. If that were not possible, 
the British government would feel itself obliged to recognise an alterna-
tive government eventually led by Van Zeeland5.
At the end of July, De Vleeschauwer left for Barcelona and from 
there to Le Perthus, at the Spanish-French border, in the hope of being 
able to convince some of his colleagues at Vichy to make the move to 
London. Meanwhile, Gutt had been able to convince his fellow min-
isters to allow him to leave for England in his capacity as Minister of 
Finance. He had completed his task in France, he argued, and was now 
eager to tackle the problems in unoccupied territory, which could only 
be properly dealt with by a minister of Finance, ensuring the servicing 
of foreign debt, the payment of the salaries and expenses of the diplo-
matic corps, and securing the gold reserves of the Bank in unoccupied 
territory.
2 De Schryver, Oorlogsdagboeken, pp. 96-98.
3 Schepens, De Belgen in Groot-Brittannië, pp. 25-26. 
4 Williame, ‘Le Congo dans la guerre’, p. 216.
5 Among other things, during a meeting with Churchill (J. Stengers, Léopold III et le 
gouvernement. Les deux politiques belges de 1940, Paris-Gembloux, pp. 117-118). See 
also: V. Dujardin and M. Dumoulin, Paul Van Zeeland, 1893-1973, Brussels, 1998, 
pp. 115-116. In this respect, see also: Schepens, De Belgen in Groot-Brittannië, pp. 
25-26.
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Gutt left for Le Perthus, firmly determined to cross to London with 
De Vleeschauwer. He and De Vleeschauwer arrived in London on 8 
August. Pierlot and Spaak accompanied Gutt to Le Perthus. They had 
given their word to return to Vichy, but after their meeting with De 
Vleeschauwer they were convinced that the government’s future lay 
in London. They soon left Vichy. The other eight members of the gov-
ernment refused to consider leaving and it was only after endless dis-
cussion that they gave their assent for Pierlot and Spaak to go, opting 
themselves to remain in France and agreeing to declare that they were 
willing to resign6.
Pierlot and Spaak reached London only on 22 October 1940, having 
escaped from two months of résidence surveillée imposed by the Span-
ish authorities after they arrived from France. Now, at last, a Belgian 
government could be formed in London, even though it boasted only 
four members. It was recognized by the British, but without any great 
enthusiasm.
The financing of The belgian governmenT in london
Although the Belgian government was now back in harness and offi-
cially recognized by the British government, there was the immediate 
question of who was to finance its operation. Tax income was virtually 
non-existent and little could be expected from Baudewyns, who had 
been sent to London with the express instruction just to take care of the 
Bank’s gold reserves.
The financing of Belgian activities in unoccupied territories had 
been examined by Baudewyns, with the help of inspector Ansiaux, even 
before Gutt’s arrival in London. Ansiaux, when discussing the question 
with Baeseleer, a director of the Banque du Congo Belge in Leopoldville, 
who was on a fact-finding trip to London, found out that De Vleeschau-
wer had contacted the Congolese administration in order to gain prior-
ity for Great Britain in the supply of goods, and particularly raw mate-
rials, from the colony. When Ansiaux heard that payment was to be in 
sterling, he felt at once that a solution to the problem of the government 
6 BNB, Archives, SD, dossier ‘documents divers’: Georges Theunis (Souvenirs de 
Camille Gutt), Ostend, 11.07.1966.
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budget deficit was at hand and began to press for a convention that the 
colony would use its sterling portfolio to provide financial support to 
the Belgian government for the duration of the war. In De Vleeschau-
wer’s plans, there would be a considerable increase in that portfolio in 
the near future7. However, this did not square with De Vleeschauwer’s 
own view, which was that the colony’s income was to be applied to its 
own requirements and to supporting England, which was already an 
enormous undertaking. To cover its costs, the Belgian government in 
exile would simply have to call on the Bank and its gold reserves8.
Gutt, however, was taken with Ansiaux’s idea and contacted Jaspar 
Wauters, the London representative of the Banque du Congo Belge9, pro-
posing that the Congolese bank grant the Belgian government a loan of 
1-2 million pounds sterling in exchange for short-term Treasury bonds 
at an annual interest of 1.75 per cent, half to be redeemed in sterling and 
half in Congolese francs. In Gutt’s opinion, this would certainly be no 
bad thing for the Banque du Congo Belge. If everything went accord-
ing to plan, the colony would have a sterling surplus at its disposition 
within the foreseeable future and, since that surplus could not be used 
outside the sterling zone, the colony could transfer it to the Belgian 
government, recouping it in part in Congolese francs10.
The Governor-general of the colony, Ryckmans, intervened to reject 
the proposal11. It was not that he was against a loan to the Belgian gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, he felt that such a loan ought to be issued exclu-
sively in Congolese francs, which the Belgian government could then 
use to purchase sterling from the Banque du Congo Belge. Ansiaux ar-
gued that this was unreasonable and even to the colony’s detriment12, as 
7 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, 1: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to 
Janssen (Brussels).
8 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2 (1940), s. f. avances de trésorerie à De 
 Vleeschauwer: juillet 1940: letters and texts of 8, 9 and 11.07.1940. 
9 J. Vanderlinden, Pierre Ryckmans, 1891-1959. Coloniser dans l’honneur, Brussels, 
1994, p. 463.
10 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2 (1941): letter of March 1941 from Ansiaux 
(London) to De Vleeschauwer (London); Ansiaux, Souvenirs, pp. 81-82.
11 Williame, ‘Le Congo dans la guerre’, pp. 213-218; Vanderlinden, Pierre Ryckmans, 
1891-1859, p. 463.
12 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, 3, dossier ‘Londres’: letter of 21.03.1941 from 
Ansiaux (London) to De Vleeschauwer.
it would mean the colony shouldering the entire exchange rate risk for 
the sterling balances it received, whereas the Belgian proposal meant 
that the risk would be shared by both partners.
The discussion dragged on, but the British government had not lost 
sight of De Vleeschauwer’s proposal regarding supplies from the Bel-
gian Congo and had sent Lord Hailey with a delegation to Leopoldville 
in September 1940 to examine the matter. Negotiations were initial-
ly conducted with the Governor-general and the management of the 
Banque du Congo Belge, but were continued at government level be-
tween Great Britain and Belgium, once the Belgian government was 
established in London. This led to the agreement of 21 January 1941, 
signed in London by the new British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, 
and Spaak13. By its terms, the Congolese franc was included in the ster-
ling zone, thereby bringing Congolese imports of goods, and Congolese 
exports of gold, coins and foreign currency within the control of the 
British monetary authorities. Additionally, there was official confir-
mation of the exchange rate of 176.625 Congolese francs to the pound, 
which consolidated a remarkable paradox: with a strong economy for 
the colony in prospect, the Congolese franc remained officially under-
valued, whereas the Belgian franc, shorn of its economic base, officially 
retained its overvalued rate of exchange of 123 Belgian francs to the 
pound. It was an artificial situation and one that cost the Belgian gov-
ernment dear. If it had been able to finance its expenditure in England 
with Belgian francs at the official rate, the government would have had 
to give out just 123 Belgian francs to the pound. Gutt subsequently at-
tempted to have the Congolese franc revalued to the level of the Belgian 
franc, but the British government naturally would have none of it.
Great Britain made use of the agreement of January 1941 to buy 
chiefly copper, cobalt, cotton, groundnuts, palm nuts and palm oil at 
fixed and favourable prices. However, the most important clause in the 
agreement concerned Congolese gold production, the Belgian govern-
ment and the colony having undertaken to cede both the balance of 
gold production over and above their own requirements and any re-
ceipts in gold currency to the Bank of England for the duration of the 
war.
13 Williame, ‘Le Congo dans la guerre’, pp. 217-220. 
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The agreement of January 1941 was not well received by the Bank. It 
was true that the integration of the colony into the sterling zone, was 
widely praised. It ensured a guaranteed export market, but this was 
at prices that were far too low. The agreement also set a geographical 
limit for imports, as goods could be bought only within the sterling 
zone, thereby making free trade a dead letter for the colony; moreover, 
the exclusive link to sterling could also entail a dangerous exchange 
rate risk14. Virtually identical critical comment was to be heard in the 
colony itself. Indeed, dissatisfaction there with the agreement was ex-
treme and felt by everyone, specifically by the Governor-general and 
the Banque du Congo Belge, but no less by the business world. As al-
ways, however, businessmen managed to find a way around the restric-
tive clauses, bumping up the production of goods that fell outside the 
scope of the agreement, which could be sold to the United States at pre-
vailing world prices15.
On 21 March 1941, within the framework of the Anglo-Congolese 
agreement, Gutt was at last able to conclude a convention between the 
Belgian government and the colony to secure the government’s financ-
ing for the duration of the war16. The convention itself was the outcome 
of the original idea from Ansiaux and the subsequent discussions be-
tween Gutt, on the one hand, and Ryckmans and the Banque du Congo 
Belge, on the other, the ground having been prepared by Ansiaux dur-
ing his mission to Lisbon in February 194117.
In order to provide cover for the financial needs of the Belgian gov-
ernment in London, the Banque du Congo Belge undertook to make the 
requisite foreign currency available and to do this by means of loans, 
for which the colonial government would stand surety. In exchange 
14 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 9, 1/24: agreement of 21.01.1941 be-
tween Great Britain and the Belgian Congo.
15 Ndl.ARA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London Archives, A, 1940-1945 (diploma-
tieke zaken CH Z): memorandum of 02.05.1945 from the Dutch legation.
16 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque Nationale (unpublished text), 
Part 1, Chapter. 9, pp. 51-53 and 59-60.
17 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives: letter of 30.07.1940 from Janssen (Brussels) to 
Baudewyns (London) and particularly letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to 
Janssen (Brussels)). See also: BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 1 (1941), s. 
f. mission d’Ansiaux à Lisbonne: projet de convention entre l’Etat belge et la colonie 
(rédigé par Ansiaux).
for the loans, the Belgian government would issue short-term Treas-
ury certificates at 1.75 per cent per year, payable in Congolese francs. 
In its turn, the Bank guaranteed to discount those certificates, should 
the Banque du Congo Belge require them to be paid out at maturity, 
rather than renewed. With this, the problem of financing the Belgian 
government during the war was resolved. In the event, the loans from 
the Banque du Congo Belge provided the greater part of the financing.
The bank in london and iTs proTagonisTs
The formation in London at the end of October 1940 of a legal govern-
ment in exile came also as a great relief to Baudewyns and Ansiaux, 
the two persons heading the Bank in the British capital. At last, after 
months of uncertainty, there was now a government again, which was 
recognized by the British and the Belgians as the only legitimate gov-
ernment of Belgium. For Baudewyns and Ansiaux, this also cleared the 
situation with their British counterparts.
The four ministers forming the government in London were Pierlot, 
Gutt, Spaak and De Vleeschauwer, but what type of people were they 
and what were the power relationships among them? In his memoirs, de 
Gaulle praised the Belgian government: ‘Pierlot, Gutt and Spaak made 
together an excellent team, combining wisdom, diligence and dexterity 
in the service of Belgium’18, but did the reality fully reflect these fine 
words? The prime minister was held in universal esteem for his integri-
ty and his perfectionism, but, in fact, he had no leadership qualities and 
his manifest difficulty in coming to a decision often led to tension with-
in the government19. The British assessment of Spaak was not wholly 
positive either. According to some he was not free of a degree of op-
portunism and was not exactly eager for work. The latter point was one 
on which Gutt, himself a workaholic, could get extremely  exercised20. 
De Vleeschauwer was virtually sidelined politically by Gutt, once the 
financing of the Belgian government in London had been settled. De 
18 Quoted by Dujardin and Dumoulin, Spaak, p. 213.
19 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 2 (1941): letter of 08.07.1941 from An-
siaux (New York) to Baudewyns (London).
20 Gutt alluded to this regularly in his letters to Theunis.
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Gaulle did not even mention De Vleeschauwer in his memoirs when he 
spoke of the Belgian government in London.
As indicated above, and disputed by no-one, Gutt was the domi-
nant figure in the Belgian government in London. Adroit and charm-
ing when necessary, he achieved his goals through unflagging drive. 
His intelligence and command of briefs enabled him to neutralize all 
criticism with just a few words, whether it came from within the gov-
ernment or from the circle of members of parliament, former minis-
ters and other prominent figures who had fled to London21. Baudewyns, 
who often suffered at his hands, wrote of him: ‘an exceptional mind: 
Gutt surpasses by far his colleagues…his English is impeccable’22.
Of the Bank’s protagonists, Baudewyns was not a fighter. However 
hard he struggled to defend the interests of the Bank, he had to knuckle 
under when it came to the point and follow the Finance Minister’s in-
structions. In fact, Gutt underestimated Baudewyns’ intellectual quali-
ties. Although not a man for public debate, Baudewyns, nevertheless, 
demonstrated an acute understanding of current problems, as he dem-
onstrated during the monetary negotiations in preparation for post-war 
monetary policy23. Ansiaux was from a different mould, a man more on 
the lines of Gutt. From their first contacts, Gutt described the young 
inspector as: ‘outstanding, courageous and smart’24. As time went 
on, Baudewyns felt himself overshadowed and even overtaken – not 
 altogether without reason – by Ansiaux, who had, meanwhile, been ap-
pointed a director. Occasionally, Baudewyns had to call him to order’25.
Theunis, a member of the supervisory council and Ambassador Ex-
traordinary in New York, was a very striking figure, very intelligent, a 
man of integrity, able and blessed with a particularly keen memory. He 
had been closely involved in the Bank’s activities since the beginning of 
the war and, holding the Bank’s mandate, it was his task to act for the 
21 See, among others: Schepens, De Belgen in Groot-Brittannië, passim.
22 Baudewyns Family Archives: letter of 17.02.1941 from Baudewyns (London) to his 
son (Oxford).
23 See below.
24 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 06.01.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York). 
25 Baudewyns Family Archives: letters of 02.12.1941 and 06.02.1942 from Baudewyns 
(London) to his son (Oxford).
Bank in New York in its function of State exchequer. In that capacity, he 
also introduced the legal proceedings against the Banque de France be-
fore the Court in New York. His long connection with Gutt explained 
why he followed the affairs of the Belgian government in London with 
more than ordinary interest. In his letters to Baudewyns from this pe-
riod, Ansiaux pointed to the enormous influence exerted by Theunis, 
behind the scenes via Gutt, on the decision-making of the Belgian gov-
ernment in London. On 7 June 1941 he wrote: ‘Theunis…is, in fact, the 
real leader of the State’26.
baudewyn’s difficulTies aT his insTallaTion in london
Baudewyns arrived in London four days after having taken his leave 
of Janssen at Bordeaux on 18 June 1940. By 24 June, he was ensconced 
in a comfortable office in the Bank of England, as indeed was An-
siaux. Getting the Bank installed in London may have gone smoothly, 
but getting on with its task of acting as State exchequer proved much 
more tricky. At their leave-taking in Bordeaux, Janssen had impressed 
on Baudewyns that the Bank’s three officers in unoccupied territory 
– Baudewyns, Ansiaux and Theunis – were on no account to exceed 
the authority delegated to them on 18 June, which was no more than to 
take measures to conserve the Bank’s gold stocks abroad. Only Ingen-
bleek, staying at Mont-de-Marsan after Janssen had left for Brussels, 
was given authority to execute payment orders on behalf of the Bank in 
unoccupied areas.
Baudewyns looked to obey Janssen’s formal order to the letter and 
informed Ansiaux and Theunis of his intention27. However, he was no 
sooner installed in London before requests for money and advances 
came pouring in. Boël needed money to find somewhere to house the 
Belgian Navy, which had moved to England. The ambassador, Cartier 
de Marchienne, requested money to support the Belgian embassy’s ex-
26 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 2 (1941): letter of 07.06.1941 from An-
siaux (New York) to Baudewyns (London).
27 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 2 (1940), s. f. ‘difficultés de disposi-
tion à la Federal Reserve Bank’: letter of 12.07.1940 from Theunis (New York) to 
Baudewyns (London).
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ceptionally busy rôle in London, to pay the salaries and costs of the 
other diplomatic and consular services within the sterling zone and 
to provide material help to the Belgian military personnel, politicians, 
officials and the like who had also fled to England. Baudewyns had 
himself to provide financial support for the twenty-eight members of 
the Bank’s staff who were in London. Over and above this, Baring, the 
London bank, was asking for instructions, to ensure the servicing of 
the State loan of 1936. Lastly, Theunis was urgently demanding money 
to be able to finance the servicing of the loan taken out in New York by 
the Belgian State, which matured on 1 July 1940. He also needed money 
to pay the oversees diplomatic services outside the sterling zone, for 
which he was responsible. Caught on the back foot by all these requests, 
Baudewyns was now fully convinced that the Bank in London ought to 
be represented by someone with power of decision, someone who, in 
the capacity of State cashier, could make specific payments on account 
of the State28. Moreover, driven to distraction by Ingenbleek’s irrational 
conduct, he sent a telegram to Theunis, requesting him to contact the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and ask, as a matter of urgency, 
whether it would be willing to execute a few more payment orders for 
the Bank if they came from London and were signed by Baudewyns29. 
However, the Federal Reserve Bank refused to recognize Baudewyns’ 
signature, keeping strictly to the instructions issued by Janssen30. At 
that point Theunis wrote to Baudewyns: ‘Janssen’s instructions to the 
Federal Reserve Bank tie my hands completely’31. Theunis found it in-
comprehensible that Janssen, on his departure for Brussels, had not 
ensured that Baudewyns would have the same authority to make pay-
28 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 2 (1940), s. f. ‘avances de trésorerie’ 
(De Vleeschauwer: juillet 1940): report of a meeting of 08.07.1947 at the Belgian 
embassy; letters of 9 and 11.07.1940.
29 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Baudewyns’: letter of 15.07.1940 
from Baudewyns (London) to Theunis (New York).
30 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 2 (1940), s. f. ‘difficultés de disposition 
à la Federal Reserve Bank’: letter of 18.07.1940 from the Federal Reserve Bank (New 
York) to Baudewyns (London).
31 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier 2 (1940), s. f. ‘difficultés de disposi-
tion à la Federal Reserve Bank’: letter of 20.08.1940 from Baudewyns (London) to 
Theunis (New York); letter of 19.09.1940 from Theunis (New York) to Baudewyns 
(London).
ments in the dollar and sterling zones as Ingenbleek for the French 
franc zone. Had he done so, all problems would have been eliminated32.
Even Janssen received no response when, as Governor, he attempt-
ed to authorise payments to the Federal Reserve Bank from Brussels33. 
That institution now invoked Belgian law, which stated that, in times 
of war, the registered office of the Bank was required to be established 
where the government had chosen to be domiciled. The legal Belgian 
government was now in London and the registered office of the Bank 
had meanwhile been transferred to Brussels, a situation which was not 
in conformity with the law. Because of this, the Federal Reserve Bank 
refused to accept payment orders from Brussels.
Baudewyns, for his part, had more to contend with than the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank’s refusal to recognize his signature, as his position 
in London as representative of the Bank was hotly disputed during the 
initial months after his arrival. At first, he concentrated on activating 
the Anglo-Belgian financial agreement of 24 May-7 June 1940 and the 
accompanying memorandum endorsed in Paris by Janssen and Cob-
bold for the Bank and the Bank of England respectively.
That agreement laid down that the British and Belgian governments 
would grant each other, for the duration of the war, a credit line of up 
to 3 million pounds sterling at an interest rate of 3 per cent; accounts 
would be squared each month and half of any credit drawn down 
would be settled in gold34. In France, the Belgians were convinced that 
the British delegates were totally behind the agreement and that offi-
cial ratification was no more than a pure formality. Once in London, 
however, Baudewyns could persuade neither the British government 
nor the Bank of England to have the necessary signatures appended to 
the agreement and its stipulations implemented35. Ultimately, a finan-
cial arrangement was set up by roundabout means: more particularly, 
a temporary agreement between the Banque du Congo Belge and the 
32 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 20.08.1940 from 
Theunis (New York) Gutt (Lisbon).
33 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, 1: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to 
Janssen (Brussels).
34 See above. 
35 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, 1: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to 
Janssen (Brussels): ‘ l’accord anglo-belge n’a pas joué’.
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Bank of England whereby, among other things, each granted the other 
a line of credit, from which the Banque du Congo Belge could lend ster-
ling to the Belgian government36.
Another difficulty concerned payment or transfer orders to the Bank 
of England on behalf of the Belgian government. Janssen had informed 
the Bank of England that, after the return of the Bank’s registered office 
to Brussels, he had resumed his authority as Governor. Next to Ingen-
bleek at Mont-de-Marsan, he would also, among other things, issue in-
ternational payment orders from Brussels on behalf of the government. 
Following a policy of its own, however, the Bank of England declared 
that it could not accept orders from Janssen nor from Ingenbleek, since, 
for the duration of the war, it would not, as a matter of principle, ex-
ecute orders issued from within German-occupied territories or even 
from unoccupied France. The fact that these were not just idle words 
was born out by the feeling Baudewyns and Ansiaux had of being in the 
firing line because of their contacts with Brussels and Mont-de Marsan, 
as detailed in Chapter 5. This unpalatable situation was resolved by a 
decree issued by the Belgian government on 31 October 1940, shortly 
after its establishment in London. This substantially increased the ad-
ministrative authority of all directors of Belgian companies who were 
resident in unoccupied territory, whatever their previous status. This 
immediately normalized the situation of Baudewyns and Theunis, both 
of whom could now act effectively in the direction of the Bank within 
the sterling and dollar zones37.
36 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier D 606/4: letter of 04.07.1940 from Baudewyns 
(London) to Janssen (Mont-de-Marsan).
37 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, 1: letter of 03.08.1940 from Ansiaux (Vichy) to 
Janssen (Brussels). See also: BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, note relative 
à l’or, n° 23.
Chapter 14
The Banque Nationale de Belgique 
in London in the Maelstrom of War
The loan of gold To greaT briTain
Just before leaving France for Belgium in early July 1940 Jannsen had 
asked Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, what he 
was doing about the instruction to transfer the Belgian gold from Lon-
don to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York1. Norman replied with 
the vague words: ‘… we are taking steps to deal with the gold held here 
for the National Bank of Belgium on the lines set out in the memorandum 
(of ) 8th June’2. In a letter of 18 July, Baudewyns also asked Norman what 
progress had been made with the transfer3. Norman again answered 
in sibylline terms: ‘You may assume, for all practical purposes, that the 
whole amount of gold which we hold for the National Bank of Belgium, is 
now on the other side of the Atlantic’4.
However, more details were provided by Siepmann of the Bank of 
England, who stated that the gold had not been transferred to the Fed-
1 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier D 606/4, ‘correspondance avec la Bank of 
England’: letter of 08.07.1940 from Baudewyns (London) to Norman (London).
2 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier D 606/4: letter of 09.07.1940 from Norman 
(London) to Baudewyns (London). Article 8 of the memorandum of 8 June reads as 
follows: ‘Dès à présent, il a été demandé à M. Cobbold que les mesures conservatoires 
que la Banque d’Angleterre pourrait prendre en ce qui concerne ses réserves métal-
liques soient étendues, dans la mesure du possible, aux réserves métalliques de la 
Banque Nationale de Belgique. M. Cobbold examinera la possibilité de donner suite 
à cette demande, étant évidemment entendu que les transports se feraient aux frais 
et risques de la Banque Nationale de Belgique(BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 
2 (1940), dossier ‘Janssen’: memorandum of 08.06.1940 from Janssen to Cobbold).
3 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier D 606/4: letter of 18.07.1940 from Baudewyns 
(London) to Norman (London).
4 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier D 606/4: letter of 24.07.1940 from Norman 
(London) to Baudewyns (London).
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eral Reserve Bank of New York, under Bank dossier, as requested by 
Janssen, but had been sent to Ottawa, where it had been deposited in 
safe custody at the Canadian central bank. Siepmann warned that any 
further insistence on the gold being taken to New York could result 
in the deposit being confiscated and would, in any case, be regarded 
as a hostile act against Great Britain5. Even before the gold had been 
moved to Canada, however, it had already been under a form of em-
bargo, as the Bank had no access to it without the authorization of the 
British government. Baudewyns’ comment, made a few months later, 
was therefore correct: ‘Since the capitulation of the French army our 
gold deposit in London has been the prisoner of Great Britain’6.
It was clear that Great Britain was not keen for the Belgian gold to 
be transferred. If it had to be, however, Britain preferred to send it to 
safety in Canada, one of the Dominions, and not to New York, out-
side  Britain’s field of influence, where there was a risk of the gold being 
frozen for the duration of the war. Nevertheless, the evasive and mis-
leading answers by the highest British authority – particularly ignoring 
Janssen’s instructions – did not really accord with the notion of fair 
play. The times were, of course, exceptionally difficult. During the late 
summer and autumn of 1940, Britain stood alone to face what proved to 
be the decisive battle against the Luftwaffe. The country needed many 
weapons, and needed them immediately. For the British, the only pos-
sible supplier was the United States, but the United States still applied 
the ‘cash and carry’ principle for all procurement: settlement for all 
purchases had to be immediate and in gold, which spelt catastrophe for 
the British Treasury.
Gutt saw in the gold affair an opportunity to rehabilitate the Bel-
gian government in the eyes of the British authorities. He had already 
worked out for himself that, sooner or later, the British would request 
the Belgian government to cede its gold to them; should he refuse, he 
risked the gold being confiscated as enemy property7. But when com-
plying with the request, Gutt intended to stipulate that the Belgian gov-
5 BNB, Archives, Boekhouding, 1, dossier D 606/4: memorandum of 24.07.1940 from 
Baudewyns.
6 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2 (1941): memorandum of 26.04.1941 from 
Baudewyns.
7 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 10.08.1940 from 
Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York).
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ernment would make that gesture only if the other governments in ex-
ile – including the Dutch, the Norwegian and the Polish – were to do 
the same. 
On 11 October 1940, Gutt was invited by the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, Kingsley Wood, to discuss the financial difficulties the Belgian 
government in London was experiencing as a result of its lack of foreign 
currency8. Gutt stated that its chief need was for sterling, as only one 
quarter of its total expenditure was required to be in US dollars. He 
went further, to suggest that the shortage of sterling could be solved 
largely by exports from the Belgian Congo to Great Britain. If the bal-
ance of trade in the Congo’s favour was found to be insufficient, then 
the Belgian government could always have recourse to the line of credit 
granted by the British, as laid down in the Anglo-Belgian financial 
agreement of 24 May-7 June 1940, although that agreement had not yet 
formally come into operation. US dollars could be purchased against 
gold from the Belgian cache at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
If that were frozen, Gutt felt that recourse could always be had to the 
Belgian gold deposited with the Bank of England.
Wood used this last suggestion of Gutt to make his own proposal, 
which was for the Bank of England to purchase against payment in ster-
ling all the Belgian gold deposited in London. Gutt could hardly say 
straight out that he found such a proposal unacceptable because he had 
insufficient confidence in the future of sterling. He therefore answered 
that the Belgian government was certainly prepared to help, but could 
do so only within the limits of what was possible. Legally, the gold was 
owned by the Bank and not by the government so that he would have 
to consult Baudewyns and Theunis. However, he emphasized that the 
gold reserve was an ‘essential’ element of the Belgian central banking 
system, acting as a guarantee for the value of Belgian banknotes, as re-
quired by the Bank’s bye-laws; hence, the Bank could not ‘sell’ the gold, 
though it could, in Gutt’s opinion, ‘lend’ it.
The British minister was unhappy about Gutt’s negative reaction 
and, in a series of discussions involving both the Bank and the Bank of 
8 . ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister: letter of 16.10.1940 from Gutt 
(London) to Kingsley Wood; letter of 22.10.1940 from Gutt (London) to Waley 
(London); report of the meeting between Waley, Gutt and De Vleeschauwer at the 
British Treasury in London, 06.11.1940.
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England, continued to press Gutt to revise his standpoint9. Neverthe-
less, Gutt refused to budge. All the members of the Belgian govern-
ment and all representatives of the Bank in London and New York gave 
their support to Gutt’s statement of principle. Moreover, Baudewyns re-
quired, in case of the gold being lent, concrete guarantees for its return, 
demanding to know where, when and how the gold – the foundation of 
the Belgian monetary system – would be returned to the Bank10.
Baudewyns now found himself caught between two fires. He saw 
clearly that, as a loyal ally, Belgium was duty-bound to support Great 
Britain in the struggle against Germany, but this conflicted with his 
own loyalty and duty to the Bank. It was a dilemma that he could not 
solve by himself and he therefore resolved to obtain Janssen’s counsel, 
hatching a plan to send Ansiaux (perhaps under a false passport) to 
unoccupied France to find a way of getting in touch with Janssen to ask 
his advice11. Gutt was not at all pleased with Baudewyns’ initiative and 
opposed the plan12.
Gutt got his way and Ansiaux did not leave for France. However, 
Baudewyns did not give up, but waited for a more opportune moment. 
This came shortly afterwards when, in February 1941, Ansiaux was sent 
not to France, but to Lisbon on behalf of both the government and 
Baudewyns. There, he was to meet Félicien Cattier of the Société Géné-
rale de Belgique, who was bringing the latest news from Belgium. An-
siaux also had to hand him instructions from the government and the 
Bank in London for Galopin and Janssen in Brussels. In his memoran-
dum, Baudewyns dealt extensively with the current discussions with 
the British government, clearly setting out the advantages and disad-
vantages of a possible loan of the gold. Cattier said that he was con-
vinced that Janssen would endorse the operation, on condition that the 
other small countries would agree to do the same13.
9 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister: letter of 18.10.1940 from Waley 
(London) to Gutt (London).
10 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 12.02.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
11 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 1 (1940): memorandum of 22.02.1941 sent by 
Baudewyns (London) to Janssen (Brussels) via Ansiaux and Cattier (Lisbon).
12 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 06.01.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
13 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, dossier ‘Cattier’: letter of 03.03.1941 from An-
siaux (Lisbon) to Baudewyns (London).
In asking for special guarantees Baudewyns’ purpose was not only 
to protect the interests of the Bank but also to gain time until he re-
ceived an answer from Janssen. Gutt saw things differently. His aim 
was to accelerate the loan of the gold, so that he would have something 
in hand for his negotiations with the British about the post-war position 
of Belgium and her colony, the gold loan being his bargaining counter. 
Moreover, he feared that long-drawn-out negotiations would give the 
loan greater publicity in Belgium and lead to questions about it. He was 
therefore outraged when he heard that Baudewyns had given a detailed 
memorandum about the matter to Ansiaux to pass on to Janssen14.
Relations between the Bank and the government did not improve 
when, in February 1941, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kings-
ley Wood, abandoned the idea of purchasing the gold and opted for a 
loan. This required a concrete proposal to be prepared and necessar-
ily required Baudewyns’ presence. Gutt, would have preferred to ar-
range the matter at government level, since he realized that Baudewyns’ 
‘ cooperation’ would not make his task any easier, which proved to be 
the case. Baudewyns regarded the loan not as one between two govern-
ments, as originally conceived, but as one from the Belgian government 
to the Bank of England. The Bank would not itself lend the gold, but, in 
response to a formal request, transfer it to the Belgian government. In 
this way, as far as the Bank was concerned, the loan would be guaran-
teed not only by the Bank of England, but also by the Belgian govern-
ment15, thereby giving the Bank dual cover.
On 17 February 1941 Wood organized a lunch at the Treasury, to 
which he invited forty guests. These included all the ministers of fi-
nance of the governments in exile in London and the representatives 
of the respective central banks. Also present were top officials from the 
Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Bank of England. In his speech 
of introduction, Wood stated bluntly that Great Britain was in need of 
help, appealing to their solidarity as allies and requesting financial help 
in the struggle against Germany.
A few days later, Wood asked Gutt round to the Treasury. There, he 
came straight to the point, saying to an astounded Gutt: ‘We need gold 
and we don’t have any gold left. Without waiting for a signed agree-
14 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 12.02.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
15 Ansiaux, Souvenirs, pp. 82-83.
 The Banque Nationale in London in the Maelstrom of War 247
248 Chapter 14
ment, could you lend us some immediately?’. Gutt called the moment 
unforgettable and dramatic: ‘I will always remember the day when 
Great Britain was asking me for gold to an amount of 25 million pound 
sterling, because she did not have any gold anymore’. Gutt answered 
that he was always ready to oblige, but that he could do no more than 
have the loan granted within the framework of the agreement being 
prepared, nevertheless promising to do everything in his power to ex-
pedite matters. He kept his word and, together with Baudewyns, was 
invited back to the Treasury on 1 and 2 March to work with Arthur 
Siepmann of the Treasury, Sir David Waley of the Foreign Office, and 
Harry Lloyd Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s envoy in London, to draw-
ing the agreement16.
On 4 March an agreement was hammered out and signed that same 
day17. By its terms, the Belgian government declared itself prepared to 
lend three quarters of the Bank’s gold deposited in London to the Bank 
of England, i.e. 7 million ounces or about 60 million pounds’ worth. 
The Bank of England subscribed to the loan with gold certificates, thus 
undertaking to repay the loan in gold. Repayment would commence six 
months after the cessation of hostilities and be in monthly instalments 
of 1 million pounds18. The Belgian government immediately asked the 
Bank for an initial tranche of 3 million ounces of gold – 25 million 
pounds’ worth – which was lent to the Bank of England on 6 March. 
The agreement also made provision for the Belgian government to have 
free access to a line of credit in sterling, should the Belgian Congo at 
any time be unable to make sufficient amounts of sterling available; fur-
thermore, that line of credit was not required to be settled in gold but 
could be in pounds19.
Even Gutt had to admit that Baudewyns’ obstinacy – a trait that 
had so often annoyed him – had not been without its uses during the 
preparation of the agreement. After the tough discussions and the con-
16 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 03.03.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
17 Baudewyns Family Archives: letter of 04.03.1941 from Baudewyns (London) to his 
son (Oxford).
18 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, 2, lettres de Baudewyns à Ansiaux: letter of 
04.03.1941 from Baudewyns (London) to Ansiaux (Lisbon).
19 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 03.03.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
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clusion of an auspicious agreement, all obstacles to the gold loan ap-
peared to have been overcome. Yet appearances can, of course, deceive. 
The conditio sine qua non for winning the Belgians over in the first 
place had been that all the small-country allies should follow suit. In 
fact, they all agreed to do so, until 11 March 1941, when the Lend Lease 
Act was passed in the United States. Then, every one of them, with the 
Netherlands in the lead, retracted their promise, assuming that Great 
Britain would now be able to survive without their help. Gutt judged 
that Belgium would be treated unfairly if the British insisted on holding 
the Belgians to their undertaking. Kingsley Wood fully recognized the 
merit of Gutt’s argument and on 30 August waived his option to take 
up the 35 million pounds’ worth of gold remaining20. The 25 million 
pounds’ worth of gold that had already been borrowed was restored in 
its entirety to the Bank on 3 March 1943, well before the end of hostili-
ties21.
The decrees of 27 november 1941
When Gutt saw all the difficulties that the Bank had to cope with in 
London, he realized that he had been wrong in allowing Janssen to re-
turn to Belgium and re-establish the Bank’s registered office in Brus-
sels. Plisnier’s appointment of a new governor of the Bank on 16 July 
1941 therefore was not at all well received in London. The government 
had certainly hoped that, following Janssen’s death, the office of gov-
ernor would remain vacant for the duration of the war22. It was hard 
enough to swallow the fact that an appointment had been made, but 
that the choice should have fallen on Goffin was the last straw.
An interview given by Goffin to the newspaper le Soir immediately 
after his appointment as governor did nothing to smooth things be-
tween London and Brussels. On the contrary: when asked whether 
20 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister, dossier ‘Angleterre’: letter of 
03.07.1941 from Gutt (London) to Pierlot (London), memorandum of 26.07.1941 
from Gutt (London) for Pierlot (London).
21 BNB, Archives, DC, 28.12.1944; BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: Kauch, La Banque 
Nationale (unpublished text), Part 1, Chapter. 9, p. 61.
22 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, 2 (1941): letter of 29.07.1941 from Ansiaux 
(New York) to Baudewyns (London).
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the Bank’s gold in unoccupied territory was really safe, Goffin had re-
plied that he trusted that the ‘so-called’ Belgian government in London 
would not use the Bank’s gold deposits for its own ends and would not 
cede it to third parties23. Gutt took this answer as a reproachful allusion 
to his recent loan of Belgian gold to the Bank of England and felt him-
self targeted and criticised personally.
Arguments other than personal criticism also raised questions about 
Goffin’s appointment. One of them concerned whether, as a secretary-
general, Plisnier was actually competent to make such an appointment, 
and this immediately put the spotlight on the scope of the legitimacy of 
all secretaries-general. By law of 10 May 1940, the government had del-
egated ministerial authority to them or their deputies, to be exercised 
in the event of the country being occupied. The government in London, 
however, had never favoured a broad interpretation of the ministerial 
authority granted to the secretaries-general. In a radio broadcast barely 
two days after Goffin’s appointment, Pierlot returned explicitly to the 
limited character of the delegated authority24.
Another reason why the government regretted allowing Janssen to 
return to Brussels and re-establish the Bank’s registered office there 
was the difficulty experienced by the Bank in introducing legal pro-
ceedings against the Banque de France before the court in New York. 
Normally, the proceedings ought to have been introduced from the 
Bank’s registered office, but this was no longer a practical option, now 
that the registered office was in occupied territory. However, the Amer-
ican judges had great difficulty in regarding Baudewyns in London and 
– even more – Theunis in New York as representatives of the Bank, 
empowered to take legal proceedings on behalf of the Bank, but without 
having received an explicit mandate from Brussels to do so25.
There were thus too many problems as long as the Bank was based 
in Brussels. Once Janssen was dead, however, Gutt set about finding a 
solution, transferring the Bank’s registered office to London, declaring 
Goffin’s appointment in Brussels illegal and appointing a new governor 
in London. Before making decrees to effect this, however, he needed 
23 Newspaper Le Soir, 23.07.1941: interview with Governor Goffin.
24 Belgian Official Gazette, London, 17.07.1941: text of Pierlot’s radio broadcast.
25 See above.
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to be sure of having the right man for the office. Objectively, the most 
obvious candidate to become governor was Paul Van Zeeland. He had 
for years been a director of the Bank, thereafter its deputy-governor; 
and although not felt by all to be irreproachable, he was seen by many 
as being the most expert in monetary matters. Moreover, he was in un-
occupied territory and was highly regarded by both the British and the 
American governments. Gutt’s personal rancour against him, however, 
was too great for his candidature to be acceptable. In Gutt’s view, the 
only other person in unoccupied territory who had the standing neces-
sary for the position was Theunis, who eventually agreed to his name 
being put forward, although only after a great deal of correspondence26.
In fact, Theunis was not overjoyed at the prospect of becoming gov-
ernor of the Bank. In no circumstances did he wish to leave New York 
and his wife was even more adamant about staying there. Furthermore, 
he had passed the legal age limit to be considered for the appointment, 
that had been set by law at 67 and Theunis was then 68. Gutt regarded it 
the job of the lawyers to smooth away such difficulties and that is what 
they did. Joseph Nisot, Theunis’ legal adviser, argued that the law ap-
plied only to governors who had not yet reached the age of 67 at the time 
of their appointment, and, as Theunis had already passed it, he could 
thus be appointed27.
On 20 October 1941, Gutt began discussions with Baudewyns in 
 order to gain his support for the planned reforms. Baudewyns had no 
objections in principle; he found it a good idea for the Bank’s regis-
tered office to be transferred to London, having always been in favour 
of the original arrangement, which laid down that, during time of war, 
the Bank’s registered office should be established where the govern-
ment was in residence. He was also able to live with the appointment 
of  Theunis and with his somewhat astonishing decision not to elect 
domicile in London, where the Bank’s registered office was now estab-
lished, but to remain in New York. Moreover, this decision would allow 
Baudewyns himself to chair the board of directors in London, as well as 
permitting him to present the official report on the Bank’s activities in 
26 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letters of the summer and 
early autumn 1941 between Gutt (London) and Theunis (New York).
27 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A2: memorandum of 10.12.1943 from Nisot.
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unoccupied territories during the war to the Bank and to Belgian public 
bodies on his return to Belgium28.
However, there was one point in the plan that Baudewyns was not 
prepared to go accept. Gutt’s idea was to have a four-strong board of 
directors in London, consisting of Baudewyns, the director already in 
situ, Ansiaux, to be promoted to director, and two outsiders yet to be 
appointed. There would thus be seven directors in total, including the 
three in Belgium. It was the appointment of two outsiders that was the 
sticking-point for Baudewyns. He feared that they would threaten his 
authority within the board in London, and also that their appointment 
would lead to an unhealthy interference from private banking taking 
root in the Bank. In this respect, he referred to what had happened in 
Belgium during the 1920s and, indeed, until late in the 1930s. Gutt con-
ceded the point: the Bank’s board of directors in London would consist 
of no more than two directors, Baudewyns and Ansiaux.
Gutt’s plan for reform was submitted to the National Committee for 
its opinion. On that committee sat Belgian parliamentarians and prom-
inent political figures who had fled to London. It met on 16  November 
1941 and found no difficulty in declaring its approval of the project 
as such. However, it reacted very negatively to Gutt’s suggestion that 
 Theunis be appointed governor and put forward Baudewyns or Van 
Zeeland as being the only feasible candidates. Used, as he was, to hav-
ing his ideas accepted, Gutt left the meeting beside himself with indig-
nation. For his part, Baudewyns saw the Bank’s future threatened by an 
unprecedented rift between government and the National Committee. 
Nevertheless, Gutt was to get his way, but only after he had promised 
to ensure that Theunis’ appointment would be only for the duration of 
the war.
On 27 November 1941, the government in London issued two de-
crees29. The first replaced royal decrees of 24 August and 2 October 1939 
on the operation, organization, competence and bye-laws of the Bank, 
and, for the duration of the war, granted the Minister of Finance power 
to appoint or dismiss up to seven directors. In addition, it specified that, 
28 Baudewyns Family Archives: letters of October-November 1941 from Baudewyns 
(London) to his son (Oxford).
29 Belgian Official Gazette, London, 10.12.1941.
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for the duration of the war, the governor and the board of directors were 
the sole management bodies of the Bank: business was to be conducted 
at the registered office established in London. The board of directors 
had a quorum when at least two members were present and should the 
governor be prevented from attending, he was to be replaced as chair-
man by the eldest of the directors present; it specified further that the 
amendments to the bye-laws were justified by the exceptional circum-
stances of the moment and that the board of directors in Brussels, the 
supervisory council, the board of scrutineers, the general council and 
the general meeting of shareholders were no longer competent to take 
administrative measures and to represent the Bank in law.
The second decree appointed Theunis as governor of the Bank for 
the duration of the war. Because only one director was present in unoc-
cupied territory and because this might threaten the Bank’s proper op-
eration, Ansiaux was appointed director on 12 December. This followed 
Gutt’s message on radio ‘Free Belgium’, in which he had explained the 
reforms and made it clear that the government in London regarded 
Goffin’s appointment as illegal and, moreover, had relieved the leaders 
of the Bank still active in Brussels of every administrative and executive 
competence.
The reacTions in belgium
As was only to be expected, the news from London came as a bomb-
shell to those in occupied Belgium, creating confusion and uncertainty 
among the leaders of both the Bank and the country30. At the Royal 
Court in Brussels, the decrees were interpreted as the opening salvo in a 
wider campaign by the government in London to curb any autonomous 
exercise of power in the occupied territory and to reinforce its own po-
litical influence in Belgium31. In industrial circles, many did not worry 
too much about the changes; they were regarded as an unnecessary and 
30 SG, Archives, Direction, Galopin, 94: message of 05.01.1942 from Galopin (Brussels) 
to Gutt (London) via Bemelmans (Berne).
31 KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, cabinet du roi, dossier 232 b: réactions aux arrêtés-
loi du 27 novembre 1941 (03.12.1941).
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inappropriate interference on the part of the government in London in 
the internal administration of occupied Belgium32.
At the Bank, too, there were some who thought that the second de-
cree could be taken with a pinch of salt. However, the board of direc-
tors in Brussels was not entirely at ease with the tone of Gutt’s radio 
broadcast. The board therefore resolved to consult the jurist Marcq33, 
who gave it as his firm opinion that the Bank’s registered office was 
validly transferred in July 1940 from Mont-de-Marsan back to Brussels. 
Additionally, Marcq recognized Goffin’s appointment as governor, con-
tradicting Gutt’s claim: the appointment by Plisnier was in conformity 
with the transfer of ministerial authority to the secretaries-general by 
the law of 10 May 1940 and fully respected the necessary conditions of 
urgency for that authority to be exercised.
Marcq also examined the scope of the two decrees. In his opinion, 
they had been validly promulgated and consequently had the force of 
law; thus, with effect from 27 November 1941, Goffin was no longer the 
governor of the Bank and was replaced by Theunis. With effect from 
that date, too, the Bank’s registered office was transferred from Brus-
sels to London. Marcq nevertheless stated that the decree reorganizing 
the Bank did not provide for closure of the Bank in Belgium34; nor did 
it remove from office the four members of the board of directors in 
Brussels, Ingenbleek, Goffin, Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse. Although 
they no longer had any power to take administrative and executive de-
cisions, their competence was now governed by article 1375 of the Civil 
Code, whereby their activities were required to be in line with what was 
expected of scrupulous and diligent caretakers35.
32 According to the Court, the reaction of many industrialists was: ‘Qu’ils nous 
fichent la paix!’: KP, Archives, fonds Leopold III, cabinet du roi, dossier 232 b: réac-
tions aux arrêtés-loi du 27 novembre 1941 (03.12.1941).
33 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 1, dossier 9.5.5/ s. f. 1: maître Marcq, questions 
soulevées par la communication radiophonique de Londres, 01.12.1941.
34 Gutt later wrote that he would have liked to close the Bank in Brussels on 27 No-
vember, but that Pierlot and the other members of the government had advised him 
against doing so: ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letters of 
20.03.1942 and 29.04.1942 from Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York).
35 The government in London attached great importance to the opinion of the ju-
rist Marcq, who had stated that Goffin was no longer governor and that, with ef-
fect from 27.11.1941, the function was legally held by Theunis: (‘Gutt est aux anges!’, 
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The board of directors in Brussels concurred with Marcq’s opinion 
and resolved to remain in post, not wishing to be accused after the war 
of desertion36. The German commissioner at the Bank, for his part, 
thought that the moment had come to force a break with the Bank in 
London and attempted to convince the board to inform the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York that Theunis, Baudewyns and Ansiaux were 
no longer part of the Bank. However, the board refused to countenance 
this, stating that only the general assembly was competent to pass a 
resolution of that nature37.
Galopin and the limited circle of leading bankers were apparently 
much more on the qui vive than the Brussels board of directors and, in 
order to gain a better insight into the actual scope of the decrees, Ga-
lopin attempted to contact the government in London. Arthur Bemel-
mans, a director of the Société Générale de Belgique, had obtained a 
passport to travel to Switzerland and, at Galopin’s request, he sent a 
telegram to Gutt from there in December 1941 to ask for an elucidation 
of the measures of 27 November38. The telegram pointed out that Gutt’s 
radio broadcast had caused a great deal of turmoil in Belgium and that 
it was very difficult to gauge the intentions behind the measures. It 
asked whether the decrees were intended solely to provide a more solid 
legal basis for the proceedings in New York or whether the decisions 
taken were really in earnest: more particularly, whether Goffin and 
Plisnier were to resign as governor and secretary-general respective-
ly, and whether the Bank in Brussels and its branches throughout the 
country were to be closed. The telegram also underlined that both the 
group around Galopin and other leading figures in business and public 
authorities wished to follow the government’s directives, but desired 
further information about the exact nature of the matter.
wrote Baudewyns to Ansiaux, when the opinion became known in London): BNB, 
Archives, SD, London Archives, 1 (1942), ‘correspondance’: letter of 16.03.1942 from 
Baudewyns (London) to Ansiaux (New York). In a memorandum of 29.05.1943, 
drawn up in London, Henri Rolin declared his agreement with Marcq’s opinion 
(BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 13, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 320/ 5): memorandum of 
29.05.1943 from Henri Rolin).
36 BNB, Archives, DC, 05.12.1941.
37 BNB, Archives, DC, 09.12.1941.
38 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1947), Part 1, pp. 39-42.
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Gutt telegraphed his reply to Bemelmans via the British embassy. 
The text, indeed, indicated clearly that important motives for the de-
crees being issued were to secure the deposits of Belgian gold abroad, 
to strengthen Belgium’s legal position in the proceedings in New York 
against the Banque de France; and finally to use the decrees for under-
pinning the governmengt’s image as an active participant in the allied 
camp. However, Gutt went much further in explaining the reasons for 
the decrees. He claimed that the removal of the Bank’s registered office 
from Mont-de-Marsan to Brussels had been illegal, as had been Goffin’s 
appointment as governor by Plisnier. All this, coupled with the regret-
table interview of Goffin in the newspaper Le Soir, meant that Goffin 
had to resign as governor. Gutt also stated that he did not wish to make 
a final statement about Plisnier, but that there was no doubt that the 
secretary-general had committed a number of grave errors. In respect 
of the Bank’s closure, Gutt said that he was not prepared to make an 
unequivocal judgement, but the Bank could probably consider scaling 
down its activities and having recourse to another issue institution, 
as had been the case during the First World War. The directors of the 
Bank, including Goffin, could remain, but could no longer exercise any 
management authority as a board of directors.
Insufficient care was taken by the British diplomatic authorities to 
deliver Gutt’s telegram safely to Bemelmans, who was handed it in the 
middle of a meeting at a Swiss bank with his German counterparts. 
Feeling certain that they had noticed something suspicious and prob-
ably suspected him of espionage, he destroyed the document, convey-
ing its contents verbally to Galopin on his return to Brussels. For fear 
of the Germans, Galopin and Bemelmans agreed to keep the telegram’s 
existence secret, which is why, although he realized how important 
Gutt’s message was, Galopin never explicitly mentioned the telegram 
to Goffin.
Galopin nevertheless made several attempts to bring the attitude of 
the Bank’s leaders in Brussels more into line with the political deci-
sion-making of the government in London. In February 1942 he invited 
 Goffin several times to exchange thoughts on the matter. During those 
personal discussions, Galopin placed the question of the gold cover in 
the wider context of Gutt’s radio broadcast of 28 November of the pre-
vious year, in which the validity of Goffin’s appointment was disputed 
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and displeasure expressed with Goffin’s interview in Le Soir. He also 
asked whether the question of the gold cover was perhaps not a good 
opportunity to scale down the Bank’s activities and for Goffin him-
self to resign as governor of the Bank and as chairman of the Banque 
d’Emission.
Goffin declared that he was prepared to follow the government’s in-
structions as far as possible, but that he would not resign as governor, 
as this would give the Germans a free hand to do what they had done in 
the Netherlands and appoint a Belgian puppet governor. Nevertheless, 
he gave an undertaking to Galopin that he would continue as governor 
only in a caretaker capacity39.
During that February, Galopin also emphatically defended his posi-
tion to the board of directors of the Banque d’Emission, suggesting that, 
to scale down its operations, the Bank ought to cease to issue notes; in 
this way it would be acting in the spirit both of the decrees (of which it 
had been sent a copy from Basel to Brussels via the BIS) and of Gutt’s 
radio broadcast. If necessary, the Banque d’Emission could undertake 
the issue of new banknotes. This view was supported by de Munck, Col-
lin, Bekaert and Peltzer, but not by most members of the board, who 
felt that a dual circulation of banknotes had to be avoided at all cost. 
It was this argument that proved decisive in the rejection of Galopin’s 
proposal.
goffin’s appoinTmenT and The ouTside world
The London decree likewise led to confusion at the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) in Basel. That institution had been set up in 
1930 in the wake of the Young Plan agreements to manage the financial 
39 BNB, Archives, SD, 31, dossier 8.11.25/ s. f. 10, ‘divers’: report of the Galopin-Goffin 
meeting of 19.02.1942. On the relations between the Bank for International Settle-
ments at Basel (BIS), the government in exile in London, the Bank in Brussels and 
in London, as far as analyzed in the next subchapter, we were able to draw on a 
comprehensive memorandum that Dr. Piet Clement, archivist of the BIS, prepared 
for us on the basis of the BIS archives at Basel, for which our heartfelt thanks. The 
main BIS file used was: BIS, Archives, dossier 7.18 (5), descriptive catalogue, Hechler 
Papers, Belgian Treasury Bills. We also used: ARA, Theunis Papers, dossier 22; BNB, 
Archives, SD, Goffin Papers, dossier 3, ‘Banque des Règlements Internationaux’.
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operations linked to the rescheduling of German war reparations. The 
BIS was required to operate in currencies that satisfied the conditions 
of the gold standard or of the gold exchange standard. By the end of 
the 1930’s, few currencies still met those conditions, but one of those 
few was the Belgian franc. In consequence, the BIS began to invest a 
proportion of its liquid resources in short-term Belgian Treasury cer-
tificates, which went by the name of ‘Mendelssohn bonds’, payable and 
repayable in Dutch guilders, since they were issued through the media-
tion of the Amsterdam house, Mendelssohn. Subsequently, there were 
further investments in Belgian Treasury certificates, also denominated 
in Dutch guilders, but issued through the mediation of the houses Pier-
son and Beyersdorf-Terlinck. At the end of August 1939 – on the eve of 
the Second World War – the portfolio of the BIS contained a consider-
able quantity of Belgian Treasury certificates for a total of 12.65 million 
Dutch guilders, redeemable on 29 May 1940.
In the meantime, the German armed forces had invaded Belgium, 
the Belgian government had fled to France, and the country had come 
under total occupation. From France, the Minister of Finance, Gutt, 
informed the BIS that the government was prevented from redeeming 
the Treasury certificates on maturity and paying the interest, due to the 
exceptional circumstances of war. Because of this, the maturity date 
would be postponed for three months. It so happened that, at the end 
of the period, Gutt was in London, together with the Minister for the 
Colonies, but at that time, not the rest of the government. Redemption 
or the payment of interest was once again excluded. Even after the Bel-
gian government had regrouped in London, the redemption and inter-
est payments on the Mendelssohn bonds had to be postponed further; 
in fact, the government went so far as to suspend all redemptions of 
Belgian foreign debt until after the war. In his letter of 22 October 1940 
to the BIS, Gutt also made it known that the government would make 
no exception, and certainly not ‘when an institution dominated by ene-
my interests is concerned’. He was clearly not particularly well disposed 
towards the BIS.
For its part, the BIS was not pleased with the Belgian decision. Its in-
vestments in short-term Belgian government paper represented a sub-
stantial proportion of its liquid resources, and these were now frozen 
or perhaps lost for good. The insinuation in Gutt’s letter was not well 
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received either, and the irritation felt on both sides shows all too clearly 
in the further correspondence. However, the BIS did not give up and 
in December 1940, its chairman, McKittrick, attempted via American 
mediation to achieve a compromise solution, whereby the BIS would 
accept consolidation of the Treasury certificates until after the war, but 
expected that the interest due would be paid regularly during the dura-
tion of the war, taken from the stock of gold that the Bank had depos-
ited under dossier with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. McKit-
trick’s efforts came to nothing. Gutt then proposed that the BIS should 
cease to pay dividends to Belgian shareholders, i.e. to the Bank and the 
few private bank-shareholders in Brussels, but this was rejected, as the 
BIS felt obliged to meet its obligations towards its shareholders, even 
in time of war. At a complete loss, McKittrick decided on 15 May 1941 
to address himself to Janssen in Brussels, who, with the government’s 
legal approval, had returned the Bank’s registered office to Belgium.
The BIS had logic on its side in the change of approach. It had obli-
gations towards the Bank and towards certain private Belgian banks, 
because together they held 19,772 BIS shares out of a total of 200,400. 
The governor of the Bank sat ex officio in the board of directors of the 
BIS and, as representative of the private shareholders, Galopin was also 
a member. The Belgian shareholders were entitled to a dividend in a 
gold-convertible currency and all of them currently had their registered 
office in Belgium. It was therefore normal that the BIS should seek a 
solution in that country.
When McKittrick wrote to Janssen, he asked whether, via an offset-
ting formula, the obligation to pay out dividends could not be applied 
to settling the Belgian Treasury’s debt to the BIS. He sent a similar letter 
to Plisnier. Janssen and Plisnier apparently responded positively, but 
wished to link any approval – in Janssen’s case in consultation with 
Galopin – to a number of conditions: among these were a reduction in 
the rate of interest from 4 to 3 per cent, the integration of the question 
of the Mendelssohn bonds into an overall arrangement for Belgium’s 
outstanding foreign debt and free disposition of the amount of gold-
convertible currency to be paid out at Basel, to the extent that it ex-
ceeded the amount involved in the offsetting arrangement.
The conditions appeared to be over-ambitious and, to find a solu-
tion, the BIS requested the Reichsbank and the German Ministry of 
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Finance to mediate. Negotiations proved laborious. Galopin, Janssen 
and his successor, Goffin, initially held to their original demand that 
Belgian shareholders have free disposition of the gold-convertible for-
eign currency accruing to them in Switzerland. Ultimately, however, 
they were unable to succeed. The eventual agreement of 22 August 1941 
was totally in line with the wishes of the BIS: the Ministry of Finance in 
Brussels declared itself prepared to pay to the Bank in Belgian francs 
the interest due on the outstanding Treasury certificates held by the 
BIS; in exchange, the Bank was prepared to use those receipts to pay, in 
Belgian francs and on behalf of the BIS, the dividends due to Belgian 
shareholders.
However, a new element was introduced by the decree of 27 Novem-
ber 1941, whereby the Belgian government in exile in London had trans-
ferred the Bank’s registered office from Brussels to London, declared 
Goffin’s appointment as governor void and designated Theunis in his 
place. Indeed, Gutt had already informed McKittrick two weeks previ-
ously that the question of interest on the Belgian Treasury certificates 
or Mendelssohn bonds and the dividends due by the BIS to the Bank 
was to be discussed and settled exclusively with the Belgian govern-
ment and the Bank in London.
On 5 December, McKittrick answered that he was prepared to 
resume discussion of the two questions with Gutt, preferably in Portu-
gal, but reiterated his proposal made a year earlier that the certificates 
be consolidated until after the war and that the payment of interest be 
made from the Belgian gold deposited in New York. Furthermore, he 
stated that the BIS could not sever its contacts with Belgium completely, 
as dividends had to be paid out to the private shareholders in Belgium 
and that, as members of the board of directors of the BIS, Goffin and 
Galopin had to be consulted where Belgian interests were involved. As 
far as the BIS was concerned, the transfer of the registered office to Lon-
don and the latest appointments at the Bank were primarily inspired by 
political considerations, in respect of which the BIS could not adopt a 
definite position, given its neutrality during the war and the fragmen-
tary information available at the time. At first sight the arguments put 
forward by the Bank in Brussels and the Bank in London to prove their 
legitimacy appeared to be valid. The BIS therefore proposed to solve the 
problem for itself by henceforth sending all documents to both gov-
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ernors and by suspending its decisions about appointments and other 
measures regarding the Bank until the question of legitimacy had been 
resolved.
Gutt did not accept McKittrick’s proposals and allowed the BIS dos-
sier to gather dust until he was informed in the spring of 1942 of the ar-
rangements of 22 August 1941 between the BIS and the Bank in Brussels, 
whereby the dividend payments to the Bank and the private sharehold-
ers, and payment of interest to the BIS would be organized via recipro-
cal offsetting in Brussels. Gutt now changed his tune and insisted on an 
agreement between the BIS and the Belgian government and the Bank 
in London. After an exchange of letters, Gutt concluded that the solu-
tion of the problem posed two alternatives: the BIS and the Belgian gov-
ernment (the latter via the Bank in London) would have all dividends 
and interest due since 1940 transferred in dollars to the respective gold 
accounts of the BIS and the Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, either without account being taken of the Brussels offsetting ar-
rangement of 22 August 1941 (Gutt’s standpoint), or with account being 
taken of that arrangement (the BIS standpoint).
Only in the course of 1943, after McKittrick’s personal negotiations 
with Theunis in February in New York, was a solution found that both 
Theunis, Gutt, and McKittrick could accept. It consisted of the Belgian 
Mendelssohn bonds being consolidated until after the war and pay-
ment of interest to the BIS, as well as BIS dividends to the Bank, being 
executed in US dollars via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, with-
out account being taken of the Brussels offsetting arrangement of 22 
August 1941. For their part, Theunis and Gutt agreed that the BIS would 
continue to pay dividends to the private shareholders in Belgium. On 
29 October 1943, they gave the green light for a transfer of 331,512 US dol-
lars from the Bank’s gold account to the BIS gold account at the Federal 
Reserve Bank: from the 543,328 US dollars due to the BIS in accrued 
interest (since 1940), 211,816 US dollars were deducted for dividends due 
to the Bank from the BIS (since 1940). At the same time, in order to pay 
dividend to the private shareholders, the BIS offered a small number 
of Mendelssohn bonds for sale in Brussels, which reduced the total 
number in the BIS portfolio from 12.65 million to 12.1 million Dutch 
guilders’ worth. After the liberation of Belgium a satisfactory solution 
was found for the redemption of the bonds and for the double payment 
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of dividends and interest for the years 1940-1941. Maurice Frère, who 
had meanwhile been appointed governor of the Bank, was instrumental 
in bringing about this arrangement and reconciliation.
Chapter 15
The Proceedings against the Banque 
de France in New York
The cause
The telegram Kauch sent from Toulouse to New York on 26 January 
1941 to inform Theunis, Belgian Ambassador Extraordinary to the 
United States, of the transfer to Germany of the Belgian gold entrust-
ed to the Banque de France was couched in somewhat cryptic terms: 
 Theunis was told that it was now up to him to undertake action in New 
York against the Banque de France. Exactly why these instructions were 
not more explicit and why it was not clearly stated who was giving them 
are questions that still remain unanswered1. But it was clear that The-
unis had to decide on the course of action to be taken, i.e. whether legal 
 proceedings should be begun against the Banque de France or a threat 
of sequestration be made as a means of putting pressure on it to achieve 
an amicable settlement.
Baudewyns and Ansiaux did not desire a legal confrontation with 
the Banque de France and supposed that this was not Janssen’s inten-
tion either. In any case, an action in law was a highly unusual manner in 
which to solve a difference of opinion between European central banks. 
Moreover, when Ansiaux travelled to Lisbon in January 1941 he was 
informed by Cattier that Janssen was in the midst of negotiations with 
the Banque de France to achieve a settlement regarding recognition of 
its responsibility for the Belgian gold and that the prospects for a settle-
ment were favourable. This was good news for Baudewyns and Ansiaux 
who also wanted an amicable arrangement. The fact that the idea of a 
compromise was rejected and legal proceedings begun in New York, 
indicates that it was not the people of the Bank in London who were 
1 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, SD 1, dossier 01.02.00.10 (A 230/1): or monétaire (mem-
orandum of 07.01.1944 from J. Nisot, New York).
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pulling the strings, but rather Gutt and Theunis, both of whom were 
bent on confrontation and felt that they had sound reason for seeking it.
Upon lodging the complaint, Theunis had been permitted by the 
judge in New York to have the French gold in the strong-rooms of the 
Federal Reserve Bank provisionally sequetrated. In an interview with 
the New York Times on 6 February 1941, Theunis declared that, on 17-18 
June 1940, the Banque de France had declined to respond to the Bank’s 
request for the contract of deposit in safe custody to be cancelled, that 
it had refused to evacuate the Belgian gold to the United States, and – 
even worse – had transferred it to the Reichsbank, against the express 
will of the Bank 2.
In a memorandum from Jean Sancery, head of the Disputes Depart-
ment in Paris, received on 27 February 1941 by Jean Martial, the Banque 
de France’s representative in New York, the French central bank, sup-
ported in this by the French Ministry of Finance, put forward three ar-
guments disputing the legal action taken by the Bank3. In the first place, 
it claimed that neither the Belgian government in exile nor the Bank’s 
representatives in London were competent to initiate legal proceedings. 
It was true that the British and American governments had recognized 
the Belgian government and the Bank’s office in London, but there 
were no clear legal grounds either for the Belgian government to be 
recognized as the ‘legal government’ or for the office to call itself ‘the 
National Bank of Belgium’. Since July 1940, and with the approval of 
the legal Belgian government, then in Vichy, the registered office of the 
Bank had been brought back to Brussels. Pursuant to the Bank’s bye-
laws, only the governor or, in his absence, the deputy-governor could 
take executive decisions on behalf of the Bank and both were now in 
Brussels. Consequently, the Bank’s office in London was not competent 
to conduct legal proceedings in New York.
2 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/73, ‘or belge’: 
Martial, mon câble d’hier, 07.02.1940 (reçu à la Banque de France, Clermont-Fer-
rand, 10.02.1941); dossier 1397.1994.01/79: report of 29.04.1941 from Martial (Cler-
mont-Ferrand) to de Boisanger.
3 SOMA, Archives, MBZ, dossier 200/F.2: memorandum of 20.02.1941 from Arnal. 
See also: BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/78, 
‘or belge’: note Sancery pour la Banque de France au sujet de l’instance engagée 
contre elle par la BNB, reçue 27.02.1941; dossier 1397.1994.01/79, ‘or belge’: note pour 
le contentieux (Paris), 28.02.1941.
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Secondly, New York State law itself disqualified the Bank’s office in 
London from taking legal action, as it stated that a foreign company 
could institute such proceedings there against another foreign compa-
ny only if one of them did business in that State, which was not the case 
in this instance. The Banque de France’s third argument was that there 
were no grounds for the complaint as such; on 18 June 1940 it had not 
‘refused’ to cancel the contract of deposit in safe custody, as it had not 
been ‘formally’ requested to do so. Furthermore, it had always declared, 
and was always prepared to reaffirm, that it continued to regard itself 
responsible for the Belgian gold, even if that gold had for the moment 
been entrusted to the Reichsbank in the form of a subordinate deposit 
in safe custody. In any case, the Banque de France would restore the 
gold to the Bank forthwith on being officially requested to do so by the 
legally recognized representatives of the Bank and when it was in a po-
sition to do so. In the Banque de France’s eyes, thus, there was no reason 
for legal proceedings4.
Theunis resolved to engage an eminent lawyer to refute the French 
arguments and turned to John Foster Dulles, who, at the time, was a 
senior partner in the well known law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell (af-
ter the Second World War he was to be appointed Secretary of State in 
Eisenhower’s presidency). Dulles had studied at the Sorbonne before 
the First World War. Theunis had got to know him immediately after 
the war, as they both served on the Reparations Commission in Paris, 
Dulles as a junior member of the American delegation and Theunis as 
head of the Belgian delegation. Theunis had already learnt to appreci-
ate Dulles’ talents and now considered that he would be an excellent 
defender of Belgian interests.
For its defence, the Banque de France turned to the equally well 
known law firm of Coudert Brothers and Co. The partners of this firm 
were initially reluctant to take the case, regarding the surrender of the 
gold to the Reichsbank as a breach of contract that would be difficult to 
defend before an American court. Coupled with this was the very nega-
tive reaction of the American press and public opinion to the news of 
the surrender, which prompted one of the Coudert brothers to object 
strongly to becoming involved, as he was a senator for New York State 
4 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01.41, ‘or belge’: note pour la 
Banque de France, 02.04.1941.
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and, with elections in prospect, was not keen for his name to be linked 
to a matter that had been subject to such sharp criticism. However, the 
oldest partner, the father, an ardent francophile, had the final word 
and accepted the commission from the Banque de France. Paul Fuller, 
nephew and partner of the brothers, would support the dossier, assisted 
by a junior partner, Manlon B. Doing5. Sancery was sent to New York 
to appear, together with Martial, for the defence before the American 
courts, the requisite powers of attorney for both having been signed on 
4 March 1941 by the French central bank’s governor, de Boisanger6.
Sancery left for New York on 15 March, sailing from Lisbon and car-
rying the documents that Martial needed to prepare the case for the 
defence. The Portuguese authorities had assured the Banque de France 
that his ship would sail directly to New York, but en route it was inter-
cepted by British ships and conducted to a port in Bermuda, where it 
had to remain at anchor for two days. With British agents subjecting the 
baggage of all travellers to a close search, Sancery made a quick decision 
to destroy a number of confidential documents7. After the war, Ansiaux 
would claim that these agents had had the documents photographed 
at night and had forwarded the photographs to the British Intelligence 
Service and to the State Department in Washington. Whatever the 
truth of the matter, Theunis was effectively informed of the situation by 
a State Department official and allowed access to the documents. This 
was extremely important in respect of the completion of the dossier8.
In his first statement, on 7 April 1941, Martial argued that the Ameri-
can courts were not competent to judge a dispute between two foreign 
companies, neither of which was active in New York State. Dulles had 
warned Theunis that the judge could well accept this argument as de-
cisive9. He advised the Bank to cede its assets at the Banque de France 
5 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/78, ‘or belge’: 
report of 29.04.1941 from Sancery (Clermont-Ferrand) to de Boisanger.
6 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: pouvoirs 
donnés à Sancéry et Martial, 04.03.1941.
7 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: mission à 
New York de M. Sancery, chef du Service du Contentieux, février-avril 1941.
8 Ansiaux, ‘L’or belge’, III, in Revue Générale, April 1985, p. 4.
9 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/73, ‘or belge’: on 
20.02.1941, the French Navy (Vichy) passed Martial’s letter of 17.02.1941 (New York) 
to the French Minister of Finance (Vichy).
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to two residents of New York State who would demand restitution from 
the Banque de France on behalf of the Bank. Acting on this advice, on 
14 March the Bank had ceded its claim to Daniel de Gorter and Henri 
Wild, both residents of New York State, the former being chairman of 
the Belgo-American Chamber of Commerce and the latter a director 
of the Banque belge pour l’Etranger. On 24 April, de Gorter and Wild 
summoned the Banque de France to appear in first instance before the 
Supreme Court of the State of New York, which sat in the State capi-
tal, Albany. Their brief was to recover the Belgian gold that had been 
deposited with the French central bank, but they also requested that a 
sequestration order be placed on the Banque de France’s assets at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Court granted their request 
and the State sheriff had the order executed the following day10.
Meanwhile, the Belgian government had decided that Gutt should 
go to New York to keep a close watch on the proceedings. He showed 
himself prepared to talk informally about possible alternatives to legal 
proceedings. At Dulles’ suggestion, he even accepted an invitation to 
lunch with Fuller from the law firm Coudert Brothers. Their discussion 
was friendly and Gutt made it clear that Belgium was not necessarily 
looking to pursue the legal action to the bitter end, but would be pre-
pared to accept an amicable settlement, as long as that put the Bank 
back in possession of its gold11.
Words like that were music to Fuller’s ears. He was convinced that 
only an amicable settlement offered a way to avoid what would almost 
certainly be a judgement against the Banque de France. Following his 
conversation with Gutt he did all in his power, in consultation with 
Martial and Sancery, to achieve a compromise. His only ally was time, 
hence his strategy of questioning the competence of the American 
courts and of exhausting all other procedural means, in order to post-
pone indefinitely discussion of the core of the matter. This fitted well 
within de Boisanger’s scheme of things, because he, too, favoured an 
amicable settlement.
10 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 1, dossier 01.02.00.10 (A 230/ 1): or monétaire, 
 memorandum of 07.01.1944 from J. Nisot (New York).
11 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/78, ‘or belge’: 
report of 29.04.1941 from Martial (Clermont-Ferrand) to de Boisanger.
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The defence’s game, thus, became a legal sparring match that lasted 
for months. Now that, legally, the competence of the American courts 
could no longer be challenged, Fuller turned to a new point of proce-
dure, stating that, according to the contract of deposit in safe custody, 
only the Paris courts were competent to judge a dispute concerning it. 
This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of the State of New 
York on 3 July, but the Banque de France then challenged that decision 
and laid the matter before the Appelate Division, a body of second in-
stance at the Supreme Court of the State of New York. On 12 August, 
this body unanimously confirmed the verdict, to which the Banque de 
France replied by requesting the Appelate Division to allow it to place 
the matter in third instance before the Court of Appeals, a request that 
was again rejected unanimously.
The Banque de France now changed tack and on 3 November sub-
mitted a number of conclusions to the Appelate Division, the purpose 
of which was to challenge the competence of the Supreme Court of New 
York; these conclusions were in turn rejected. Then, on 10 November, 
the central bank requested a further delay, only for the Appelate Divi-
sion to refuse to allow any prolongation. On 17 November, the Banque 
de France approached Chief Justice Lehman to obtain the requested 
prolongation, but he, too, refused to grant it. The next day, however, 
both admitted a procedural error and on 18 November granted the 
prolongation of delay. That same day, the Banque de France submitted 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals against the judgment of 3 Novem-
ber, which had rejected a request for the competence of the American 
courts to be limited12.
In tandem with his strategy of using all the legal tricks to postpone 
the case, Fuller had been continuing to work for an amicable settlement 
between the two central banks and in June-July had already produced 
a text that both his client, the Banque de France, and the French Min-
istry of Finance could agree to13, no mean feat. By the terms of the text, 
the Banque de France declared itself prepared to make restitution of 
the Belgian gold and to do so against the guarantee of its own gold de-
posited in New York, with restitution obviously devolving to the ‘legal’ 
12 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 1, dossier 01.02.00.10 (A 230/ 1): or monétaire (mem-
orandum of 07.01.1944 from J. Nisot (New York).
13 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/79, ‘or belge’: 
letter of 09.10.1941 from Cathala (Paris) to de Boisanger (Clermont-Ferrand).
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representatives of the Bank and not to those in London who ‘claimed’ 
to be the legal representatives14.
Naturally enough, the Bank in London, receiving the proposal in 
November 1941, was unable to agree. For his part, Dulles found it too 
vague and, to put it mildly, too bruising for the representatives of the 
Bank in London. From the Banque de France’s point of view, there was 
good reason for it to continue to refuse to recognize the Bank in Lon-
don as being legally the National Bank of Belgium, because, from Paris, 
it was still negotiating with Brussels to achieve an accommodation15. In 
furtherance of this, in October the Banque de France submitted Fuller’s 
proposal to Goffin. However, advised by the jurist Marcq, the board of 
directors of the Bank replied that it had no competence in respect of 
measures taken in unoccupied territory and that the Bank in Brussels 
could therefore not respond to the French proposal. From that point on, 
the Banque de France saw no purpose in continuing to negotiate with 
Brussels and now turned exclusively to the Belgian government and the 
Bank in London for further attempts at an accommodation.
The french aTTempTs To achieve an amicable soluTion
Fuller did not down tools after his failed attempt to achieve a compro-
mise. In November 1941, he contacted Dulles again to see whether an 
arrangement of that sort could be worked out. Dulles answered that 
he would consult his client on the matter and informed the American 
Treasury and the State Department of what was happening16; thereafter, 
both departments took a close interest in the case17.
14 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/73, ‘or belge’: 
telegram of 07.06.1941 from Martial (New York) to the Banque de France (Cler-
mont-Ferrand); dossier 1397.1994.01/71, ‘or belge’: letter of 20.06.1941 from de 
Boisanger (Clermont-Ferrand) to Bouthillier (Vichy); Secrétariat Général, dos-
sier 1060.2001.01/40, ‘or belge’: meetings of 20.06.1941 and 27.06.1941 between de 
Boisanger and Schäfer in Paris, meeting of 04.07.1941 between Bolgert and Schäfer, 
letter of 10.07.1941 from Schäfer (Paris) to de Boisanger (Clermont-Ferrand).
15 See above.
16 Washington, National Archives, Belgium, dossier 855.515/73: letter of 07.11.1941 
from Bernstein (US Treasury, Washington) to Foley (US Treasury, Washington).
17 Washington, National Archives, Belgium, dossier 855.515/69: memorandum of 
17.12.1941 (US Treasury) to Dean Acheson (Secretary of State, US State Department).
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The discussion between the two lawyers ultimately took place mid-
December on the telephone18. Prompted by the Banque de France at 
Clermont-Ferrand, Fuller again suggested a settlement. He stated that 
the Banque de France remained prepared to put its name to an official 
document recognizing its obligation to make restitution of the gold re-
ceived in deposit, but that it still refused to make an immediate transfer 
to the Bank of the monetary gold it held under dossier with the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, because of the continuing uncertainty 
about whether restitution was to be made to the Bank in London or the 
Bank in Brussels. The Banque de France therefore promised to make 
restitution as soon as doubt about the Bank’s status had been dispelled 
or – if the circumstances of war prevented this – as soon as hostili-
ties ceased. In the latter case, it would make restitution to the institu-
tion then recognized by American jurisprudence as being officially the 
Bank. Lastly, the Banque de France was also prepared to use the gold it 
held under dossier at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as a guar-
antee for the restitution.
Dulles informed Theunis of the conversation, pointing out that it 
would be in the Bank’s interest to answer that it found the proposal 
attractive and wanted to examine it: the proposal was indeed to the 
Bank’s advantage, as it did not serve to halt the legal proceedings and 
at the same time implied fresh recognition by the Banque de France of 
the Bank’s rights19. Dulles also advised that the Bank itself should delay 
the legal proceedings somewhat, because, following the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States had declared 
war on the Axis Powers and joined the ranks of the Western Allies. 
Rumours were now circulating in Washington that the American gov-
ernment would freeze, or even confiscate, the assets of civilians and 
companies from occupied countries. Freezing or confiscation, it was 
argued, should be regarded as a guarantee against possible damage or 
loss that the American government or American citizens might suffer 
in consequence of the country’s entry into the war on the side of the 
Allies20.
18 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 13, dossier A 320/6: letter of 12.12.1941 from Dulles 
(New York) to Bernstein (Washington).
19 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 13, dossier A 320/6: letter of 15.12.1941 from Theunis 
(New York) to Gutt (London).
20 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 13, dossier A 320/6: secret supplementary letter 
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A further argument was that not to freeze or confiscate the assets 
could be seen as discriminating between the Allied countries. With its 
policy of ‘cash and carry’, the American government had forced Great 
Britain to liquidate all her domestic gold reserves and all her assets 
abroad, in order to finance the purchase of war materials. She was not 
only using those materials to defend herself, but would also be using 
them for the eventual liberation of the occupied territories. It would, 
therefore, be unfair to Great Britain if the governments, citizens and 
companies of those occupied territories had free disposition of their 
assets in the United States and did not commit them to liberating their 
own territories, whereas the British had committed their assets to just 
that purpose. Dulles indicated that the planned measure would have 
repercussions on the dispute between the two central banks, his rea-
soning being that, were the American president to eliminate the dis-
crimination against Great Britain, gold that Belgium had demanded 
and received could be frozen or confiscated as a Belgian asset. Were no 
restitution to have yet taken place, the gold would be frozen or confis-
cated as French gold and the Bank would retain its claim against the 
Banque de France. In Dulles’ view it was now better for the Bank to 
attempt to defer the restitution for as long as possible21.
In a letter of 4 March 1942, Theunis therefore pressed Gutt to follow 
Dulles’ advice, stating his own opinion that the Bank should reply to 
the Banque de France that it was prepared to accept the French proposal 
as the basis for a possible settlement22. Gutt was unhappy at Theunis’ 
suggestion. He had taken a hard line right from the first French over-
tures in the course of 1941, when he was insisting on a transfer of the 
French monetary gold at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to the 
gold in the Belgian account23.
The Banque de France nevertheless continued to hold out hopes of 
a settlement and had meanwhile again attempted to delay legal pro-
ceedings. On 5 March, the Court of Appeals of the State of New York 
of 15.12.1941 from Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London), with an account of the 
Dulles-Boël meeting.
21 ARA, Pierlot Papers, dossier ‘London’: letters of 15.12.1941 and 31.12.1941 from 
 Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London).
22 BNB, Archives, Malaise Papers: letter of 04.03.1942 from Theunis (New York) to 
Gutt (London).
23 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 13, dossier A 320/6: letter of 16.12.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
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granted permission for the question of the competence of the Ameri-
can courts to be laid before the Supreme Court in Washington. Two 
days later, the French central bank went to that federal court with the 
request that it annul the verdicts of the Appelate Division and of the 
Court of Appeals of the State of New York24. By the end of the month, 
however, these two French initiatives had proved unsuccessful, so that 
Dulles was able to notify Theunis that the opposing party was required 
to submit its response to the charges within ten days and that, at last, 
the core of the matter could be argued25.
Ultimately, Dulles’ optimism appeared to be somewhat premature, 
as the Banque de France launched a fresh campaign in April 1942 to 
have the case postponed. Referring to the court case concerning the 
Bank of Rumania, it lodged a request with the Supreme Court in Al-
bany on 6 April for the sequestration order placed on its gold with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be lifted. The same day, it re-
quested that same court for a new prolongation of delay, in order to be 
able to respond to the action brought by de Gorter and Wild, since no 
verdict had yet been given on the lifting of the sequestration order. Both 
requests met the same fate as their predecessors and were rejected, as 
was the appeal the Banque de France lodged on 27 April with the Ap-
pelate Division against those two verdicts. The next day, a review of 
the verdict on the request for a prolongation of delay was sought, but 
this, too, was rejected. At the end of June, finally, the Supreme Court in 
Washington handed down its verdict, which was likewise in favour of 
the Bank26, and with this, the possibilities of gaining a further delay in 
arguing the core of the matter were now exhausted. In the meantime, 
however – more particularly on 5 May – Fuller had tabled a new pro-
posal for an amicable settlement.
According to this new proposal, the Banque de France would go a 
step further than the compromise it had offered the previous year. It 
would be prepared to hold a specific sum in gold under dossier at the 
24 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/72, ‘or belge’: 
letter of 11.03.1942 from Martial (New York) to Gargam (Clermont-Ferrand).
25 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 25.03.1942 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
26 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 9.1/26, s. f. 1: letter of 15.06.1942 
from Ansiaux (London) to Theunis (New York).
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York as a guarantee in favour of the Bank 
and to give a formal undertaking that, once hostilities had ceased, it 
would restore the gold to the Bank at whatever location the Bank indi-
cated: New York, Brussels or Paris. During the term of the agreement, 
the Banque de France would recognize the representatives of the Bank 
in London as the legal representatives of the Bank, but only within the 
context of this operation; in the case of dispute, the matter would be 
referred to an American court of law. In return, the Bank and de Gorter 
and Wild would halt legal proceedings and request that the sequestra-
tion order be lifted27.
Martial gave this proposal his full endorsement, supported by the 
management of the Banque de France: Fuller and Martial could now 
go ahead28. The proposal was received fairly positively in London, and 
both Dulles and Theunis were in favour, because they thought that a 
solution was now in sight29. However, new difficulties arose and, once 
again, nothing came of the hoped-for amicable settlement.
The Bank had indeed ceded its claim to de Gorter and Wild, but es-
sentially it remained the claimant. Regulating the relationship between 
the American government and central banks in exile was American 
decree No. 31 of 19 May 1941, especially article 25, which laid down that 
the Secretary of State was empowered to indicate who, on behalf of 
those central banks, would have power of disposal over their assets. In 
June 1941, Spaak had submitted a request to that end, with respect to 
Baudewyns and Theunis, but the request had been declared inadmis-
sible and the Belgian government had left the matter at that. In March 
1942, however, with the prospect of the main issue being pleaded in New 
York, the recognition of the right of disposition for Baudewyns and 
Theunis became relevant again, as the opposing party or even the court 
27 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/72, ‘or belge’: 
telegram of 03.07.1942 (delivered 19.07.1942) from Martial (New York) to the Banque 
de France (Clermont-Ferrand), Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/42, ‘or 
belge’: note sur le projet d’accord élaboré à New York, 02.09.1942.
28 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/72, ‘or belge’: 
letter of 09.10.1942 from Cathala (Vichy) to de Boisanger (Clermont-Ferrand); Se-
crétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: projet d’accord amiable en vue 
de mettre fin au procès relatif à l’or belge, 13.10.1942.
29 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 13, dossier A 320/6: letter from Nisot (New York) to 
Dulles (New York).
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could use the refusal of the Secretary of State to admit Spaak’s request 
as an argument against the Bank’s claim for the gold. Legitimizing the 
decrees of 27 November 1941 on the transfer of the Bank’s registered 
office from Brussels to London became a first step in negating such a 
line of argument. With that purpose in mind, the Belgian government 
in London lodged a request with the Supreme Court in Albany to be 
officially recognized as the sole legal government of Belgium. Recogni-
tion was given on 7 March 1942, thereby automatically legitimizing the 
decrees30. On 25 May, Theunis, as governor, was licensed to take indi-
vidual decisions in the United States on behalf of the Bank; Baudewyns, 
as director, and Ansiaux, as nominal secretary, were granted the same 
authority, but could exercise it only in tandem31.
An estimate had meanwhile been made of the sheriff’s fee, the 
amount the plaintiff was required to pay to the Department of Justice 
as cover the State’s legal costs: the total was 2,560,000 US dollars. For the 
times, this was an enormous amount. Dulles and Fuller immediately 
lodged a protest against it and also had a bill introduced by members of 
the New York State Assembly in Albany to have payment of the sheriff’s 
fee deferred until after the final court ruling. The bill was approved. 
Dulles and Fuller then attempted to go a step further and had a sec-
ond bill introduced that would limit the sheriff’s fee in the future to a 
maximum amount of 10,000 US dollars per complaint. This bill, too, 
was approved by the Assembly, but was vetoed by the New York State 
governor32.
The problem of The luxembourg gold
The question of the gold deposited with the Bank by the Caisse d’Epargne 
du Luxembourg was even more sensitive. At the end of March 1942, in 
a two-fold approach, the prime minister of the Luxembourg govern-
30 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers: letter of 07.03.1942 from Theunis (New York) to 
Gutt (London).
31 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën, dossier ‘London’: report of the Cabinet meet-
ing of 25.05.1942.
32 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 21.04.1942 from 
 Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London).
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ment in exile, Pierre Dupong, contacted Theunis in Washington and 
the Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Bech, sought out 
Gutt in London. Both came with the same disquieting account of how 
the Bank in Brussels had instructed the Banque de France to restore to 
Luxembourg the gold that the French central bank had accepted in safe 
custody together with the Belgian gold. Theunis and Gutt refused to 
commit themselves, replying that the Bank in Brussels had no authority 
to make any arrangements regarding that gold and that the present di-
rectors of the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg had been appointed by 
the Germans and consequently had no competence in the matter: only 
the Bank in London and the pre-war directors of the Caisse d’Epargne 
du Luxembourg could legitimately take action in that respect33.
It was, nevertheless, pretty clear that both the Bank in London and 
Theunis were embarrassed by the question. As early as the beginning 
of May 1942, Baudewyns was informing Theunis that the Luxembourg 
gold threatened to become an issue in the Bank’s legal action in New 
York. Baudewyns was so shocked by the conduct of the Bank in Brus-
sels that he again wondered whether it would not be better to move in 
the direction of an amicable settlement34.
The question of the Luxembourg gold became extremely acute when, 
in early September, the Banque de France, via its lawyer, Fuller, submit-
ted its response to the charges of de Gorter and Wild to the court35. 
Among other things, it was explicitly stated that, in 1940, the then gov-
ernor of the Bank, Georges Janssen, had himself directed that the Bel-
gian gold be repatriated to Brussels and, in 1941, the deputy-governor, 
Ingenbleek had signed the letter instructing the Banque de France to 
restore the Luxembourg gold to the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg. 
In its argument, the French defence did not miss the opportunity to 
underline that the Bank in Brussels knew very well at the time that the 
Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg – now managed by puppets of the 
Nazi regime, although this was not stated in so many words – would 
33 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 31.03.1942 from 
 Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London).
34 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers A 3, dossier 9.1/31 s. f. 1: letters of 02.05.1942 and 
05.05.1942 from Baudewyns (London) to Theunis (New York).
35 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 1, dossier 01.02.00.10 (A 230/1): note, Nisot, 
07.01.1944.
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transfer the gold from Luxembourg to the Reichsbank. This being so, 
the defence wondered how the Bank could bring charges against the 
Banque de France for transferring the Belgian gold to the Reichsbank, 
when the Bank itself was responsible for the Luxembourg gold being 
transferred to Berlin.
 The French response to the Bank’s charge came as a shock to 
Baudewyns and Ansiaux, as they confessed at the end of September 
194236. Dulles suggested that there should be no further mention of the 
decrees of 27 November 1941, since it would give the American judge 
the impression that the government and the Bank in London had some-
thing to hide and that it was for this reason that, in consultation with 
the government, the Bank had decided to transfer its registered office to 
London. In Dulles’ opinion, such an impression would not be condu-
cive to a favourable verdict, particularly now that the core of the matter 
could be discussed. After consulting his lawyer Nisot, Theunis chose to 
differ from this argument37. From a legal point of view, Ingenbleek’s sig-
nature in July 1941 was worthless, as the Luxembourg gold was at that 
time still outside occupied territory, meaning that, according to Belgian 
law, Ingenbleek had no power of disposition over it. Furthermore, the 
officials of the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg had no authority to 
request the gold’s restitution, since they had been appointed under the 
occupation and a Grand-Duché de Luxembourg ordinance issued from 
London on 5 February 1941 had declared their appointments illegal38. 
Theunis and Nisot therefore argued that the Belgian plaintiffs could 
go ahead with their action. However, such reasoning smacked more of 
an exercise in legal cleverness than a realistic approach to the problem.
Dulles stuck to his guns. Since Dupong’s visit to Theunis at the end 
of March 1942, he had had a presentiment that the question of the Lux-
embourg gold would weigh on the action in New York. He had, in fact, 
favoured an amicable settlement right from the outset, but his clients 
had never agreed to it. He now decided not to wait until the beginning 
36 BNB, Archives, London Archives, 1942, dossier ‘or’: letter of 22.09.1942 from 
Baudewyns (London) to Theunis (New York).
37 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 9.1/26: letter of 25.09.1942 from 
Ansiaux (London) to Theunis (New York).
38 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 13, dossier A 320/6: opinion of 13.10.1942 from Nisot 
(New York) to Theunis (New York).
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of September, when the main action was due to be determined, but to 
react immediately and favourably to the new French proposal of 5 May 
1942 seeking an amicable settlement.
In June, together with Fuller, Dulles had cast around for a formula 
that, taking account of the complications that had arisen, could meet 
with the approval of both parties39. However, all indications are that the 
two lawyers’ efforts were ultimately brought to grief by the inflexibility 
of the Bank and the government in London40. In any case, the action 
continued and, on 4 November, Dulles submitted a ‘motion for particu-
lars’ to the Supreme Court in Albany, with seventeen questions about 
the replies that, via Fuller, the Banque de France had submitted to the 
court at the beginning of September41. Among other things, the motion 
contained a request for more information about how the Reichsbank 
had been able to take the place of the Banque de France as custodian 
of the Belgian gold. How strong had been the pressure from the Vichy 
government on the Banque de France, to transfer the gold to Berlin? 
Additional information was also requested about the restitution of the 
Luxembourg gold, about the competence of Ingenbleek and the current 
directors of the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg, about whether the 
registered office of the Banque de France was in Paris or at Clermont-
Ferrand, and more besides. Dulles’ conclusion was that the Banque de 
France’s response of September 1942 was wholly unsatisfactory: there 
were not only gaps, but also a great many inconsistencies. 
On 13 January 1943, Judge Bernstein ruled that the Banque de France 
must submit its reply to Dulles’ motion to the court within thirty days42, 
and this duly occurred shortly thereafter. The Banque de France admit-
ted that the Bank had deposited gold in safe custody with it and also 
admitted that it had transferred the custodianship to the Reichsbank 
39 Washington, National Archives, Belgium, dossier 855.515/72: Department of State, 
Financial Division, memorandum of 11.06.1942 from Berle.
40 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 9.1/26 s. f. 1: letter of 15.06.1942 from 
Ansiaux (London) to Theunis (New York).
41 Washington, National Archives, Belgium, dossier 855.515/75: motion of particulars 
by Dulles to Supreme Court of New York, 04.11.1942.
42 Washington, National Archives, Belgium, dossier 855.515/82: Dulles (New York) to 
Luxford (US Treasury), 14.01.1943; BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 
9.1/26: memorandum of 12.01.1943.
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without consulting the Bank. It maintained, however, that the trans-
fer released it from its obligation to make restitution of the gold to the 
Bank, justifying this position by submitting that French law permitted 
one custodian to be replaced by another. The principle of replacement, 
it argued further, had been effectively established in December 1940 
in the Wiesbaden Protocol, an agreement between the Reichsbank and 
the Banque de France, two institutions that had been recognized by the 
American government as legal central banks. Consequently, the trans-
fer of the gold to the Reichsbank was totally legal. Furthermore, the Vi-
chy government had forced the Banque de France to make the transfer, 
so that the central bank could rightly invoke a cas de force majeure and 
could no longer be held liable. If the Bank desired restitution, it should 
address itself to the Reichsbank or to the French government at Vichy.
The Banque de France stated further that, on the instructions of the 
Bank in Brussels, a portion of the gold deposited in safe custody had 
already been restored to the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg and that 
a considerable portion had been transferred to its own gold reserve, in 
settlement of the exchange of Belgian banknotes and in repayment of 
the State loans to the Belgian government during the months of May-
June 1940. It also stated that, according to the original contract of de-
posit in safe custody, any dispute with the Banque de France regarding 
this matter was required to be adjudicated by a court at the place where 
the head office of the custodian was established, in this case at Cler-
mont-Ferrand. Finally, the Banque de France was unable to give any 
additional information, since Martial, its representative in New York, 
was deprived of any further contact with France. Dulles’ answer to this 
was that Martial had had a year and a half to collect the necessary in-
formation from France and that, in consequence, he could be assumed 
to have everything to hand to provide the answers requested43.
The pleading of the core matter from April 1943 onward, which the 
Belgian party had for so long insisted on, did not go all that smoothly. 
In the first place, embarrassing questions were asked by Martial about 
the role played by the Bank’s governor, Janssen, in the repatriation of 
the Belgian gold from West Africa to Europe. A negative assessment 
was also given of Janssen’s attitude regarding the restitution of gold to 
43 Washington, National Archives, Belgium, dossier 855.515/ 82 and 85: memoran-
dums of 12.01.1943 and 26.01.1943.
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the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg. At the same time the New York 
Times, in a stark banner headline, trumpeted: ‘Belgian Quislings invit-
ed the Vichy government to transfer the Belgian gold to Brussels’44. In a 
counter article in the same newspaper, Gutt gave a spirited rebuttal of 
the imputation, but the original report continued to reverberate in the 
United States45.
Theunis now began to have doubts about a successful outcome to 
the action, writing to Baudewyns on 30 June that he saw little chance of 
a satisfactory solution in the short term46. Gutt nevertheless remained 
obstinately wedded to continuing the action, writing to Boël in No-
vember 1943: ‘Do you think that I am going to let them (the Banque de 
France) get away with murder? Not me!’47. The same month, however, 
Theunis notified Gutt that Dulles, although he was now in a position 
to argue the main issue, chose not to, since American jurisprudence 
provided for such cases to be postponed until four months after the 
cessation of hostilities, in order to enable the defending party to call 
its witnesses; with the total occupation of France since the beginning 
of 1943 there was no question of calling them now48. Gutt at last gave 
in, but only on condition that the temporary suspension of the court 
proceedings could in no way be construed as bringing an end to the ac-
tion49. Baudewyns, and everyone in New York, including Dulles, agreed 
with the condition.
However, Gutt was not one to let the grass grow under his feet. Now 
that the action in New York had been temporarily suspended, he set 
about adjusting his strategy to make use of changed circumstances. The 
Comité Français de la Libération Nationale, whose registered office was 
44 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Rolin’: letter of 15.06.1943 from Ro-
lin (London) to Theunis (New York).
45 Washington, National Archives, Belgium, 855.515/ 86: Gutt’s reply to an article in 
the newspaper The New York Times of 08.06.1943.
46 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 1, dossier 01.02.00.10 (A 230/1): or monétaire (mem-
orandum of 07.01.1944 from J. Nisot, New York, p. 5).
47 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 17-18.11.1943 from 
Gutt (London) to Boël (?).
48 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 18.11.1943 from 
 Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London).
49 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Baudewyns’: letter of 29.11.1943 
from Baudewyns (London) to Theunis (Washington).
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in Algiers, had little by little been gaining in status with the Allies since 
their successful landing in North Africa in November 1942, and during 
1943 the prospect of France and Belgium being liberated was improv-
ing. Gutt therefore decided to open negotiations with the Comité, with 
a view to finding a solution to the Franco-Belgian dispute about the 
gold. He wanted the conflict out of the way before the liberation and 
hoped to use the action in New York as a means of pressure. By the 
end of November, he was already having talks in New York with Jean 
Monnet about the gold. His move proved to be the initial impetus for 
the fresh negotiations that would lead to an amicable settlement after 
the liberation.
The legal proceedings: worTh The candle?
Attempting to provide an objective evaluation of the legal proceedings 
in New York is fraught with pitfalls. From the order and calm of good 
archives, it is no easy matter to form an unbiased picture of how the 
protagonists in the affair were to hold a straight course in the chaotic 
circumstances into which they were cast. One problem confronting 
them was communication. Our generation finds it difficult to com-
prehend the fact that, barely sixty-five or so years ago, leaders in very 
critical circumstances did not even have a telephone to hand. In conse-
quence, rumour and misunderstanding were rife and nobody appeared 
to be immune. A first point of reference in constructing a narrative has 
therefore to be the written sources, even though they require a criti-
cal examination. What they show in this case is that it was certainly 
not the original intention of the Bank’s governor, Janssen, to resort to 
open conflict in order to obtain restitution of the Bank’s gold from the 
Banque de France. On the contrary. The then governor of the Banque 
de France, Fournier, also wanted to find a solution acceptable to both 
parties.
Who, then, set the legal action in New York in train? Ultimately, the 
finger points to Theunis and Gutt as the instigators. Theunis was an 
impulsive man and showed himself to be extremely irritated about the 
difficulties placed in his way in the United States about the measures 
he was trying to take on behalf of the Bank, difficulties that he attrib-
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uted to the hybrid status of an occupied and an unoccupied France. For 
him, a court case would clarify the situation. In addition, he was an 
authoritarian man who, once set on a course of action, was difficult to 
persuade to stop and reflect whether means other than a confrontation 
could serve his purpose. 
Despite his vigorous approach in the run-up to the court case and 
during its first months, Theunis, in fact, appeared willing to consider 
proposals from the Banque de France for an amicable settlement. Those 
proposals were warmly recommended by Dulles, as we have seen, and 
Theunis had come to value his New York lawyer very highly during the 
negotiations and increasingly took notice of his opinion, which may go 
some way to explaining, why, in time, he was to abandon his aggressive 
attitude towards the French central bank.
There remains Gutt. Was he the central figure – the hardliner – who, 
in all the labyrinthine procedures, never lost sight of the goal of get-
ting the Banque de France formally to admit that it had been gravely 
at fault? As the court action progressed, it became clear that the driv-
ing force behind the stubborn refusal to come to a compromise was, 
indeed, Gutt and continued to be so, even after it had become apparent 
that the Bank’s case was not so conclusive as originally thought. Gutt’s 
distrust of the French authorities was long-standing. He could not for-
get the dramatic journey in March 1935 to Paris, where he had asked 
in vain for help to save Belgium from a severe devaluation of its cur-
rency. What grieved him most, however, was the reception given to the 
Belgian government by the French authorities in May-June 1940, if this 
could in any way be described as a reception. He was a single-minded 
statesman who did not allow himself to be diverted by emotion. Even 
for him, though, there were limits; the humiliation brought by the ar-
rogance of the French politicians and monetary leaders towards the 
Belgian government were a little too hard to take, a bridge too far. A 
confidential and, for Gutt, very emotional letter to Spaak in 1944 shows 
him giving vent to his deepest suspicions of the French political and 
financial world50.
How are the entire proceedings to be evaluated? The Banque de 
France continued to maintain that it bore no responsibility for the 
50 See below.
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transfer of the Belgian gold to Berlin, as it had been forced into that 
action. The legal proceedings led unfortunately to souring the relation-
ship between the two central banks. Even before the question of a court 
case had come up, the Banque de France had agreed formally to make 
restitution of the gold. In the event, the court action was halted in 1943 
at a moment when the prospect of a favourable outcome for Belgium 
was no longer looking so rosy. The costs rocketed, particularly when 
the sheriff’s fee had to be settled, and the question is whether such an 
investment of public money was justified in such a cause at such a time. 
The invasion of Europe was imminent and the occupied territories had 
more to worry about than who was responsible for the Bank’s gold. A 
judgement boils down to the question of whether the legal proceedings 
were really worth the candle.
Chapter 16
The Payment Orders 
‘Laut besonderer Mitteilung’ 
incorporaTion inTo The german war economy
The winter of 1941-1942 proved to be the turning-point in the fortunes 
of the belligerents. For Nazi Germany, it was a period of reverses. The 
failure of the ‘Barbarossa’ Blitzkrieg offensive in the Soviet Union and 
the enormous loss of men and material during the overwintering of the 
German army in the bitter cold of the Russian steppes, capped by the 
United States’ entry into the war on the side of the Western Allies in 
December 1941, represented major setbacks for a regime that had thus 
far gone from one victory to another. The reverses also had unmistak-
able repercussions on public opinion in Belgium, where, for many, it 
was at last no longer utopian to believe in an Allied victory and where 
renewed hope fed resistance to the occupier1.
The shifts in the overall aspect of the war inevitably also had an im-
pact on German war strategy, smoothing the way for those at the top to 
pursuit a policy of total war. The driving force behind it was Dr. Fritz 
Todt, Minister of Armaments and Munitions. In his view, not just the 
German economy, but also the economies of the occupied territories, 
had to be more intensively geared to supporting the war machine2. A 
second aspect of the new strategy was one that also affected Belgium, 
this time through the labour market. Special premiums were offered to 
attract Belgian workers to Germany, in order to replace Germans mobi-
lized to make up the huge losses on the eastern front3. Parallel with this 
1 SG, Archives, Direction, Galopin Papers: Struye, l’opinion publique en Belgique 
après 24 mois d’occupation.
2 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium, pp. 44-102.
3 The estimates of the number of Belgian workers who went voluntarily to Germa-
ny during the first years of the war vary enormously. An official statistic puts the 
number of jobs created in Germany for Belgian workers between July 1940 and 
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was the employment of more and more Belgian contractors to build 
the Atlantic Wall, a solid line of fortifications along the Dutch, Belgian 
and French coastlines against a possible military invasion launched 
from across the Channel. Priority was given to this project, as the Ger-
man General Staff thought that such an attack could be expected in the 
course of 1942.
The incorporation of Belgium and all occupied territories into the 
new strategy was given strong ideological underpinning by the Berlin 
government. Official propaganda proclaimed that it was all about the 
protection of European civilization from the ‘Bolshevik threat’, no less 
than the ‘salvation of Europe’ under the leadership of Germany. It was 
therefore the duty of all European countries to contribute uncondition-
ally to that cause4.
In line with the new strategy the Berlin government wrote secretly 
to von Falkenhausen on 16 January and 21 February 1942, giving in-
structions that the details of certain deliveries of goods and services 
from Belgium to Germany of a military or political character were not 
to be revealed5. Instead, the German Ministry of Economic Affairs 
would issue a ‘blanket’ payment order in Belgian francs to the Banque 
d’Emission, with the statement ‘laut besonderer Mitteilung’ (‘according 
to special notification’)6. In this way, the anonymity of Belgian suppli-
ers vis-à-vis the Banque d’Emission would be ensured and the nature of 
the transactions remain concealed.
September 1941 inclusive at 205, 305 (BNB, Archives, SD, 15, clearing, dossier 8.11/5: 
placements des ouvriers belges en Allemagne. Source: Office National du Travail). 
The number of new voluntary applications was to rise further during the cold win-
ter of 1941-1942, due to the parlous situation in Belgium at the time regarding food 
and to the fact that high recruitment premiums were offered from the beginning of 
1942 on.
4 BNB, Archives, SD, 17bis, clearing, dossier 8.11/7: visite du Dr. Landfried, compte 
rendu des entretiens, 30.06.1942.
5 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, Militärverwaltung: Hofrichter, Abschlusz-
bericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, Part 1, pp. 132-133.
6 In 1940 Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, had already called for 
the establishment in Belgium of German-controlled banks, in order to take Belgo-
German economic relations out of the hands of the big Belgian banks. The estab-
lishment of the Hansa-bank, the Commerzbank and the Continental Bank has to be 
seen in this light. The reference to these banks in the secret instructions is in line 
with Schacht’s call; the Banque d’Emission was, in fact, regarded by the Germans 
as an institution dominated by the big Belgian banks.
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At the meeting of the managing directors of the Banque d’Emission 
on 28 January 1942, mention was made of two important payment or-
ders already bearing the statement ‘laut besonderer Mitteilung’7 and 
similar orders were received in quick succession. From communica-
tions with Hofrichter of the Bankaufsichtamt, it appeared that the or-
ders were for non-commercial transactions or services. Berger there-
fore contacted the Secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Banque d’Emission’s board of directors. During the subsequent 
discussions, it was decided that, for the moment, the orders should be 
executed, since this was no time to be contesting the instructions of 
the Bankaufsichtamt: in the immediate offing, more explicitly, was the 
journey of the Belgian delegation to Berlin to discuss a reduction of the 
overall costs of occupation and an increase in food aid, and that could 
not be compromised.
The discussions in the board of directors about the matter were not 
at all tranquil. In the Belgo-German balance of payments, the clear-
ing operations were already skewed and the formula of ‘laut besonderer 
Mitteilung’ would serve only to skew them further8. In 1941, payment or 
transfer orders with detailed information about the beneficiaries and 
the nature of the transactions concerned accounted for some 98 per 
cent of the total. By the end of March 1942, nearly 70 per cent of the to-
tal was being accounted for by blanket orders without indication of the 
actual beneficiaries or the nature of the transactions involved9. This was 
unacceptable, the more so as independent German agencies were sys-
tematically buying up goods on the black market in Belgium at prices 
four or five times the official tariffs.
On 3 April 1942, the management of the Banque d’Emission noti-
fied Commissioner von Becker that it would no longer execute blanket 
payment orders for amounts above 40,000 Reichsmarks10. At the same 
time, the management wrote to Plisnier and Leemans, requesting them 
7 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 28.01.1942.
8 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 12.02.1942.
9 BNB, Archives, DC, 23.04.1942: note verbale.
10 On 20 April, the board of directors also decided to suspend payment orders for 
smaller amounts, if they were not accompanied by the necessary precise details, 
although the decision was cancelled the next day at the request of the members of 
the delegation to Berlin (BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7 (Berlin): 
paiements laut besonderer Mitteilung).
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to explain to the German authorities why some payments were being 
suspended and to insist on a solution being found acceptable to the 
Banque d’Emission11.
Goffin and Berger met Leemans on 9 April to discuss the problem12. 
The Secretary-general agreed to write a letter to Reeder, President of the 
Military Administration, to expose the abuses regarding the blanket 
payment orders and German purchases on the black market, and also 
to insist on a reorganization of the export trade to Germany. Exports 
of Belgian products to every country except Germany were subject to 
prior licensing by the Clearing Office at the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs. Extending the requirement to cover exports to Germany as well 
would be a means of curbing the growing imbalance in the clearing 
system, which would be to everyone’s advantage13.
Reeder appreciated the Banque d’Emission’s arguments and suggest-
ed to Leemans that the suspended payments be transferred to occupa-
tion costs. Moreover, he would try to ensure that in future only excep-
tional payment orders submitted to the Banque d’Emission would carry 
the statement ‘laut besonderer Mitteilung’14. The Bankaufsichtamt, how-
ever, was totally opposed to Reeder’s proposal. On Hofrichter’s instruc-
tions, von Becker wrote to the Banque d’Emission that Reeder’s under-
taking was based on a misunderstanding. The details required for the 
payments suspended by the Banque d’Emission could not be provided 
and it would not be possible to give details for a large number of orders 
in the future. Von Becker’s letter consequently contained a ‘formal or-
der’ for the twenty-four blanket payment orders involved to be executed 
forthwith15. A few days later, Hofrichter made it clear to Berger that, 
when it came to important decisions, it was the Berlin government and 
not the Military Government in Brussels that had the last word. If the 
orders in question were not executed immediately, serious sanctions 
could be expected from Berlin16. This clearly brought into the light the 
11 BNB, Archives, DC, 03.04.1942.
12 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7 (Berlin): paiements laut besonderer 
Mitteilung (négociations janvier-mai 1942).
13 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7 (Berlin): paiements laut besonderer 
Mitteilung (letter of 09.04.1942 from Leemans to von Falkenhausen).
14 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7 (Berlin): paiements laut besonderer 
Mitteilung (letter of 13.04.1942 from Leemans to Goffin).
15 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 16.04.1942.
16 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 18.04.1942.
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tension between the Bankaufsichtamt, which followed the instructions 
of the Nazi government in Berlin to the letter, and the Military Govern-
ment in Brussels, which pursued a more moderate course.
During the deliberations about whether or not to execute the blan-
ket payment orders, the managing directors had felt it advisable to ob-
tain the opinion of the jurist Marcq, who advised that a formal order 
could effectively be regarded as a coercive measure, but added that after 
the liberation public opinion could interprete the managing director’s 
passive attitude as ‘de facto’ financial aid to the enemy17. This warning 
strengthened the management in their determination to continue to 
resist executing the blanket payment orders and to use the threat of 
suspension as a means of obtaining more detailed information.
Towards The agreemenT of 5 may 1942
As already mentioned, the members of the delegation to Berlin (Plis-
nier, Galopin, M.-L. Gérard, Goffin, Leemans and De Winter) met on 
30 March 1942 in Plisnier’s private office to evaluate the results of their 
visit. There was little for them to do but admit that the initiative had 
been a complete failure but they felt that the delegation’s display of 
solidarity during the visit had been exemplary and justified its seek-
ing a mandate from the Bank’s supervisory council and the Banque 
d’Emission’s board of directors to continue negotiations18.
The thought of giving a mandate to the ‘Berlin delegation’ made the 
managing directors and board of directors of the Banque d’Emission 
uneasy, but they ultimately acquiesced in the proposal, probably be-
cause they had no arguments to hand to counter it19. On 21 April the 
delegation met again in Plisnier’s private office to work out the guide-
lines for the strategy to be followed20. The first item on the agenda was a 
proposal to establish a joint committee of German and Belgian experts 
to examine the question of the suspended payments – the total amount 
17 BNB, Archives, Contentieux, Miomandre Papers: opinion of 16.04.1942 from R. 
Marcq.
18 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7: réunion chez M. Plisnier, 30.03.1942.
19 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 02.04.1942.
20 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7 (Berlin): paiements laut besonderer 
Mitteilung (aide-mémoire de la réunion chez M. Plisnier, 21.04.1942).
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of which had meanwhile risen to nearly 700 million Belgian francs – 
and to determine whether they could be executed, provided more de-
tailed information was submitted. Another proposal was that Leemans 
should submit a memorandum to Reeder, which would contain a series 
of measures to reform the clearing system, but this reckoned without 
Plisnier, who immediately opposed the idea. He had no intention of 
being the dupe of any reform operation and realized what was afoot: 
anything that would not pass muster for the clearing system would be 
shifted onto occupation costs. Galopin and M.-L. Gérard pointed to the 
strategic character of the proposals: with the clearing system reformed, 
efforts could be concentrated on getting the occupation costs reduced. 
Plisnier recognized the logic of the proposal, but accepted only with 
great difficulty and on certain conditions.
On 23 April, Leemans submitted a memorandum to Reeder, con-
taining the following proposals: payment orders of a political nature 
should be withdrawn from the clearing system; those without details 
should not amount to more than 2 per cent of total monthly payments; 
normal payment orders should carry adequate details about the actual 
beneficiaries and the nature of the transactions concerned; and pay-
ment orders from France in favour of German agencies or other or-
ganizations should be executed only where offset by French exports of 
foodstuffs. The memorandum also floated the idea of the establishment 
of a joint committee of experts21.
Reeder accepted the idea of a joint committee that would look at 
both the problem of the pending payment orders and the proposals to 
reform the clearing system. With the first meeting of the committee 
taking place the next day, 24 April, the Belgo-German negotiations ap-
peared at last to be gathering momentum. But Hofrichter, who headed 
the German experts on the committee, immediately stated that all pay-
ment orders, both pending and future, were to be executed, the Bel-
gians having the choice of the channel to be used. The Bankaufsichtamt 
had no objection to the clearing system not being used for some of the 
orders, but would in those cases demand that payment be by means of a 
charge on occupation costs. In principle Hofrichter favoured Leemans’ 
proposal regarding payment orders from France, but suggested that it 
21 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 06.05.1942.
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be dealt with separately, since the French authorities needed to be in-
volved in the matter.
The Belgians protested against the automatic linking of the Ger-
man clearing deficit to an increase in occupation costs: Plisnier would 
never accept it. Hofrichter appreciated the point and, after taking time 
to ponder the question, came back on 27 April with counter-propos-
als. The first concerned the blanket payment orders by German banks 
having branches in Belgium. These, in fact, were orders from the five 
biggest German purchasing agencies in Belgium, four of which were 
prepared to give details for between two thirds and three quarters of 
their payment orders; the fifth and largest agency, the Todt Organiza-
tion, refused to co-operate and its payment orders would be charged to 
occupation costs. For non-blanket payment orders a difference was to 
be made between those of a political nature, which would be taken out 
of the clearing system, and those being economic, which would remain 
in it. Nevertheless, for the last category of orders, a limit of 50 million 
Belgian francs’ worth per month would also be set for payment orders 
registered as ‘laut besonderer Mitteilung’. Payment orders from France 
would be regulated by a Franco-Belgian clearing agreement and, in this 
respect, the Military Government would seek an agreement from Ber-
lin. Finally, in order to hold down the costs of occupation, purchases 
of goods by troops in transit and remittances from German families to 
their menfolk serving in Belgium would no longer be settled through 
occupation costs, but through the clearing system22.
The delegation was able to accept all Hofrichter’s counter-proposals, 
save the last. In the delegation’s view, purchases by troops in transit and 
remittances from Germany should continue to be charged to occupa-
tion costs. Failing that, the German clearing deficit would soar again23. 
In a letter of 5 May to Leemans, von Falkenhausen confirmed the over-
all agreement, but reserved the right to increase the level of occupation 
costs, if necessary24.
22 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7: réunion des techniciens, 27.04.1942.
23 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7: réunions au cabinet de M. Leemans, 
28.04.1942; BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 06.05.1942.
24 BNB, Archives, SD, 17 A, clearing, dossier 8.11/7: letter of 05.05.1942 from von Falken-
hausen to Leemans.
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the reappearance oF the reichskreditkassenscheine
Most of the board of directors and the entire management of the Banque 
d’Emission appeared satisfied with the results of the discussions and the 
agreement. A few new concessions made by the Military Government 
in May and June strengthened the impression that its relationship with 
financial circles in Belgium had become more relaxed.
Unexpectedly, however, Reichskreditkassenscheine had begun to cir-
culate again in Belgium in March 1942. This was certainly not in ac-
cordance with the cooperation being enjoyed with the Military Gov-
ernment. By the beginning of June the Bank already had 549 million 
Belgian francs’ worth in hand. Investigation showed that Scheine were 
being fraudulently introduced into Belgium by troops resting from the 
eastern front, although this could not account for the large amounts 
involved. It transpired that certain purchasing agencies of the armed 
forces, particularly those linked to the Luftwaffe, were making use of 
the Scheine to finance their transactions on the black market25. To make 
things worse, on 9 June the Military Government requested the Bank 
to transfer 500 million Belgian francs’ worth of Scheine to the Brussels 
Reichskreditkasse in exchange for a credit there in favour of the Bank26. 
As in 1940, the Bank again demanded that the Scheine cease to be 
used as legal tender and be withdrawn from circulation. During nego-
tiations with the Military Government, a choice of two solutions was 
tabled: either discredit the Scheine among the population, whereby they 
would automatically cease to circulate, or officially demonetize them. 
The Belgians opted for the second27. In a circular of 7 July 1942, the Mili-
tary Government forbad the private banks to accept or use Reichskre-
ditkassenscheine in the future; Belgian nationals could exchange them 
at the Bank, German nationals at the Reichskreditkasse. The population 
at large was requested to cease accepting Scheine. The Bank was dissat-
isfied with the arrangement. It feared being the victim of malpractice, 
25 Freiburg im Breisgau, Militärarchiv, Militärverwaltung: Hofrichter, Abschlusz-
bericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, Part 1, p. 113.
26 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, 3, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 4: Reichskreditkassenschei-
ne.
27 BNB, Archives, SD, 36, service étranger, dossier 8.11.32: les entrées frauduleuses de 
RKK-scheine en 1942.
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given that the administration and the semi-public institutions were not 
included in the operation, and therefore insisted on a cut-off date, after 
which no further exchange would be possible for everyone. Moreover, 
it requested that a ceiling be set for the Scheine to be exchanged. On 21 
July, the end of that month was set by the Military Government as the 
cut-off date, though this was later shifted to 17 August. A ceiling was set 
at 1,800 million Belgian francs: in the event this was slightly exceeded 
and 1,812 million Belgian francs’ worth of Scheine were ultimately ex-
changed.
cracco’s memorandum and iTs consequences
The relaxation in the relationship between the Military Government 
and the Banque d’Emission was also quickly overshadowed by other 
problems and tensions. In the first place, no satisfactory solution was 
forthcoming for the elimination of the respective clearing deficits of 
France and the Netherlands vis-à-vis Belgium. The French deficit con-
tinued to grow, because the French obstinately refused to deliver food 
to Belgium in exchange for the payment of wages to Belgian workers 
employed in France or for French purchases of goods – particularly 
various types of coke – in Belgium.
Even worse, during the summer of 1942, negotiations started between 
the French and German authorities to transfer the Belgian credit bal-
ance in the Franco-Belgian clearing system – a matter of 1,250 million 
Belgian francs – to the Belgo-German clearing system. The Germans 
declared themselves prepared to assume the French clearing deficit vis-
à-vis Belgium and to enter it in the books of the Verrechnungskasse in 
Berlin as a liability in favour of Belgium, provided that France supplied 
certain goods to Germany as compensation. Germany would thus re-
ceive goods that Belgium had demanded in vain from France during 
the preceding months, and the Banque d’Emission would have to con-
tent itself with an additional increase in its clearing credit balance at 
the Verrechnungskasse28. Settlement of the Dutch clearing deficit vis-à-
vis Belgium likewise led to serious difficulties during the summer of 
1942. Requiring ever increasing amounts in Belgian banknotes in order 
28 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 22.06.1942.
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to pay Belgian workers employed in the Netherlands, the Nederlandsche 
Bank was asking to have the resulting liability entered on the Belgo-
Dutch clearing account, but, in return, the Banque d’Emission was 
demanding delivery of foodstuffs to Belgium. In the same way as the 
French, however, the Dutch authorities refused to comply29. The Banque 
d’Emission then proposed that payment for the Belgian banknotes be 
in Belgian Treasury certificates held by the Nederlandsche Bank30. The 
Dutch initially rejected the proposal, but in September, under pressure 
from the Military Government in Brussels, found themselves forced to 
accept it.
A second major concern for the Bank and the Banque d’Emission 
during the summer of 1942 was the marked expansion of transactions 
on the black market in Belgium. The fresh increase in the German 
clearing deficit vis-à-vis Belgium in July, after two months of reason-
able stability, was due chiefly to payment orders for transactions on the 
black market under the blanket cover of ‘laut besonderer Mitteilung’31.
Table 16.1:  Total Belgian clearing balance per sector (June 1941-June 1942) 
(in millions of Belgian francs)































Source: BNB, Archives, SD, 18, clearing, file 8.11.8/3: report F. Cracco, 24.07.1942.
A report of 24 July 1942 by Cracco, Head of the Foreign Department, 
stated that the occupier was abusing the system on such a large scale 
that the international credit system had become thoroughly dislocated 
and had, in fact, been turned on its head, with the debtor now dictating 
to the creditor. The report went further, declaring that the lack of con-
29 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 02.09.1942, 16.09.1942.
30 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 08.07.1942, 16.08.1942, 30.09.1942.
31 BNB, Archives, SD, 18, clearing, dossier 8.11.8/3: rapport de M. F. Cracco, 24.07.1942.
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trol had served to increase abuse of the system by the Belgian business 
world. By selling frozen shares and assets in Central and South-eastern 
Europe to German investors, for example, certain holding companies 
had been able to recoup the value of their erstwhile foreign holdings via 
the clearing system. That recoupment had, in fact, been on the back of 
the Belgian people, as the risk in respect of the Belgian clearing balance 
at the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin was covered by the State guarantee. 
The report did not spare the industrialists and their middlemen either: 
however justified in social and economic terms the Galopin Commit-
tee’s policy of work resumption had initially been, and in fact still was, 
there was no denying that abuses had generated unjustified war profits 
right across the board32.
As was to be expected, Cracco’s report was not well received by the 
founder-bankers of the Banque d’Emission. The furore led to them de-
voting an extraordinary meeting to the report, which took place on 8 
September, monitored by Galopin. From a preliminary analysis of the 
figures Galopin concluded that only a limited proportion of the Belgian 
clearing balance could be imputed to the export of goods by the big 
industrial groups. The greater part of it concerned the payment orders 
marked ‘laut besonderer Mitteilung’ and thus referred largely to trans-
actions in which those groups took no part. Galopin, nevertheless, did 
not duck the question of industry’s responsibility. In his view, the ques-
tion had become so serious, given the present situation of the clearing 
system, that it demanded resolution33.
At another meeting two days later, Galopin expanded on what he 
had said on 8 September. First of all, he suggested that Cracco’s statisti-
cal analysis be examined more deeply: this would enable the sectors 
and social categories guilty of abusing the clearing system to be identi-
fied more clearly. His second point was that the Bank and the Banque 
d’Emission had to take responsibility in the alarming development in 
the clearing system. He therefore requested the managements to pre-
pare a memorandum clearly setting out their position34.
32 BNB, Archives, SD, 18, clearing, dossier 8.11.8/3: note justificative (de Cracco) relative 
aux conclusions du rapport, 17.08.1942.
33 BNB, Archives, SD, 18, clearing, dossier 8.11.8/5: réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 
08.09.1942.
34 BNB, Archives, SD, 18, clearing, dossier 8.11.8/ 10: procès-verbaux du comité de di-
294 Chapter 16
The allegations of Cracco and the reaction to them among the found-
er-bankers made a strong impression on Berger and Van Nieuwen-
huyse35, both of whom now took the lead in getting the stance of their 
institutions adapted to the changed circumstances. Their first move was 
to request Leemans to address a letter to Reeder, complaining about 
the violation of the agreement of 5 May: during the summer the orders 
marked ‘ laut besonderer Mitteilung’ had increased substantially.
The Military Government’s reply of 29 September to Leeman’s letter 
was very disturbing, as its main thrust was to emphasize the necessity 
of incorporating Belgian industry more efficiently into the German war 
economy. Of course, it also stated that the Military Government would 
attempt to provide the information required on the orders marked ‘ laut 
besonderer Mitteilung’, but in Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse’s view 
the reply was no more than an exercise in vague promises from which 
nothing much was to be expected.
At the same time, the management was looking to address the rec-
ommendations made by Galopin on 8 and 10 September. The task of 
dealing with the first recommendation – namely that there should be 
additional statistical analysis – was given to Cracco. To Van Nieuwen-
huyse went the difficult task of preparing a comprehensive memoran-
dum placing the stance of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission towards 
the clearing problem in its proper context and setting it out clearly. An 
initial draft of this memorandum was ready by the end of September 
and was discussed thoroughly by the other managing directors during 
the days that followed36.
The document took a fairly aggressive line and illustrated the man-
agement’s frustrations with the other Belgian partners in the clearing 
crisis. It stated that there was no longer any contact with the Minis-
try of Finance. Following the discussions in April about reforming the 
clearing system at the expense of occupation costs, Plisnier had with-
rection (discussion du mémorandum).
35 When, during a meeting of the board of directors on 07.09.1942, Deputy-governor 
Ingenbleek asked whether it was indeed, advisable to approve the report, given the 
blunt complaint against the industrialists, Berger responded by saying: ‘ le rap-
port…dit strictement la vérité…un jour nous nous féliciterons d’avoir approuvé ce 
document et nous reconnaîtrons les effets heureux de l’émotion qu’il a pu soulever 
dans certains milieux’: BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 07.09.1942.
36 BNB, Archives, SD, 18, clearing, dossier 8.11.8/10: procès-verbaux du comité de direc-
tion, September 1942.
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drawn, disillusioned, from joint action. Within the Belgian adminis-
tration, only Leemans now remained as a valid contact. Furthermore, 
the managing directors’ distrust of the Banque d’Emission’s founder-
bankers began to take on a sharper edge, with Berger feeling that they 
were attempting to shift responsibility for the clearing system onto 
the management. Van Nieuwenhuyse agreed37. The previous spirit of 
 cooperation appeared now largely to have evaporated.
The conclusion drawn in Van Nieuwenhuyse’s memorandum was 
that the Banque d’Emission should unilaterally terminate the conven-
tion that it had concluded with the Reichsbank on 16-17 August 1940. 
This would provide the Banque d’Emission with a legal basis for refus-
ing to execute any more payment orders lacking justification. Deputy-
governor Ingenbleek, however, argued that a much better course would 
be to form a common front against the occupier38.
Van Nieuwenhuyse and Berger were open to the suggestion of a 
common front, but stood by their idea of taking a hard line. Once a few 
sharp edges had been smoothed, the other members of the manage-
ment, Governor Goffin and Deputy-governer Ingenbleek, acquiesced 
in the memorandum and on 3 October they all approved it. It was also 
agreed that the text be submitted not only to the Bank’s supervisory 
council and the board of directors of the Banque d’Emission, but also 
to Plisnier39.
37 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 30.09.1942.
38 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 01.10.1942.
39 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 02.10.1942, 05.10.1942.
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The Creation of a United Front 
The resoluTions of 16 ocTober 1942
The memorandum approved unanimously by the management on 3 
October 1942 was submitted to the Bank’s supervisory council and the 
Banque d’Emission’s board of directors on 8 October. The next day the 
supervisory council examined it1. Bekaert declared that the Bank should 
refuse to co-operate in financing German purchases on the black mar-
ket and, to that end, should develop a supervisory system that would 
examine every transaction. Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse, present at 
the meeting, demurred, unconvinced of its viability and preferring a 
general measure, more particularly the abandonment of the 1940 con-
vention. Bekaert, an experienced and pragmatic businessman, and sup-
ported by Peltzer, another businessman, stated his conviction that the 
Germans had to be confronted at every turn and that a general and 
radical measure would inevitably fail, because of German opposition.
The jurists Marcq and De Visscher had been invited to the meet-
ing and attempted to place the opposing standpoints within a realistic 
context. They pointed out that, to abandon the 1940 convention, would 
be to invite a series of measures from the Military Government, aimed 
at obtaining execution of the payment orders; once things reached that 
pass, the management could either bow to orders or refuse to accept 
them and consequently resign; acceptance meant no lightening of re-
sponsibility and, in the present circumstances, resignation was clearly 
not in the interest of the country. The suggestion of the two jurists, 
therefore, was that it might be wiser to demand concrete concessions 
from the Military Government, before terminating the convention; a 
feasible goal put forward by De Visscher was for a ceiling to be agreed 
for the charges being imposed.
1 BNB, Archives, RR, 09.10.1942.
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Initially, Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse stuck to their guns, but ulti-
mately allowed themselves to be convinced by the arguments of the ju-
rists; in consequence, the renunciation of the convention was scrapped 
from the conclusion of the memorandum and replaced by a demand for 
a ceiling to be set for the payment orders2.
The meeting of the founder-bankers of the Banque d’Emission to 
discuss the memorandum was likewise attended by Marcq and De 
Visscher. Discussion proved to be more tense than within the supervi-
sory council3 and, as always, the proceedings were dominated by Ga-
lopin. He stated that the occupier had not respected the agreement of 
5 May and that the Banque d’Emission and the Bank had therefore to 
react forcefully and together. However, it was less clear how this might 
be done. Here, Galopin favoured Bekaert’s proposal to the supervisory 
council: the managements of the two institutions should fight to gain 
more control over the payment orders; once they had succeeded in this, 
it would be easier for them to identify abuses in the clearing system, 
expose them and attempt to eliminate them.
Goffin and Ingenbleek saw no salvation in Galopin’s strategy and 
remained in favour of the management’s proposals. They were con-
vinced that efficient supervision was impossible: the 135-strong staff of 
the Foreign Department were handling an average of 2,500 dossiers a 
day and there was a major problem in separating the legitimate trans-
actions from the illegitimate. Because the information supplied by the 
Germans was so scant, tracking down irregularities was like looking 
for a needle in a haystack. In Van Nieuwenhuyse’s view, there could be 
only one solution: to obtain a joint ceiling for the clearing deficit and 
the occupation costs.
Galopin realized immediately that the proposal of the managing 
directors would place a curb on Belgian exports, thereby threatening 
his policy of maintaining employment in Belgium. Since the Germans 
refused to admit the word ‘unemployed’ in their vocabulary, any re-
duction in industrial activity would be accompanied by large-scale 
 deportation of Belgian workers to Germany, the more so since the Ger-
2 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 4, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 239/8): relations des négocia-
tions consécutives au mémorandum du 3 octobre.
3 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier, 8.11.9/2: réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 
12.10.1942.
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man ordinance of 6 October 1942 envisaged ‘forced’ labour, involving 
such deportation. De Munck noted that the danger was increased by 
the ‘fixed’ ceiling that Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse had proposed. 
Indeed, because the sole aim was to set a fixed ceiling for the total costs, 
the Germans could spread those costs at will. If they judged it better 
to deploy Belgian workers in the service of war industry in Germany, 
they could shift all costs in respect of Belgium onto occupation costs 
and thus allow the clearing system to atrophy. Exports from Belgium 
to Germany would then automatically cease and the labour thereby re-
leased be fully available for deportation.
Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse responded by suggesting that the ceil-
ing be embedded in a system of control, whereby exports to Germany 
would be accompanied by a licence issued by a Belgian authority. This a 
priori control would eliminate irregular transactions from the clearing 
system and be an effective replacement for the ex post facto control of 
the agreement of 5 May. Pragmatists as they were, the founder-bankers 
of the Banque d’Emission were extremely sceptical of any such concept: 
the idea that the Germans would accept a ceiling demonstrated a poor 
sense of reality and to couple the obligation of a Belgian licence to the 
ceiling was totally unrealistic.
The bankers, for their part, stated that there were valid arguments 
to justify de facto collaboration. Supplying the population with food, 
avoiding the mass deportation of workers to Germany, maintaining an 
industrial infrastructure in the country, with a view to post-war recov-
ery, were all overriding arguments in their opinion. Moreover, during 
the preceding two years of war, nearly 40 per cent of total Belgian ex-
ports had been offset by imports of foodstuffs and raw materials; un-
doubtedly, therefore, the policy of the least evil had produced a number 
of positive results, however unsatisfactory in general.
In De Visscher’s opinion the arguments put forward by the found-
er-bankers were not valid for those heading the Bank and the Banque 
d’Emission4, who had their own monetary responsibility to bear that 
even German enforcement orders could not remove. Moreover, for the 
Bank’s leaders the situation was not to get any better, because the prob-
lem of financing was made all the more acute by the transfers of savings 
from workers deported to Germany.
4 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 14.10.1942.
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Following the discussion, De Visscher and Marcq were given the 
task of working out a number of resolutions with Berger and Van 
 Nieuwenhuyse, that would take account of the remarks and criticisms 
that had been made. Since both directors were by now so firmly rooted 
in their ideas, there was little scope for compromise between them and 
the two jurists. The two managing directors, in fact, dictated the con-
tent of the texts, and they proposed six resolutions5. The first included 
De Visscher’s suggestion of a ceiling, meaning that henceforth there 
would be a monthly maximum for the burden of costs imposed by the 
occupier, including occupation costs, clearing payment orders, requi-
sitions and the conversion of Reichskreditkassenscheine. Furthermore, 
Belgium needed to exert control over how the costs were broken down 
according to the various categories. The second stated that the agree-
ment of 5 May had not been respected by the occupier and was therefore 
deemed to have lapsed; payment orders bearing the inscription ‘laut 
besonderer Mitteilung’ would no longer be automatically executed. The 
third was that all transactions with other countries, including Germa-
ny, should be subject to prior control and approval by the Clearing Of-
fice at the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
The three following resolutions were not so comprehensive and thus 
less essential. The first declared that transfers to Belgium of money 
by workers employed in German war industry could not be accepted 
and would not be executed in future; the needs of families in Belgium 
would be supplied by Belgian poor-relief services. The second was for 
Belgian credit balances in the clearing system between the French and 
Belgian Reichskreditkasse to be deducted from occupation costs. The 
third was for the Bank and the Banque d’Emission to refuse to transfer 
1 billion Belgian francs’ worth of Reichskreditkassenscheine from their 
portfolios to the Reichskreditkasse, recently requested by the Military 
Government.
The six resolutions were submitted to the founder-bankers of the 
Banque d’Emission6. Goffin ensured that they had the support of the 
Bank’s supervisory council, even though they were exacting in their 
demands and aggressive in tone. Unusually, the bankers found them-
5 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/3: résolutions du 16 octobre 1942.
6 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/2: réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 
14.10.1942.
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selves thrown entirely on the defensive. They had always pressed the 
management of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission to act vigorously 
to combat abuses. Now that vigorous action was being taken, how could 
they back down? On the other hand, they realized all too well that the 
demands being made were not feasible. If this went ahead, they would 
be on course for a serious clash with the Military Government, which 
they wanted to avoid.
A.-E. Janssen made a dramatic call for everyone to support the pol-
icy of accommodation and for new negotiations with the occupier, the 
sole purpose being to increase the effectiveness of Belgian control of the 
clearing transactions. Only if this proved to be impossible could con-
sideration be given to the proposals of Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse.
In the end, however, the founder-bankers lined up behind the reso-
lutions and on 16 October, together with the directors and supervisory 
council of the Bank, as they put their signatures to the text. However, 
the agreement that was reached was not quite what it purported to be: 
the founder-bankers regarded the resolutions as maximum bargain-
ing demands to be used in negotiations with the Military Government 
and eventually to be scaled down in exchange for German concessions. 
Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse, with the backing of Goffin, demanded 
that the resolutions be accepted in toto by the Germans as a conditio 
sine qua non for any agreement, otherwise they would resign7. How-
ever, neither standpoint was made explicit in the text, apparently in 
order to gain the support of the secretaries-general of the Belgian ad-
ministration.
The dramaTic inTerview wiTh reeder
The text of the resolutions was sent to Plisnier and Leemans, with a 
request for them to join the action8. Plisnier reacted positively to the 
text. Wanting first to hear how the two parties interpreted it – because 
he suspected that their versions might differ – he invited those involved 
7 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of En-
quiry (published text, 1946), Chapter. 3, pp. 105-107.
8 BNB, Archives, SD, 32, dossier 8.11.26/8: divers (difficultés actuelles de la BEB), 
20.10.1942.
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to a joint meeting in his private office. He was not mistaken. According 
to Galopin, the resolutions were not to be taken as an ultimatum to the 
Germans, but as a basis for negotiations. For Van Nieuwenhuyse and 
Berger, however, they had indeed to be regarded as an ultimatum: if 
the Military Government could not agree with the entire package, then 
the board of directors of the Bank (most of them also managing direc-
tors of the Banque d’Emission) would resign. Plisnier declared that, if 
that were the case, he would align support their decision. The repre-
sentatives of the Banque d’Emission’s board of directors and the Bank’s 
supervisory council had no wish to break ranks; they stated that they, 
too, would resign, if the respective managements did so ‘for justified 
reasons’9. As individuals, however, they would remain at their posts in 
their companies, ‘not wanting to abandon their workers to be deported 
to Germany’10.
It became clear as the meeting drew to a close that there was still 
uncertainty about a considerable number of points, particularly about 
the strategy to be adopted in arguing the case for the memorandum 
with Reeder and about who should be delegated to argue it. On this 
last issue quick agreement was reached: Plisnier and Leemans would 
act for the country’s administration, Goffin and Berger for the Banque 
d’Emission, and Galopin and M.-L. Gérard for the founder-bankers. It 
was also decided that these delegates would coordinate their strategy in 
a preparatory meeting.
The intense preparations for the planned action had naturally not 
gone unnoticed by the Bankaufsichtamt and, on 21 October 1942, von 
Becker asked Ingenbleek for more information. It appeared from what 
was said that von Becker was particularly well informed. He warned 
Ingenbleek that too aggressive an approach would have severe conse-
quences: ‘you will have government by the SS’, and there would be very 
unpleasant sanctions. After these threats, he introduced a note of dis-
appointment, asking whether the Belgians had no appreciation of the 
efforts of the Military Government to make the occupation as bearable 
as possible. He was certainly honest in stating that: ‘general von Falken-
hausen sometimes risks being considered too lenient by the Nazi-gov-
9 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Chapter. 3, p. 107 (footnote 1).
10 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/5: préparation de la réunion chez M. 
Reeder.
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ernment in Berlin, by going out of his way to alleviate the burden of 
occupation on Belgium’’11.
The meeting with Reeder was initially set for 27 and then for 28 Oc-
tober. After intensive discussions during their preparatory meeting the 
Belgian delegates resolved to abandon the idea of presenting the six 
resolutions as a straightforward ultimatum12. First would come the de-
mand for the Banque d’Emission to have effective control of the global 
payment orders, which from the end of the summer 1942 were again 
increasing dramatically. The main argument for this was the fact that 
German purchases on the black market were no longer exceptional oc-
currences, but common practice. Such abuses could no longer be toler-
ated and only effective control by the Belgian authorities could stop 
them.
The second point to be addressed would be the question of the clear-
ing system as such, and here the emphasis would be chiefly on deter-
mining what transactions qualified for the system. The third point 
would be the matter of the ceiling, though this would be presented as 
only a secondary problem. Lastly, in order of importance, would come 
the questions of the wage transfers, the offsetting between the French 
and Belgian Reichskreditkassen and the refusal to transfer the Reichs-
kreditkassenscheine to the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels. Van Nieuwen-
huyse was quite disillusioned about the direction things were taking, 
but the opportunity for a united front demanded a readiness to accept 
a degree of compromise13.
The actual meeting with Reeder took place at the headquarters of 
the Military Government14. In his introductory remarks, Reeder im-
mediately set the tone by stating that the Military Government did not 
like requests for negotiations. The fact that it had agreed to receive the 
delegation had therefore to be seen as an exceptional gesture of cour-
tesy on the part of the Germans. 
11 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 21.10.1942.
12 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, dossier KB 1: note relative à la crise traversée 
par la BEB au cours du quatrième trimestre 1942, 04.02.1943.
13 In this respect, see the allusions in: BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6 g: 
letter of 12.01.1943 from Kauch to Basyn, p. 6.
14 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/ s. f. 6: réunion chez le Président 
Reeder, 28.10.1942; BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6 e: Basyn, relation des 
négociations consécutives au mémorandum du 3 octobre 1942 (17.12.1942).
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Reeder’s discouraging introduction did not deter Plisnier from tak-
ing the bull by the horns and declaring that, as the Germans were not 
respecting the agreement of 5 May 1942, the arrangements it contained 
had to be reviewed and improved: ‘Belgian’ control over clearing trans-
actions had to be built into a new agreement and steps had to be taken 
to curb German purchases on the Belgian black market. He concluded 
with an urgent call for a reduction in overall occupation costs.
In his response, Reeder reduced the entire matter to Plisnier’s com-
ments regarding the problem of the black market and claimed that he 
would be the first to act vigorously to stamp out such malpractice. In an 
aside, however, he remarked that there were two parties in the market: 
without the Belgian black-marketeers, the German purchasing agen-
cies could not operate. He then proposed that a special commission 
be set up to control all that Belgians were offering on that market to 
German buyers. In future, moreover, all payments within the clearing 
system would be concentrated and executed via an account opened at 
the Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse (WVK), in order to impose effective 
control by the Military Government and thereby eliminate the abuses 
and irregularities.
Galopin perceived positive elements in Reeder’s proposals, but 
doubted whether they were sufficient to resolve all the questions that 
had been tabled. He was convinced that, if the intention was really to 
eliminate payment orders carrying the reference ‘laut besonderer Mit-
teilung’, German control would have to be matched by a system of con-
trol set up within the Belgian administration.
Reeder declared his readiness to examine the demands of the Bel-
gian delegation and the degree to which the Military Government 
could meet them. However, the effect of these positive noises was damp-
ened when, just before ending, he mentioned, as if in passing, that the 
coming months could well see new requests for lump-sum payments, 
without any details being offered. Surprised by this unexpected state-
ment, the Belgian delegation asked what precisely it meant, whereupon 
Reeder gave the floor to Hofrichter. The explanation was businesslike, 
curt, even imperious, immediately cancelling the sense of conciliation 
to reveal how big was the gap within the Military Government between 
the moderates around Reeder and the Hofrichter coterie, which looked 
to follow Berlin’s strict line15.
15 BNB, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, dossier 8.10.10/ s. f.15: réunion des banquiers fonda-
teurs, 03.11.1942, p. 5.
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Hofrichter then set out a complete financial programme that would 
fundamentally reorganize the clearing system. The Banque d’Emission 
was to accept the concentration of all payments in the Wehrmachtver-
rechnungskasse. It also had to execute immediately the suspended pay-
ments, which already amounted to about 750 million Belgian francs. 
Furthermore, the Banque d’Emission was required to transfer a lump 
sum of 500 million Belgian francs each month, for which no details 
would be provided; however, details would be given for 90-100% of 
blanket payment orders exceeding that monthly sum. Lastly, and con-
trary to what had been laid down in the agreement of 5 May, no further 
details would be given about the payments made between May and Oc-
tober 1942, amounting to 1,512.5 million Belgian francs.
Hofrichter’s words and arrogant manner came as a violent shock to 
the delegation. Goffin reacted immediately and said that Hofrichter’s 
programme had not taken the least account of the Belgian delegation’s 
proposals. Now it appeared that, with their unacceptable demands, 
the Geman authorities were leaving the managers of the Bank and the 
Banque d’Emission no option but to tender their resignations16. Reeder 
had not expected such a sharp reply and reacted rapidly and drastically. 
He found Goffin’s intervention unseemly and declared that acceptance 
of Hofrichter’s four-point programme – which would also be set out 
in a letter to be circulated – was the conditio sine qua non for Belgian 
request to be considered. He then suspended the meeting and stormed 
out.
reeder’s order for immediaTe paymenT
The letter Reeder had referred to was delivered on 29 October. It re-
peated the demands set out by Hofrichter, but reformulated them, mak-
ing them in part more imperative and in part more flexible17. The de-
mand for execution of the suspended payments amounting to about 
750 million Belgian francs was translated in the letter into a formal 
order; payment was required to be made by no later than 4 p.m. on 30 
October and was an unconditional requirement for negotiations to be 
16 BNB, Archives, SD, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/s. f.10: réunion tenue le vendredi 30 octo-
bre 1942 à 19 heures chez M. le Bâtonnier René Marcq, p. 12.
17 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/ s. f. 7: lettre du Président Reeder, 
29.10.1942.
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resumed. Furthermore, Reeder explicitly confirmed that the agreement 
of 5 May remained in force, with the difference that the details agreed 
upon would no longer be supplied by the German purchasing agencies, 
but by the Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse. A more flexible stance was 
taken towards execution of future blanket payment orders, with Reeder 
offering two options.
The first (option A) was for the monthly payment of a lump sum 
of 500 million Belgian francs to the Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse: in 
principle, no details would be provided, although the Military Govern-
ment promised to make an effort to supply the names of the Belgian 
sellers, as well as the amounts paid to them and the nature of the goods 
involved in the transactions; in any case details would be given in re-
spect of virtually all blanket payment orders exceeding the monthly 
lump sum.
The second option (option B) was for all purchases of goods in Bel-
gium made by German agencies or by troops in transit, and destined 
for use outside Belgium, to be financed via the clearing system and no 
longer via occupation costs; details would be provided for at least 90 per 
cent of the transactions concerned. Were the Banque d’Emission to re-
ject this option, financing would continue to be via occupation costs. If 
the first option was also rejected, occupation costs would be increased 
by the amount of the monthly lump sum.
The order for immediate payment of 750 million Belgian francs re-
quired a rapid decision about the course of action to be followed. The 
managing directors of the Banque d’Emission met the same day18. In 
a first draft of the reply they refused to comply with Reeder’s order. 
Their argument was that the money would largely be applied to finance 
purchases on the black market; but since both German ordinances and 
Belgian decrees prohibited such transactions, the Banque d’Emission 
was bound to refuse to execute the payment.
The draft reply was submitted to Plisnier who the following morning 
invited Galopin and M.-L. Gérard, together with Goffin and Berger, to 
discuss it19. Galopin and M.-L. Gérard disapproved of the text, believ-
ing the refusal to pay was pointless and irresponsible, since it would 
18 BNB, Archives, DC NBB-BEB, 30.10.1942.
19 BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6 e: Basyn, relation des négociations con-
sécutives au mémorandum du 3 octobre 1942 (17.12.1942).
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block the future negotiations. They also found the tone of the reply too 
aggressive. No-one wanted a breach with the Military Government, but 
breach there would be if the reply was sent in its present form. The draft 
was therefore revised in Plisnier’s office and its tone moderated. The 
new form stated that the Banque d’Emission was prepared to execute 
the payment, but only on condition that the Bankaufsichtamt give a 
prior assurance that the money would not be used to finance purchases 
on the black market.
The revised text was ready by 1 p.m. and in principle could be hand-
ed in due time to the Bankaufsichtamt. However, Berger wished to sub-
mit it first to the other managing directors. They disagreed with the 
revised text and decided to work on a new and harsher version that 
partly reflected the original draft20. The founder-bankers, in their turn, 
saw themselves unable to accept the new version and sent it back to the 
managing directors with the request that everything possible be done 
to moderate it. By now, however, the lengthy discussions and arguments 
over the text had overrun the deadline of 4 p.m. Half an hour late, Gof-
fin reported to the Bankaufsichtamt and asked whether he could submit 
the text on the following Tuesday morning, a delay of four days, on the 
excuse that the Banque d’Emission’s leaders had not finished discussing 
on it and that some members could not be reached, because ‘All Saints’ 
fell on that weekend21. Hofrichter asked whether the payment had been 
made. When Goffin replied that it had not, he was told to remain at the 
Bank until further notice.
The intense discussion that had been taking place all the while among 
the managing dirctors centred on how the reply could be amended to 
bring it more into line with what had been proposed by Galopin and 
M.-L. Gérard. Ultimately, it was the more moderate version that was 
chosen as the agreed text, i.e. the one on which consensus had been 
reached around midday in Plisnier’s office22. 
Around 6 p.m., Goffin was summoned to the Bankaufsichtamt. He 
was now able to present the reply, but when he drew the attention of von 
20 BNB, Archives, DC NBB-BEB, 30.10.1942, p. 5.
21 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Chapter. 3, p. 112.
22 BNB, Archives, DC NBB-BEB, 30.10.1942, p. 6. See also, BNB, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, 
dossier 8.10.11/ s. f. 15: réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 04.11.1942, p. 6.
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Becker and Hofrichter the payment being conditional, the Germans re-
fused to accept the reply23: they said that an official of the Bankaufsicht-
amt would be at the Bank at 10 a.m. the following morning to verify that 
the payment had been made. The memorandum also contained certain 
unmistakable threats: for example, before 7 p.m. that evening Goffin 
was required to confirm that the Bank’s equipment – particularly its 
printing presses – were in good condition and that all the Bank’s valu-
ables were immediately available. Any slip-up in these respects would 
be regarded as an act of sabotage. Furthermore, not only the manage-
ments of both banks, but also the members of the Bank’s supervisory 
council and board of scrutineers, as well as the members of the Banque 
d’Emission’s board of directors, would be held responsible for a refusal 
to execute the payment24.
The managing directors were at their wits’ end and therefore sought 
external help. They found the jurist Marcq prepared to receive them in 
his office that evening and there they were joined by De Visscher and 
Plisnier25. De Visscher and Marcq judged that the threats had reached 
such a pitch that they had to be regarded in a new light. Manifestly, the 
Military Government now saw the execution of an order as a matter 
of prestige and felt that there could be no further discussion. The two 
jurists took the view that, if, in spite of everything, the Germans still 
appeared ready to negotiate further, this was an important reason to 
justify immediate and unconditional payment. Plisnier took the same 
line.
The managing directors resolved to do this. Berger agreed, but with 
‘rage in his heart’. Van Nieuwenhuyse, too, declared his support for the 
majority, but not without reservation: on the assumption that nego-
tiations would lead to nothing and that the plundering of the coun-
try would continue and ultimately result in ruin, he wanted to decide 
whether he would remain as a director or resign26.
23 BNB, Archives, DC NBB-BEB, 30.10.1942, p. 7.
24 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/ s. f. 9: sommation des autorités al-
lemandes, 30.10.1942.
25 BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/ s. f. 10: réunion tenue le vendredi 
30 octobre 1942 à 19 heures chez M. le Bâtonnier René Marcq.
26 The two jurists gave their opinion in writing and submitted the letter to Goffin on 
3 November 1942: BNB, Archives, SD, 19, clearing, dossier 8.11.9/s. f. 11: consultation 
de Me Marcq et du Prof. De Visscher.
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The payment was made the next morning. During the night of 30/31 
October, German police in plain clothes surrounded the Bank and at 
10 a.m. burst into the cashiers’ hall. Meanwhile, two members of the 
Bankaufsichtamt, dressed in army uniform, presented themselves to 
Goffin to check whether the instruction to transfer the money had been 
handed to Cracco and if the transfer had actually taken place27.




The Rupture of the United Front
preparaTions for The negoTiaTions of 18 november 1942
On 3 November, the dramatic events of the ‘All Saints’ weekend were 
revealed to the founder-bankers and the Bank’s supervisory council. 
Galopin, in his personal notes, regarded making the payment as ‘un-
conditional surrender’ that severely weakened the Belgian negotiating 
position and consequently boded ill for the future. He was also critical 
of the opinion given by the two jurists, who had recommended that 
the payment be executed so that negotiations could be continued. But 
how were they to be continued? By hostages? The Bank and the Banque 
d’Emission now had to get agreement to the unacceptable demands of 
16 October. In the face of this, any negotiation was doomed to failure. 
What would happen then? Collective resignation? If this was to be ac-
cepted, then the only course was also to abandon the policy of accom-
modation.
At the meetings of the leaders of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission 
on 3 and 4 November, Galopin referred only vaguely to his personal 
evaluation of the drama played out over the weekend. M.-L. Gérard was 
more explicit and regretted that he had not been involved in the delib-
erations, even though, unlike Galopin, he had been in Brussels over the 
weekend. However, both endorsed the decision that had been taken, 
accepting that the managing directors had allowed themselves to be 
guided by the opinion of two competent and reliable jurists1.
During the meetings, there was also thorough discussion of the 
choice between the two options that Reeder had proposed in his let-
ter of 29 October, regarding reorganization of the clearing system. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, option A would require the Banque 
1 BNB, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/ s. f. 15: réunion des banquiers fonda-
teurs, 03.11.1942 and 04.11.1942.
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d’Emission to accept to pay an additional lump-sum amount of 500 
million Belgian francs a month via the clearing system, without the 
Military Government being obliged to provide any details for the pay-
ment; option B would require the goods and services purchased by 
troops in transit to be financed by the Banque d’Emission via the clear-
ing system, and no longer be charged to occupation costs. Should the 
Banque d’Emission reject both options, everything would remain as it 
had been, i.e. with purchases by troops in transit being charged to oc-
cupation costs, but with the addition of the 500 million Belgian francs 
of option A to the present monthly amount of occupation costs.
For those present, option A was unacceptable: to sanction it would 
be to invite a further increase in the risk of the Banque d’Emission find-
ing itself financing doubtful transactions. After great hesitation, it was 
also decided to reject B, as this also concerned transactions of a mili-
tary character. However, the rejection of both options meant that the 
Ministry of Finance was now saddled with an additional charge of 500 
million Belgian francs a month, which Ingenbleek, supported by Ga-
lopin, de Munck and Berger, felt could not be permitted2. The question 
then was to find a way out of the impasse. According to Berger and 
others, some of the purchases of troops in transit were clearly commer-
cial transactions and could therefore be financed without any objection 
via the clearing system; consequently, Reeder’s additional charge of 500 
million Belgian francs could be reduced in proportion, thereby spread-
ing it over the clearing system and occupation costs. This suggestion 
met with approval.
Berger then brought the expenditure of the Feldpost into the equa-
tion. This institution was used by German troops in Belgium to ob-
tain certain sums of money from Germany each month to buy goods to 
send back home. Until now, the expenditure of the Feldpost had been 
financed via occupation costs, but, as Berger pointed out, the expendi-
ture chiefly concerned commercial transactions and could therefore 
also be financed via the clearing system, which would naturally result 
in a further reduction in occupation costs and bring about an even bet-
ter distribution of the additional charge of 500 million Belgian francs. 
2 BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6 G: letter of 12.01.1943 from Kauch to 
Basyn.
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Naturally enough, the suggestions had to be put to Plisnier, whose 
agreement was necessary if the united front was to be maintained3.
The managing directors had put the proposals in a draft reply to 
Reeder that was intended to serve as the basis for talks with Plisnier, 
taking place on 6 November. The Secretary-general showed no inter-
est in the proposals and was unwilling to commit himself. In the end 
the draft was reduced to a vague text that everyone, including Plisnier, 
could accept. By and large, it indicated a preference for option B, but 
also included a reference to option A. It stated that, as regards blan-
ket payment orders, the Banque d’Emission was prepared to transfer 
a maximum monthly sum of 500 million Belgian francs to the Wehr-
machtverrechnungskasse, provided that the money was applied to fi-
nancing normal commercial transactions and that payments would be 
made directly to the Belgian sellers concerned and after each transac-
tion. The nature of the transactions would also be notified in detail to 
the Banque d’Emission.
Meanwhile, during his encounter with Leemans, Reeder had indi-
cated that the discussion about his two options could be integrated into 
overall negotiations on the many questions that had remained unre-
solved since the suspension of the meeting at the end of October. Reeder 
set 18 November as the date for the negotiations. The news, however, did 
not change the disillusion of the managing directors about Plisnier’s 
negative attitude during the discussion of 6 November. Van Nieuwen-
huyse, in particular, was highly resentful of Plisnier’s apparent lack of 
interest – his indifference, even – during the discussion. Plisnier had 
shown clearly that he had not moved a jot from his previous position: 
‘direct cooperation’ in purging the clearing operations implied ‘direct 
cooperation’ in increasing occupation costs and he had no intention 
of becoming involved. During their meeting the next day the manag-
ing directors resolved to reject both options in Reeder’s letter and to 
shift the entire charge of 500 million Belgian francs onto occupation 
costs, thereby returning to their previous resolution to pursue a policy 
of monetary and financial orthodoxy, even at the cost of the collapse of 
the united front. Berger went to Galopin to inform him of the manage-
ment’s new position and mentioned a possible collective resignation.
3 BNB, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/ s. f. 15: réunion tenue chez M. Plis-
nier, 06.11.1942.
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This sudden about-turn of the managing directors left Plisnier once 
again facing the spectre of higher occupation costs. He was unsure of 
how to react. Should he resign as secretary-general, because of the high-
er costs? Or should he accept the increase as ‘cas de force majeure’? It 
was a difficult dilemma. For advice, he turned to De Visscher and on 
11 November convened a meeting of a number of former ministers in 
whom he had confidence4.
For De Visscher, there could be no doubt: the united front had to 
be maintained at all cost. The former ministers were more down-to-
earth in their response, though their opinion was far from unanimous. 
Joseph Pholien and Octave Dierckx suggested resignation. Most of 
the other former ministers insisted on not resigning, expressing their 
fullest confidence in the wisdom of the secretary-general’s judgement, 
even if some new concessions had to be made. The words were very flat-
tering, but contained little effective advice. However, all those present 
were agreed on one thing, namely that the clearing system had to be 
purged of all suspect transactions, both political and military. On 13 
November, A.-E. Janssen and M.-L. Gérard reported to the managing 
directors and board of directors of the Banque d’Emission on what had 
taken place at the meeting of former ministers5. They emphasized that 
all those present were agreed that dubious transactions should be kept 
out of the clearing system.
The Banque d’Emission’s leaders then set about drawing up the 
strategy to be followed at the coming meeting with the Germans on 18 
November, the managing directors repeating that they wished to keep 
entirely to the resolutions of 16 October and to their position on 7 No-
vember. Galopin agreed, but felt that Plisnier could not be left in the 
lurch. Turning next to the composition of the Belgian delegation to the 
meeting, it was decided that it would consist of Berger, Van Nieuwen-
huyse and Cracco, for the Banque d’Emission, and Smeers and Olivier 
Gérard respectively for the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs.
The delegates met on 16 November. Those from the Banque 
d’Emission proposed that a monthly ceiling of 2.5 billion Belgian francs 
4 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB: réunion du 11 novembre 1942 des anciens ministres 
chez M. Plisnier, 11.11.1942.
5 BNB, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/15: réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 
13.11.1942.
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be demanded for total charges (actual charges during October had ris-
en to 3.7 billion)6, spread as follows: 1.5 billion for orthodox occupation 
costs and 1 billion for additional charges, 400 million of which to be 
financed via the clearing system, since that amount could be regarded 
as concerning normal commercial transactions. Half the remaining 
600 million related to wage transfers from Belgian workers employed 
abroad, in respect of which the German authorities had at one time 
declared themselves prepared to work out a formula acceptable to the 
Belgians. What were termed ‘dubious transactions’ thus accounted for 
no more than 300 million Belgian francs and would have to be borne by 
the Ministry of Finance as additional occupation costs.
The proposal was not well received by the ministry’s delegate, 
Smeers. He immediately pointed out that Plisnier never would agree 
to it. Upon this, the managing directors convened an emergency meet-
ing with the founder-bankers, Plisnier, Smeers and the jurists Marcq 
and De Visscher on 17 November. The meeting proved to be dramatic7, 
with Plisnier sticking obstinately to his guns: he repeated that, when 
the Banque d’Emission had refused to have the lump sum of 500 mil-
lion Belgian francs financed via the clearing system, as proposed by 
Reeder in his first option, he had never assented to that amount being 
shifted onto occupation costs. Although he showed understanding for 
the Banque d’Emission’s decision, he could not accept that, in conse-
quence of that refusal, he was required to approve being saddled with 
the additional charge.
In this, Plisnier was following the advice of De Visscher, who judged 
that, once a joint refusal had been made, no further reproach could be 
levelled at the Belgians: they had resisted strongly and courageously, 
and the fact that they had nevertheless had to submit to the increase 
in charges – charges imposed by order of the occupier – was not now 
a matter of their voluntary cooperation. De Visscher, moreover, had a 
strong suspicion that the consequences of such a strategy would not 
necessarily be dramatic: the Germans would not react by dismissing 
the top people in Belgium, because they had need of them. Approx-
imately 700 German officials could not administer the country ade-
6 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB: réunion à la BEB, 17.11.1942; BNB, Archives, SD, 20, 
clearing, dossier 8.11.10/15: réunion tenue au cabinet de M. Plisnier, 18.11.1942.
7 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB: réunion à la BEB, 17.11.1942.
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quately without the cooperation of competent Belgians, which was the 
underlying reason why, throughout the occupation, major instruments 
of administrative control had remained in Belgian hands8.
Plisnier was able to associate himself with De Visscher’s opinion 
when he stated that the Banque d’Emission and the Ministry of Finance 
should act in solidarity. In line with that, Plisnier accepted that pay-
ments in respect of dubious transactions be split, deciding – now against 
De Visscher’s advice – to do so voluntarily as a logical consequence of 
the state of emergency. But what did ‘solidarity’ actually mean for those 
involved? For the Banque d’Emission, which felt itself for ethical reasons 
no longer able to finance dubious transactions via the clearing system, 
solidarity meant the Ministry of Finance accepting to finance them via 
occupation costs. For Plisnier, on the contrary, it meant precisely that 
the burden and the responsibility should be shared.
Ultimately, it was Galopin who provided the breakthrough9. He 
pointed out that much of the discussion with the German authori-
ties would concern Belgian control of the transactions that fell under 
Reeder’s demand for an additional 500 million Belgian francs a month. 
As it could be assumed that most of the transactions would be justifi-
able, they could be financed by the Banque d’Emission via the clearing 
system. The transactions that remained as dubious would probably ac-
count for no more than 100 million Belgian francs a month. Which 
institution took on that residual amount was now a matter of indiffer-
ence and he urged the management of the Banque d’Emission to finance 
that too.
Ingenbleek noted the consensus and Plisnier declared that this was 
a conclusion he could accept. The clouds seemed suddenly to have dis-
appeared, but what had been missed in the tense discussion and the 
ensuing euphoria was that the solution accepted turned De Visscher’s 
original and vital idea on its head. What Plisnier had done was to get 
the Banque d’Emission and its founder-bankers voluntarily to agree – 
8 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB dossier n° 9: visite à M. De Visscher 
20.11.1942 (text probably from de Munck, who went to De Visscher after the crisis 
and on 04.01.1945 requested him to confirm the content of that conversation). See 
also: ARA, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/16: note sur l’état de nécessité 
par le prof. De Visscher, 10.11.1942.
9 BNB, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/15: réunion tenue au cabinet de M. 
Plisnier, 18.11.1942.
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for the sake of maintaining the united front – to finance a number of 
dubious transactions.
It quickly became clear that Goffin, Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse 
would not agree to Galopin’s proposed compromise. Ultimately, they 
decided among themselves to stick to De Visscher’s original advice and 
reject the proposal for the Banque d’Emission to assume voluntary pay-
ment of the additional charge.
The negoTiaTions of 18 november 1942
The negotiations with the Germans took place in the afternoon of 18 
November at the premises of the Bankaufsichtamt, as agreed the previ-
ous week10. The first point tabled by the Belgian delegation concerned 
the demand for a priori control of transactions through the use of a li-
cence and, yet again, the Germans declared that they could not comply. 
However, they were prepared to provide prior details for transactions 
up to 375 million Belgian francs a month for payment orders issued by 
German banks in Belgium.
The demand for an upper limit on total occupation costs was like-
wise refused. Reeder’s letter of 29 October came up for discussion and 
the Germans stated their readiness to provide as many details as they 
could regarding the additional charge of 500 million Belgian francs. In-
formation about all purchases by German agencies would be provided 
six to eight weeks after payment11. However, if the Banque d’Emission 
still aimed to keep a totally checked clearing system, the Military Gov-
ernment would be obliged to increase the current level of occupation 
costs by between two thirds and three quarters.
10 BNB, Archives, SD, 20, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/17: procès-verbal succinct de la 
séance au commissariat allemand, 18.11.1942.
11 During a meeting with de Launoit, Leemans said that the Military Government 
was highly irritated by the activities of the German purchasing agencies, which, 
on the instructions of Berlin and without the knowledge of the Military Govern-
ment, were creaming off the markets in Belgium and demanding payment via the 
clearing system on the basis of joint orders. Reeder had given Leemans an angry 
letter to read from Hofrichter to the Berlin government, in which the abuses were 
sharply attacked: ARA, Plisnier Papers, dossier 1: Banque d’Emission, aide-mémoi-
re, 23-26.11.1942.
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The Germans were prepared to accept the conditions set by the dele-
gation for the wage transfers from Belgian workers employed in France 
and the Netherlands, and the amounts in question would be credited 
to a special Banque d’Emission account at the Banque de France and 
De Nederlandsche Bank12. However, the demand for goods – in other 
words, food – to be given in exchange for goods and services delivered 
from Belgium to France and the Netherlands on behalf of the occupier 
could not be met, as the two neighbouring countries refused to com-
ply. However, the resulting credit balances could be applied to repaying 
Belgian public debt in France and the Netherlands: an agreement in 
this sense had already been concluded with the Netherlands and the 
German authorities were looking for a similar agreement with France.
The day after, at a meeting of the founder-bankers, attended by cer-
tain members of the Bank’s supervisory council, the delegates reported 
on their previous day’s encounter with the Germans. Goffin, Berger and 
Van Nieuwenhuyse noted that, with the exception of the wage trans-
fers, no account at all had been taken of Belgian demands. Consequent-
ly they had resolved to resign from both the Banque d’Emission and 
the Bank. Solvay and A.-E. Janssen felt that this decision could well be 
defended from a strictly monetary point of view, but not on the higher 
grounds of the common interest. Galopin agreed entirely with Solvay 
and Janssen’s statement. Plisnier, too, regretted the resignation, want-
ing the negotiations to be continued, and requesting forty-eight hours 
for reflection13. After a great deal of discussion, Goffin withdrew his res-
ignation and asked Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse to reconsider their 
decision. Berger answered by posing a counter question: would Plisnier 
maintain his decision not to include any dubious transactions in the 
package of 500 million Belgian francs as additional occupation costs 
or was he prepared to concede on this? Plisnier answered that he had 
to refuse.
The two jurists Marcq and De Visscher, who were also present, 
shared Plisnier’s view. They had, in fact, gained their point: both sides 
had refused to accept voluntarily the additional increase in charges. 
12 BNB, Archives, SD, 20bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/27: lettre du Président Reeder, 
07.12.1942 (report of the meeting of 14.12.1942 at the Bankaufsichtamt).
13 BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6 e: Basyn, relation des négociations con-
sécutives au mémorandum du 3 octobre 1942 (01.12.1942), p. 37.
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However, their success was tempered by the refusal of Berger and Van 
Nieuwenhuyse to accept their advice not to resign. As long as there was 
a chance of keeping control of monetary and financial events in reliable 
Belgian hands, they argued, however fragile and inadequate that con-
trol was, resignation was not the path to follow.
Finally, the meeting requested Ingenbleek to make contact with 
Plisnier personally in order to examine whether a compromise, which 
could satisfy the two resigning managing directors, was still possible. 
Meanwhile Ingenbleek had contacted the former ministers Pholien 
and Dierckx, who, during the meeting of 11 November, had advised 
the secretary-general to resign. After a long exchange, Ingenbleek was 
able to convince the two ministers to reverse their decision and give 
their support to the policy of accommodation. In a memorandum of 
22 November, they stated that Plisnier now found himself in a ‘cas 
de force majeure’ situation and could legitimately accept the dubious 
transactions as part of occupation costs14. The three then visited Plis-
nier, who promised to make a conciliatory statement at the meeting of 
the Banque d’Emission’s board of directors the next day, 23 November15. 
However, during the meeting, Plisnier failed to make the statement he 
had promised, and from this Galopin inferred that there could be no 
further papering over the cracks in the united front. Henceforth, each 
group would have to act on its own responsibility. Taking its cue from 
this assessment, the board of directors resolved to continue negotia-
tions with the Military Government16.
Was Plisnier’s attitude determined by wounded pride, willfulness 
and a lack of resolve, as the Banque d’Emission’s founder-bankers al-
ways claimed later? Was the advice of Marcq, and especially De Viss-
cher, to continue to resist the occupier decisive or were there at play 
more personal feelings of repressed antipathy towards the founder-
bankers, whom Plisnier had never really trusted? Was he thinking that, 
14 Quoted by F. Maerten, ‘Pholien face à la seconde occupation du pays’, in: F. Carton 
de Wiart and G. Janssens, eds., Joseph Pholien. Un homme d’état pour une Belgique 
en crise, Brussels, 2003, pp. 175-176.
15 BNB, Archives, SD, clearing, 20bis, dossier 8.11.10/23: nouvelles propositions du 
Commissariat (communication de M. le Vice-Gouverneur, 26.11.1942).
16 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Chapter. 3, p. 117.
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as always, they were trying to shift the entire problem of the dubious 
transactions onto him?
It may well have been a mixture of all these factors. Indeed, that the 
last reflection was not entirely unfounded is borne out by the unex-
pected comment of such a man as A.-E. Janssen: ‘For us it’s a good deal: 
the shit bin has been moved’ (‘Bonne affaire pour nous. Le bac à merde 
est déplacé’)’17. In his arguments, as well as in his subsequent letters, 
Plisnier regularly emphasized that he favoured joint action, which for 
him implied concessions by both sides. He never forgave the Banque 
d’Emission’s founder-bankers for their abandonment of solidarity dur-
ing the crisis.
The arrangemenT of 25 november 1942
In Ingenbleek’s view, the situation had become extremely critical. 
Without the knowledge of the founder-bankers, but with the approval 
of Goffin, he went to speak with Prack of the Bankaufsichtamt to sound 
him out about how the German authorities would react to the rigid 
standpoints now adopted by the Banque d’Emission and the Minis-
try of Finance18. Prack warned Ingenbleek that there would be severe 
sanctions if the monetary and financial leaders of the country were to 
carry their resistance to extremes: ‘The Gestapo will reign without any 
restraint…, general von Falkenhausen will disappear’19. Ingenbleek be-
gan to fear that, as a counter-measure, the Germans might well take 
control of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission. He therefore continued 
17 Quoted by Kauch: BNB, Archives, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6 g: letter of 12.01.1942 
from Kauch to Basyn, p. 9.
18 BNB, Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published 
text, 1946), Chapter. 3, pp. 118-119.
19 BNB, Archives, SD, 20bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/23: nouvelles propositions du 
Commissariat (communication de M. le Vice-Gouverneur, 26.11.1942). During a 
later meeting with A.-E. Janssen, Ingenbleek said the following about his role in 
the acute crisis of that moment: ‘c’est grâce à moi que les Allemands ne se sont pas 
installés en maîtres à la Banque Nationale pour y faire imprimer tous les milliards 
qu’ils désiraient se procurer, et que les hautes personnalités sont encore à la tête de 
leurs établissements’ (BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 5, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 409/2 
and A 267): Ingenbleek, aide-mémoire of 23-28.12.1942).
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to search for a compromise that would extract the Banque d’Emission 
from the impasse. To that end, he went to see Hofrichter, who had made 
an interesting suggestion the previous May. It had not been followed 
up then, although – as has been indicated – it had occasionally resur-
faced, first in a letter written by Reeder on 29 October 1942 and later in a 
memorandum prepared by Berger during the meetings of the founder-
bankers on 3 and 4 November. Ingenbleek now proposed subtracting 
the commercial purchases made by troops in transit and the Feldpost 
transactions from the occupation costs and moving them to the clearing 
operations of the Banque d‘Emission. The reduction in the occupation 
costs, realized in this way, would compensate for the monthly charge of 
500 million Belgian francs, imposed by Reeder as an extra occupation 
cost upon the Ministry of Finance, if the Banque d’Emission refused to 
integrate it in its clearing system. The shift thus would amount to a zero 
operation for the Ministry and not entail any increase in occupation 
costs; for the Banque d’Emission, it would mean a purging of the clear-
ing system. Hofrichter promised to look into the matter.
On 25 November, Hofrichter summoned Goffin and Cracco, and 
told them what the Bankaufsichtamt now proposed20. First of all, it 
had agreed to all dubious transactions of a political or military nature 
(including those involving the black market) being removed from the 
clearing system. As regards all normal commercial transactions, all 
the required information would be provided at the same time as pay-
ment orders were submitted. For blanket payment orders, the Wehr-
machtverrechnungskassse would provide details for up to 90 per cent 
of the total amounts involved. Moreover, payments for commercial 
purchases made by troops in transit, and destined for another coun-
try, as well as payments for Feldpost transactions, would be withdrawn 
from occupation costs and would henceforth be settled via the clearing 
system. Lastly, the financing of dubious transactions would be trans-
ferred to occupation costs, but would not result in any rise in the overall 
amount.
Hofrichter went on to underline that the Military Government had 
now gone a long way to meeting Belgian wishes and that he therefore 
20 BNB, Archives, SD, 20bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/23: nouvelles propositions du 
Commissariat (compte rendu de la séance, 25.11.1942). See also: ARA, Plisnier Pa-
pers, dossier 1: Banque d’Emission, aide-mémoire, 23-26.11.1942.
322 Chapter 18
expected immediate endorsement of the proposal by all parties con-
cerned, adding that heavy sanctions would follow if full endorsement 
was not forthcoming. Should the Banque d’Emission reject the proposal, 
it would be required to make substantial sums available to the military 
commander; in case of refusal to act on the military commander’s order, 
the board of directors and all other leaders of the Banque d’Emission 
and the Bank would be held jointly responsible for the refusal, and the 
private banks would be obliged to pay the sums demanded themselves.
At a meeting of the Banque d’Emission’s founder-bankers that same 
day, Goffin and Cracco reported on their encounter with Hofrichter21. 
The bankers found that the proposal largely met what they were de-
manding and that there was no reason to refuse. However, Cracco felt 
that Plisnier ought to be informed in advance. Plisnier was pleased to 
hear that a favourable arrangement had been found for the Banque 
d’Emission and that there was to be no increase in occupation costs. 
Of course, he regretted that the proposed arrangement had shifted the 
problem of the irregular payments on to the Treasury, but the problem 
was not insurmountable. He would raise the question when next he had 
an opportunity to argue for the occupation costs to be reduced22. He 
finally expressed the hope that, with so much achieved, Berger and Van 
Nieuwenhuyse would withdraw their resignation.
On 3 December, Hofrichter travelled to Berlin to submit the arrange-
ment to the government representatives for approval23. There appeared 
to be no great problem and by 7 December Reeder officially informed 
the Banque d’Emission that the agreement of 5 May 1942 was regarded 
as having been terminated and replaced by the arrangement of 25 No-
vember, coming into effect on 1 January 1943. Only the monthly lump 
sum of 50 million Belgian francs imposed by the May arrangement 
would remain24. Finally Reeder stated that there could be no favourable 
21 BNB, Archives, SD, 20bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/23: nouvelles propositions du 
Commissariat (réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 25.11.1942).
22 NBB, SD, Basyn Papers, dossier 6 e: Basyn, relation des négociations consécutives au 
mémorandum du 3 octobre 1942 (17.12.1942), p. 31.
23 BNB, Archives, DC NBB BEB, 03.12.1942.
24 In April 1943, this amount was increased to 75 million Belgian francs a month: BNB, 
Archives, SD, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of Enquiry (published text, 
1946), Part 1, Chapter. 3, p. 127.
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response at the moment to the request for a reduction in occupation 
costs.
the question oF successors For berger and van 
nieuwenhuyse
Reeder’s letter was followed by an abatement of the storm aroused by 
Plisnier’s stance during the meetings of the previous weeks. A.-E. Jans-
sen took the opportunity to convene a meeting on 19 December 1942 
of the leaders of the Banque d’Emission, the Bank and the secretaries-
general of the Ministries of Finance and of Economic Affairs. The at-
tempt at reconciliation took place in Plisnier’s private office. A.-E. Jans-
sen opened the meeting with a plea for the united front to be restored: 
as negotiations were about to be resumed regarding the clearing sys-
tem and the occupation costs between the Banque d’Emission and the 
Military Government, it would be useful if the Banque d’Emission and 
the Ministry of Finance could dovetail their approaches. Plisnier stated 
that he was ready to co-operate, Galopin responding that the Banque 
d’Emission would show complete solidarity with the secretary-general 
in his resistance to occupation costs being raised25.
The arrangement of 25 November and the restoration of the united 
front on 19 December prompted the members of the Bank’s supervisory 
council to confirm that they would be remaining in office and not follow-
ing the example of Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse in resigning. Although 
not ideal, the arrangement of 25 November included important conces-
sions on the part of the Germans and could be considered as ‘a serious 
attempt to purge the clearing’’26. Nevertheless, the resignation of Berger 
and Van Nieuwenhuyse remained a source of great embarrassment. 
Most of the leading figures in the country, supported by public opinion, 
praised the two directors for acting courageously, but felt that, particu-
larly after 25 November, they ought to reconsider their decision, the Mili-
tary Government having met Belgian demands to a substantial degree27.
25 ARA, Plisnier Papers, dossier 1 h: réunion tenue au cabinet de M. Plisnier, 19.12.1942. 
See also: BNB, Archives, RR, 30.12.1942; BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 06.01.1943.
26 BNB, Archives, RR, 30.12.1942.
27 BNB, Archives, SD, 20bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/ 24: réunion des banquiers fonda-
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On 3 December, Galopin spoke with the two directors for two hours 
in an attempt to convince them to change their minds, but to no avail. 
Both continued to insist that the resolutions of 16 October had to be 
accepted in their entirety by the occupier as a conditio sine qua non for 
further negotiations. As regards the upper limit, Berger showed himself 
a little more flexible, but for Van Nieuwenhuyse this point was also not 
negotiable: the limit represented a ‘total and fixed’ maximum. Galopin 
concluded that the two directors were so unbending and rooted in their 
prejudices that it was preferable to keep them out of the leadership. That 
same day, Goffin spoke with Hofrichter about the possibility of the two 
directors returning, and mentioned the unanimous resolution of his 
colleagues to request them to withdraw their resignation. Hofrichter 
found this unfortunate and pointed out that Reeder was highly dis-
pleased about the resignation and was looking to replace the two as 
quickly as possible. The Military Government was even considering 
blocking their eventual return28.
The question now arose of who was to replace them. Hofrichter sug-
gested Cracco. In spite of feeling that Cracco was not an easy man to 
negotiate with, Hofrichter regarded him as intelligent, with a thorough 
grasp of his dossiers and behaving correctly during and after negotia-
tions. Goffin found the suggestion acceptable and Cracco was sounded 
out. He agreed to have his name put forward and thus the first candi-
date had been discovered without too much discussion. Ingenbleek, on 
his part, proposed Kauch as the second candidate: he had been private 
secretary to the former governor, Janssen, and was a prominent mem-
ber of the Research Department29. Kauch himself agreed directly, but 
speaking for the founder-bankers, A.-E. Janssen and de Munck vetoed 
his candidature, arguing that Kauch did not have a sufficient mastery 
of Dutch and that he also lacked the necessary competence. That was, 
at least, the official reason for the veto; it was, after all, a public secret 
that Kauch was not over-fond of private bankers; it was also a fact that 
teurs, 09.12.1942; BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 5, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 409/2) and A 
267): Ingenbleek, note (spring 1943).
28 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 06.01.1943.
29 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 5, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 409/2 and A 267): Ingenbleek, 
aide-mémoire, 23.12.1942 – 31.12.1942.
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the founder-bankers had a candidate of their own: Robert Vandeputte, 
secretary of the Belgian Banking Association.
Serious objections to Vandeputte’s candidature were raised by a 
number of persons. The first was that, from a political point of view, his 
appointment would create an unacceptable imbalance within the lead-
ership of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission, as he, too, like Cracco 
and the Bank’s economic adviser, L.-H. Dupriez – not to mention its 
legal adviser, De Visscher – held a professorship at the University of 
Louvain. A second concerned his professional past, since he came from 
within the Belgian Banking Association and was thus a confidant of 
the private bankers. One of the aims of the reform of the Bank in 1937 
had been to curb the influence of the private bankers within the Bank 
and for such a person to be brought into its management would be in 
conflict with the spirit of the law30. However, the Banque d’Emission’s 
founders continued to support their candidate and carried the day.
The candidature and the status of the new directors was vigorously 
debated during the meetings of the Bank’s supervisory council31 and 
of the Banque d’Emission’s board of directors32. Within the supervi-
sory council, Bekaert’s proposal to appoint the new directors solely 
ad interim met with stiff opposition from the Banque d’Emission’s 
 founder-bankers. Ultimately, a compromise was reached, with Bekaert 
accepting the principle of an appointment, but only for the duration of 
hostilities33. The government commissioner Smeers endorsed the com-
promise.
Cracco’s appointment had meanwhile failed to win general approval 
within the Bank or the Banque d’Emission. Within the Bank, many per-
ceived a contradiction in his attitude: it was, after all, his highly criti-
cal report of July 1942 regarding the clearing system that had spurred 
Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse to adopt an aggressive stance towards 
the occupier. Sticking to principle had led them to resign, but now it 
appeared as though Cracco was using the situation to ease himself into 
a directorship. The first thought of the employees and staff of the Bank 
30 BNB, Archives, RR, 06.02.1943.
31 BNB, Archives, RR, 30.12.1942, 06.01.1943.
32 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 06.01.1943, 11.01.1943.
33 BNB, Archives, SD, 20bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/29: letter of 31.12.1942 from Bekaert 
to Goffin.
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and the Banque d’Emission was to meet Cracco’s appointment with go-
ing on a ‘sit-down strike’ (‘une grève des bras croisés’), but that would 
have been contrary to house tradition and was not pursued34. 
34 Weekly newspaper Cassandre, 17.01.1943.
Chapter 19
Towards the End of the Occupation
The Turn of The Tide in miliTary affairs
The repercussions of the turn of the tide for the German armies since 
1942 were also felt at the Bank and the Banque d’Emission. Their pres-
sure to have a more effective say in clearing operations now found 
greater response from the Military Government, handicapped as it was 
by an increasing shortage of qualified German personnel1. Internally, 
the Bankaufsichtamt even agreed that it was pointless to oppose the 
growing resistance by threatening to close the two institutions2.
At the same time, however, the Berlin government began to take a 
much tougher line towards its own officials in Brussels. One of the first 
victims, not undeservedly, was von Becker, head of the Bankaufsicht-
amt and commissioner of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission, who 
in the autumn of 1943 was dismissed on suspicion of corruption. He 
was provisionally replaced by Dr. Jost, an insignificant figure3. Initially, 
after von Becker’s departure, Hofrichter had probably hoped to step 
into von Becker’s shoes, which he certainly merited, but events dictated 
otherwise. In Berlin, the Minister of Economic Affairs, Walther Funck, 
was himself under fire as someone who was too close to von Becker 
and he feared that Hofrichter had too much inside information. Hof-
richter thus fell out of favour and, despite Reeder’s persistent pleading, 
was also required to leave Brussels for Northern France. He returned 
to Brussels shortly thereafter, but declined to resume his function as 
1 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 17.04.1944. 
2 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier 2: Jost, Abschluszbericht der Militärverwal-
tung und des Reichskommissars für Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 01.01.1944 – 
31.08.1944, pp. 4-5.
3 BNB, Archives, DC BEB 07.01.1944.
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deputy-commissioner as long as his position was not fully confirmed4. 
Consequently, he was sidelined, even before he disappeared for good 
from the Military Government in April 1944. Jost, for his part, was ap-
pointed as commissioner of both the Bank and the Banque d’Emission, 
with effect from 1 March 19445.
All these changes at the top of the Military Government did nothing 
to make contacts any easier for the Belgians attempting to steer their 
country’s affairs. Oddly, too, they seemed to look back with some re-
gret to the earlier, familiar relationships with the Military Government, 
even though the encounters then were often confrontational and they 
had to give way more than once6.
The Military Government in Brussels itself had come into direct 
conflict with the Nazi government in Berlin, due to its strong disap-
proval of the ordinance in respect of forced labour, which in 1943 led to 
the large-scale deportation of Belgian workers to Germany and France. 
The Military Government had also hindered the requisitions of Fritz 
Sauckel’s administration7 and vigorously opposed the efforts of the Ber-
lin government to gain greater control over the Belgian economy. The 
rest was done by the SS’s concoction of a corruption scandal among von 
Falkenhausen’s confidants. Ultimately, Hitler decided to get rid of the 
Military Government in Belgium and Northern France, and replace it 
with a Civilian Administration. As this came into effect only on 13 July 
1944, however, it was a little late in the day for such a change and the 
result was that Reeder stayed on as president of the Administration. 
Barely two months later, the country was liberated8.
Major changes had also taken place at the head of the Bank and the 
Banque d’Emission during this period. Since 16 January 1943, Goffin 
and Ingenbleek had been joined by Cracco and Vandeputte, both of 
whom were immediately very active. But Cracco was suddenly stopped 
4 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, Direction, Nokin Papers: memorandum of 
February 1944.
5 BNB, Archives, DC, 08.03.1944.
6 BNB, Archives, SD, 22bis, clearing, 8.11.12/11: réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 
17.04.1944.
7 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, pp. 243-335. For-
tunately, the Military Government was supported in this by Röchling, who had 
been sent specially by Albert Speer to Belgium to push up industrial production 
there for Germany.
8 Nefors, Economische collaboratie in België, pp. 223-224.
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short, when he was arrested by the Gestapo on 7 August 19439. Cracco 
had received a sum of money from his brother, who was active in the 
Resistance. Through his office at the Bank, he was supposed to hand 
this to two Resistance members, the money being to aid Allied pilots 
who had gone into hiding after being shot down over Belgium. Infor-
mation about this had leaked out and, after being arrested, Cracco was 
summoned before a military tribunal of the Luftwaffe. The military 
prosecutor demanded the death penalty, the normal punishment for a 
deed of that kind10, but the tribunal, probably after a great deal of lob-
bying, and to everyone’s relief, sentenced Cracco on 12 November 1943 
to eight years’ hard labour and a fine of 62,000 Belgian francs or a year’s 
additional jail11.
The conviction was confirmed in December, after appeal. Cracco 
was provisionally confined in the central prison at Leuven and trans-
ferred to Germany on 1 April 194412. In the whole affair, the Bankauf-
sichtamt had done what it could and on 30 June 1944 Goffin was able to 
announce that a fresh appeal for clemency had been granted and that 
the punishment had been commuted from hard labour to straightfor-
ward imprisonment at Wittlich in Germany13. Cracco was eventually 
released in 1945 by American forces.
Cracco’s arrest not only raised emotions throughout the Bank, but 
also did nothing to simplify the distribution of tasks within the man-
agements of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission. At the beginning 
of February 1943, an eye complaint had obliged Ingenbleek to take a 
long leave of absence14. His work had been taken over by Vandeputte 
who, upon Cracco’s arrest, was asked to take over his commitments. 
Vandeputte accepted, but was at the same time relieved of his responsi-
bility for ‘current matters’15.
9 BNB, Archives, DC, 07.08.1943.
10 BNB, Archives, DC, 14.11.1943: report of Vandeputte on his meeting with the jurist F. 
Eickhoff, a barrister at the Court of Appeal in Brussels and Cracco’s defence lawyer.
11 BNB, Archives, SD, Cracco Papers: letter of 24.01.1986 from Prack to Cracco; BNB, 
Archives, DC, 14.11.1943.
12 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 05.04.1944.
13 BNB, Archives, DC, 30.06.1944.
14 BNB, Archives, SD, 12, notes confidentielles diverses, dossier 8.11/2: letter of 
01.02.1943 from Ingenbleek to Goffin.
15 BNB, Archives, DC, 07.08.1943.
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Vandeputte now emerged as the strong man in the Bank and the 
Banque d’Emission. He had the organizational talent of a real manager 
and the statements, memoranda and reports of that time bear the un-
mistakable imprint of his new approach. He bombarded the Bankauf-
sichtamt with critical comments about inadmissible payment orders 
from German agencies active in Belgium16.
There was, lastly, also a change in the cooperation between the Bank 
and the Banque d’Emission. The catalyst for this was certainly the trag-
ic death of Galopin on 28 February 1944, who was murdered on his 
doorstep by members of a commando of a pro-German organization 
(DeVlag). His death came as a heavy blow to many and not least to the 
Banque d’Emission, whose founder-bankers were suddenly deprived of 
their figure-head and moral safeguard. The Bank’s supervisory council 
and board of scrutineers had also had great confidence in him, even 
though he was not a member of either body. After his murder, the mood 
of confidence ebbed away and the alarming question of whether the 
leaders of the two institutions had got things right began to undermine 
their cohesion. A further point was that the Bank now had to prepare 
for the uncertain future that awaited it after the liberation without a 
strong personality such as Galopin.
Now that the end of the war was in sight, criticism from London 
and Belgian Resistance circles became more insistent, prompting the 
managing directors of the Banque d’Emission to be concerned about 
their responsibility for the clearing system. They asked the board of di-
rectors to what degree they regarded themselves co-responsible for the 
orders, which were being executed on their advice. During a meeting 
of the board on 8 May 1944 A.-E. Janssen stated that, strictly speaking, 
it was exclusively Goffin and Vandeputte who were responsible for the 
management of the Banque d’Emission. At the institution’s creation, the 
board of directors had been given no more than an ‘advisory role’17. 
However, if after the liberation, an investigation committee were to 
ask the managing directors to justify their decisions during the war, it 
would be unforgivable for the directors not to share responsability with 
16 BNB, Archives, SD, 2, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.11/ s. f. 2: note de Mlle Malaise, 
03.12.1945.
17 BNB, Archives, SD, 24, clearing, dossier 8.11.14/25: la mission et l’organisation de la 
BEB (note, 03.05.1944, réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 08.05.1944).
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the managing directors. The other members of the meeting agreed with 
this view. In passing, it should be noted that, at the time, A.-E. Janssen 
was the only one who had contact with the government in London and 
who enjoyed its confidence.
The belgian economy aT The end of The occupaTion
The final years of the occupation saw total war expenditure rising to 
what was an enormous amount for the time. Of the combined expendi-
ture of the State and the Banque d’Emission just 38.5 per cent went di-
rectly to Belgium; the remaining 61.5 per cent going to the occupier.
The Banque d’Emission received the greater part of its resources 
from the Bank, which was covered by a State guarantee for money due 
from the Banque d’Emission. For its part, the State was only able to 
finance its money requirements in part from tax receipts, which in 1943-
1944 covered barely 29 per cent of expenditure. The rest was funded 
by advances from the Bank in the form of transfers in its current ac-
count and in banknotes (37 per cent of expenditure), and by long-, me-
dium- and short-term loans (34 per cent of expenditure). By 31 August 
1944, the total circulation of banknotes had increased by 233 per cent in 
comparison with the situation at 8 May 1940. Belgium, though, got off 
Table 19.1:  Total means of payment in circulation, 1940-1944  







































































Source: BNB, Archives, AV, report by the board of scrutineers for the 1940-1944 finan-
cial years, prepared on behalf of the supervisory council, 1945, p. 11.
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fairly lightly in this respect, in comparison to her neighbours: between 
1 January 1938 and 31 May 1944, the circulation of banknotes rose by 346 
per cent in Belgium, compared with 498 per cent in France, 389 per cent 
in the Netherlands and 618 per cent in Germany.
Account has of course to be taken of more than just the banknotes. 
There were also the notes of 50, 20 and 5 Belgian francs issued by the 
Treasury. Their circulation likewise increased substantially, though not 
greatly, in comparison to the circulation of the banknotes.
Besides the Ministry of Finance’s payment of occupation costs, the 
major cause of the rise in money circulation was the Banque d’Emission’s 
financing of the clearing system. During 1943 and 1944, occupation costs 
held steady at their level of 1.5 billion Belgian francs a month, whereas 
the Banque d’Emission’s total credit balances at the Verrechnungskasse 
in Berlin went up appreciably, particularly the balances vis-à-vis Ger-
many (approximately 90 per cent of the total). Three factors are of im-
portance in the analysis of the figures: the difference between balances 
arising from transactions in respect of goods,  services and capital; the 
difference between direct and indirect payments in the clearing system; 
and the difference between balances at the end of the year and at the 
end of each month.
The Belgian clearing credit balances developed differently, depend-
ing on whether they arose from the supply of goods, services or capi-
tal. During 1943 and 1944, there was a clear weakening in percentage 
terms in the rise of the credit balance for goods, the prime reason for 
this being increasing difficulties in the industrial sector: air raids had 
inflicted serious damage to a number of factories and to the transport 
infrastructure, and had hindered the supply of raw materials, which 
were in any case becoming scarcer as the war dragged on. A second rea-
son for the weakening was the stricter control exercised by the Banque 
d’Emission on the transactions that qualified for payment within the 
clearing system. On the other hand, the credit balance for services 
showed a very marked increase, which was chiefly the consequence of 
the forced labour in Germany, France and the Netherlands.
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Table 19.2:  Belgian clearing credit balance at the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin, 1940-1944 
(total balances and – between brackets – the Belgo-German clearing credit 
balances) (in millions of Belgian francs)














































Source: BNB, Archives, AV, report by the board of scrutineers for the 1940-1944 finan-
cial years, prepared on behalf of the supervisory council, 1945, p. 16.
Payments in the clearing system can also be broken down according to 
direct or indirect transactions. The first category concerned amounts 
that the Banque d’Emission paid out to the beneficiaries directly; the 
second also concerned amounts that the Banque d’Emission paid out 
to the beneficiaries, but indirectly via the Wehrmachtverrechnungskas-
se, the Reichskreditkasse or German banks established in Belgium. For 
direct payments, the Banque d’Emission received immediate and fairly 
precise details about the beneficiaries and the nature of the transactions 
concerned, but that was less the case for indirect payments, details of 
which were provided only a posteriori, about two months after payment, 
and were not always particularly accurate. Furthermore, a proportion 
of the payments was exempt from the requirement to provide details. 
It is true that the arrangement of 25 November-7 December 1942 con-
siderably reduced that proportion, but in April 1944 Reeder had raised 
the exempted monthly amount from 50 million to 75 million Belgian 
francs. All the while, vigilance remained the watchword in monitoring 
these arrangements.
In addition, much work had been done by Cracco and Vandeputte 
to get indirect payments reduced as much as possible in favour of di-
rect, and they had been fairly successful in this until the spring of 1944. 
From April of that year, however, indirect payments began to rise again 
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in relative terms18. The two managing directors were also able to gain 
an improvement in the quality of the information provided: Cracco via 
the introduction of Banque d’Emission certificates, Vandeputte, later, 
via the tightening of control. They also succeeded in excluding dubious 
transactions from the payment system and even in claiming back some 
payments made erroneously.
Table 19.3: Payments in the clearing system, 1942-1944 (in per cent)



















Source: ARA, fonds SG, executive committee, Nokin Papers, BEB, file 16: observations 
relatives au rapport de la Commission d’Enquête (BEB) pour la période 15.01.1943-
31.08.1944, p. 15.
The post-war Commission of Enquiry was to be very strong in its con-
demnation of the many payments for unspecified transactions, which 
it regarded as payments bearing the stamp of political and military 
 cooperation19. Cracco and Vandeputte would protest vigorously against 
this view and produced calculations showing that payments for un-
specified transactions accounted for barely 7 per cent (3.9 billion Bel-
gian francs) of the total amounts paid out in 1943 and 1944 (about 35 
billion and 20 billion Belgian francs respectively). Included in that 7 
per cent, moreover, was expenditure for the Feldpost and the transfers 
of banknotes to neighbouring countries for, among other things, the re-
muneration of Belgian workers. According to Cracco and Vandeputte, 
these could not be considered as transactions of a political or military 
nature. In addition, the two men argued that this in no way proved 
that all the transactions in respect of the exempted payments were of 
18 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 04.07.1944, 24.07.1944 (report of a meeting at the Bankauf-
sichtamt)
19 BNB, Archives, SD, Malaise Papers, ‘enquête BEB’: report of the Commission of En-
quiry (published text, 1946), Part 1, pp. 139-140.
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a prohibited political or military nature: they were convinced that the 
opposite was the case20.
To indicate the burden that the clearing system imposed on the Bel-
gian economy during the occupation, it is better to look at the average 
monthly increase in the clearing balance in Belgium’s favour, rather 
than each year’s final balance. That increase remained fairly limited 
until August 1941, but from then on began to accelerate to reach an 
overwhelming maximum in the last quarter of 1942, when it averaged 
2.2 billion Belgian francs a month. The average remained at this high 
level throughout 1943, but dipped thereafter.
Table 19.4:  Average monthly increase in the clearing balance in Belgium’s favour, 1940-
1944 (in millions of Belgian francs)













Source: Freiburg im Breisgau, Military archives, RW 36/277: Hofrichter, Abschlusz-
bericht der Militärverwaltung in Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 1940-1944, p. 14; ARA, 
fonds SG, executive committee, Nokin Papers, BEB file 16: observations relatives au 
rapport de la Commission d’Enquête, p. 20.
anxious years For the staFF and For the bank
The enormous expansion in the money supply had a fatal effect on pric-
es: not so much on official prices as these were fixed and rose only very 
moderately, but on ‘black market’ prices, which went up by unfettered 
leaps and bounds. The underlying cause was official rationing, which 
was so strict that people were obliged to turn to the black market for 
their food, if they could pay the excessive prices being demanded. The 
situation was compounded by a tireless competitor on that market, the 
20 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, Direction, Nokin Papers, BEB, dossier 16: 
observations relatives au rapport de la Commission d’Enquête, observations de M. 
Cracco.
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German purchasing agencies. In August 1944, for example, the index 
figure for a package of essential consumer goods purchased partly at 
official prices and partly at black market prices reached a maximum of 
939, compared to the reference index of 100 in April 194021.
Like the majority of the population, the staff of the Bank and the 
Banque d’Emission suffered badly from the price increases, made all 
the worse by the absence of any substantial adjustment to wages and 
salaries. The managements of the two institutions attempted to counter 
this by granting loans and advances that, in principle, had to be repaid 
after the war. They also increased the budget for charitable activities, 
which was now directed specifically at those of their own staff in need, 
including pensioners; in addition, they accelerated promotions, and 
continued to offer benefits in kind. Overall, it was an impressive effort 
on the part of the two institutions, which, in the spring of 1943, were 
employing more than 1,700 people.
A particular concern for management towards the end of the occupa-
tion was the drafting of staff for forced labour in Germany. Because 
of their close contacts with the Military Government and with the 
Bankaufsichtamt, the two institutions were initially spared the drafts 
ordered by the ordinance of 6 October 1942. At the beginning of 1943, 
however, the recruiting office (Werbestelle) began to exert significantly 
greater pressure on companies, including banks. In April of that year, 
Goffin consequently submitted a request to the secretary-general of 
the Ministry of Finance for the staff to obtain the same sort of identity 
card issued to the staff of government departments, State companies 
and semi-public organizations, which served as proof of employment 
and the means of exemption. Goffin’s request was granted and the staff 
continued to escape being impressed.
However, fresh difficulties arose with the ordinance of 28 June 1943, 
which laid down that institutions assimilated to government depart-
ments would no longer enjoy exemption22. In September, the Werbestelle 
decided to draft Bank staff. Vandeputte was asked to submit detailed 
lists of employees born in 1920 and 1921, of whom there were about fifty.
21 Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 303.
22 BNB, Archives, Contentieux, Miomandre Papers, dossier a: note pour le comité de 
direction, 07.07.1943.
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A sharp discussion arose among the leaders of the Bank about 
whether the lists should be handed over. Goffin and Vandeputte were 
in favour, although only the lists of those who had already received no-
tice of call-up. They argued that handing over the lists could enable 
them to engage the Werbestelle in a discussion to have the departure of 
a number of employees postponed indefinitely or even cancelled. Their 
view prevailed. In November 1943, the Bank was requested to indicate 
sixteen of the group of those called up, just half of whom would be 
drafted. The management refused to comply, insisting that it would not 
give active assistance in impressment. This led to the Werbestelle, after 
deliberation with Vandeputte, dividing the staff called up into three 
groups, which would depart on 15 January, 15 February and 30 March 
1944 respectively23.
An ordinance issued on 7 January 1944 tightened the forced labour 
measures even further, with drafting now being extended to take in 
young men born in 1922, 1923 and 1924. Fifty-one employees of the 
Bank were cited and the problem of submitting lists once again came 
to the fore. This time, Vandeputte allowed those involved to decide for 
themselves. Twenty-six, including nine who had already been called up, 
agreed to have their names submitted; eighteen asked for their names 
not to be given and the rest could no longer be contacted24. Ultimately, 
twenty of the staff were drafted to work in Germany, the rest – the ma-
jority – opted to go into hiding25. The Bank continued to pay virtually 
the full amount of their wages and salaries to their families26.
The rounding-up of labour that began at the end of 1942 in the oc-
cupied territories served to strengthen opposition to the Germans. The 
Resistance now no longer limited itself chiefly to passing on secret in-
formation, concealing escaped air-crew, discreet sabotage through go-
slow campaigns, and anti-German propaganda, but gradually extended 
23 BNB, Archives, DC, 27.12.1943, 25.01.1944.
24 BNB, Archives, DC, 21.03.1944, 24.03.1944, 05.04.1944.
25 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 16.05.1944. 
26 Vandeputte had likewise ensured that the Bank granted subsidies to the rectors of 
the free universities of Louvain and Brussels to help students called up for labour 
in Germany, but who had refused to go and had gone into hiding: BNB, Archives, 
SD, 3, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.15/ s. f. 1, ‘correspondance Mlle Malaise, 1953-1955’ 
(draft declaration from Malaise in support of Vandeputte, 26.01.1953).
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its activities to armed attacks and to larger-scale sabotage27, which, of 
course, required greater financial resources. The Belgian government 
in London had been systematically sending US dollars with its agents 
that were being parachuted into Belgium, but the difficulties created by 
the clandestine exchange of dollars had forced this form of financing 
to be abandoned28. This led Raymond Scheyven, head of the ‘Socrates’ 
Resistance cell, to issue ‘Socrates’ certificates, many of which he was 
able to place with financial institutions and big companies through the 
mediation of his uncle, A.-E. Janssen, and which brought in a total of 
176 million Belgian francs between mid 1943 and August 1944. After 
the liberation, the certificates were redeemed by the Bank on behalf of 
the State29. Other Resistance groups, too, received financial help from 
banks, holding companies and large businesses, but this aid was not so 
formalized as the Socrates-certificate system30. The Bank took no part 
in that system, but later organized its own means of financing the Bel-
gian Resistance.
Some Resistance groups resorted to violence. Even the Bank it-
self was an occasional victim of hold-ups, sometimes with the secret 
 cooperation of local branch managers. The general climate of unrest 
and of expectations about an imminent invasion prompted the Bank 
to take special precautionary measures. On 29 June 1943, for example, 
the Bank circulated instructions to all branch managers on how to safe-
guard their cash reserves in case of military operations or outbreaks 
27 According to what Struye noted, it was only 1942 that the Belgian Resistance began 
to organize itself. Organized resistance expanded considerably from 1943 on: ARA, 
fonds Société Générale de Belgique, Défense, dossier 22: Struye, L’opinion publique 
en Belgique après vingt mois d’occupation (25.02.1942); Struye, L’opinion publique 
en Belgique après deux ans et demi d’occupation (31.12.1942).
28 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister, dossier 74: letter of 21.10.1943 
from de Staercke (London) to Gutt (London); letter of 26.10.1943 from Gutt (Lon-
don) to de Staercke (London).
29 Bernard Ducarme, Le financement de la résistance armée en Belgique, 1940-1944 
(CRISP, cahiers 476-477), 1970, 62 p.
30 At the beginning of June 1944, for example, the Bank’s agent at Liège, on his own 
responsibility, handed over 4 million Belgian francs to representatives of the Secret 
Army (Het Geheime Leger): BNB, Archives, DC, 07.12.1944. In respect of aid to other 
Resistance groups, see: Fernand Strubbe, Geheime oorlog 40/45. De Inlichtings- en 
Actiediensten in België, Tielt, 1993.
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of disorder in their area31. The reason for the June instructions was to 
prepare, in case of an invasion, for the possibility – taken very seriously 
at the time – of the German forces withdrawing behind a defensive line 
along the river Meuse. Exactly what measures were to be taken was the 
subject of a sharp dispute between the Bank, the Ministry of Finance 
and the private bankers32. A front line along the river would serve to cut 
off the southern districts from the rest of the country and consequently 
threaten both the payment of the wages and salaries of public sector 
employees and the circulation of money. In the opinion of Plisnier and 
the private bankers, that particular crisis could be averted by giving 
the Bank’s branches extra cash reserves, a move that would have the 
additional advantage of preventing a repetition of the chaotic situation 
of May 1940.
The Bank’s directors were unimpressed by the suggestion and point-
ed out that, in the present state of unrest in the south of the country, 
additional cash reserves would only increase the risk of hold-ups and 
expose the staff to even greater threat. Moreover, there was also the pos-
sibility that German troops would simply confiscate the money. Lastly, 
as Goffin indicated, there was the problem of transport and insurance. 
The board argued further that the Bank had just four lorries and that 
the insurance companies had required a considerable reduction in the 
amount of money carried by each of them. As Plisnier was not prepared 
to provide a State guarantee to cover the risks of higher cash reserves 
and the attendant transport costs, the Bank could not disregard the 
conditions laid down by those companies. If the private bankers wished 
to have more cash resources at their disposition in Wallonia, the direc-
tors argued, they would have to put in more themselves.
The private bankers and the Secretary-general were not particularly 
happy about the Bank’s standpoint and, at the beginning of 1944, re-
sumed their offensive, supported this time by the Bankaufsichtamt33. 
31 BNB, Archives, SD, 2, Malaise Papers, dossier 9.5.6: annexe à la circulaire du 29 juin 
1943 (instructions aux agents en vue d’assurer la sécurité de leur encaisse en cas de 
troubles ou d’événements militaires).
32 BNB, Archives, SD, 14, Reichskreditkassenscheine, dossier 8.11/4: constitution 
d’encaisses spéciales en province, 20.09.1943; BNB, Archives, DC, 06.10.1943; BNB, 
Archives, SD, dossier 8.11/21: encaisses dans les agences (réunion des banquiers, 
11.10.1943).
33 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 07.01.1944.
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In April, Plisnier stated that, as State exchequer, the Bank was obliged 
to maintain substantial reserves in the provinces as well, in order to 
ensure the prompt payment of public sector wages and salaries, and to 
cover other current expenditure. Furthermore, he emphasized that his 
request for the cash reserves at the branches to be increased was to be 
considered as an instruction, which in May 1944 the board decided to 
endorse34.
cracco’s emissiebank cerTificaTes
On 3 December 1942, shortly after the resignation of Berger and Van 
Nieuwenhuyse, Cracco submitted a memorandum to the Bank’s board 
of directors, in which he set out a plan to subject clearing-system pay-
ments concerning exports of goods and services to stricter control. 
Payments by the Banque d’Emission would no longer be totally in cash; 
rather, 30 per cent would be in registered, non-negotiable certificates 
from the Banque d’Emission, redeemable once hostilities ceased. Be-
sides serving to put a brake on the growth of the money supply and 
to counter price inflation, this procedure would provide a better in-
sight into the indirect transactions being routed through the clearing 
system35. This would at last be a way of drastically curbing payments 
for transactions on the black market and transactions of a political or 
military character.
Galopin insisted that Cracco should make contact with the leaders 
of the industrial groups via the Ministry of Economic Affairs, as he 
expected opposition from that quarter. A meeting was arranged and 
took place on 7 January 1943 at the ministry. As expected, Cracco’s pro-
posal came in for heavy criticism, the industrialists regarding the non-
negotiability of the certificates as an unacceptable obstacle, but in the 
end they gave in.
There was also opposition on the German side. Hofrichter proposed 
that, by way of experiment, the arrangement be applied initially solely 
to payments for direct clearing transactions and that there be an as-
34 BNB, Archives, DC, 04.05.1944, 10.05.1944.
35 The amount, corresponding to a payment with certificates, would be entered in the 
Banque d’Emission’s books on an individual account of the beneficiary.
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sessment after two or three months’ experience to determine whether it 
could also be extended to payments for indirect clearing transactions. 
It was only with great difficulty, and after major concessions, that Crac-
co was able to persuade Hofrichter to withdraw his counter-proposal36 
and to issue in February 1943 an ordinance that adopted Cracco’s origi-
nal suggestions. However, the arrangement would cover only payment 
orders for the purchase of goods, not those for services. In addition, all 
payment orders for sums below 10,000 Reichsmarks (125,000 Belgian 
francs) would be automatically exempt and the Bankaufsichtamt would 
reserve the right to grant an exemption for higher amounts in excep-
tional cases. The Banque d’Emission would be similarly empowered and 
would also be able to grant advance redemption of the certificates to 
companies with liquidity problems37.
The system ran into difficulties right from the outset. Arguing that 
their profit margins were minimal, their activities loss-making or their 
liquidity position tight, the coal mines and the coke works immediately 
pushed for exemption, their example being followed by certain textile 
and steel firms38. The Banque d’Emission adopted a flexible stance and 
granted a number of exemptions, but all this led to a storm of criti-
cism at the meeting of the board of directors in early April 1943. Cracco 
defended himself by pointing out that no less than 789 certificates had 
been issued for a total amount of 136.5 million Belgian francs, and these 
had been in favour of 455 enterprises. However, he had to admit that 
only 13.5 per cent of payments falling under the arrangement had been 
financed with certificates during that period, emphasizing that the 
Wehr machtverrechnungskasse and the Reichskreditkasse were barely 
applying the arrangement at all39.
As April and May passed, criticism mounted. From Berlin came 
rumblings of displeasure about the decline in Belgian deliveries to 
36 BNB, Archives, SD, 20bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.10/30: note relative aux récentes 
négociations au sujet des modalités de liquidation des ordres de paiement en clear-
ing, 15.01.1943.
37 The Bank would cede Treasury certificates from its portfolio to the Banque 
d’Emission, as surety for and in proportion to Banque d’Emission certificates is-
sued. The Bank would take back the Treasury certificates, as soon as the certificates 
had been paid out in cash: BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 01.07.1943.
38 BNB, Archives, DC, 05.03.1943.
39 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 07.04.1943.
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Germany and the rise in Belgian export prices. Criticism was also 
rife within Belgium. Businessmen had no faith in the certificates and 
complained that exemptions were being granted arbitrarily, leading to 
widespread discrimination. As a result, the real dupes of the system 
were those who tried to run their businesses honestly40.
Cracco and Hofrichter began to negotiate possible amendments to 
the system. Hofrichter sought a gradual scaling-down, beginning with 
a reduction from 30 to 20 per cent of the payment percentage to be 
settled with certificates. Cracco demanded that the threshold for au-
tomatic exemption be lowered from 10,000 to 6,000 Reichsmarks and 
that there be stricter action regarding the German purchasing agencies. 
In the end, Hofrichter got his way in respect of the percentage, while 
Cracco had to be content with a promise that the agencies would be 
urged to apply the arrangement more effectively. The new arrangement 
took effect on 1 June 194341.
The lowering of the percentage did nothing to quieten criticism on 
either the Belgian or the German side. In the opinion of the founder-
bankers the measure had totally failed to achieve its aims: there had 
been barely any reduction in the circulation of money and only a mar-
ginal improvement, at best, in the control over clearing transactions. 
Moreover, widespread irritation had been caused by the arbitrary 
 handling of dossiers42. On the German side, the non-negotiability of 
the certificates came under heavy fire. Hofrichter and Cracco therefore 
sat down again to see how the system could be improved. The discus-
sion with the bankers was anything but smooth43. They were not keen 
to take up the certificates, as they had no confidence in them. Indeed, 
they were prepared to grant advances with certificates as collateral only 
to companies that could present Treasury certificates from the Banque 
40 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 07.05.1943, 22.05.1943; BNB, Archives, SD, 33, divers, dossier 
8.11.27/ 1: divers (certificats de la BEB, note, 19.04.1943).
41 BNB, Archives, SD, 21, clearing, dossier 8.11.11/33: abaissement de la quotité de 30 
à 20 procent (note du 15 mai 1943); BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 01.06.1943, 02.06.1943; 
Belgian Official Gazette, 04-05.06.1943.
42 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 16.06.1943, 21.06.1943, 24.06.1943.
43 BNB, Archives, SD, 21bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.11/35: réunion des fondateurs, 
28.06.1943, 05.07.1943, 19.07.1943, 21.07.1943; BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 01.07.1943, 
13.07.1943, 19.07.1943, 22.07.1943.
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d’Emission’s portfolio as additional security. Cracco and Vandeputte 
pointed out the impossibility of this: the Bank’s cession of Treasury 
certificates to the Banque d’Emission was a transaction for the public 
benefit and could not be changed. The bankers dug their heels in and 
demanded that they be allowed to discount bills payable at the Bank for 
the amount of the advances granted. They won and the certificates were 
made negotiable at the banks under these conditions44.
Meanwhile, repeated complaints from Berlin about the dwindling of 
Belgian deliveries to Germany had again antagonized the Bankaufsicht-
amt against the certificates45. German pressure became all the greater 
after Cracco’s arrest on 7 August 1943 and Vandeputte responded by 
making a further reduction to 10 per cent in the payment percentage 
required to be settled with Banque d’Emission certificates46.
44 BNB, Archives, SD, 21bis, clearing, dossier, 8.11.11/36: réunion des banquiers fonda-
teurs, 05.08.1943.
45 BNB, Archives, SD, 21bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.11/35: compte rendu de la réunion au 
commissariat, 20.07.1943; BNB, Archives, SD, 26, WVK, dossier 8.11.16/10: communi-
cations des membres du comité, 29.07.1943.
46 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 08.11.1943.

Chapter 20
The Liberation in Sight
The final skirmishes wiTh The bankaufsichtamt
The fact that the relationship between the Bank and the Banque 
d’Emission, on the one hand, and the Bankaufsichtamt, on the other, 
remained tense, was due not so much to the occupying authority, which 
was inclined to adopt a more flexible line, but to the chief person on the 
Belgian side, namely the director Vandeputte. He was a stickler for the 
rules, never failed to spot an irregularity and subjected every dossier to 
the same perfectionist eye.
A major point of resentment continued to be the occupier’s practice 
of requisitioning1. This had already been widespread in the early period 
of the occupation, but had expanded over the years to cover a broader 
range of goods. In January 1943, the Germans even turned to taking the 
bells from church towers as raw materials in their armaments factories. 
The method of recompense also differed widely. At first, recompense 
was made through the Ministry of Finance, partly in cash and partly 
in Treasury certificates, and was charged to occupation costs. Before 
long, however, it was being made via the clearing system. For the sake of 
appearances, however, the German authorities employed an increasing 
number of Belgian middlemen, so that the requisitioning could pass as 
a normal commercial contract2.
When the occupier began to use such contracts in April 1943 to buy 
up machinery and the entire plant of factories, and even to dismantle 
factories that were no longer operating, because their owners refused 
1 BNB, Archives, SD, 23, clearing, dossier 8.11.13/16: paiement des réquisitions de 
l’occupant.
2 Vandeputte was very suspicious of this: BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 16.12.1943; BNB, Ar-
chives, SD, 23, clearing, dossier 8.11.13/16: réquisitions, divers, textiles, 03.03.1944.
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to collaborate, there was reaction from the Belgian authorities3. They 
felt that the occupier was going too far and jeopardising the industrial 
infrastructure of the country. The managing directors of the Banque 
d’Emission therefore decided to refuse the execution of payment orders 
for such veiled requisitioning.
A second point of disagreement was the requisitioning of gold and 
foreign currency. At the end of 1942, the Germans began a fresh ploy. 
As explained above, the gold deposited by the Bank with the Banque 
de France had been transferred in 1941-1942 by the latter into the ‘safe-
keeping’ of the Reichsbank in Berlin. On 9 October 1942, however, with-
out consultation or warning, the Reichsbank informed Governor Gof-
fin via a letter from the Bankaufsichtamt in Brussels that the German 
government had requisitioned that gold and assessed remuneration at 
2,784 Reichsmarks per kilogram of fine gold. The letter went on to ask 
how the Bank would like to receive that amount. Goffin answered that 
the Bank was not involved and did not want to be involved. As a result, 
the amount of 552,378,318.20 Reichsmarks was lodged with the court in 
Berlin4.
In a further step, the Germans demanded that sterling held by pri-
vate individuals and declared in 1940, but not commandeered, had now 
to be surrendered5. Writing on 23 February 1943 to the managing direc-
tors of the Banque d’Emission, von Becker ordered that the pounds were 
to be offered to the Banque d’Emission, purchased by it and channelled 
to the Reichsbank6. The handling of the dossiers went so slowly that 
the Bankaufsichtamt insisted on dealing with them more quickly. The 
managing directors refused, whereupon, on 30 June 1943, the Military 
Government issued an eleventh implementing ordinance, which trans-
ferred the handling from the Banque d’Emission to the Reichskreditkas-
se7. Even then the operation was not very successful. The total amount 
3 BZ, fonds OB, dossier 26: letter of 15.04.1943 from Goffin to Leemans; BZ, fonds OB, 
dossier 27: letter of 23.10.1943 from Leemans to von Falkenhausen.
4 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, pp. 182-184.
5 The measure applied not only to the pound sterling, but also to the South African, 
the Palestinian and the Egyptian pounds.
6 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 1-2, d: letter of 27.03.1943 from the Banque 
d’Emission to customers and banks.
7 Verordnungsblatt (German Official Gazette), 13.07.1943.
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of sterling involved was £180,000. About £60,000 which belonged to 
Jews or to persons from territories hostile to the Germans had already 
been confiscated. No more than £46,000 was ultimately sent to Berlin.
On 29 July 1943, the Military Government issued a twelfth imple-
menting ordinance: gold, foreign currency and securities denominated 
in foreign currency that belonged to individuals or legal persons es-
tablished in the Belgian Congo were required to be declared, offered 
and eventually surrendered to the Banque d’Emission8. The managing 
directors refused to co-operate. An additional order was received on 
20 September to purchase all American and Swiss banknotes that had 
been declared in consequence of the twelfth ordinance9. In a circular 
sent on 15 October 1943 to all foreign exchange banks holding such 
banknotes, the Banque d’Emission expressly emphasized that this was 
compulsory. The banks allowed the process of declaration to drag on, 
under the pretext of being unable to contact the depositors. The Bank-
aufsichtamt returned to the matter in August 1944, though by now the 
liberation was very much in the offing10.
A third major point of friction between the Banque d’Emission 
and the Bankaufsichtamt concerned the establishment of branches of 
German companies or new German companies in Belgium and the 
increase in the capital of German banks established in Belgium. All 
these developments were the direct consequence of Albert Speer taking 
charge of the German war economy. Speer was an architect, a confidant 
of Hitler and a highly skilled organizer. In answer to the devastating air 
attacks by the Allies on industrial areas in Germany, he had convinced 
the German authorities to transfer a proportion of production to the 
occupied territories11, arguing that greater dispersal would make mass 
destruction more difficult. Furthermore, doubtless the Allies would be 
reluctant to bomb a friendly nation. The German banks established in 
8 The ordinance appeared in the Verordnungsblatt (German Official Gazette) of 
09.08.1943.
9 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, Direction, BEB, dossier 22: note ‘réquisi-
tion d’or et de devises’, annex 3.
10 BNB, Archives, SD, clearing, dossier 8.11.13/14 bis: entretien au commissariat alle-
mand, 08.08.1944.
11 Klemm, German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944, pp. 271-272, 283-
313.
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Belgium had responded to this by increasing their capital in order to 
finance the extra activity12.
Setting up or expanding firms demanded the investment of capi-
tal and more operating funds in Belgium, the attendant transfers from 
Germany being arranged through the clearing system. In Vandeputte’s 
view, the establishment of German subsidiaries and companies in Bel-
gium meant a change in the industrial structure of the country, which 
was a matter of such public importance that it ought to involve the 
Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs13. He was backed in this 
by the founder-bankers, who were naturally none too keen on German 
companies being set up in Belgium, although they admitted that this 
had served to cut the deportation of workers to Germany.
It so happened that relations between the Banque d’Emission and 
Secretary-general Plisnier were still tense at this time. Indeed, Plisnier 
wanted nothing more to do with Banque d’Emission affairs and was 
even refusing to answer letters14. He had the impression that the institu-
tion was attempting increasingly to shift its responsibility onto him as 
Secretary-general of the Ministry of Finance. Goffin went to see Plis-
nier, in order to smooth ruffled feathers: Plisnier assured him that he 
harboured no hostility towards or mistrust of the Banque d’Emission, 
he just did not want to be involved in its activities and decisions15. In a 
later discussion with Vandeputte, however, Plisnier agreed that applica-
tions for capital transfers should be examined jointly, case by case, and 
payment of them refused if the planned production in Belgium had a 
military character16.
A further point of resentment by the Banque d’Emission was the ac-
tivity of the Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse, whose importance in clear-
ing operations had rapidly increased after the arrangement of 7 Decem-
ber 1942. In order to facilitate its payments to the German agencies, it 
12 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 14.12.1943; BNB, Archives, SD, 22bis, clearing, dossier 
8.11.12/7: réunion du comité du clearing, 17.12.1943.
13 BNB, Archives, SD, 22bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.12/7.
14 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 24.01.1944.
15 BNB, Archives, SD, 22bis, clearing, dossier 8.11.13/13: rapports avec le secrétaire 
général du Ministère des Finances, meeting between Goffin and Plisnier, 10.02.1944.
16 BNB, Archives, SD, 24, clearing, dossier 8.11.14/19: Betriebsmittel, meeting at the 
Bankaufsichtamt, 10.02.1944; meeting between Vandeputte and Plisnier, 03.03.1944.
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regularly requested the Banque d’Emission to transfer substantial sums 
to its account: at 31 October 1943, the overall provision for this totalled 
the considerable amount of 1,355 billion Belgian francs. As pointed 
out by Ingenbleek, the provisions boiled down to giving financial sup-
port to the enemy, which was punishable under article 115 of the Penal 
Code17. In a memorandum of 15-17 November 1943 to the Bankaufsicht-
amt, the Banque d’Emission protested vehemently against such prac-
tices18. Reeder endorsed the protest and promised that a start would be 
made in November to scale down the provisions. He kept his word and 
by 31 December that year, the overall provision held by the Wehrmacht-
verrechnungskasse had shrunk to 831 million Belgian francs; by 31 May 
1944, it was down to 216 million19.
A fresh point of discussion arose when, in April 1944, indirect clear-
ing operations20 came to account again for two thirds of payments for 
all clearing operations. All that could be purchased in Belgium was 
now being bought up by the German agencies – even furniture, glass-
ware, kitchenware and the like – to replace household goods destroyed 
in Germany by the Allied bombings. Belgium was also being used as a 
route to sell on large quantities of French wine and liqueurs to Germa-
ny21. In July-August, as the liberation became imminent, the managing 
directors resolved to postpone payments as much as possible and even 
to suspend them entirely.
The exporT of banknoTes To france
As already indicated, the German army’s purchase of Belgian goods 
destined for use in France had been the subject of strong protest by 
17 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 16.11.1943.
18 BNB, Archives, Prack Papers, dossier 2: Jost, Abschluszbericht der Militärver-
waltung des Reichskommissars für Belgien und Nord-Frankreich, 01.01.1944-
30.08.1944, p. 35-36.
19 BNB, Archives, SD, 26, clearing, dossier 8.11.16/1: WVK (note, 01.07.1944).
20 BNB, Archives, SD, 23, clearing, dossier 8.11.12/11ter: réunion des banquiers fonda-
teurs, 26.06.1944-09.08.1944.
21 BNB, Archives, SD, 26, clearing, dossier 8.11.16/ s. f. 2, 5, 7, 11: WVK (vins, note 
10.08.1944).
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the Banque d’Emission in the course of 1942. The managing directors 
refused to agree that no goods could be obtained in return from France 
and that everything was to be settled through the Franco-Belgian clear-
ing system. During negotiations about the problem in Paris in January 
194322, the Belgian delegation revived an earlier proposal for the credit 
balance arising from the sale of goods destined for France to be entered 
on a special account at the Banque de France that Belgium could use 
for the import of goods from France. Again, however, the proposal was 
firmly rejected.
A second point in the negotiations concerned the question of bank-
notes. The Banque de France requested the Banque d’Emission to cede 
its portfolio of French banknotes to France, declaring that it would 
have the equivalent value credited to the Belgian clearing balance in 
Berlin. The Banque d’Emission refused and the Banque de France then 
asked to be supplied with 100 million Belgian francs in banknotes, for 
which it would similarly repay Belgium through the clearing system. 
The bank notes were required to pay the wages of Belgian frontier work-
ers in France and, increasingly, of Belgian workers in the French interi-
or. Until then, the Banque de France had financed those payments with 
the Belgian banknotes that had been in its portfolio since the summer 
of 1940, when Belgian refugees were exchanging their money for French 
francs23. That stock was now all but exhausted and a fresh supply had 
to be obtained.
For various reasons, the Belgians were not at all happy with the re-
quest. In the first place, they were well aware of the fraud that was being 
practised in France with Belgian money: the exchange rate on the black 
market tended to be around 40 Belgian francs to 100 French, whereas 
the official rate was set at 62.5 Belgian francs to 100 French. Belgian 
workers, having their wages paid in Belgian money, exchanged that 
money into French on the black market in France and then had that 
French money exchanged for Belgian francs at par at Belgian banks24. 
A second cause for complaint was the manner in which the Banque de 
France made remuneration for the banknotes it purchased: the amount 
22 BNB, Archives, RR, 27.01.1943.
23 BNB, Archives, SD, 24, clearing, dossier 8.11.14/31: note concernant la remise des 
francs français à la Banque de France, July 1943.
24 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 06.05.1943.
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was registered as a Belgian credit item on the Belgian clearing account 
in Berlin. Ultimately, the Belgians gave in, agreeing to dispatch 100 mil-
lion Belgian francs to the Banque de France and have the amount en-
tered as a credit on the Belgian clearing account in Berlin. As a conces-
sion to the Belgians the French promised to institute stricter controls 
on the payment of the wages25.
A further round of negotiations took place in Paris on 9 and 10 
September 1943, firstly to look at the question of the repayment of 
the Belgian loans of 193426. Vandeputte, who had meanwhile replaced 
Cracco, attempted to have the 800 million French francs now held in 
banknotes by the Banque d’Emission applied to the repayment of those 
loans. The Banque de France refused, arguing that the banknotes had 
been brought into Belgium partly in 1940 and partly more recently – 
fraudulently – for speculative purposes and therefore did not qualify 
for compensation.
The Belgian negotiators gained a point over wage payments; they 
would be organized more effectively through the introduction of a 
standardized pay slip. It was in respect of this concession that the Bel-
gians finally accepted a French proposal for the Banque d’Emission to 
send 50 million Belgian francs in banknotes each month to the Banque 
de France to cover the payment of the wages of Belgians working in 
France. The Belgians also agreed that each monthly amount would be 
entered as a credit on the Belgian clearing account in Berlin.
The new arrangement came into effect on 1 December 1943 and the 
first monthly transfer of the 50 million francs took place on 4 February 
194427. Vandeputte nevertheless had difficulties with the arrangement. 
As soon as the landings had taken place in Normandy, he informed 
the Banque de France that the managing directors of the Banque 
d’Emission had resolved to halt the dispatches of Belgian banknotes 
with effect from 1 July28. The Banque de France reacted sharply, but the 
breakthrough of the Allied troops in France soon served to break con-
tacts between Paris and Brussels29.
25 BNB, Archives, RR, 27.01.1943.
26 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 15.09.1943.
27 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 04.02.1944.
28 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 14.06.1944. 
29 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 02.08.1944.
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moneTary differences and dispuTes wiTh The neTherlands and 
germany
In the autumn of 1943, the German General Staff was expecting an im-
minent Allied landing, possibly in the delta area of the rivers Scheldt, 
Meuse and Rhine, and had consequently sent a force of troops to Zee-
land, besides having the Todt Organization build additional defence 
works in the south of the Netherlands. The purchase of provisions for 
those troops and of building materials was organized from Belgium 
and the Berlin government intended to make a similar financing ar-
rangement to that for the purchase of goods in Belgium destined for 
France. To this end, Hofrichter instructed the Banque d’Emission on 17 
September 1943 that, with effect from November, it was to finance mili-
tary purchases in Belgium destined for the Netherlands. In return, a 
corresponding credit would be entered on the Belgian clearing account 
in Berlin30. The managing directors could not agree to this procedure 
– it was not for Belgium to finance German military expenditure in 
the Netherlands31 – and on 2 October the Bank informed the Military 
Government that it refused to execute the instruction of 17 September.
A second problem soon became acute. From the end of 1943, the 
Nederlandsche Bank had been urging the Banque d’Emission to transfer 
to Amsterdam the guilders it had received for exchange from Belgian 
workers in the Netherlands. In return, a corresponding credit would 
be entered on the Belgian clearing account at the Verrechnungskasse 
in Berlin32. The Banque d’Emission had always refused to countenance 
this, but the Nederlandsche bank continued to press the case, even to 
the point of Dutch employers being forbidden, to pay Belgian workers 
(mainly frontier workers) in guilders with effect from 1 July 1944, with 
the result that Belgian labour in the Netherlands was blocked. On 11 
August 1944 the President of the Nederlandsche Bank, Rost van Ton-
ningen, came in person to Brussels to push through the Dutch request 
with German help. In the end, the managing directors of the Banque 
30 BNB, Archives, SD, 22, clearing, dossier 8.11.12/1: virements des RKK Hollande et 
Belgique, letter of 17.09.1943 from Hofrichter to Goffin.
31 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 27.09.1943.
32 BNB, Archives, SD, 22, clearing, 8.11.12/1: virements des RKK Hollande et Belgique 
(meeting between Vandeputte and Hofrichter, 29.09.1943).
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d’Emission, being aware of the social implications for Belgian workers, 
gave in, accepting the procedure for a period of three months.
The Banque d’Emission’s major dispute with the German Military 
Government in Brussels had also to do with payments for Belgian la-
bour. The Belgians who left voluntarily during the early years of the oc-
cupation to work in Germany had never had any difficulty in convert-
ing their savings from Reichsmarks into Belgian francs in Germany, 
but this situation had been changed by the ordinance of 6 October 1942 
on forced labour. The number of Belgian workers employed in Germa-
ny rose considerably. By the beginning of 1943 it was already approxi-
mately 300,00033; and by 1944, it was even being put at between 425,000 
and 450,00034. The dispatch of Belgian banknotes by the Reichskredit-
kasse from Brussels to Berlin now assumed unforeseen proportions, the 
average amount transferred each month between the end of 1942 and 
the spring of 1943 rising from 115 million to 300 million Belgian francs35.
However, suspicions were aroused at the Banque d’Emission that not 
all the banknotes were reaching the Belgian workers. This was conced-
ed by the Military Government and the result was a circular letter of 26 
May 1943 laying down that, with effect from 1 July 1943, Belgian workers 
in Germany were no longer permitted to exchange money in Germany 
when they took their holiday. All that they could do was to purchase 
Reisegutscheine issued by the Deutsche Bank, up to a maximum value of 
300 Reichsmarks, which could be exchanged for Belgian francs in Bel-
gium at all post offices and the local branches of the Reichskreditkasse36.
The new system resulted in a substantial reduction in the dispatches 
of Belgian banknotes to Germany, from a maximum of 300 million 
Belgian francs’ worth a month in the spring of 1943 to between 100 and 
125 million francs’ worth by the end of the year37. But the system did not 
halt the consignments. The Bankaufsichtamt was then asked to explain 
33 BNB, Archives, SD, 21, clearing, dossier 8.11.11/32: réunion des banquiers fondateurs, 
01.04.1943.
34 BNB, Archives, SD, 25, travail à l’étranger, dossier 8.11.15/2: note sur les travailleurs à 
l’étranger, 31.05.1944; BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 07.06.1944.
35 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 16.02.1944.
36 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 02.06.1943; BNB, Archives, SD, 25, travail à l’étranger, dossier 
8.11.15/2: note sur les travailleurs belges à l’étranger, 31.05.1944.
37 BNB, Archives, BR BEB, 16.02.1944.
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the purpose of the still considerable quantity of Belgian banknotes be-
ing sent to Germany by the Reichskreditkasse38. Hofrichter answered 
that, because of the air attacks and the resulting chaos in many German 
towns, workers returning on holiday to Belgium were finding it impos-
sible to purchase Reisegutscheine and thus were attempting to exchange 
their German savings into Belgian money locally. Secondly, the wages 
of Belgian frontier workers were still being paid in Belgian francs39. 
Vandeputte was not satisfied with the explanation and Hofrichter ulti-
mately had to admit that the banknotes were also being used to provide 
German troops in transit through Belgium with Belgian money40.
The Bankaufsichtamt then suggested that dispatches of banknotes 
to Germany be limited to a fixed amount of 50 million Belgian francs a 
month. The Banque d’Emission opposed this, being against the idea of a 
fixed payment. However, the Berlin government insisted, but qualified 
this by promising that the money would henceforth no longer be used 
to finance German troops in transit41.
A compromise was reached in February 1944, whereby the Banque 
d’Emission would continue to send 50 million Belgian francs’ worth of 
banknotes each month to the Reichsbank, but just for a period of three 
months. After that, the matter would be reviewed. At that moment, the 
Bankaufsichtamt declared that the amount required had stabilized at 
around 40 million Belgian francs a month and that the money was be-
ing used chiefly to pay the frontier workers. The Banque d’Emission ul-
timately agreed to pay that amount42.
38 BNB, Archives, SD, 23, clearing, dossier 8.11.13/12bis: envoi de billets belges en Alle-
magne (letter of 17.08.1943 from Goffin to the Bankaufsichtamt); BNB, Archives, BR 
BEB, 20.10.1943: BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 25.11.1943.
39 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 14.12.1943.
40 BNB, Archives, RR, 29.12.1943 (letter of 20.12.1943 from the Bankaufsichtamt to Gof-
fin).
41 BNB, Archives, SD, 23, clearing, dossier 8.11.13/12bis: envoi des billets belges en Al-
lemagne (report of the meeting at the Bankaufsichtamt on 10.02.1944).
42 BNB, Archives, SD, 23, clearing, dossier 8.11.13/12bis: envoi des billets belges en Al-
lemagne (RR, 10.05.1944, 31.05.1944, 07.06.1944).
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The preparaTions for posT-war moneTary reform
At quite an early stage during the occupation, the Bank turned its atten-
tion to the monetary and financial reform necessary to restore the in-
ternal and external stability of the pre-war years. The death of  Georges 
Janssen brought this to a temporary halt, but a study group was set up 
in the course of 1942 by Dupriez, Cracco, Kauch and Vincent, another 
employee of the Bank, to examine post-war problems of exchange con-
trol. A much broader investigation got under way at the Bank at the 
beginning of 1943, to examine the entire question of post-war monetary 
recovery and the reform of public finances. For the sake of security, the 
Bank confined its research to a small study group, headed by the gov-
ernment commissioner Smeers. It met each Tuesday afternoon at the 
Bank, which is why it came to be called the Comité du Mardi43.
Within the study group, there was total agreement about a number 
of important general principles. First of all, the reform had not only to 
be pushed through rapidly, but also be exhaustive and fundamental. 
For this to be achieved, several measures would have to be taken im-
mediately after the liberation. In addition, new banknotes would have 
to be issued, coupled with tax measures, to end the war-time inflation. 
Everyone was also agreed on a tax on war profits, the yardstick for 
which would be the growth in assets since 10 May 1940. However, be-
cause the proceeds from such a tax would be insufficient to compensate 
for the monetary dislocation during the war, supplementary tax meas-
ures were also necessary. Lastly, it was clear to everyone that exchange 
controls had to be renewed44.
Opinions differed on the question of the supplementary tax meas-
ures. Dupriez proposed that there should be just one supplementary 
measure, over and above the special tax on war profits, namely an im-
mediate monetary tax to eliminate war-time inflation and reform the 
public finances45. The introduction of a new currency unit (the guilder 
43 F. Cracco, ‘Rond de monetaire hervorming van 1944’, in: Tijdschrift van het perso-
neel van de NBB, July-August 1977, p. 13.
44 BNB, Archives, SD, 48, dossier 8.13/10: rapports relatifs aux travaux de la commis-
sion d’études financières de Bruxelles (memorandum of 20.01.1944).
45 BNB, Archives, SD, 48, dossier 8.13/10: rapports relatifs aux travaux de la commis-
sion d’études financières de Bruxelles (memorandum from Dupriez, undated).
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in place of the franc) and the attendant issue of new banknotes and 
coins would provide the opportunity to levy a general monetary tax. 
All circulating banknotes and coins, all current and assimilated ac-
counts at banks and the Postal Cheque Office would be converted at a 
rate of 50 per cent of their value into the new currency; the remaining 
50 per cent going to pay off the State’s debt to the Bank and the private 
bankers. In addition, all receivables, including insurance claims, sav-
ings, government and private sector bonds, and mortgage and com-
mercial claims would be converted into the new currency at 75 per cent 
of their original value, the remaining 25 per cent also going to the State 
to redeem debt.
Dupriez’s purpose was to place a rapid and drastic curb on the cir-
culation of money and thereby immediately bring about deflation. The 
simplicity of the operation meant that potential loopholes would be 
avoided and red tape kept to a minimum. In his opinion, the proposal 
was also justified from a social and ethical point of view, as it was based 
on the assumption that notes and coins, as well as deposits on transfer 
accounts, were largely being held by those who had profited from the 
war. Lower income groups, on the contrary, no longer had any cash or 
savings and thus would not be hit by the monetary tax. In the business 
world, most companies had invested their liquid assets in private and 
public securities, which would be taxed at no more than 25 per cent, if 
at all, so that there would be only a minimal disturbance to the coun-
try’s economic activity. For the same reason, the bank sector would be 
subject to only limited taxation, in order to make it easier for bridging 
loans to be provided to companies in temporary difficulty. However, 
companies, guilty of economic collaboration, or other companies, that 
had improperly enriched themselves, would be hit hard by the special 
tax on war profits.
The proposal was heavily criticized by Kauch and Franz De Voghel, 
Deputy-chairman of the Banking Commission46, their main point be-
ing the taxing of only one element of wealth, i.e. the monetary assets. 
Both offered an alternative proposal47 for reform in two phases. The first 
46 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 9, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 241/9, s. f. 3 and 6): résumé 
des observations présentées au cours de l’examen des projets d’assainissement 
monétaire; remarques de M. Kauch (undated).
47 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 9, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 241/9, s.f. 3): proposition De 
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phase would begin immediately after the liberation and be restricted 
to provisional reform: existing banknotes would be withdrawn from 
circulation and be replaced by a fresh issue. Each inhabitant would be 
permitted to exchange old banknotes for new, up to a maximum of 
5,000 Belgian francs – an indicative amount – with the option of using 
current accounts for the purpose. The rest would be frozen, with the 
exception of what had been registered on 10 May 1940. The redemption 
of Treasury certificates would also be frozen.
The regulation regarding the frozen monies, credit balances and se-
curities would be the subject of the reform’s second phase and would be 
entrusted to a new, autonomous institution yet to be established, whose 
task would be to split the frozen assets into two equivalent parts, one 
subject to temporary freezing, the other to absolute or very long-term 
freezing. The assets in the first category would be released gradually, as 
required by the resumption of economic activity. Those in the second 
would be kept out of circulation indefinitely or at least for a very long 
period, having to be converted into a long-term, currency-reform loan. 
The proceeds of this loan would be applied to redeem short-term gov-
ernment debt.
The Kauch-De Voghel proposal likewise met with sharp criticism48. 
In particular, the operation planned for the second phase was thought 
to be too complex and would take too long to be effective: the current 
administration certainly lacked the competent manpower to bring such 
a difficult task to a successful conclusion within a reasonable time-span. 
It was also pointed out that the currency-reform loan would consolidate 
only part of the short-term government debt; consequently, debt to the 
Bank and the private bankers could not be fully redeemed. Kauch and 
De Voghel attempted to adjust their proposal in the light of the criti-
cism, but even then failed to win the support of the entire study group. 
The final report therefore presented the two proposals – that of Dupriez 
and that of Kauch and De Voghel – as alternatives.
Dupriez had also thoroughly examined the problem of the post-war 
rate of exchange and for this purpose, too, submitted a proposal to the 
Voghel-Kauch, observations et critiques (aides-mémoires, undated).
48 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, 9, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 241/9, s. f. 3): résultats des ob-
servations présentées au cours de l’examen des projets d’assainissement monétaire 
(undated).
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study group49. The exchange rate of the Belgian franc had to be linked to 
sterling, because Belgium would be dependent chiefly on sterling- area 
countries for her foreign trade after the war. A comparative analysis of 
prices and wages in Belgium and Great Britain led him to judge that a 
rate of 150 Belgian francs to 1 pound sterling would keep the purchas-
ing power of the two countries in balance. However, the proposed rate 
implied a devaluation of the Belgian francs, which had been officially 
maintained at 123 Belgian francs to the pound during the war.
 The final report of the Brussels study group included not only the 
general proposals for post-war reform, but also texts of draft laws de-
signed to provide the proper legal basis for implementing the reform50. 
As early as March 1943, moreover, the engraver Jules Van Paemel had 
been commissioned to design a series of banknotes, and that year had 
also seen the declaration forms necessary for the administration of the 
entire reform process being printed in secret at the Bank.
No liberation came as expected in 1943. Pending it, this first series 
of proposals and texts with draft laws, together with the declaration 
forms, were locked away in the safe of the printing works, to which only 
the head of the works, had the key. During the summer of 1944, new 
proposals and new texts were worked out and added to the dossier51. On 
11 September 1944, the chairman of the study group, Smeers, handed 
the dossier over to the Minister of Finance, Gutt, in the minister’s pri-
vate office in Brussels52.
49 Dupriez, Les réformes monétaires de Belgique, passim.
50 BNB, Archives, SD, 48, dossier 8.13/10: rapports relatifs aux travaux de la Commis-
sion d’études financières de Bruxelles (memorandum of 10.01.1944).
51 Simonis, ‘Enkele korte, persoonlijke herinneringen aan de besluiten van 6 oktober 
1944’, in: Tijdschrift voor het personeel van de NBB, April 1977, p. 8.
52 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.02.41 (A 254/2, 3 and 4): rapport relatif 
aux travaux de la Commission d’études financières de Bruxelles, 11.09.1944. Dur-
ing July and August 1944, the working-party developed new proposals and draft 
texts for laws regarding special taxes on war profits and assets.
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The final days of The occupaTion
Events in 1944 were more than ever overshadowed by the approach-
ing liberation. Some sceptics adopted a circumspect approach, but most 
Belgians – including those who had borne great responsibility during 
the occupation – looked forward with what, in retrospect, can be called 
amazing naivety to their country being freed from the yoke of occupa-
tion. Even Cracco, when he heard at the end of March 1944 that his 
imprisonment in Belgium was to be commuted into a deportation to 
Germany, wrote to Kauch to inform him that he was standing for re-
election as a director at the general meeting of shareholders in August 
of that year53.
During the final days of the occupation, the Banque d’Emission was 
faced with urgent demands from German creditors to have their cur-
rent accounts paid in cash54. The managing directors resolved to put off 
meeting those demands as much as possible and were partially success-
ful in this with the Werhrmachtverrechnungskasse, wholly successful 
with the German banks, though not with the purchasing agencies. On 
4 September, however – the day that saw the liberation of Brussels – 
all payments were henceforth suspended and the Banque d’Emission 
closed its doors55.
Unimaginable relief, great expectations and uncertainty dominat-
ed the days immediately following the liberation. The Bank itself was 
waiting for instructions from the government, unsure about what to 
do regarding money circulation and for the time being maintaining its 
refusal to accept banknotes from the public, save in redemption of debt.
53 BNB, Archives, dossiers officiels après 1945, dossier 111: affaire Cracco (arrestation, 
non-renouvellement de son mandat après la guerre).
54 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 30.08.1944, 31.08.1944, 01.09.1944, 02.09.1944.
55 BNB, Archives, DC BEB, 06.09.1944.
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Preparation in London for 
Post-War Belgium
The esTablishmenT and sTarT of The cepag
By the late autumn of 1940, it had become evident to everyone in London 
that the Germans had lost the Battle of Britain, and hope had began to 
dawn that the final victory would be for the Allies. The Belgian govern-
ment in exile now judged it opportune to start studying the post-war 
reform of Belgium’s institutional structure, not only political reform, 
but also plans for a new socio-economic system1. Around the same time 
three prominent Belgian socialists who had fled to London – Jef Rens, 
Max Buset and Louis de Brouckère – had planned to set up a Belgian 
Committee for the Study of Post-war Problems (Commission belge pour 
l’Etude des Problèmes d’Après-Guerre – CEPAG) to prepare the return of 
the government after the country’s liberation. Ideas, drawn from the 
pre-war statist thinking of Belgian public figures, such as Hendrik De 
Man and Paul Van Zeeland, were clearly in evidence, as well as new 
theories of the English economist John Maynard Keynes2.
The government concurred with such a committee being set up, Gutt 
wanting this to be established in London3 with Rens as its secretary-
general. Spaak insisted on Van Zeeland, the former Prime-Minister, 
being appointed as chairman. Both Gutt and Spaak got their way. The 
CEPAG was inaugurated on 27 June 1941, Van Zeeland having arrived 
1 Dujardin and Dumoulin, Paul Van Zeeland, 1893-1973, p. 121..
2 Diane de Bellefroid, La Commission belge pour l’Etude des Problèmes d’Après-
Guerre (CEPAG), 1941-1944, (degree thesis, UCL, Department of History; supervisor: 
M. Dumoulin), Louvain- la-Neuve 1987, pp. 63-65.
3 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 17.01.1941 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
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from his residence in the United States for the occasion4. Sections – 
seven in all – were set up for foreign policy, state reform, the economy, 
education, social affairs, colonial matters and reconstruction.
The section dealing with the economy held its first meeting in Lon-
don on 16 July 1941, under the chairmanship of Van Zeeland. The occa-
sion was taken to divide the section into four study groups to cover the 
‘state supervision of economic life’, ‘industrial restructuring’, ‘the rela-
tionship between industry and science’ and ‘international economic re-
lationships’. The latter, which also included Van Zeeland and Ansiaux, 
was chaired by Baudewyns5.
In December 1941, Baudewyns was ready with his initial outline re-
port – rapport préliminaire sur le problème du change6 – which dem-
onstrated that the problem of the exchange rate had to be faced imme-
diately after the liberation. It went on to state that the problem would 
be solved satisfactorily only if the government took effective and rapid 
action to end the monetary chaos of the war years. This supposed an 
immediate purging of the excess circulation of money, contrary to what 
had happened after the First World War. Setting a long-term exchange 
rate for the Belgian franc would therefore have to be postponed until 
after the liberation, as only then would it be possible to compare price 
levels in the sterling and dollar zones. The report went on to point out 
that, after the end of hostilities, strict exchange control would have to 
be maintained as long as internal and external price levels were not 
stabilized, although that control ought not to become an obstacle to the 
smooth resumption of Belgium’s foreign trade or to the liberalization of 
trade relationships in general.
Baudewyns’s report gained the particular attention of Gustave 
Joassart, the pre-war general manager of the FN armaments factory at 
Herstal, who had arrived in London from Belgium in November 19417 
and had joined the CEPAG as a member of the section dealing with the 
economy. After receiving the report, he contacted Baudewyns to exam-
ine certain aspects of it more deeply. What had impressed him most 
4 Dujardin and Dumoulin, Paul Van Zeeland, 1893-1973, pp. 122-123.
5 Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 311.
6 BNB, Archives, Commission belge pour l’Etude des Problèmes d’Après-Guerre 
(London): note préliminaire sur le problème du change, December 1941.
7 Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, p. 145.
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was Baudewyns’s practical approach, which contrasted with the empty 
rhetoric of the memoranda and reports of the other sections8, which, in 
Joassart’s view, lacked substance and pragmatism9.
The study group was asked to develop the report into a comprehen-
sive package of measures to guide monetary and financial reorgani-
zation after the liberation. Baudewyns finished revising his text on 20 
March 1942 and submitted it to Van Zeeland as a preparatory draft. 
He argued for as limited a depreciation of the Belgian franc as pos-
sible against sterling and the US dollar. His standpoint was, no doubt, 
explained by Belgium’s traumatic experience of monetary affairs after 
the First World War. During the early 1920s lax governmental policy 
had led to the Belgian franc going into free fall on the international 
exchange markets until it eventually stabilized in 1926 at a fifth of its 
pre-war value against both gold and sterling. Another catastrophe of 
such magnitude had to be avoided at all cost.
In the opening chapter, Baudewyns set out his suggestions to elimi-
nate the uncontrolled expansion of the money supply. All banknotes in 
denominations of 100 Belgian francs and above would have to be sur-
rendered within three days at a bank or at the Postal Cheque Office and 
withdrawn from circulation. Their value would be converted into cred-
it balances on new or existing accounts, which would be in part con-
solidated into non-negotiable state securities to be held by the banks. 
Exempt from this would be all accounts up to an amount of 50,000 
Belgian francs per household head or legal person. The accounts of the 
banks themselves would be exempt for their full value. Should domes-
tic economic activity demand further resources, the percentage of the 
consolidated balances would be adjusted. In principle, exempt accounts 
and the non-consolidated portion of the other accounts would be freely 
accessible and new banknotes would be issued for the purpose.
8 Baudewyns Family Archives: letter of 15.10.1941 from Baudewyns (London) to his 
son (Oxford).
9 According to Jan-Albert Goris (a famous Belgian poet and novelist of Flemish ori-
gin and collaborator of Theunis in New York), it was a mistake to treat the Flem-
ish problem within the CEPAG as purely a language problem and not to address 
the community question in Belgium, a political aspect that, in his view, could no 
longer be ignored. His remark drew no response (ARA, Theunis Papers, dossier 2 M, 
n° 5: letter of 05.09.1941 from Goris (New York) to Theunis (New York)).
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The State securities Baudewyns referred to could be applied to the 
payment of tax on war profits, provided government approval was 
forthcoming. They could also be used as collateral to obtain bank loans, 
although only after approval by an Office du Crédit, yet to be estab-
lished and integrated into the Bank. The proceeds from the special tax 
on war profits and from the revaluation of the Bank’s gold reserves, 
together with the consolidated bank accounts, would be applied to re-
deeming the mass of short-term Treasury certificates held by banks and 
the public and to clearing government debt at the Bank. Furthermore, 
consumer goods would have to remain rationed some time to keep the 
level of domestic prices down, although there had to be flexibility in 
rationing of essential goods in recognition of all the hardships suffered 
during the war.
For Baudewyns, his entire plan centred on fixing the post-war rate 
of exchange. If the surplus money in circulation could be eliminated, 
lending placed under strict control, a tight rein kept on the price level, 
and public finances reformed, a ‘limited’ devaluation of the Belgian 
franc – as favoured by Baudewyns – would likely be sufficient and the 
purchasing power of wages and salaries not too seriously eroded. Nev-
ertheless, setting the rate of exchange would have to take account also 
of the Belgian franc’s competitiveness against sterling and the US dollar 
on the world market. It was a question of waiting to see how those two 
currencies performed, hence Baudewyns’s circumspect suggestion that 
a ‘provisional’ rate of exchange be considered. However, one monetary 
question could be settled immediately, which was to restore the pre-war 
unity of the Belgian and Congolese francs.
baudewyns’ proposal becomes The guTT plan
As chairman of the CEPAG, Van Zeeland had the task of synthesizing 
Baudewyns’s draft and the discussions within the study group10. Cer-
tain of Baudewyns’s suggestions Van Zeeland incorporated virtually 
unchanged into his report to the government. Others he altered com-
pletely according to his own view. In his draft, Baudewyns had sug-
10 CEPAG, Deuxième rapport de la Commission Belge pour l’Etude des Problèmes 
d’Après-Guerre, London, April 1942.
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gested that the Belgian franc’s exchange rate ought to be as close as 
possible to its pre-war level and that the circulation of money and the 
level of prices should be adjusted accordingly. Van Zeeland disregarded 
this idea and substituted his own – that the Belgian franc’s post-war 
exchange rate should be geared as much as possible to the level of prices 
at the time of the liberation.
One of the suggestions that Van Zeeland also adopted from 
Baudewyns’s report was how to combat the threat of ‘post-war’ infla-
tion. Only a few points of detail were changed. He proposed, for exam-
ple, a tightening of the supervision of the activities of the banks and 
the stock markets, with two institutions being planned for the purpose, 
rather than one. Furthermore, the Bank itself needed to be integrated 
more into the apparatus of government and pursue a policy of flexible 
and inexpensive credit, in order to promote economic recovery and full 
employment. The same inspiration, deriving from the statist De Man 
Plan of 1933, was even more apparent in the other sections of Van Zee-
land’s report, which dealt with the general economy: after the war, ‘or-
ganized freedom’ (‘La liberté organisée’) had to be the guiding principle 
of economic activity in the country11.
Gutt was vexed with Van Zeeland’s report. At the Cabinet meeting 
of 27 May, he stated that he could agree with 90 per cent of the pro-
posals in respect of monetary reform immediately after the liberation, 
but not with the proposals for structural reform, which, in his view, 
were too dirigiste, too statist. The reaction pointed up the contrast be-
tween the economic views of the two men. For Gutt, the short-term 
monetary measures were more important than the long-term and pri-
ority should be given to monetary measures over economic policy. He 
was convinced that, immediately after the war, such measures would 
be sufficient to guarantee stable exchange rates and stable prices in a 
gradually recovering, open, liberal market economy, a context in which 
socio-economic progress would develop harmoniously. His model was 
‘la belle époque’ of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning 
of the twentieth. Van Zeeland, on the contrary, was convinced that this 
economic model was outdated: structural reform was now necessary. 
The government had to adopt a more prominent role; it had to organ-
11 Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, pp. 442-443.
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ize the country’s socio-economic activity, coordinate the economic ac-
tivities and participate creatively in international cooperation to ensure 
balanced economic growth and a just distribution of incomes. Viewed 
in this context, monetary measures should not be a priority in them-
selves, but serve to underpin long-term structural reform.
Gutt, moreover, could not accept that Van Zeeland had adopted 
many of the elements of Baudewyns’s proposal, without any attribution 
and, worse, that he had altered the proposal in such a way that the cru-
cial point of departure regarding the exchange rate and its monetary 
implications no longer reflected the opinions of Baudewyns, the study 
group and the wider CEPAG section on the economy, but represented 
solely Van Zeeland’s personal view12. In consequence, there was a move 
to curb his influence.
Consideration was given to reorganizing all CEPAG sections in such 
a manner that the reports would give way to studies more in keeping 
with the strategies championed by the Belgian government in London. 
Seven Comités d’Application were set up, each with a limited number of 
members selected by the government, their task being chiefly to flesh 
out the general reports, under government supervision. On 27 May 1942 
and on Gutt’s proposal, the government set up a Comité d’Application 
for the economy: Joassart was appointed to be its chairman, which is 
why it came to be known as the Joassart Committee. Notably, Van Zee-
land was not a member13.
Gutt and Joassart shared Baudewyns’s opinion that the moment had 
not yet come to give thought to setting a fixed gold parity for the Bel-
gian franc, although they felt it desirable that there be some sort of an-
chor as a point of departure for a later solution. What they had in mind 
was a more-or- less fixed ratio of the Belgian franc to sterling. Con-
sultations took place in June with the management of the Bank which 
led to the choice of a provisional rate of 176.625 Belgian francs to the 
pound. This appeared to be economically justified and also offered the 
12 Baudewyns Family Archives: letter of 11.05.1942 from Baudewyns (London) to his 
son (Oxford); BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 9.1/26, ‘période de 
guerre, correspondance’: letter of 15.06.1942 from Ansiaux (London) to Theunis 
(New York).
13 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister, CEPAG, dossier 527: letter of 
01.06.1942 from Pierlot to Rens. See also: De Bellefroid, CEPAG, pp. 100 ff.
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advantage of re-establishing the links between the rates of the Belgian 
and Congolese francs14.
The first meeting of the Joassart Committee, on 8 June 1942, pro-
vided Baudewyns with the occasion to comment on the Van Zeeland 
report. He was cautious in his criticism, but pointed out clearly that the 
report was unacceptable in its present form. He proposed to set out a 
new and more comprehensive project15, taking his previous suggestions 
as the point of departure.
The new proposal that Baudewyns presented to the Joassart Com-
mittee on 1 July, in which Ansiaux was closely involved, repeated the 
ideas of his earlier plan, though this was set out in greater depth and 
was more detailed. He retained his earlier suggestions regarding ration-
ing and the control of prices, exchange transactions and foreign trade. 
He also retained the suggestion that the Bank should take control of 
lending, though it was expanded to include Van Zeeland’s proposal for 
two specific institutions to supervise short- and long-term lending re-
spectively. But Baudewyns remained vehemently opposed to Van Zee-
land’s suggestions in respect of the exchange rate, being convinced that, 
by implementing rapid and radical monetary reform, the government 
could go far to curb war-time inflation and even head off a feared post-
war inflation. A ‘limited’ devaluation of the Belgian franc against the 
major world currencies would thus be sufficient to reintegrate Belgium 
smoothly into the world economy. He also showed himself to be an op-
ponent of any official integration of the Belgian franc into the sterling 
zone. In prevailing circumstances, this would serve only to deprive the 
Belgian government of freedom to act, without offering any concrete 
gain in return.
Baudewyns, furthermore, introduced a number of suggestions for 
structural reform within the Bank. He took the view that the law of 
1937 required fundamental revision, because the proposals for mon-
etary reform implied closer cooperation between the Bank and the 
government. The Bank’s board of directors needed to be expanded, as 
control of lending and exchange operations would add appreciably to 
14 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letters of 26.06.1942 and 
10.08.1942.from Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York).
15 BNB, Archives, SD, Baudewyns Papers, A 2, dossier 9.1/26, ‘période de guerre, cor-
respondance’: letter of 15.06.1942 from Ansiaux (London) to Theunis (New York).
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the Bank’s activities and responsibilities. There had also to be arrange-
ments for settling government debt vis-à-vis the Bank and for granting 
advances against the guarantee of state securities, as well as arrange-
ments regarding discounting policy, exchange-rate policy, gold cover, 
the legal competence of the various management and administrative 
bodies of the Bank, the abolition of the Banking Commission, the ac-
quisition of the assets and liabilities of the Banque d’Emission and the 
relationship with the Belgian Congo’s note-issue authority. All this rep-
resented a mammoth programme that, however necessary, could not 
be implemented in a rush. Its implementation was thus put off to a later 
date16. A final and important part of Baudewyns’s report concerned 
post-war taxation policy and again he returned to the essential points 
of his earlier suggestions. Explicitly, he rejected any idea of introducing 
a wealth tax, preferring to tax income, more particularly the profits of 
limited companies.
Having discussed and approved Baudewyns’s proposal, the Joassart 
Committee sent it to Gutt for comments, who gave it his approval later 
that same July17. On 3 August 1942, Baudewyns sent a summary of his 
plan to René Pleven of the Comité Français de la Libération Nationale 
and to his ‘friends’ at the Bank of England18. Gutt, for his part, put the 
proposal before the Cabinet on 6 October, where it was received quite fa-
vourably. ‘It’s a great, very great success’, wrote Baudewyns to Theunis19.
The belgian discussions abouT The exchange raTe and currency 
reform
Van Zeeland was far from pleased at the way in which he had been 
kept out of the Joassart Committee, which meant that he was virtually 
16 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers A 2, dossier 9.1/26, ‘période de guerre, corre-
spondance’: letter of 28.06.1942 from Ansiaux (London) to Theunis (New York).
17 BNB, Archives, SD, 54A, Ansiaux Papers A 3, dossier 9.1/30, s. f. 1: meeting at the 
Ministry of Finance, 24.07.1942.
18 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister, CEPAG (London): esquisse 
d’une solution des problèmes monétaires et économiques d’après-guerre, note 
Baudewyns pour Mr. Pleven et pour les amis de la Bank of England, 03.08.1942.
19 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘accords monétaires’: letter of 
06.10.1942 from Baudewyns (London) to Theunis (New York).
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excluded from all discussion at governmental level about the monetary 
future of Belgium. He was no less annoyed at the way his report had 
been put to one side by the committee and replaced by the Baudewyns 
proposal, which in the meantime had become the Gutt Plan20.
At a meeting with Gutt on 10 November 1942, Van Zeeland repeat-
ed the arguments of his April report, claiming that his proposal was 
aimed at a stable transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy: 
‘no inflation, no deflation’. In his opinion, Baudewyns’s proposal went 
much too far in combating inflation. Van Zeeland stated that he was 
certainly not opposed to monetary reform as such, but the reform had 
to be limited to the removal of surplus (chiefly ‘hoarded’) money, be-
cause that money would generate additional inflation if it was allowed 
to come into circulation after the liberation. The real price level at the 
time of the liberation had to be the point of departure for reform, be-
sides providing the basis for determining the rate of exchange, where 
the level of prices in the dollar and sterling zones had to be taken into 
account. All this would probably cause the devaluation to be greater 
than in Baudewyns’s proposal, but it would provide a boost to the busi-
ness world and create opportunities for enterprising businessmen.
Van Zeeland’s standpoint was clearly founded on his experiences 
during the 1930s, when the Belgian economy was thrown totally out of 
kilter by the deflationary policy pursued by the second Theunis govern-
ment and was only returned to stability by the devaluation and the ex-
pansionary measures carried out under the Van Zeeland-De Man gov-
ernment in 1935. In taking those experiences into account, Van Zeeland 
was, in fact, also supporting the new Keynesian approach in economic 
policy. Baudewyns and Gutt, on the other hand, rested their views on 
events in Belgium during the 1920s, when the careless handling of con-
verting German marks and the lax monetary policy of the first Theunis 
government led to prices skyrocketing and to a collapse in the exchange 
rate of the Belgian franc. It was only in 1926 that the currency was stabi-
lized, although this was regarded at the time as an unpalatable reverse. 
As disciples of the traditional, quantity theory of money and of the clas-
20 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister, CEPAG (London): résumé 
d’une conversation entre M. Gutt et M. Van Zeeland, 10.11.1942; P. Van Zeeland, 
principes de politique monétaire, 25.11.1942. See also: H. Van Praag, L’opération 
Gutt, pp. 26-29.
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sical liberal model, Gutt and Baudewyns insisted that the money supply 
had to be drastically reduced if stability was to be restored to prices 
and the exchange rate; only in this way could the incomes of rentiers, 
wage-earners and salaried persons be protected. There appeared to be 
no reconciling the two standpoints, as they were based on diametrically 
opposed underlying concepts.
After his meeting with Van Zeeland, Gutt sent a letter to the Resist-
ance Committee in Belgium, which was headed by Professor Charles 
De Visscher, with whom the London government was in clandestine 
contact21. Gutt wanted to hear the opinion of the Belgian experts on 
post-war currency reform. In his letter he set out the two London stand-
points in a fair amount of detail and as objectively as possible, naming 
them thesis A and thesis B for the sake of anonymity.
The early months of 1943 saw responses from Galopin, A.-E. Jans-
sen, Dupriez, Frère and the economist Edouard Dervichian22. Regard-
ing the exchange rate, all endorsed thesis A, being the Baudewyns-Gutt 
proposal. The reactions from Belgium were music to Gutt’s ears. The 
exchange rate of around 176 Belgian francs to the pound sterling, his 
hobby horse, was about midway between the rate of around 150 francs 
recommended by certain experts in Belgium and the rate of 250-300 
francs proposed by Van Zeeland.
Gutt appeared to have won, but Van Zeeland in the United States 
continued in early 1943 to push ‘his’ rate. He had access to the high-
est levels of the American administration, which made Gutt fear that 
the American authorities would get the impression that Van Zeeland’s 
standpoint on the exchange rate was, in fact, the Belgian government’s 
standpoint23. To prevent any misunderstanding, Gutt sent a memoran-
dum, by way of Spaak and the Belgian Embassy, to the State Depart-
ment in January of that year, in which it was made clear that only the 
21 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister, CEPAG (London): Gutt, note au 
sujet du problème monétaire (deux thèses sont en présence), 13.11.1942; V. Janssens, 
De Belgische frank, p. 314.
22 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 10.03.1943 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York); letter of 19.03.1943 from Baudewyns (London) 
to Theunis (New York); letter of 23.12.1945 from Gutt (London) to Theunis (New 
York). See also: H. Van Praag, L’opération Gutt, p. 29.
23 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 11.12.1942 from Gutt 
(London) to De Schryver (New York).
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Belgian government in London was competent to determine the ex-
change rate of the Belgian franc.
In London, Gutt found himself supported by Lord Keynes, who had 
circulated a memorandum in December 1942, setting out how the mon-
etary reform ought to be conducted after the war: ‘It seems to me that, in 
deciding the proper post-war rate of exchange, the primary consideration 
is neither the volume of notes nor the level (of prices). Apart from more 
fundamental considerations, a post-war rate of exchange, adjusted to the 
post-war level of wages, may represent a convenient middle course’24. The 
position taken by Keynes ran counter to Van Zeeland’s ideas and was 
clearly in line with the thinking of Baudewyns and Gutt. With Keynes’s 
memorandum in mind, Gutt commissioned Paul Lévy, an economist 
who had made his way to London from Belgium, to make a detailed 
statistical study of the available data on British and Belgian wages and 
salaries, and use that to calculate a sensible rate of exchange. Lévy’s 
calculation indicated a rate of about 176 Belgian francs to the pound. To 
add to this, Gutt received a well- documented memorandum in April 
from Galopin that contained a recommendation for a Belgian franc 
parity likewise close to his preferred level. Gutt was now convinced that 
his choice was the right one and, at the Cabinet meeting of the end of 
April 1943, proposed that the exchange rate be officially set at 176.625 
Belgian francs to the pound sterling25.
The discussion in the Cabinet was particularly acerbic and revealed 
deep divisions among the government leaders26. Spaak, supported by 
Rens, was still under the sway of Van Zeeland’s views and remained 
convinced that the rate proposed by Gutt was too high and would lead 
to unjustifiable socio-economic distortions. De Vleeschauwer was no 
less critical, pointing out that pressure groups in the Belgian Congo 
feared that unifying the Belgian and Congolese francs would result in 
too high an exchange rate for the colony’s currency, in comparison with 
that for the currencies of neighbouring countries likewise exporting 
raw materials; hence their preference for the sort of monetary policy 
that Van Zeeland proposed. But, surprisingly, a majority of the Cabinet 
24 Quoted by Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, pp. 458-459.
25 Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, pp. 457-461, 467-468.
26 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letters of 25.04.1943 and 
28.04.1943 from Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York).
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ultimately opted for a rate of around 162 francs to the pound and of 
about 41 francs to the dollar27.
These rates were, in fact, even higher than those proposed by Gutt. 
The reason for their being chosen can most probably be found in the 
wider situation regarding the French franc. At the time of the North 
African landing in November 1942, the Allied military leaders had 
unilaterally announced an exchange rate of 300 French francs to the 
pound sterling, but, at the insistence of the Comité Français de Libéra-
tion Nationale in London, the American and British governments had 
decided on 2 February 1943 to change that to 200 French francs to the 
pound. The resulting cross-rate with the Belgian franc had consequent-
ly brought the rate of the Belgian franc to 150 to the pound. The major-
ity of the Belgian ministers were probably looking for a rate in line with 
the rate of the French franc, the traditional monetary reference point 
for Belgium28. Gutt had to back down and ultimately accepted the com-
promise of rates around 162 Belgian francs to the pound and around 41 
to the dollar, but only on condition that he would be able to increase 
those rates to respectively 176.625 and 43.827 francs – the levels he had 
originally suggested – if the British and American authorities rejected 
the rates of the compromise as being too high.
In July 1943 Gutt went to the British and American governments to 
clarify the Belgian decision: during the discussions both governments 
indicated that the rates, set by the Cabinet, were too high and that their 
preference was for Gutt’s initial option. Ultimately the official rates 
were set at 176.625 and 43.827 Belgian francs to the pound sterling and 
the dollar respectively. All this may possibly have been an example of 
Gutt’s diplomatic talent, but it ought not to be forgotten that, at the 
time, thought was being given in Washington and London to the ap-
proaching invasion of Europe: too strong an exchange rate for the cur-
rencies in the countries set for liberation would simply add to the cost 
of liberating them.
Once the matter of the exchange rate had been settled, the focus of 
discussion within the Belgian government switched to the overall pack-
27 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives: letter of 02.09.1943 from Frazer (London) to 
Rowe Dutton (London).
28 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister: letter of 12.02.1943 from Gutt 
(London) to Pierlot (London).
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age for currency reform. Spaak’s criticism now was directed towards 
the fiscal aspects of the reform; in his view, to replace the wealth tax by 
a mandatory, long-term loan, as proposed, would burden the govern-
ment budget to such an extent as to pose an unjustified threat to post-
war social policy, the cornerstone of social recovery.
 The discussions dragged on, with the result that the final draft texts 
on the currency reform were submitted to the Cabinet for approval only 
on 3 April 1944. All texts were finally approved, after a number of minor 
amendments had been made to them29. On 7 April, the problem of ex-
change rates was addressed and Spaak once more challenged the rates 
agreed on, remaining convinced that they were too high and would 
lead to deflation and thereby be detrimental to the socio-economic situ-
ation. Gutt reiterated his support for a strong currency, because Bel-
gium would for a long time be reliant on mass imports of raw materials 
and capital goods for industry. Exports would not be a priority for the 
immediate future, whereas imports would be, as it was from imports 
that the post-war recovery had to generate the necessary capacity to re-
equip industry: indeed, they would be the linch-pin of that recovery30. 
Spaak only gave his assent after Gutt formally undertook to adjust the 
exchange rate if the level of 176.625 francs to the pound was effectively 
shown to be too high and an obstacle to economic growth.
This left just the draft decrees regarding fiscal and financial matters 
to be discussed and these were addressed on 14 April. Gutt feared – 
rightly – that Spaak would be obstructive, as he remained an outspoken 
champion of a wealth tax, a measure that had not been included in the 
plan for reform. The expected attack materialized, with Spaak being 
supported by his Socialist colleague, the recently appointed Minister 
August Balthazar. They both upbraided Gutt for indefinitely postpon-
ing a decision about that tax, accusing him of looking to drop the meas-
ure altogether31. Making no concession, however, Gutt carried the day, 
and all the drafts were approved by the Cabinet on 27 April.
29 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 04.04.1944 from 
Gutt (London) to Theunis (New York).
30 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister: report of a Cabinet meeting 
(London), 07.04.1944.
31 Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, p. 46.

Chapter 22
The Build-up to Post-War 
International Cooperation
from The duTch-belgian-luxembourg moneTary agreemenT To 
benelux
Quite early during the war, Gutt, supported by Theunis, began to play 
with the idea of setting up a form of monetary and economic coop-
eration with the Netherlands. The idea first crystallized in discussions 
during the spring of 1941 between Gutt and Johannes van den Broek, 
head of the Dutch Economic Mission in the United States. Before the 
war, they had been members of the international tin cartel and their 
work together had engendered a mutual respect. Encountering each 
other in New York, and now with government responsibilities, their 
talks were chiefly about how the post-war economy in Europe ought 
to be organized. They shared the same underlying view that interna-
tional cooperation was far preferable to the neo-mercantilism of the 
1930s. Such cooperation held great promise, but could be realized only 
through an adequate political framework. Gutt thought that a first, 
modest step towards a wider international reorganization of the world 
economy could be a Belgo-Dutch agreement for cooperation, which he 
looked to achieve from within the Belgian government and via contacts 
with his Dutch colleagues in London.
Gutt was not interested solely in broad, overarching ideas; he saw 
very real advantages for Belgium in closer cooperation with the Neth-
erlands, whose economic recovery after the war, together with that 
of her colonies, would guarantee a substantial market for Belgian ex-
ports. For the immediate future, moreover, positive cooperation would 
strengthen the two countries’ hand in the impending discussions in 
Great Britain and the United States about the future orientation of the 
world economy1.
1 BNB, Archives, SD, 46, Ansiaux Papers, A 1: letter of 16.06.1942 from Ansiaux (Lon-
don) to Theunis (New York).
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Within the Belgian government, there was little, if any, understand-
ing of Gutt’s ideas, both his colleagues and immediate advisers offer-
ing nothing but negative arguments. Spaak was worried about the Brit-
ish reaction and wondered whether association with the sterling area 
would not offer better prospects, given that Sir Anthony Eden, the Brit-
ish Foreign Secretary, had recently spoken of possible post-war mon-
etary cooperation between the British Empire and Great Britain’s Euro-
pean allies. Others took the view that there was too great a disparity in 
the political traditions of Belgium and the Netherlands and, moreover, 
that the two economies were no longer complementary, meaning that 
any union would serve only to sharpen competition between them. 
There was also a very sceptical reaction from the business world in Bel-
gium, when it was consulted about the plans. A monetary union could 
never be viable without economic and even political union, and this 
last would throw up insoluble problems regarding the two royal houses 
and the respective colonies. Moreover, how would the French-speaking 
Belgians feel in a predominantly Dutch-speaking union? The argumen-
tation was vague, but the resistance was manifest and Gutt was unable 
to drum up support, even within the ranks of his own government.
At the end of 1942, however, the situation changed, with the appoint-
ment of van den Broek as Dutch Minister of Finance and his move from 
New York to London, which immediately gave Gutt an influential ally 
within the Dutch government. The matter could now be discussed 
again and unexpectedly took a favourable turn, following what took 
place in North Africa in November 1942 regarding the unfavourable 
exchange rate of the French franc, unilaterally imposed by the Anglo-
American armies.
The incident prompted the European governments in exile in Lon-
don to hold joint discussions and these served at once to bring the Dutch 
and Belgian governments closer together2. In February 1943, Gutt and 
2 The Sous-Comité d’Experts pour l’étude des questions monétaires d’après-guerre, 
with representatives of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale and of the 
Dutch, Belgian, Luxembourg and Norwegian governments, met on 18.11.1942 to 
discuss the incident. On 02.02.1943, in consequence of this and other reactions, the 
Anglo-American army leadership lowered the Algerian rate of the French franc 
from 300 to 200 French francs to the pound sterling: H. Van Praag, L’opération 
Gutt, p. 35.
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van den Broek took advantage of the two governments’ shift in atti-
tude to resume discussion about monetary and economic  cooperation3. 
For strategic and practical reasons, they now opted for a two-phase ap-
proach: during the first, a monetary agreement would be set up as rap-
idly as possible: and during the second, a customs union. Their hope 
was to have both in place before the liberation.
The reason for giving preference to a separate monetary agreement 
was linked to the talks taking place in Washington about a new world 
monetary system (including post-war exchange rates) and no less to 
the ambitious plans for the establishment of new, international institu-
tions. For the small countries to avoid the diktat of their big allies in the 
determination of their post-war exchange rates and to be adequately 
represented in those institutions, mutual cooperation was crucial4.
Arguments of this nature struck a chord, even with the most critical 
opponents of Belgo-Dutch cooperation, and Gutt and van den Broek 
were given carte blanche to go ahead with their plans. By 14 March 1943 
the two were ready with their proposal, which was approved in April by 
the respective governments5. In the first place this provided for fixed ex-
change rates between the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg currencies 
(including the currencies of the colonies), with none of the three coun-
tries being able to alter the rates without the assent of the other two. 
Furthermore, mutual lines of credit would be granted on favourable 
conditions, to be discussed and laid down in mutual agreements by the 
Bank and the Nederlandsche Bank. Lastly, the proposals also included 
the appointment of a group of experts to work out a plan for the estab-
lishment of a customs union. The actual agreement would be signed as 
soon as the parities between the currencies concerned were fixed. Van 
den Broek’s opinion was that the agreement could be signed immedi-
ately, but certain of his Dutch colleagues thought that the parity should 
3 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 10.03.1943 from Gutt 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
4 J.J. Polak, ‘Financial relations between the Netherlands and Belgium: 1943 to 1993’ 
in: A. Bakker et al., eds., Monetary Stability through International Cooperation. Es-
says in honour of André Szasz, Amsterdam, 1994, p. 184.
5 Ndl.MF, Archives, London settlement office, 1940-1948, dossier 539/ 1-2: letter of 
14.03.1943 from van den Broek (London) to van Kleffens (London); meeting of 
22.03.1943.
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depend on a monetary agreement under discussion with Great Britain, 
but not yet finalized6.
The postponement was an irritation to van den Broek and Gutt, as it 
frustrated their hope of being able to go to the monetary conference in 
Washington in May 1943 with an agreement in their pockets. They ar-
gued for a compromise, which was accepted just before the conference. 
It was that the Dutch and Belgian representatives in Washington would 
propose a provisional and informal fixed parity of 1 Dutch guilder to 
16.52 Belgian francs7. 
At last, after a few more delays, the Dutch-Belgian-Luxembourg 
monetary agreement was officially signed in London on 21 October 
19438. The exchange rate between the Dutch and Belgian currencies was 
set at the level agreed in May. Mutual lines of credit to the value of 1 
billion Belgian francs were proposed, subject to monthly monitoring 
by the two central banks. No interest would be due on up to half the 
credit line; should more than half the credit line be drawn down, inter-
est at the official discount rate would be charged. Debit balances above 
1 billion francs would be liable for settlement in gold or a gold-based 
currency. It was also confirmed that the agreement was provisional. It 
came into force officially on 1 September 1945, after the Netherlands and 
Belgium had been liberated and the two central banks had been able to 
make the necessary arrangements9.
Once the monetary agreement had been announced, the experts be-
gan their preparatory talks on the customs union. However, setting a 
common external tariff and working out transitional measures for the 
abolition of internal tariffs and quota restrictions took much more time 
than expected and it was only on 9 September 1944 that the customs 
union treaty between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg was 
6 Polak, ‘Financial relations between the Netherlands and Belgium’, in: A. Bakker et 
al., eds., Monetary Stability through International Cooperation. Essays in honour of 
André Szasz, Amsterdam, 1994, p. 190.
7 Ndl.MF, Archives, London settlement office, 1940-1948, dossier 539/ 1-2: letter of 
12.05.1943 from van den Broek (London) to van Kleffens (London).
8 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1, dossier 9.1/24: Dutch-Belgian-Luxembourg 
monetary agreement, 21.10.1943. 
9 The discussions between the Bank and the Nederlandsche Bank were held in Brus-
sels on 31.07.1945. The agreement was officially announced in the Belgian Official 
Gazette of 09.09.1945.
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signed in London, on the Belgian government’s return to Brussels. The 
treaty went down in history books as ‘the Benelux Treaty’, and came 
into provisional effect on 10 May 1945, but had to wait until 1949 before 
taking definitive effect10.
The international press was laudatory: ‘The two countries have set 
an excellent example of good-neighbourliness...it is a serious practical 
example of what could be done on a vast scale’ (The Financial Times); 
‘The real important thing is that the agreement provides for coordinated 
action’ (The Times); ‘We look with sympathy on the efforts of two small 
and complementary countries to form a single trading area’ (Manchester 
Guardian); ‘The Low Countries plan a customs block as an example to 
post-war Europe’ (New York Times). In fact, both the monetary agree-
ment and the Benelux Treaty proved to be forerunners of wider alli-
ances: the former was the prototype of more than one hundred similar, 
bilateral agreements after the war; the latter was a first, distant step 
towards the Treaty of Rome.
The franco-belgian and anglo-belgian moneTary agreemenTs
Upon the announcement of the monetary agreement of 21 October 
1943, the Comité Français de Libération Nationale contacted Gutt in 
order to conclude a parallel Franco-Belgian monetary and economic 
cooperation agreement11, but Gutt, Theunis, Baudewyns and Ansiaux 
were not in favour12. First and foremost, the experience of recent years 
with France had been far too negative for them to have any desire to be 
drawn again into the French sphere of influence. In a letter to Spaak 
at a later date, Gutt wrote very bitterly: ‘The French government likes 
Belgium very much on the condition that she follows its policy…. I have 
experienced these sympathies for 25 years : they never have prevented 
10 Ndl.BZ, London Archives, 1940-1945, dossier GA EZ/CHZ, F 78; Ndl.MF, Archives, 
London settlement office, 1940-1948, dossier 353: Belgo-Dutch-Luxembourg cus-
toms union.
11 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1, dossier 9.1/26: letter of 02.11.1943 from An-
siaux (London) to Theunis (New York); letter of 18.11.1943 from Theunis (New York) 
to Ansiaux (London).
12 Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, pp. 429-433.
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treaties being abandoned, nor even treason….I fear that today we will 
have to deal with the same kind of men as we did before…. I know 
them’13.
Secondly, the Belgians feared that economic recovery in France af-
ter the war would be very much an uphill struggle; with that in pros-
pect, they could see no advantage in a monetary agreement, only future 
obligations. Thirdly, the Belgians wanted decisions about the Belgian 
franc’s rate of exchange against sterling and the US dollar to be made by 
their own national decisions14. Lastly, and not unimportantly, they were 
infuriated by the deliberate vagueness of the promise of the Comité 
Français de Libération Nationale regarding restitution of the Bank’s 
gold surrendered by France to Germany. That vagueness in a matter 
about which the Belgians in exile felt so strongly, closed the door on 
any talks about possible economic and monetary cooperation between 
the two countries.
The French made a fresh approach to Gutt and van den Broek in 
April 194415. France and Great Britain had concluded their monetary 
agreement in February, inspired by the Dutch-Belgian-Luxembourg 
model. The Comité Français de Libération Nationale deemed the time 
was ripe to begin negotiating with the Benelux countries16. The nego-
tiations dragged on, Gutt remaining all the while in close contact with 
van den Broek, but at last, on 1 September 1944, a draft agreement was 
tabled that both France and the Benelux countries could endorse. A 
provisional Belgo-French agreement was signed in London on 4 Sep-
tember, heralding a definitive version, once discussions in the liberated 
territories had clarified a number of matters. Mutual exchange rates 
were set on the basis of the cross-rates then in force against sterling17 
13 BNB, Archives, Ansiaux Papers, dossier A 2, s. f., ‘correspondance avec Gutt, Boël et 
autres’: letter of 23.06.1944 from Gutt (Prestwick) to Spaak (London).
14 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letters of 12.11.1943 and 
13.11.1943 from Theunis (New York) to Gutt (Atlantic City); letter of 16.11.1943 from 
Theunis (New York) to Spaak (Atlantic City).
15 Ndl.BZ, London Archives, 1940-1945, GA EZ/CHZ, dossier 2210, F 76: letter of 
17.04.1944 from van den Broek (London) to van Kleffens (London).
16 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers A 2, dossier 9.1/26: letter of 17.05.1944 from Rens 
(London) to Ansiaux (Bretton Woods).
17 For Belgium and Luxembourg, this exercise resulted in a new rate of 100 Belgian 
francs to 113.25 French francs.
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and were to be adjusted in the future only after joint consultation. Ad-
ditionally, mutual credit lines of 2 billion French francs and 1.765 billion 
Belgian francs were granted, the conditions being the same as those in 
the Benelux Treaty. The agreement would be implemented by the Bank 
and the Banque de France18: and the two central banks agreed this pro-
visionally on 10 October 1944.
Negotiations on the long-term agreement took place in Paris to-
wards the end of October 1944. An attempt was made by the French 
representatives to have the line of credit increased to 3 billion French 
francs, but their proposal was rejected; otherwise, there was acceptance 
that settlement of debit balances exceeding the line of credit should be 
in gold. The permanent agreement was signed in Paris on 27 October 
1944. It was very much in line with the provisional version and with 
it lapsed the virtually forgotten French-British-Belgian agreement of 7 
July 194019.
A similar monetary agreement was also concluded with Great Brit-
ain, but only after many difficulties had been overcome. At the end of 
1943, Gutt had insisted with Sir David Waley of the Treasury that such 
an agreement be concluded, but – very diplomatically – the British had 
not reacted20. Following the agreement between France and Great Brit-
ain in February 1944, however, the Benelux countries felt that the time 
had come for a British agreement21: Gutt and van den Broek therefore 
made a fresh approach to Waley. The Belgians and Dutch wanted to use 
fixed exchange rates to tie the franc and guilder zones (each with its 
colonial dependants) to sterling, thereby recognizing the supremacy of 
sterling as an international reserve currency. In return, Great Britain 
would confirm the independence and sovereignty of the Belgian franc 
and Dutch guilder and help to restore those currencies’ pre-war posi-
18 Ndl.MF, Archives, London settlement office, 1940-1948, dossier N 537, letters of 
29.08.1944; 01.09.1944; 05.09.1944 and 09.09.1944 from Gutt (London) to van den 
Broek (London).
19 Ndl.MF, Archives, London settlement office, 1940-1948, dossier 537: report of the 
meetings of 24, 25 and 26.10.1944. 
20 SOMA, Archives, Gutt Papers: letter of 05.12.1943 from Gutt (London) to Waley 
(London); Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, pp. 414-415.
21 Ndl.BZ, London Archives, 1940-1945, dossier GA EZ/CHZ: F 76, report of the meet-
ing of 29.02.1944; F 78, letter of 14.03.1944 from Beyen (London) to Crena de Iongh 
(Washington).
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tion in respect of international payments. The Belgians and Dutch also 
sought privileged access to the British market after the war, to be able 
to purchase – on credit, if need be – capital goods for the recovery of 
their economies22.
The Treasury and the Bank of England did not look kindly on the 
proposal. There could be no question of an Anglo-Benelux agreement, 
as that would lead to the transferability of sterling within the Benelux 
zone. Moreover, it could hinder the sterling area’s accession to an inter-
national, multilateral arrangement. Lastly, any agreements could only 
apply to future commercial payments in current accounts: existing ster-
ling balances would have to be dealt with separately23.
Ansiaux had been working since 26 February 1944 on an initial draft 
and this was presented to the Treasury on 4 March for discussion. Wa-
ley raised difficulties and remained critical, even when new, revised 
versions were later submitted that took account of points raised during 
the discussions. The negotiations dragged on without result24, despite 
the Belgians pointing out that an agreement would clearly be to Great 
Britain’s advantage. It would peg the Belgian franc to sterling, which 
was tantamount to a Belgian vote of confidence in Great Britain’s fu-
ture, but if the British could see no virtue in that, Belgium would have 
to peg her currency to gold, independent of sterling25.
Waley would not be convinced: the enormous extent of sterling bal-
ances in the world meant that limits on transactions in sterling would 
in any case have to be retained. For the time being, therefore, it would 
not be possible to use existing and any new Belgian sterling balances, 
so that there was little sense in concluding an agreement that included 
the provision of mutual lines of credit. Baudewyns and Ansiaux an-
swered that the proposal concerned essentially a monetary and not a 
22 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV88, dossier 11: report of a meeting at the Treasury, 
20.07.1944; further: notes on the Anglo-Belgian monetary agreement, 09.02.1945.
23 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV88, dossier 11, ‘Siepman (Bank of England) to Wa-
ley (Treasury)’: objections to monetary agreement with the Belgians and Dutch, 
01.03.1944; BEngl, Archives, Gold, OV48: correspondence of April-May 1944 on the 
Anglo-Belgian monetary agreement.
24 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV88, dossier 11, ‘Mutual Aid and General Monetary 
Agreements, March-September 1944’.
25 BNB, Archives, SD, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: projet d’accord monétaire anglo-
belge (report of 23.06.1944 from Baudewyns).
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credit agreement: it was more about the setting of a fixed exchange rate 
and, as far as credit was concerned, only about limited, mutual debit 
margins. Waley remained unmoved: the British government was only 
prepared to conclude an agreement if Belgium and the Netherlands 
agreed to continue to provide credit facilities to Great Britain, without 
any reciprocal obligation on the British side26.
Van den Broek and Gutt held consultations together in London in 
August 1944 to decide what the reaction to the British standpoint should 
be. In the first place, they thought that they should certainly recognise 
the problem of the sterling balances: these had increased enormously 
during the war and were set to rise even further in the immediate fu-
ture – in the particular case of Belgium, via the Anglo-Belgian Finan-
cial and Mutual Aid agreements signed on 22 August 194427. The proper 
course for Belgium and the Netherlands would be to retain the balances 
arising from the war in escrow for the time being and, furthermore, 
to declare that they would not draw down the balances under the Fi-
nancial and Mutual Aid scheme in gold or gold currency. With effect 
from a date to be determined, however, they argued that Belgium and 
the Netherlands would be allowed to apply those balances in annual 
tranches to purchases in the sterling zone. As regards the mutual pro-
vision of credit in the current account, the view of both Gutt and van 
den Broek was that there could be no derogation from the principle of 
reciprocity, though they declared themselves willing for the suggested 
credit margin of 10 million pounds to be reduced and for the life of the 
agreement to be cut from nine to three years28.
Consensus was ultimately reached on 22 September29 and an Anglo-
Belgian monetary agreement, incorporating the Belgian concessions 
over sterling balances, was at last signed on 5 October 1944 in London. 
26 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV88, dossier 11: report of a meeting at the Treasury, 
20.07.1944.
27 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV88, dossier 11: note of conversations at the Treasury 
regarding the Belgo-Dutch agreements, 04.09.1944; draft letter of 08.09.1944 to the 
Chancellor. 
28 BNB, Archives, London Archives, dossier ‘or’: report of a meeting between Gutt and 
van den Broek, 18.08.1944.
29 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV88, dossier 11: memorandum of 16.09.1944 from Fra-
ser to Waley; letter of 22.09.1944 from Fraser to Aarom (American embassy); de-
finitive text of the agreement, 03.10.1944.
384 Chapter 22
The exchange rate for current commercial transactions was officially set 
at 1 pound sterling to 176.625 Belgian francs and the respective govern-
ments granted each other a credit line of 5 million pounds sterling. The 
actual implementation of the agreement would be taken care of by the 
Bank and the Bank of England30.
30 Ndl.BZ, London Archives, 1940-1945, GA EZ/CHZ, dossier 2210 F 76: monetary agree-
ment between the government of the UK and the government of Belgium, London, 
05.10.1944.
CHAPTER 23
Belgium and the New 
Economic World Order
belgium and The breTTon woods agreemenTs of 22 July 1944
The problems exercising the governments and central banks in London 
and Washington were much broader than the setting of new, more re-
alistic exchange rates aimed at economic recovery in Western Europe 
after the war. In particular, there was the question of a new economic 
world order. Everyone was agreed that the ending of the war would 
provide a unique opportunity to rid the world of the pre-war monetary 
chaos and to harness international cooperation to achieving a stable 
and ordered system of free world trade and unhindered payment flows.
In June 1942, Gutt invited the famous English economist John May-
nard Keynes to dinner, together with Baudewyns, Ansiaux, Jef Rens 
and Fernand Van Langenhove, to discuss post-war recovery1. Since the 
Anglo-American discussions in 1941 about the Lend Lease Agreement, 
Keynes had been working on a comprehensive plan for the post-war 
 organization of international payment flows; his underlying assump-
tion was that any such plan ought to be to the benefit of the ‘national 
economy’, with full employment as the main priority. This did not mean 
that Keynes had no regard for the world economy; on the contrary, he 
was an ardent champion of greater openness and of broader interna-
tional cooperation than had been the case during the inter-war years. 
In this, a dominant role would be played by the United States, in con-
sequence of the enormous creditor position she had built up vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world, a position that would certainly continue to extend. 
The United States had by far the greatest gold reserves of any country 
and, after the war, would be the major supplier of both producer and 
1 Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, p. 364, footnote 17.
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consumer goods. This, Keynes foresaw, would lead to an exceptional 
scarcity of dollars for all countries after the war, irrespective of their 
side as a belligerent.
In view of this situation Keynes, with the support of the Treasury, 
had published a plan for setting up an International Clearing Union. 
The Union was presented as a type of international bank that would 
use a new unit of account, the bancor with a fixed, but adjustable gold 
parity. Each participating country would be allotted a quantity of ban-
cors in proportion to its pre-war trade volume, population and gold 
reserves, criteria that were clearly to the advantage of Great Britain, 
whose Imperial Preference System and monetary policy had allowed 
her to sustain her foreign trade better than other countries during the 
1930s. Moreover, the Union would adopt a multilateral clearing system. 
Where the total balance (credit or debit) exceeded the allotment of ban-
cors, progressively rising interest rates would be applied as a sanction to 
countries both in surplus and deficit, thereby prompting all countries 
to work to achieve a new equilibrium in their balances of trade and 
payments2.
A plan was likewise being prepared in the United States by Harry 
Dexter White, a top official at the American Treasury Department. 
White had formulated some of its proposals at the beginning of 1941 
and had developed them further when, in December of that year, the 
United States had joined the Allied camp. The proposals were published 
in April 1942 as the White Plan. White suggested the creation of two 
supranational institutions to guide the recovery of the world economy: 
a world bank for the provision of long-term credit and an internation-
al stabilization fund for the provision of short-term credit, the two to 
function within a context of fixed exchange rates, free world trade, and 
the free movement of money and capital. The stabilization fund would 
use multilateral offsetting to facilitate international payment flows. It 
would draw its resources from its members, whose contributions would 
be in gold and in their national currencies. The fund would thus act as 
a sort of international bank, where all participating countries would be 
able, on the most favourable conditions, to purchase foreign currency, 
in order to cope with temporary deficits in the balances of trade and 
2 R. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes. Fighting for Britain, 1937-1946, London, pp. 179-
332.
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payments. This would serve to counter any brake on commercial ex-
pansion, brought about by balance-of-payment problems, and thereby 
help to correct the unequal distribution of gold reserves in the world3.
The two plans had a number of features in common, particularly 
that regarding an international, multilateral clearing system, which was 
very much on the lines of the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse set up by 
Hjalmar Schacht. However, there were also important differences. Key-
nes, for example, wished to place the burden of eliminating temporary 
balance-of-payments’ disequilibria on countries in surplus and coun-
tries in deficit, White solely on countries in deficit4. Looking to achieve 
a political consensus, the two men negotiated intensively to harmonize 
their plans during the months that followed. They came up ultimately 
with a joint proposal that included the establishment of a World Bank 
and an International Monetary Fund, a proposal that was eventually 
discussed, amended and approved by the forty-five countries represent-
ed at the international conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944.
Theunis was distrustful of the joint proposal right from the outset, 
his ideology being too liberal to accept supranational organizations. A 
negative view of the two plans was also taken by Gutt’5. These were not 
the sole voices raised in criticism. Ranged against the proposals were 
also the entire banking world in New York, the Republican Party (led 
by Senator Robert Taft), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the 
Federal Reserve Board in Washington. Each had its own specific mo-
tives, but together they created a formidable opposition. The American 
bankers feared competition from the World Bank and the Fund; the 
Federal Reserve institutions feared the loss of their strong grip on mon-
etary policy; and the Republican Party was by tradition averse to the 
dirigiste slant of the New Deal inspiration that it detected in the White 
Plan and whose influence it feared in the subsequent joint proposals6.
3 J.K. Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965. Twenty Years of Inter-
national Cooperation, vol. 1, Chronicle, Washington, 1969; A. Van Dormael, Bretton 
Woods. Birth of a Monetary System, New York, 1978; R.N. Gardner, Sterling Dollar 
Diplomacy in Current Perspective, New York, 1988 ²; H. James, International Mon-
etary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, Oxford, 1996.
4 H. Van der Wee, Prosperity and Upheaval. The World Economy, 1945-1980, p. 425-
435.
5 Quoted by Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, p. 375.
6 Ndl.MF, Archives, London settlement office, 1940-1948, dossier 6921: memorandum 
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However, the project had the backing of the American president, 
and all its opponents consequently found themselves obliged to adjust 
to the new monetary landscape it introduced. In European circles the 
proposal immediately conjured up the spectre of a liberator reserving 
the right to set exchange rates unilaterally in the liberated territories, 
and preferably ‘soft’ rates that would give greater purchasing power 
to the pay of the invading forces7. Proper agreements about rates had 
therefore to be made, and made fairly quickly, because the invasion of 
Europe was believed to be imminent.
During the spring an summer of 1943 intense bilateral talks to 
evaluate the joint plan of White and Keynes began in Washington be-
tween representatives of the American Treasury and representatives of 
the European Ministers of Finance8. The Europeans thought that the 
problem of exchange rates would now be addressed, as it was integrally 
bound up with the plan. Furthermore, the European governments in 
exile wanted certainty about the exchange rates that would be applied 
by the Allied military command after the landings. Representing Bel-
gium in the talks was Boël and he quickly received the impression that 
the American Treasury had weaker rates in mind for the Belgian franc 
than had been decided by the Belgian government in London. As men-
tioned above, the rates had been fixed at 162 and 42 Belgian francs to the 
pound and the US dollar respectively, but during the discussions with 
the Americans these rates were adjusted to 160 and 40, as the Ameri-
cans preferred rounded figures.
At the beginning of October Boël himself came to the conclusion 
that the rates proposed by Belgium no longer corresponded to reality: 
the war was dragging on and clandestine sources were informing him 
that the issue of banknotes in Belgium was getting increasingly out of 
hand, so that the earlier calculations were no longer accurate. All this 
of 03.10.1943 from the American Bankers Association, passed by Crena de Iongh 
to van den Broek; ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’, letters of 
14.06.1944 and 22.06.1944 from Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London).
7 Ndl.MF, Archives, London settlement office, 1940-1948, dossier 6901: memoran-
dum of early 1944 from Steenberghe (Washington) to Crena de Iongh (New York).
8 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister: letter of 10.08.1943 from Gutt 
(London) to Pierlot (London) and Boël’s reports of 26.07.1943 and 16.08.1943 on his 
discussions in Washington.
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convinced him that Gutt’s preferred rates of 176.625 and 43.827 Belgian 
francs to sterling and the US dollar respectively were the correct ones9.
In January 1944, accompanied by Theunis, Ansiaux and Boël, 
Gutt conducted fresh exchange-rate negotiations in Washington with 
White10, in which British, French, Dutch and Norwegian representa-
tives were also involved. Calculations by Ansiaux and Boël indicated 
that Gutt’s preferred rates were the most obvious ones to adopt; indeed, 
they were very much in line with the French and Dutch options. A mar-
gin of uncertainty nevertheless remained, as the future relationship 
of sterling to the US dollar remained unknown. White’s initial reac-
tion to the Belgian proposal was sceptical: he feared that the suggested 
rates were too high and would be an obstacle to Belgian exports, which 
would be a crucial factor in Belgium’s post-war recovery.
Tradition has it that, towards the end of difficult talks, which had 
been continued by Ansiaux after Gutt’s departure, White suddenly 
asked how much a female cloakroom assistant received in Belgium for 
her services, to which Ansiaux is supposed to have answered ‘one franc’. 
After a few seconds’ silence, White is then supposed to have declared 
that, in that case, he sympathized with the Belgian proposal. To every-
one’s relief, he closed the meeting with the redeeming statement that it 
was up to the Belgian government to determine its country’s rates of ex-
change. Provided the rates were reasonable, the American government 
would agree to them11. At the Belgian Cabinet meeting of 7 April 1944 in 
London, Gutt once again tabled the proposal that he and Ansiaux had 
defended in Washington. This time his rates of respectively 176.625 and 
43.827 were approved. He had good reason to be satisfied.
A final, major question remained to be resolved. The establishment 
of an International Stabilization Fund and a World Bank had still to be 
9 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 07.10.1943 from 
 Theunis (New York) to Gutt (London).
10 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: memorandum with a report 
of the meeting in White’s office, 07.01.1944; letter of 24.01.1944 from Theunis (New 
York) to De Schryver (London).
11 BNB, Archives, London Archives, dossier ‘Janssen’: notes on a conversation with 
Ansiaux, 23.02.1944; BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, dossier ‘période de guerre 
et immédiatement après-guerre’ (letter of 03.05.1985 from van Bellingen to An-
siaux, with the text of an announcement made by Ansiaux at a colloquium in Lon-
don).
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proposed to the future member states and approved. During the winter 
of 1943-1944, White and Keynes had reached an accommodation and 
now submitted a joint project that by and large embodied the Ameri-
can plan. During the discussions, the interests of the Benelux countries 
were successfully defended by Boël, Crena de Iongh and Jacques J. Po-
lak12. Combining the membership quotas set for Belgium and the Neth-
erlands meant that the two countries could jointly appoint an executive 
director in the executive committee of both the Fund and the Bank13.
Gutt, Theunis and Boël played a fairly important role at the Bret-
ton Woods Conference (1-22 July 1944), at which they represented Bel-
gium, together with Joseph Nisot, Baron de Gruben and Boris-Serge 
Chlep ner14. Gutt was elected one of the four deputy-chairmen of the 
conference and, with Theunis, was asked to prepare the reports of the 
World Bank commission. During the discussion Boël drew attention to 
the principle of fixed exchange rates, which Keynes had previously suc-
ceeded in substantially watering down, while pushing through his own 
opinion of the problem, but the Belgian delegation was able to get the 
regulations for this important issue tightened up again.
Theunis and Gutt left the Bretton Woods Conference feeling rela-
tively satisfied at the results that had been achieved. They were im-
pressed by the unanimous will to work for international cooperation, 
so different and so new in comparison to the politics of the 1930s. For an 
export-oriented country like Belgium, it was extremely advantageous 
to see the emphasis being placed on the idea that the key to sustainable 
recovery of the world economy was an expansion of world trade15. 
12 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1, dossier 0.1/30: letter of 25.05.1944 from Boël 
(Washington) to Gutt (London).
13 Polak, ‘Financial Relations between the Netherlands and Belgium’ in: A. Bakker et 
al., eds., Monetary Stability through International Cooperation. Essays in honour of 
André Szasz, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 184-185.
14 Crombois, Camille Gutt, 1940-1945, p. 389.
15 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister: letter of 24.07.1944 from Gutt 
(New York) to Pierlot (London); ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-
Spaak’: letter of 03.08.1944 from Theunis (New York) to Spaak (London).
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The banknoTes for The army of liberaTion and for The currency 
reform
As already indicated, financing the army of liberation became a thorny 
problem, in consequence of the landing of the Allies in North Africa 
at the end of 1942. Gutt therefore contacted the British Treasury at the 
beginning of 1943 and emphasized that the Allied troops landing in 
North-western Europe would have to respect certain elementary rules, 
one of which was that an army of liberation in Belgium would be re-
quired to settle its expenditure and pay its troops exclusively in Belgian 
francs. The Belgian government in London would make the requisite 
banknotes available at the appropriate moment16.
An agreement was reached in May 1943 with the British Treasury, 
according to which the Belgian government would instruct the Bank 
to deposit 750 million Belgian francs in banknotes with the Bank of 
England, for the account of the War Office. In a further agreement con-
cluded on 29 October, that was increased to 4 billion Belgian francs and 
provision was made for a line of credit to be opened at the Bank for 1 
billion Belgian francs. Repayment was to be made in sterling at a rate 
to be determined by the Belgian government in consultation with the 
British government, once Belgium had been liberated. The provision of 
services to the Allied armies would be borne by Belgium as a contribu-
tion towards the liberation of her territory17.
Thus, by December 1943 full preparations were being made for the 
issue of banknotes to be advanced to the Allied armies and the new 
banknotes to accompany the currency reform. Contrary to what he had 
achieved with the British, Gutt had still not been able to conclude a con-
crete agreement with the Americans. In an attempt to find a satisfacto-
ry arrangement, he had a fresh meeting in Washington on 29 December 
with White and his assistant Taylor. Irritated by Gutt’s insistence, how-
ever, White rejected every proposal and declared that there could be no 
immediate solution for Belgium. In particular what was holding him 
back was the fact that the estimates for the cost of re-conquering Eu-
16 SOMA, Archives, Gutt Papers, dossier AA, 1624: letter of 15.04.1943 from Gutt (Lon-
don) to Waley (London).
17 SOMA, Archives, Gutt Papers, dossier AA 1624: letter of 07.05.1943 from Gutt (Lon-
don) to Waley (London) and Gutt’s memorandum of 29.10.1943. 
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rope still had to be endorsed by Congress, a delicate matter. White was, 
in fact, looking to integrate everything into a single package covering 
the entire operation of the landing and the re-conquest, and only when 
that had been done would it be possible for a specific arrangement to be 
made for Belgium. However, Gutt continued to press his point, arguing 
that, he, too, had budgetary obligations with regard to the Belgian peo-
ple. Moreover, he could not see why, if Great Britain could come to an 
arrangement with Belgium, the United States still would not. It was all 
to no avail. White remained unmoved and closed the discussion with 
the vague promise that the United States would honour its obligations 
and proceed in due time to the reimbursement of all costs. However, a 
separate agreement between the two countries was at present out of the 
question18.
Further discussions took place in January and February 1944, but 
also without success19. At one moment, White even declared that he 
knew nothing of the Belgian banknotes being printed in Great Brit-
ain and that the US dollars (bearing a yellow seal) for the American 
troops to be landed in North-western Europe were ready. Ultimately, he 
agreed in principle to Gutt’s demand for American military expendi-
ture in liberated Belgium to be in Belgian banknotes.
During these difficult talks, Gutt, Ansiaux and Boël had held con-
sultations with the French and the Dutch, to take joint action to get 
agreement from White about the amount of money held by the Amer-
ican army of liberation, but that did not lead directly to any formal 
agreement. Nevertheless, White gave the Belgian delegation a few guar-
antees. He would propose to Congress that the American army of lib-
eration undertake to pay exclusively in Belgian francs in Belgium and 
would also attempt to have all military expenditure reimbursed within 
the framework of the Mutual Aid Agreement. Furthermore, he prom-
ised that the military command would keep accurate accounts of all 
expenditure20. An agreement on those lines was ultimately signed on 
18 SOMA, Archives, Gutt Papers, dossier AA 1624: report of the meeting in White’s of-
fice in Washington, 29.12.1943.
19 ARA, fonds ministerie van Financiën: letter of 09.02.1944 from Gutt (Washington) 
to de Gruben (Washington); BNB, Archives, London Archives, dossier A.-E. Jans-
sen: notes on a conversation with Ansiaux, 23.02.1944.
20 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gutt’: letter of 10.03.1944 from 
 Ansiaux or Boël (Washington) to Gutt (London).
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1 June 1944 with the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces21, and 
by 6 September, 1,840 crates of Belgian banknotes in denominations 
of 1,000, 500, 100, 50 and 10 francs were in the hands of the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).
The organizaTion of The bank’s reTurn To belgium
From the autumn of 1943 onwards, the Belgian government and the 
Bank’s management in London and in New York began to prepare for 
their return to Belgium22. A memorandum with clear proposals was 
already on the table in October23. Authority would be delegated to one 
of the directors in London, who would follow closely behind the army 
of liberation and immediately assume control of the Bank’s branches as 
they were liberated, as well as the head office in Brussels. The director 
would be accompanied by a small staff and, via the Belgian Military 
Mission, would also work with the Allied Supreme Commander, all the 
while retaining his independence. The government’s choice for this task 
was Ansiaux, who received his appointment in the spring of 194424.
In December 1943, Theunis began to look for a way to ditch the 
Bank’s management in Brussels and turned to Nisot, his legal adviser 
in New York, to find one25. Nisot’s proposal was ready by the beginning 
of January: the government was to issue a decree stating that, from the 
time of the liberation to the first subsequent general assembly, the man-
agement of the Bank was to be exercised exclusively by the Governor 
21 BNB, Archives, London Archives, 1944: expéditions de billets par le SHAEFF.
22 In November-December 1943 Theunis was already preparing the great purging of 
the leaders of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission: ‘Avez-vous déjà pensé à ce que 
vous ferez du faux gouverneur, du molasson Ingenbleek et des deux individus qui se 
sont introduits pour faire marcher à fond le clearing en faveur de l’Allemangne? Je 
suppose que votre réponse est: un coup de balai (BNB, Archives, London Archives, 
1943: letters of 18.11.1943 and 28.12.1943 from Theunis (New York) to Baudewyns 
(London).
23 SOMA, Archives, Gutt Papers: memorandum of 25.10.1943 on the organization of the 
Bank during the re-conquest of the country (London). 
24 SOMA, Archives, Gutt Papers: letter of 22.05.1944 from Gutt (London) to Frazer 
(London).
25 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Baudewyns’: letter of 14.12.1943 
from Theunis (New York) to Baudewyns (London).
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and the two directors from London. That same decree would invest An-
siaux with authority to act during the re-conquest of the country, which 
would automatically disqualify the Brussels management of the Bank 
from exercising any authority in the interim26.
In Baudewyns’s opinion no special decree was required for the Brus-
sels management to be purged after the country’s liberation and for An-
siaux to be invested with the agreed authority, as both the organic law 
governing the Bank and the Bank’s own bye-laws provided for such 
measures to be taken27. This became a point of dispute between Nisot 
and Baudewyns, and was ultimately resolved in Baudewyns’s favour28.
The liberation was now at hand and Ansiaux joined the army of lib-
eration as soon as it approached the Belgian border. Theunis in New 
York and Baudewyns in London, together with the government, began 
to organize their return to a liberated country. This came at the begin-
ning of September 1944.
26 BNB, Archives, Ansiaux Papers, A 2: note de Nisot (New York) concernant la BNB, 
03.01.1944.
27 BNB, Archives, London Archives, 1944: letter of 06.03.1944 from Baudewyns (Lon-
don) to Theunis (New York) (statut juridique de la Direction de la BNB en prévision 
du retour).
28 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 9.1/26; ‘correspondance Gutt et au-
tres’: letters of 24.03.1944 and 30.03.1944 from de Selliers de Moranville (New York) 
to Ansiaux (London).
Chapter 24
The Return from London
The greaT seTTling of scores
When Brussels was liberated on 4 September 1944, the Bank’s manage-
ment had all the counters closed and waited for instructions from Lon-
don. However, these did not arrive immediately and the Brussels board 
of directors found itself in a state of temporary paralysis. A degree of 
clarity was provided by Prime Minister Pierlot’s address on the govern-
ment’s return to Belgium on 8 September, in which he declared that all 
appointments made in Belgium during the war were to be regarded as 
null and void. At the same time, he elucidated the measures taken by 
the government a few days earlier in London to safeguard the money 
supply and that were now of immediate effect in Belgium.
The following morning, Goffin was summoned to the Minister of Fi-
nance and, in an extremely short encounter, was requested to tender his 
resignation and quit the Bank’s premises. He complied forthwith. In-
genbleek was then summoned to an even less friendly encounter, with 
Gutt reproving him for his lax, even collaborationist stance during the 
occupation and demanding his immediate resignation. With the alter-
native of immediate dismissal, Ingenbleek, too, complied forthwith1.
In a decree of 5 September 1944, the government had declared that 
all the measures regarding the Bank, announced on 27 November 1941, 
had now lapsed. More particularly, the Bank’s registered office was 
brought back to Brussels, the board of directors would henceforth con-
sist of six members, and all present directors, as well as the members of 
the supervisory council and the board of scrutineers, would have their 
mandates terminated on the day of the next general assembly meeting, 
1 BNB, Archives, DC, 09.09.1944; BNB, Archives, SD, dossiers officiels après 1945, dos-
sier 45: administration de la Banque (démissions): letter of 09.09.1944 from Ingen-
bleek to Gutt.
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when new elections would be taking place. On the government’s return 
from London, Gutt (on Smeers’s advice) had entrusted the management 
of the Bank to an interim management board consisting of Vandeputte, 
Ansiaux, Sontag and Basyn,2. The board met daily from 11 to 15 Septem-
ber and was replaced by a normally functioning board of directors on 
16 September, the day of Governor Theunis’s return from New York. 
This new board was chaired by the Governor and had five other mem-
bers: the directors Baudewyns, Ansiaux and Vandeputte, the Treasurer 
Sontag and the Secretary Basyn3.
At the first meeting of the general council on 27 September Theunis 
announced the resignation of Goffin and Ingenbleek. The council im-
mediately inferred that what had taken place was not ‘resignation’, but 
‘dismissal’: the fact that Goffin had been ‘removed’ from office must thus 
have been due to a blameworthy attitude during the war. Even though 
the word was not uttered, some members of the council regarded Gof-
fin’s dismissal as a censure that also reflected on them, something they 
were not prepared to accept. The ensuing discussion was developed by 
Bekaert and Peltzer, members of the supervisory council, into an open 
defence of Goffin. They stressed that his appointment in 1941 as gover-
nor had been the only way to prevent a catastrophic German nominee. 
As governor, furthermore, they claimed that Goffin had always acted 
bravely, patriotically and with dignity. If his dismissal implied a cen-
sure, that censure fell on all members of the council. They went on to 
ask whether there was, perhaps, a secret agenda behind the decree of 5 
September, and whether this was part of an attempt by the executives 
from London to get rid of all those present at the general council, on 
the pretext of their having adopted too lax an approach during the oc-
cupation4. Theunis climbed down, stating that Goffin’s resignation in 
no way implied blame on the members of the council, and added that 
he rejoiced to be once more among his colleagues of the supervisory 
council and the board of scrutineers.
Theunis and Gutt were no doubt given food for thought by the criti-
cal reaction of the supervisory council to the less-than-elegant way in 
which they had treated Goffin. The incident during the meeting of the 
2 BNB, Archives, DC, 09.09.1944.
3 BNB, Archives, DC, 16.09.1944.
4 BNB, Archives, AR, 27.09.1944.
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general council probably made them realize that they had not suffi-
ciently assessed the difficulty in carrying out policy during the occupa-
tion. Indeed, Gutt was later to concede that the government in London 
had been very isolated during the war and that what information it had 
received about the policy being pursued in Belgium came from the few 
individuals who had fled to London and who themselves were poorly 
informed or had a biased view of what was taking place in the occupied 
territory5. Barely a couple of months after the dramatic events at the 
Bank, both Gutt and Theunis therefore felt morally obliged to make a 
gesture towards Goffin6. Following joint consultation and after seeking 
the jurist Marcq’s opinion, Theunis proposed to the supervisory council 
that Goffin be granted a pension in recognition of services rendered7, a 
proposal that was approved8.
However, Frère, elected Governor on 3 November, and the newly 
elected directors protested against the resolution to award a pension, 
pointing out that the bye-laws of 1937 forbad the members of the board 
of directors from receiving any remuneration from the Bank other than 
the salary allotted to them, which was deemed to be sufficient for them 
to make their own arrangements for their pensions or to cover other 
risks. On 2 March 1945 this standpoint was endorsed by the Minister 
of Finance9.
The resignations at the Bank were not confined to the Governor and 
the Deputy-governor, but also involved the directors Vandeputte and 
Cracco. Vandeputte was convinced that he would be elected as direc-
tor at the meeting of the general assembly on 3 November 1944. His 
view was that, during the past months, Gutt and Theunis had given him 
credit for what he had done during the final years of the war and had 
regarded him as a worthy colleague during the transitional months of 
September and October. Cracco, for his part, had managed at the last 
minute – just before his deportation to Germany – to put his name for-
ward for election as a director and it was assumed that his candidature 
5 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Gut’: letter of 02.03.1947 from Gutt 
(Washington) to Theunis (Brussels).
6 NBB Archives, RR, 29.11.1944; BNB, Archives, AR, 13.12.1944.
7 BNB, Archives, SD, Frère Papers: letter of 28.11.1944 from Goffin to Frère.
8 BNB, Archives, AR, 25.10.1944.
9 BNB, Archives, Frère Papers, dossier ‘pension, Goffin’: letter of 17.02.1945 from Frère 
to Eyskens; letter of 02.03.1945 Eyskens to Frère. 
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would be accepted without demur. Particularly during the final months 
before his deportation, he had presented himself as an active defender 
of the Bank’s interests. As a director, moreover, he had been regarded 
by the German authorities in Belgium as a sharp and difficult negotia-
tor and had even earned their grudging respect. Now he had the aura 
of a member of the Resistance, held captive in a German prison. In the 
first flush of the liberation, was there anyone who could offer better 
credentials as a candidate for Bank director?
Gutt and Theunis had no problems with the two candidatures, but 
Berger and Van Nieuwenhuyse did and informally vetoed them10. They 
felt that, as ‘members of the Resistance’, they could demand to be re-
instated on the board of directors themselves and refused to sit on it 
with Vandeputte and Cracco, though why this was so difficult for them 
remains an open question. Gutt and Theunis gave in. They had been 
suddenly catapulted out of their ivory towers in London and New York 
into reality or, rather, into the chaos of an unrecognisable country that 
appeared to be their fatherland. They wanted to adjust to circumstances 
far distant from those of the Belgium that they had left. If voices were 
raised against Vandeputte and even against Cracco, they felt that they 
had to take account of them. 
The question of purging officials at the Bank also raised questions 
within the supervisory council. Although Peltzer had been arrested 
three times by the Germans during the occupation (a consequence of 
his patriotic stance and actions), he was detained on 9 July 1945 by the 
public prosecutor on suspicion of economic collaboration11. Within the 
10 Report of Vandeputte’s address to the meeting of the general council on 25.10.1944: 
‘Convoqué chez le Ministre des Finances dès la libération du territoire, M. Vandeputte 
s’est entendu dire par lui que l’on avait au sujet de son activité (comme directeur de la 
Banque) une opinion favorable. Le Ministre des Finances n’a pas manqué d’exprimer 
lui-même sa satisfaction sur la manière dont M. Vandeputte a défendu les intérêts du 
pays. M. Vandeputte a dans ces conditions continué à collaborer après la libération 
avec le Ministre des Finances pour la mise au point des arrêtés monétaires qui furent 
dans une très large mesure le fruit des travaux des commissions d’études qui ont 
siégé à la Banque Nationale sous l’occupation, aux travaux desquels il a régulière-
ment participé’: BNB, Archives, AR, 25.10.1944.
11 The Bank’s agent reported the ‘grande émotion’ that the detention of Peltzer ex-
cited in the region: ‘aucun homme de bonne foi ne pouvait considérer André Pelt-
zer comme un collaborateur volontaire de l’ennemi. L’intervention soudaine, et à 
mon avis regrettable, de l’auditorat militaire est généralement attribuée à la pression 
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board of directors, Berger asked whether, under those circumstances, 
Peltzer could remain as a member of the supervisory council and stated 
that, in any case, no further credit should be granted to his compa-
nies. Ultimately the problem solved itself, with Peltzer being provision-
ally freed in August and all charges against him and his companies 
dropped shortly thereafter.
The purging was not restricted to members of the management, but 
also extended to members of the staff. Shortly after the liberation, the 
Bank set up a commission of enquiry whose task was to identify any 
anti-patriotic behaviour on the part of staff and to suggest appropriate 
sanctions to the management12. The commission completed its work in 
February 1945 and its investigations resulted in the immediate dismiss-
al of eleven members of staff at head office; three others received notice 
of dismissal and one other was asked to resign. Out of a staff total of 
around 1,000, that is no bad score for a period that can be appropriately 
labelled repressive.
The purging turned lastly to the Banque d’Emission. Although the 
Bank and this institution had worked very closely together during the 
occupation, the Belgian government in London during the war and 
Governor Frère after the liberation attempted to make a fairly sharp 
distinction between the two. This harked back to Governor Janssen’s 
conscious attempt to use a clear division of function between the two in 
order to delineate the specific character of each. He had managed to or-
ganize the distribution of responsibility in such a way that all financial-
economic activities directly concerned with the occupation as such, or 
manifestly linked to the exceptional circumstances of war, were shifted 
onto the Banque d’Emission, leaving the Bank, as far as possible, to pur-
sue its pre-war activities. That division of function also proved helpful 
to the Belgian government in London, which was now able to secure the 
Bank from any possible suspicion of collaboration during the difficult 
d’éléments communistes…. Les employés et les ouvriers des usines sont déjà inter-
venus en faveur de leur patron’. In a telegram, Madame Jeanne Peltzer addressed 
herself directly to Frére: ‘mon sang britannique est révolté par l’ingratitude montrée 
à l’égard de mon mari, qui a vu son devoir de rester auprès de ses ouvriers au lieu de 
suivre mon désir de rentrer dans mon pays l’Angleterre en 1942’: BNB, Archives, SD, 
Frère Papers: dossier ‘arrestation André Peltzer’.
12 BNB, Archives, DC, 29.09.1944.
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war years. The full odium of economic and financial collaboration was 
thus shifted onto the Banque d’Emission, which, after Janssen’s death, 
was led by its founder-bankers, together with the boards of directors of 
the two institutions.
After the liberation, the lead in the country’s overall purging was 
taken by the parties of the Left, particularly the Communist party, 
which had made its mark in the Resistance during the final years of 
the war. They accused the Banque d’Emission of having used the guise 
of the employment policy to help Belgian industrial and financial big 
business to legitimize collaboration. They claimed further that big busi-
ness had done well out of the war and, with the support of the Banque 
d’Emission, had unjustifiably enriched itself. The fierce campaign that 
was consequently launched by the Left against the Banque d’Emission 
initially confirmed the suspicions of the government, recently returned 
from London.
As indicated, the Banque d’Emission had, with effect from 4 Sep-
tember 1944, closed its doors in Brussels. Pursuant to its bye-laws, the 
Banque d’Emission had to be liquidated on the cessation of hostilities, 
and its founder-bankers gathered on 18 September to review the mat-
ter. De Munck and others judged that liquidation could not take place 
until the Banque d’Emission’s Belgian current accounts and certificates 
had been paid out, even if that required further advances from the 
Bank. Collin even took the view that the unpaid credit balances at the 
Verrechnungskasse in Berlin had to be settled first. Vandeputte, still a 
member of the Bank’s board of directors, was better informed about the 
negative opinion held of the Banque d’Emission by the new Bank man-
agement and by the government, and therefore rejected the proposals 
as unrealistic, making it clear at the same time that the suggested ap-
proach to the Bank had no chance of success.
For these reasons, Vandeputte felt that it would be more advisable 
to prepare a general report for the Minister of Finance on the prob-
lem of liquidating the institution, a problem that was particularly acute 
in respect of the creditors and chiefly the Bank. On 20 September the 
board of directors agreed that Vandeputte should draw up such a report 
and also formulate a number of proposals for the settlement of certain 
priority liabilities, after their legitimacy had been determined13. Mean-
13 BNB, Archives, SD, 40, dossier 8.11.40/1: liquidation de la BEB (réunion des banquiers 
fondateurs, 25.09.1944; BR BEB, 27.09.1944).
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while, it had become clear that the situation was going to be reviewed 
through entirely different eyes, as the matter had been taken in hand by 
the military prosecutor’s office (see infra).
governor theunis in brussels
Theunis’s spell as governor in Brussels was brief, lasting from 16 Sep-
tember to 3 November 1944. The period may have been short, but ex-
ceptional circumstances made it one during which important and mo-
mentous steps were taken as regards not only the management of the 
Bank, but also the entire country. On 20 and 27 September, Theunis 
submitted a concise, provisional review to the supervisory council and 
the general council of the Bank’s activities in London during the war 
years14. He stated that, at the time of the German invasion, the major 
task entrusted by the management to the Bank’s representatives abroad 
had been to secure the gold reserves. He took the view that the task 
had been more than admirably fulfilled, since the approximately 21 bil-
lion Belgian francs’ worth of gold transferred abroad before and at the 
beginning of the invasion had been reduced by no more than 247 mil-
lion francs’ worth. It was true that the Banque de France had surren-
dered about 6.6 billion francs’ worth to Nazi Germany, but he hoped 
that, thanks to the legal proceedings instituted in New York against the 
French central bank, this could be recouped in full.
Theunis also announced that, in exchange for Treasury certificates, 
the Bank had granted about 10 billion Belgian francs in interest-free ad-
vances to the Belgian government in London, which had used them in 
part to provide financial help to the Allied forces. The government had 
also used the money to set aside a substantial provision for the even-
tual redemption of the Treasury certificates that the Banque du Congo 
Belge had received during the war in exchange for the cession of gold 
and sterling. Lastly, Theunis reported that the Bank’s own expenditure 
in London during the war had amounted to nearly 49 million Belgian 
francs, covering chiefly the cost of transporting Belgian gold from Lon-
don to Ottowa in June 1940, the printing of new banknotes and the 
accommodation expenses of the Bank’s staff in London during the war.
14 BNB, Archives, RR, 20.09.1944; BNB, Archives, AR, 27.09.1944.
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The preparations for the election of the six new directors on 3 No-
vember generated a great deal of tension within the Bank. In accord-
ance with the bye-laws, it fell to the general council, on the advice of 
the governor, to propose the candidates for consideration to the general 
meeting of shareholders, but Theunis felt that the new governor, though 
not yet appointed, ought also to have a certain say in the composition 
of what was to be his board of directors. Additionally, pressure from 
Theunis and Gutt, coupled with the veto of Berger and Van Nieuwen-
huyse, had led Vandeputte to withdraw his candidacy. During his fi-
nal attendance at the meetings of the general council, though, he gave 
vent to his great disappointment, declaring that he had not sought his 
appointment in 1943, but that, in spite of the very substantial risks he 
knew it entailed, had ultimately accepted it at the urging of a number 
of prominent figures who had all reminded him of his patriotic duty15.
The directors appointed at the general meeting of 3 Novem-
ber were Ansiaux, Baudewyns, Berger, De Voghel, Smeers and Van 
 Nieuwenhuyse. The Prince Regent of the country, Charles, appointed 
Frère as Governor and Baudewyns became Deputy-governor. Joseph 
 Van heurck, previously Director-general of the Treasury and the 
 National Debt, became Government Commissioner, Sontag remained 
in his position as Treasurer and Basyn was confirmed in his previous 
function as Secretary.
Fresh difficulties arose at the beginning of 1945. It was still not pos-
sible for the considerable moneys due to the Bank from the State to 
be settled and there was nothing to indicate that there could be set-
tlement within the foreseeable future The problem of the tax on war 
profits had not yet been entirely cleared up and it was equally uncertain 
what precisely should happen in respect of the revaluation of the gold 
reserves. Added to that was the very precarious situation of the Bank it-
self. There was still no certainty about whether the State would assume 
the enormous debt of 64.6 billion Belgian francs due to the Bank from 
the Banque d’Emission. On top of all this, the Socialist representative 
Lode Craeybeckx submitted a bill in March 1945 for the nationaliza-
tion of certain sections of the Belgian economy, including the Bank. 
The board of directors felt that, under these circumstances, it would 
be both inopportune and impossible for the Bank’s claims against the 
15 BNB, Archives, AR, 25.10.1944.
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State to be settled in the short term, let alone for a radical reform of the 
Bank to be launched in the immediate future. In April, therefore, the 
Bank resolved to postpone both settlement and reform until a less tense 
moment16. It was thus only on 13 September 1948 that – in implementa-
tion of the law of 28 July 1948 – settlement and reform would finally be 
arranged17.
The obligation to submit the balance sheets and accounts for the 
1940-1944 financial years before the end of June 1945 nevertheless re-
mained. It was in fact met at an extraordinary general assembly meet-
ing on 30 June 1945 at which, on behalf of the supervisory council, the 
board of scrutineers submitted them to the shareholders for discussion 
and approval18. The last balance sheet submitted set out the position 
of the Bank as at 31 December 1944. On the liabilities side, there was 
a directly payable amount of 46.3 billion Belgian francs, 42.7 billion of 
which in respect of new banknotes. On the assets side, the gold reserve 
was entered at a value of 32 billion Belgian francs, 10.5 billion of which 
(i.e. the increase in value, after the reserve’s revaluation) was transferred 
to a blocked account in the name of the government, in order to redeem 
part of the State’s short term debt to the Bank in a final settlement at a 
later date. At that moment the debt stood at 31.4 billion Belgian francs 
and would rise to nearly 41 billion in July 1945.
The closure of The belgo-french gold dossier
As indicated in Chapter 15, the legal proceedings that the Bank had in-
stituted during the war in New York against the Banque de France had 
been suspended when the Germans had extended their occupation of 
France to the entire country, following the Allied landing in North Af-
rica at the end of 1942. A second important consequence of the North 
African landing was the change in de Gaulle’s position within the Al-
lied camp. By joining the Americans in that landing, de Gaulle had 
16 BNB, Archives, DC, 19.03.1945.
17 R. Simonis, ‘Les règlements internationaux de 1939 à nos jours. Deuxième partie: la 
période de 1945 à 1950’, in: Revue de la Banque, 48, 4/5, 1984 (special double issue), 
p. 53.
18 BNB, Archives, AV, 30.06.1945, 27.08.1945.
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virtually supplanted the Vichy regime’s General Giraud. He had also 
become the unchallenged leader of the Comité Français de Libération 
Nationale, which projected itself as the political organ of Free France 
against the Vichy government. The Belgian government in London was 
the first to recognize the Comité as the legitimate representative of Free 
France.
This was no coincidence. Since the beginning of 1943, the lawyers of 
the Bank and of the Banque de France had been prevented from con-
ferring with the French government at Vichy and with the Banque de 
France at Clermont-Ferrand. Gutt consequently informed the French 
diplomat Hervé Alphand in the summer of that year that the Belgian 
government attached great importance to knowing what the Comité’s 
stance was regarding the matter of the Belgian gold. Alphand conveyed 
the message to Algiers, where the Comité then was, and on 5 October 
received a draft declaration in reply, to the effect that the Comité had 
no doubt that the Banque de France would restore the gold to the Bank 
after the war, as indeed had always been the central bank’s intention. 
Moreover, the Comité promised to urge the future government of a lib-
erated France to have the gold restored as soon as possible19.
Alphand passed the text of the reply to Spaak, who informed his 
government20. In December, the matter came up during two meetings 
between Gutt and Jean Monnet in New York, on the occasion of the 
conference establishing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA)21. Gutt did not pull his punches and expressed 
his great disappointment with the French text, stating that a declara-
tion of good will was wholly inadequate and that a more positive solu-
tion had to be offered. With Alphand and André Istel, and after consul-
tation with Fuller in New York, Monnet drafted a new text in which the 
Comité’s undertaking was given more emphasis than in the original22.
19 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: projet, 
04.10.1943; A/S: ‘or belge’, note (undated); PB/MI: projet de déclaration (undated).
20 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: letter of 
13.11.1943 from Valensi (Washington) to Guindey (Algiers).
21 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: letter of 
14.12.1943 from Monnet (New York) to Comité de Libération (Algiers).
22 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: letter of 
19.12.1943 from Monnet (New York) to Comité de Libération (Algiers).
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The Comité, backed by Jean Martial, who happened to be visiting Al-
giers at the time, was unable to agree with the draft, feeling that it went 
too far, and declared that the Comité itself had no legal competence to 
take measures regarding the disposal of assets of the Banque de France 
or to give an undertaking for their cession to the Bank. Monnet and 
Alphand refused to give up and asked Theunis for substantive details 
and suggestions that would correctly reflect the Belgian position on the 
matter and help in resolving the dispute. Theunis had Ansiaux draw up 
a memorandum, in which the whole story of the gold transfer to Berlin 
was set out with concrete data and figures. This was handed over to the 
French on 9 February 194423.
In March 1944 Alphand and Monnet pressed the Comité to formulate 
more concrete proposals. The Comité now indicated its willingness to 
certify that the Bank would be reimbursed for all losses it had incurred 
regarding the gold deposited with the French central bank. Instruc-
tions were then given to Martial, who had meanwhile returned to New 
York, to work with Fuller to prepare a draft agreement on those lines24. 
The draft was completed in April and in it the Comité recognized the 
obligation of the French government to restore to the Bank after the war 
the crates of fine gold deposited in safe custody with the French central 
bank, or reimburse the equivalent in gold after the war25.
It is likely that there was no immediate discussion of the draft. Mar-
tial fell seriously ill shortly thereafter and was given six months’ sick 
leave; at the beginning of June, moreover, came the landings of the Al-
lied forces on the coast of Normandy, which brought the prospect of 
the liberation of France and Belgium. Suddenly, there were other things 
occupying people’s minds. Nevertheless, the question of the gold con-
tinued to concern the French and, in the course of June, the Comité 
– which had meanwhile become the Gouvernement Provisoire de la 
République Française – contacted the Belgian government directly in 
23 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 13, dossier A 320/6: letter of 14.02.1944 from Nisot 
(New York) to Dulles (New York). 
24 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat de la direction, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: let-
ter of 05.04.1944 from Massigli, Mayer and Mendès-France (Algiers) to Monnet 
(Washington).
25 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat de la direction, dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: letter 
of 15.04.1944 from Martial (New York) to Valensi (Washington).
406 Chapter 24
London, pressing for an amicable settlement26. Now, for the first time, 
Gutt reacted favourably. Spaak was fully supportive of Gutt’s more pos-
itive attitude and was himself prepared to make a number of conces-
sions27.
During the discussions, the provisional French government, repre-
sented by Pierre Mendès-France, initially kept to the draft text drawn 
up in April. Gutt sent the text to Theunis in New York for advice, who, 
in turn, passed it to his legal adviser, Nisot. His reaction was very nega-
tive: what were the actual conditions surrounding the guarantee of an 
eventual reimbursement by France? For how long could the legal pro-
ceedings be suspended28? In London, Ansiaux, too, had cast a critical 
eye over the proposal and he, too, saw it in a less than positive light. 
For him, it implied a change of debtor, which boiled down in legal 
terms to ‘novation’ – the substitution of a new contract in place of an 
old – whereby all the Bank’s contractual rights vis-à-vis the Banque de 
France would lapse. Belgium had therefore absolutely to avoid recog-
nizing a debtor other than the French central bank, certainly not the 
German government or the Reichsbank and certainly not the French 
government. Likewise, there could be no accepting the argument that, 
through force majeure, the Banque de France was freed from its respon-
sibility. The Banque de France was the sole debtor and there could be 
no derogation from that underlying point. In addition, a suspension 
of the legal proceedings, as formulated in the proposal, could result in 
postponement sine die, which was a further risk to be avoided. In their 
assessment, the advisers were unanimous: the proposal had to be re-
jected29.
During the Bretton Woods conference (15-22 July 1944) Mendès-
France organized an informal dinner, which was attended by the Bel-
gians Gutt, Boël and Ansiaux, and the Frenchmen Istel, de Largentaye 
and Aglion. The purpose of the gathering was to seek a solution to the 
gold dispute, but talk also ranged over a Franco-Belgian monetary 
26 Cornu, L’or monétaire au vingtième siècle, p. 188.
27 NBB, Archives SD, Ansiaux Papers, A2, s.f. 4: letter of 22.06.1944 from Ansiaux 
(London) to Theunis (New York).
28 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1: comments of 03.06.1944 by Nisot (New 
York) on Mendès-France’s proposal to resolve the Belgo-French gold dispute.
29 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2: letter of 06.07.1944 from Ansiaux (London) 
to Gutt (London).
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agreement and, indeed, of a wider Franco-Belgian-Dutch economic 
 cooperation agreement. Gutt – very soberly, as always – suggested that 
the last two points could better be discussed in London; as to the gold 
dispute, he stated frankly that the French proposal was unacceptable 
for three reasons. The first was that changing debtors was not custom-
ary practice between central banks and could not be permitted. The 
second was that he could not be satisfied with an undertaking from 
the provisional French government; there could be no certainty that 
a subsequent government would not dispute such an undertaking and 
simply ignore it. The third reason was that he regarded the proposed 
guarantee as empty and one that could remain on ice as long as the gold 
was not received back from Germany. Gutt’s negative response came 
as a disappointment to Mendès-France, who now saw himself obliged, 
once again, to go through the long process of finding consensus among 
de Gaulle and the members of his provisional government for a new, 
viable formula30.
By 28 July, Mendès-France and Istel had come up with an amended 
proposal. The formula of the guarantee was replaced by the promise 
that, as soon as its head office was liberated, the Banque de France would 
make immediate payment of an advance to the value of the Belgian gold 
deposited with it. This would be guaranteed by the provisional govern-
ment and the advance would be repayable only if the Bank was unable 
to recoup the gold from Germany. Naturally, the provisional govern-
ment counted on the Bank suspending the legal proceedings in New 
York forthwith and cancelling them once the payment of the advance 
had been received. Gutt felt that the new proposal contained a number 
of important improvements: for example, the Banque de France now 
regarded itself as the debtor and the formula of the advance implied im-
mediate and effective payment. However, he thought that it still needed 
more work31.
At the insistence of the French government, the matter was fast-
tracked as soon as Paris was liberated in August 1944. France was anx-
30 ARA, Administrative services of the Prime Minister, Pierlot Papers, dossier 6: letter 
of 21.07.1944 from Gutt (Bretton Woods) to Spaak (London).
31 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1: new proposal from Istel, with comments 
from Nisot, 28.07.1944. See also: BZ, Archives, dossier 12.318: letters of 04.08.1944 
and 14.08.1944 from Gutt to Spaak.
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ious to start importing goods from the United States as soon as possible 
and was consequently looking to have the sequestration on her gold 
lifted. The acting governor of the Banque de France, Henri de Bletterie, 
informed the Belgian government in London that the French central 
bank had always recognized its liability towards the Bank and therefore 
desired as speedily as possible to meet its obligation to restore the gold, 
adding that the French Minister of Finance was in full agreement with 
this32.
Backed up by Baudewyns, Ansiaux and a few members of the Minis-
tries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, Gutt immediately began negotia-
tions in London with the Banque de France’s representatives and a text 
was hammered out by the beginning of September that could meet with 
everyone’s approval33. The Banque de France undertook to restore the 
Belgian gold as rapidly as possible and the provisional French govern-
ment declared itself prepared to make immediate and full restoration 
if the gold was not back in the Bank’s hands by 23 December 1944, the 
details of all this to be resolved between the two central banks. For its 
part, the Belgian government promised to press the Bank to suspend 
the legal proceedings until 23 December and to abandon them once the 
agreed restoration had taken place. Belgium would also make a special 
effort to track down the looted gold and would transfer any it recovered 
to the French central bank. In a letter to Theunis, Gutt expressed his 
great satisfaction with the proposal and was told in return that the reac-
tions in New York were also highly favourable34.
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georges Bidault, wrote to 
Spaak on 16 September 1944 that the Banque de France was prepared 
to restore the gold, so that no further negotiation at governmental level 
was necessary; this could now be taken over by the two central banks35. 
On 2 October, de Bletterie came personally from Paris to the Bank in 
32 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1: memorandum of August 1944.
33 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/43, ‘or belge’: telegram of 
08.09.1944 from the Banque de France (Paris) to the French embassy in London.
34 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers A 1: letter of 23.08.1944 from Gutt (London) to 
Theunis (New York); letter of 26.08.1944 from Spaak (London) to Gutt (London) 
and Theunis (New York). 
35 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 1: letter of 16.09.1944 from Bidault (Paris) to 
Spaak.
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Brussels to set the negotiations in train. With the instruction to be flex-
ible, Bolgert and Sancery were delegated to continue discussions during 
the following days and bring them to a successful conclusion. In this 
respect, the Luxembourg gold (4,317 kilograms’ worth) ought strictly 
to have been deducted from the amount of gold to be restored, as the 
Bank itself had ordered it to be surrendered to Germany, but the nego-
tiators were given leeway to make a concession here, should the Bank 
take a rigid stance and require the Luxembourg gold to be included. 
The negotiators were also given a free hand regarding the actual place 
for the transfer, which the Bank preferred to be France and the Banque 
de France naturally preferred to be in a country where it held a stock of 
gold. A Belgian concession to the French on this point would, of course, 
save the French paying the transport costs, but the negotiators were 
free to meet the Bank’s wishes. As regards the costs and fees involved 
in the legal proceedings in New York, the negotiators were required to 
suggest that each party bear its own costs and the fees for which it was 
liable. Should the Bank insist on a fifty-fifty arrangement, this could be 
accepted, but only in respect of costs, not fees36.
It appeared on the eve of the negotiations that an agreement would 
soon be struck37, but disillusionment rapidly set in, especially on the 
French side, the French delegation noting: ‘The distrust and obstinacy 
shown by the Belgians since nearly four years have not at all softened38. 
During the first meeting, Theunis baldly announced that, in the ab-
sence of an agreement, the Bank would continue with the legal pro-
ceedings in New York and undoubtedly win the case. Then, on 6 Octo-
ber, Ansiaux joined the negotiators and stated that Gutt could not agree 
to the French proposal to exclude the Luxembourg gold from what was 
to be restored. In answer, the French delegation argued that it had been 
the Bank, the actual custodian of the Luxembourg gold, that had given 
the Banque de France express instructions during the war to send that 
36 BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/90, ‘or belge’: 
note pour le ministre, 29.09.1944.
37 BNB, Archives, DC, 02.10.1944, 03.10.1944, 04.10.1944.
38 In a comprehensive report, Bolgert set out the course of the negotiations in detail: 
BdFr, Archives, Direction de la documentation, dossier 1397.1994.01/89, ‘or belge’: 
compte-rendu des négociations qui se sont poursuivies à Bruxelles du 1er au 8 oc-
tobre 1944.
410 Chapter 24
gold to Luxembourg, from whence it had been transferred to Germany. 
It was therefore not the Banque de France, but the Bank that was liable 
to reimburse the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg.
The tone of Ansiaux’s reply was regarded by the French as being par-
ticularly virulent. His argument was that both the Banque de France 
and the French government had unacceptably ignored the royal decree 
of 2 February 1940. That decree had declared all Belgian officials in 
occupied territory to be incompetent to enter into any commitments 
abroad on behalf of the State or their institutions; consequently, the 
instructions of Janssen and Ingenbleek in respect of the Luxembourg 
gold were to be deemed invalid, and thus responsibility for the French 
central bank and the French government failing to take account of the 
decree could not be laid at the door of the Belgian government.
The French delegation forcibly rejected this argument, pointing out 
that, in July 1940, Janssen had returned to Brussels with the full au-
thorization of the Belgian government and that all his actions until his 
death in June 1941 had been recognized as legally valid by the Belgian 
government in London. Why, the French questioned, should his ac-
tion regarding the Luxembourg gold be specifically excluded from this? 
However, the Belgian negotiators stuck obstinately to their standpoint, 
which simply served to sour the negotiations.
During a meeting the next day between the French delegation and 
Gutt, the Minister, once again, demanded that the Luxembourg gold 
be included in what was to be restored to Belgium. According to the 
French, this could not be done immediately. In the first place, there had 
to be a formal request from the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg; sec-
ondly, that institution would have to prove that, prior to the surrender 
of the gold to the Reichsbank, it had not received any reimbursement 
or compensation. However, Gutt continued to insist on his original de-
mand until the French ambassador, also present at the meeting, gave an 
undertaking that his government would stand surety for the restoration 
of the Luxembourg gold to the Bank. Gutt now agreed to drop the de-
mand for its immediate restoration and to have that take place at a later 
date. With this, the problems were straightened out and Gutt concluded 
with a special word of praise for the French gesture.
The agreement was signed on 8 October by Bolgert and Sancery for 
the Banque de France and was ratified a few days later by the institu-
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tion’s acting governor, de Bletterie39. By the terms of the agreement, the 
French central bank undertook to transfer 198,434 kilograms of fine 
gold to the Bank before 23 December that year40. The agreement also 
laid down that the Bank could select the location for the transfer. After 
a little hesitation, the Bank opted for the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and restoration duly took place on 22 December 194441. That same 
month, a proportion of the French gold held at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and subject to the sequestration was released, the 
sequestration being lifted entirely the following month42.
Ultimately, everyone gained satisfaction from this result, the French 
delegation because the Banque de France’s unimpeachable reputation 
had been confirmed and efforts could now be focused on getting the se-
questration in New York lifted. It is true that the Belgian delegation had 
had to make a few concessions, but it, too, had cause to be satisfied with 
the result when it later heard from Dulles that, in essence, legal pro-
ceedings would have dragged on much longer than originally thought 
and that they might well have had to be settled by an international or 
even a French court of law43. The French central bank’s promise to take 
the French banknotes still in the Banque d’Emission’s portfolio was an 
additional reason for the Belgians to be very pleased with the outcome.
39 BNB, Archives, RR, 09.10.1944. BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat du Conseil Général et 
du Conseil de la politique monétaire, dossier 1069.1989.19/2, ‘or belge’: convention 
franco-belge, 8-9.10.1944..
40 The accounting department calculated the amount of gold to be restored as follows: 
on 10.05.1940, the Bank had entrusted a total of 245,503 kg of fine gold to the Banque 
de France (209,505 kg in deposit, 35,998 under dossier). Between 10 May and 4 June, 
42,702 kg of this had been withdrawn, leaving a net balance of 202,801 kg. The 
provision later granted by the Bank was regarded as cancelled. From the balance 
was deducted the amount of the Luxembourg gold deposited with the Bank (4,317 
kg) and the cession, later noted, of 50 kg, leaving a final amount to be restored of 
198,434 kg of fine gold.
41 BZ, Diplomatic Archives, dossier 12.318: letter of 20.10.1944 from Spaak to Gutt and 
Theunis; letter of 04.12.1944 from Frère to Spaak; BNB, Archives, RR, 06.12.1944; 
BNB, Archives, DC, 02.01.1945.
42 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/43, ‘or belge’: letter of 
21.10.1944 from Guindey to Moninck; dossier 1060.2001.01/41, ‘or belge’: memoran-
dum of 22.12.1944 for Martial.





The compleTion of The belgo-french reconciliaTion
Three major questions remained to be resolved with the Banque de 
France: the cost of the abandoned legal proceedings in New York; the 
decisions to be made when the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg de-
manded the return of the gold it had deposited with the Bank; and the 
steps to be taken by the Banque de France to recover Belgian gold that 
might be found in Germany or elsewhere. The first question was re-
solved rapidly and satisfactorily. During the October negotiations, it 
had been agreed that, with the exception of lawyers’ fees, legal costs 
would be shared between the two central banks1. However, there was 
also the delicate problem of the sheriff’s fee. Originally the fee amount-
ed to 2.5 million US dollars, but it had already been reduced to 256,000 
US dollars. In the end the sheriff, under pressure of the American gov-
ernment, having reduced drastically a similar fee due by the Polish, also 
reduced the Belgian fee to 10,175 US dollars, to be paid half by the Bank 
and half by the Banque de France2.
With regard to the second question, the Luxembourg Minister of 
Finance, Pierre Dupong, informed the Bank on 21 March 1945 that his 
government was concerned about the gold deposited with the Bank by 
the Caisse d’Epargne du Luxembourg and enquired whether it was still 
available in Brussels3. This tardy request for information was undoubt-
edly due to von Rundstedt’s Ardennes Offensive of December 1944, 
which meant that Luxembourg’s institutions were able to begin func-
tioning normally again only after the Offensive was broken. In reply to 
1 ARA, Theunis Papers, ‘correspondance Theunis-Nisot’: letter of 03.10.1944 from 
Theunis to Nisot (New York).
2 BNB, Archives, DC, 25.06.1945.
3 BNB, Archives, DC, 21.03.1945.
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the enquiry, Governor Frère sent Dupong a detailed report of what had 
befallen the Luxembourg gold. Dupong reasoned that, on the basis of 
the report, the Caisse d’Epargne could claim a right to restoration. Frère 
replied he would take up the matter with the Banque de France, which 
in 1940 had received the Luxembourg gold in safe custody4.
Frère spent 12-15 July 1945 in Paris to discuss the Luxembourg prob-
lem with the new governor of the Banque de France, Emmanuel Mon-
ick. The talks went especially smoothly and, because the French gov-
ernment wished to fulfil its vague promise to Gutt the previous year, 
Monick was able to inform Frère that the Banque de France would an-
swer for the restoration of the gold and, to that end, would deal directly 
with the Luxembourg government and the Caisse d’Epargne. In April 
1946 an agreement for this was signed between the Banque de France, 
the Bank and the Caisse d’Epargne5.
The third major question concerned the steps to be taken by the 
Banque de France to recover Belgian gold that might be found in Ger-
many or elsewhere after the war. The onus was, in fact, on the Bank, as 
the original owner, to demand its return – should any be found – and 
then transfer it to the French central bank. In April 1945, news came 
that the American Third Army had discovered a substantial quantity 
of gold bars and coins in the salt mines of Merkers in Germany. In line 
with the agreement of 8 October 1944, in which it had undertaken to 
spare no effort to help the Banque de France to track the gold down, 
the Bank immediately took steps in tandem with the French central 
bank to be able to participate in the identification of the find. However, 
the two banks were refused access, as the Americans were not allowing 
any civil officials into the area until the conquest of Germany had been 
completed6.
Following the German surrender in May 1945, matters could be tak-
en further. Puhl, the former Deputy-president of the Reichsbank, was 
4 BNB, Archives, RR, 11.07.1945.
5 BZ, Diplomatic Archives, dossier 12.318: letter of 30.04.1944 from Spaak to the 
French ambassador in Brussels. See also: BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat du Conseil 
Général et du Conseil de la politique monétaire, dossier 1069.1989.19/2: conven-
tion entre Banque de France, Banque Nationale de Belgique et Caisse d’Epargne du 
Grand Duché de Luxembourg, 20.02.1946, 23.02.1946, 02.03.1946.
6 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/43: rapport sur la ré-
cupération du Trésor à la mine de Kaiseroda à Merkers (Frankfurt, 18.04.1945).
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at Lindau under French supervision. Being questioned, he asserted that 
most of the Belgian gold had been melted down at the Prussian Mint 
and had been recast as Reichsbank gold bars, stamped with the years 
1937 or 1938, but he did not say that they had been put back into cir-
culation. According to what he remembered, nearly half of them had 
been used to pay for purchases from German allies and other friendly 
neutral countries7. In August 1945, the Bank’s treasurer, Sontag, was 
given permission to travel with officials of the French central bank to 
Frankfurt, where the gold discovered at Merkers had been taken and 
inventoried. There were certainly indications that Belgian gold was 
probably among the gold bars, but no conclusive evidence8. It was only 
in January 1946 that proper identification could take place, when a 
Banque de France delegation was admitted to the archives of the Prus-
sian Mint, which had been transferred to the headquarters of the Soviet 
army in the Russian zone of occupation in Berlin. The journals of the 
smelting-works for the 1938-1943 period provided detailed information 
about which numbered Belgian gold bars had been recast under a new 
Reichsbank number and with a fictitious date9. This identification ena-
bled the destination of exported bars to be traced in certain instances. 
A considerable proportion of them, for example, had ended up in the 
Banque Nationale Suisse, in the central banks of Rumania, Portugal, 
Sweden and Spain10, and in the BIS at Basel11.
7 BdFr, Archives, Secrétariat Général, dossier 1060.2001.01/43: Puhl, la question de 
l’or belge (undated); letter of 21.06.1945 from Panouillot to the Minister of Finance 
(Paris).
8 BNB, Archives, AR, 22.08.1945: note pour le gouverneur (report of the Treasurer 
Sontag on his mission to Frankfurt, 10.08.1945-14.08.1945).
9 BNB, Archives, Schatbewaarder, T 2, dossier 02.03.02.05 (D 556/9): rapport de la 
mission de la Banque de France à Berlin, 02.01.1946-13.01.1946 (copy).
10 BNB, Archives, Hoofdkas, CC 1, dossier 25.17.02.00 (G 677): divers (note du chef de 
service du change (Brussels): or d’origine belge (refondu), retrouvé en Espagne, 
26.04.1949).
11 During 1943-1944, the Reichsbank had gold to the value of 531.7 million Swiss francs 
transferred to its own deposit of gold with the Banque Nationale Suisse at Berne. Of 
this, 378.6 million francs’ worth was delivered to the Banque Nationale Suisse itself, 
98.4 million francs’ worth to the Banco de Portugal, 35.6 million francs’ worth to 
the Royal Bank of Sweden, 12.2 million francs’ worth to the National Bank of Ru-
mania and 6.8 million francs’ worth to the BIS at Basel: Commission Indépendante 
d’Experts (Suisse: Seconde Guerre Mondiale), La Suisse et les transactions sur l’or 
pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Rapport intermédiaire, Berne (1997), annex 
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Already at the beginning of 1945, the Banque de France and the 
French government had urged the Belgian government to accord spe-
cial treatment to the Bank’s rediscovered gold. Monetary gold was not 
to be considered as war booty, but to be returned intact to the central 
banks to which it rightfully belonged12. The Belgian government took 
steps to have this done, but the American government quickly made it 
known that it would not entertain any proposals to that effect, stating 
that, much as it would have liked to return monetary gold identified as 
Belgian to the Bank, the exceptional circumstances ruled out such a 
move. According to the Americans, to return the gold would, among 
other things, create a dangerous precedent. Virtually all the Austrian 
and Italian monetary gold had been found and identified, and it would 
not be fair that the central banks of Germany’s allies – as Austria and 
Italy were – should be able to recover their gold in full simply because 
it had been kept intact by the Germans; the central banks of Western 
allies would be left in the cold, because none, or only a proportion, of 
their gold, whether plundered or recast, could be found. The American 
government was now certain that not all the plundered gold would be 
recovered, so that there would be insufficient for everyone to recoup 
their gold in full, and it was for this reason that the Americans were 
considering the formation of a pool from which recoupment could take 
place13.
During the Paris conferences of 9 November and 21 December 
1945 on reparations, the eighteen participating countries set up an 
Inter- Allied Reparation Agency and adopted the American proposal 
for a pool as the guiding principle for the distribution of reparation 
payments14. The agency requested the American, British and French 
governments themselves to solve the problem of reparations and to 
undertake the distribution of the attendant payments, as well as to be-
gin negotiations with neutral countries, such as Switzerland, Sweden, 
Portugal and Spain, aimed at placing a claim on German assets there, 
2, table 23. See also: Commission Indépendante d’Experts (Chairman : Professor 
Jean-François Berger) (Suisse: Seconde Guerre Mondiale), La Suisse, le national-
socialisme et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Rapport final, Berne, 2002, pp. 224-238.
12 BNB, Archives, IS, dossier 39/1120: letter of 23.02.1945 from Moninck (Paris) to Frère.
13 BZ, Diplomatic Archives, DA, dossier 18: letters of 10.08.1945 and 14.08.1945 from 
Silvercruys (Washington) to Spaak.
14 Cornu, L’or monétaire du vingtième siècle, pp. 195-198.
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insofar as they qualified to be used for reparations15. On 26 Septem-
ber 1946, pursuant to their mandate, the three governments set up a 
Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, with its 
registered office in Brussels16. The method adopted by this commission 
was similar to that followed by the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency in 
December 1945: all plundered monetary gold found in Germany or else-
where would be placed in a joint fund and each country involved would 
receive part of it, in proportion to the gold it had lost through German 
seizure during the period of occupation.
Requests for restitution had to be submitted to the commission be-
fore 15 September 1947 and the petitioning countries were Albania, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Poland and Yugoslavia. The first distribution took place on 16 
October 1947, Belgium receiving 90,650 kilograms of monetary gold 
and Luxembourg 1,930 kilograms17. Both transferred those amounts 
to France, as agreed. The commission remained active for a number 
of years and distributed a further amount of monetary gold, of which 
Belgium received just under 40,000 kilograms. France, thus, ultimately 
recovered about 64 per cent of the 198,434 kilograms of monetary gold 
that she had restored to Belgium18.
the gutt operation (6 october 1944)
Once Gutt’s suggested exchange rates for the Belgian franc had been 
accepted by the American and British governments at the beginning of 
1944, the time appeared ripe to incorporate the decisions into decrees. 
15 Commission Indépendante d’Experts, La Suisse et les transactions sur l’or, p. 191.
16 BZ, Diplomatiek archief, DA, dossier 18: la restitution de l’or monétaire (note pour le 
ministre, 10.10.1947).
17 BZ, Diplomatic Archives, DA, dossier 18: la restitution de l’or monétaire (letter of 
16.10.1947 from the Commission tripartite to the Belgian delegate of the inter-Al-
lied agency).
18 Cornu, L’histoire de l’or au vingtième siècle, pp. 199-200. The French government 
reimbursed the Banque de France for the shortfall (about 70,000 kg), doing so in 
the form of a credit and at the official gold rate for the French franc in December 
1944, though it was only in 1958 that the credit was paid out; in the meantime, the 
gold value of the French franc had fallen sharply, which resulted in the Banque de 
France, too, having to bear part of the loss.
418 CHAPTER 25
By a decree of 1 May 1944 the King and his government were empow-
ered to fix the price of gold and the exchange rates of foreign currency 
in terms of the Belgian franc. At the same time, the decree abolished 
the franc’s gold weight as promulgated in the royal decree of 1936, and 
empowered the government to set a new gold weight as soon as circum-
stances permitted. The same day, also by decree, the Cabinet officially 
fixed that weight as one kilogram of monetary gold to 49,318.0822 Bel-
gian francs, which led to the following exchange rates: 176.625 francs to 
the pound sterling, 43.827 francs to the US dollar, 0.883 of a franc to the 
French franc and 16.52 francs to the Dutch guilder. The Belgian franc’s 
devaluation against its pre-war gold weight amounted to 32.7 per cent 
and against the exchange rates of the other currencies in August 1939 to 
30.29 percent against sterling, 48.65 per cent against the US dollar, 14.94 
per cent against the French franc and 4.96 per cent against the Dutch 
guilder19.
The decree of 1 May 1944 was published in Brussels in the Belgian 
Official Gazette of 5 September 1944, together with other decrees drawn 
up in London, of which one amended the organic law of the Bank and 
another re-established the institution’s registered office in Brussels. 
Lastly, a further five decrees were published instituting safeguarding 
measures regarding the prospective currency reform20.
The government’s initial intention was to press ahead with monetary 
reform immediately upon returning from London at the beginning 
of September 1944, but the immediate operation envisaged was seen 
to be impossible. Printing the new banknotes had not yet been com-
pleted in London and, much worse, transport was lacking to get them 
to Belgium, exacerbated by the Allied Supreme Command’s refusal to 
carry them in any of its warships. Meanwhile, Baudewyns had noti-
fied the board of directors that 23 billion Belgian francs’ worth of new 
19 Janssens, De Belgische frank, pp. 322-324.
20 For detailed information in respect of the Gutt Operation, see chiefly: H. Van 
Praag, L’opération Gutt: l’assainissement monétaire de la Belgique au lendemain de 
la seconde guerre mondiale (unpublished graduate thesis, ULB), Brussels, 1990; H. 
Van Praag, ‘L’assainissement monétaire au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondi-
ale. L’Opération Gutt en Belgique – La politique du Général de Gaulle en France’, 
in: Revue de la Banque, February-March, 1996 (supplément historique), pp.3-37. See 
also: C. Chambre, L’expérience monétaire belge (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Univer-
sity of Paris), 1950. 
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banknotes were in London, waiting to be shipped, with a final batch of 
3 billion francs’ worth still being printed. This meant that there was a 
total stock of 26 billion francs’ worth to be brought over. As soon as the 
shipments arrived, eight million inhabitants of Belgium would each be 
able to exchange 2 000 old Belgian francs for new banknotes21.
Lastly, it was not until 11 September that the Brussels Comité du 
Mardi was ready with its report on currency reform (Rapport relatif aux 
travaux de la commission d’études financières, 1943-1944)22. The submis-
sion of the report led to Gutt setting up a small committee to work with 
a number of members of his private office to compare the draft bills 
from Brussels with those from London23. Despite scant contact between 
the two capitals, the texts exhibited a remarkable, underlying similar-
ity24, although differences were also uncovered.
All the measures announced by Gutt in a radio address on 5 Septem-
ber and published that same day in the Belgian Official Gazette natu-
rally bore the full London stamp, having already been promulgated as 
a decree on 1 May 1944 by the Belgian government in London. For the 
texts of the currency reform as such, however, it was seen that the drafts 
prepared in Brussels were much more in line with the daily life of the 
Belgian population on the eve of liberation. This was not surprising, 
given that the local experts had been able to continue fine-tuning their 
analyses up to that moment and had a much broader range of data to 
hand, enabling them to prepare more comprehensive and more accu-
rate texts. These latter texts were generally preferred and in many cases 
adopted verbatim, or with only a minimum number of amendments, in 
the final versions. Gutt would acknowledge his debt to these texts, only 
several years later.
21 BNB, Archives, DC, 16.09.1944.
22 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 9, dossier 01.02.01.70 (A 241/9 s. f. 1): letter of 
12.09.1944 from Smeers to Gutt.
23 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers, A 2, dossier 9.1/32, ‘correspondance avec Gutt’ 
(address of 03.11.1969 by Ansiaux).
24 Gutt spoke of ‘une ressemblance quasi-miraculeuse’, but this statement was clearly 
exaggerated. Dupriez’s assessment is more qualified and probably closer to the 
truth, and account has been taken of it (BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 12, dossier 
01.02.02.70 (A 269/1): assainissement monétaire (review by Gutt at the end of 1948, 
beginning of 1949); Dupriez, Les réformes monétaires de la Belgique, Titre IV: la 
réforme monétaire de 1944).
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The postponement of the reform by one month had a number of 
adverse consequences. The imminence of reform was on everyone’s 
minds and there was a resulting flight out of notes and coins, matched 
by a frantic rush into tangible goods. Inflated prices were paid for jew-
els, diamonds, coins and other objects in precious metal, for watches, 
stamp collections, paintings and antiques, and even for furs, pianos, bi-
cycles, colonial goods, not forgetting household linen, bricks and win-
dow glass25. Stocks of postage and revenue stamps were bought up from 
post offices and there was even a run on tram and train season tickets. 
The reverse of this was that numerous farmers provisionally held their 
products back from sale, fearing that they would be saddled with virtu-
ally worthless banknotes26. And some speculators began to hoard 50- 
and 20-franc notes27.
Fortunately, at the end of September the government was able to 
profit from a suggestion made by an American naval officer and lay its 
hands on a number of landing-craft to ship the stock of new banknotes 
from Great Britain to Caen, from where they were taken by train and 
truck via Rouen, Paris and Liège to Brussels. At last, on 4 October, the 
Bank in Brussels had a stock of 20 billion francs’ worth of new bank-
notes to hand, which it proceeded to distribute post-haste to its own 
branches, to the private banks and to the 1,300 post offices in the coun-
try28. The eight decrees in respect of the currency reform were prom-
ulgated on Friday 6 October and published the following day in the 
Belgian Official Gazette, finally clearing the way for the Gutt Operation 
to begin on Monday 9 October.
In a radio broadcast on 12 October, Minister Gutt addressed the 
population directly to explain the purpose of the operation. He pointed 
out that the immediate, two-thirds reduction in the circulation of notes 
and coins and deposits on transfer accounts, together with the manda-
tory declaration of moveable assets, would be a painful experience after 
four hard years of occupation, but that the measures were necessary for 
a variety of reasons. Only a drastic reduction of money in circulation 
25 Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 325.
26 BZ.Ndl, London Archives, 1940-1944, GA diplomatieke zaken, dossier (DZ) EZ/CHZ: 
report of the envoy van Harinxma thoe Slooten, 04.10.1944.
27 BNB, Archives, DC, 01.09.1944.
28 BNB, Archives, RR, 04.10.1944.
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could restore monetary stability to the country, eliminate war inflation 
and prevent post-war inflation, maintain the purchasing power of wage 
income and savings, and secure the viability of Belgian exports. Gutt 
also pointed out that the mandatory declaration of moveable assets was 
necessary for ethical reasons. Its purpose was to identify hidden, illegal 
German holdings and to expose the scandalous profits made by Belgian 
war-profiteers29.
The purpose of the currency reform was, in fact, both monetary and 
fiscal. On the monetary side, there was a series of measures to curb 
the circulation of notes and coins and replace the old banknotes in cir-
culation with new. All banknotes of 100 Belgian francs and above in 
circulation were forthwith deprived of their power as legal tender and, 
with effect from Monday 9 October, had to be declared and surrendered 
within five days at one of the bank branches or post offices accredited 
for the purpose. In exchange, and against surrender of household ration 
coupon No. 12, each household head could receive an equal quantity of 
banknotes, with a maximum of 2,000 francs per household member; 
any balance being deposited in a special, blocked account. The mon-
etary package also contained a series of measures to reduce  deposits on 
transfer accounts. All current accounts at private commercial banks, 
private savings banks and the Postal Cheque Office, as well as all time 
deposit accounts with a term of two years or less, were frozen; no sin-
gle-premium life-insurance contracts or other insurance contracts fea-
turing capitalization were allowed; foreign currency transactions were 
subject to the approval of an Institut des changes established forthwith 
by decree. Lending by private banks was made subject to strict control, 
with all applications for loans above 1 million francs having to be sub-
mitted to the Bank for approval.
A number of exemptions were nevertheless built into the measures, 
allowing an additional quantity of new banknotes to be brought into 
circulation. From the outset, for example, exemption from any limita-
tion on conversion was granted in respect of the cash stocks and current 
accounts of the State, provinces, municipalities, public and semi-public 
institutions, public and private banks, the Postal Cheque Office and the 
savings banks. Also qualifying for this exemption were monasteries 
29 BNB, Archives, SD, Ansiaux Papers A 2, dossier 9.1/32, s. f. 5, ‘correspondance avec 
Gutt’ (draft text for a radio broadcast by Gutt, 10.10.1944; text of the broadcast, 
12.10.1944).
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and convents, churches and cultural associations, because the decree of 
18 October designated charitable and non-profit cultural organizations 
as public institutions. In addition, holders of frozen accounts were of-
fered a series of specific exemptions: the first was to have immediate and 
unrestricted disposition of 10 per cent of their current account balance 
as of 8 October 1944 or immediate and unrestricted disposition of their 
entire current account balance as of 9 May 1940. Commercial, indus-
trial and craft entrepreneurs were permitted to withdraw 1,000 francs 
per week per employee from their current account. Lastly, the Minister 
of Finance took it upon himself to decide before 9 November whether a 
certain amount of the balances on frozen accounts could qualify for an 
additional conversion into new banknotes. The matter was, in fact, set-
tled by decree of 28 October 1944, whereby, for each household member, 
a maximum amount of 3,000 francs from the blocked accounts could 
be converted into new banknotes.
At the same time, Gutt announced an arrangement for the accounts 
remaining frozen after this second conversion operation. Henceforth, 
40 per cent of the balances would be temporarily frozen and released 
in accordance with general government measures as economic activity 
in the country improved or in accordance with the decision of a special 
committee empowered to approve any applications for release. The re-
maining 60 per cent would be frozen indefinitely, with their ultimate 
disposition to be determined later. By decree of 14 October 1945, it was 
finally laid down that these frozen balances would become a compulso-
ry long-term loan to the government at 3.5 per cent, whose certificates, 
though non-transferable, could be utilised for the payment of special 
war taxes.
First among the measures on the fiscal side was the obligation on 
those who held securities, whether domestic or foreign, to have them 
declared and stamped within fourteen days. Also to be declared were 
all time deposit accounts at banks at home and abroad, all long-term 
savings accounts, all other assets in Belgian and foreign currency, and 
all holdings of gold and other foreign exchange. To make the meas-
ure watertight, the exchange markets were closed until further notice; 
when at last they reopened – which was not until April 1945 – it was laid 
down that only declared securities could be traded and then only under 
restricted conditions.
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The fiscal regulations also contained measures designed to effect the 
reform of government finances. Gutt felt he could achieve this through 
the proceeds of a tax on the increase in wealth between 10 May 1940 and 
the beginning of September 1944; he was convinced that the tax would 
enable him to strike at all war-profiteers. Gutt’s tax bill was approved by 
the government on 20 December 1944 and was then submitted to Par-
liament. When it came to be debated by the full Parliament, however, it 
met a storm of criticism; indeed, the opposition was so great that, in the 
turbulent sitting of 6 February 1945, the Pierlot government lost a vote 
of confidence and resigned the following day.
The Pierlot government was succeeded by the first Van Acker gov-
ernment, in which Gaston Eyskens was Minister of Finance. Eyskens 
prepared a new bill regarding war profits, which, submitted by his suc-
cessor, Franz De Voghel, was approved by Parliament in three votes on 
15, 16 and 17 October. The legislation provided for full confiscation of 
all profits and income derived from illegal transactions with the enemy 
and, in addition, imposed a heavy and progressive tax, ranging from 70 
to 100 per cent, on all excess profits and income earned during the war. 
A final measure was a limited, one-off wealth tax of 5 per cent, levied 
on the most important components of wealth. As a rider to all this, 
the initial term of forty years set for the repayment of the compulsory 
currency-reform was reduced in 1951 by special legislation and repay-
ment was completed by the end of 1971.

Chapter 26
The End of an Era
The currency reform in acTion
The Gutt Operation was an extremely large-scale undertaking. At the 
2,158 bank branches and post offices accredited for the purpose, no less 
than 1.3 million individuals applied to exchange old banknotes for new1. 
Between 9 and 12 October, a total of 14.4 billion Belgian francs’ worth 
of banknotes were exchanged and a further 73.6 billion francs’ worth 
of old banknotes were declared and deposited, but not exchanged. The 
Bank estimated the stock of banknote’s held by banks, public, semi-
public and assimilated institutions at 2.5-3 billion francs, meaning that 
an overall amount of 92.5-93 billion francs’ worth of old banknotes had 
fallen into the net of exchange, declaration and deposit.
At the Bank, the staff was swamped by all the extra work. The tellers 
in the Head Cashier’s Office simply could not cope, the more so as all 
transactions at that time were executed manually. In addition to han-
dling the banknotes, there was also the more complex work involved 
with the current accounts: new accounts had to be opened to deal with 
the surplus of old banknotes that were not permitted to be exchanged 
for new, and, a little later, existing current accounts had to be split into 
temporarily and indefinitely frozen accounts, occasioning even more 
work. There was also the business of checking current account balances 
as at 9 May 1940 for those who had opted for the frozen balance exemp-
tion and no less time-consuming in respect of administration was the 
organization of the exchange control. At top level, moreover, contacts 
had to be re-established and maintained with other central banks. 
1 Interview with W. Pluym.
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As indicated above, the economy had been in decline since the spring 
1944, when the railways and other routes from Germany to France via 
Belgium began to be a particular target for Allied bombardment. Dur-
ing the re-conquest of the country at the beginning of September, the 
situation became even more dire. It is true that the liberation was tak-
ing place at an unanticipated speed, but this did not mean that the ad-
vance of the Allied armies was reducing the economic dislocation. The 
proposed currency reform further increased uncertainty and disquiet 
among many producers and sellers, who questioned whether the time 
was right to put goods onto the market.
The publication of the monetary decrees on 6 October 1944, never-
theless, came as a shock. At a stroke, they cut the circulation of bank-
notes (including Treasury money) from 107 billion to 23 billion Belgian 
francs. Despite the expansion to nearly 32 billion francs, following a 
decree of 28 October, this still represented an enormous contraction2. 
Including deposits on transfer accounts, the overall money supply was 
reduced drastically from 165 billion to 57.5 billion francs, which was not 
far from its level 50.5 billion francs in May 1940.
Gutt hoped that the radical monetary legislation would serve to bring 
prices down, but, to the general disappointment, this did not prove to 
2 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, SD 11, dossier 01.02.02.50 (B642): note concernant les 
résultats des mesures d’assainissement monétaire et la sitution de la circulation 
monétaire au 31 décembre 1944 (strictement confidentiel).
Table 26.1:  Development of the money supply in Belgium (1936-1948) 
(in billions of Belgian francs)





















































































































Total 43.0 50.5 164.6 57.4 74.2 131.5 145.6 151.3
Source: Janssens, De Belgische frank, p. 334.
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be the case. He and his advisers had, in fact, got their estimates wrong 
about both supply and demand. The more flagrant miscalculation was 
on the supply side. The economy remained disorganized and few goods 
were reaching the market, even after 6 October. For the time being all 
Belgian imports of raw and ancillary materials were suspended and 
the port of Antwerp, the first port to fall virtually intact into Allied 
hands, was open only for military purposes. Consequently, no help was 
to be expected in the immediate future from America or from neutral 
countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Moreover, 
there was a dire lack of coal: the Belgian mines were running at only 
half capacity, so that there were even restrictions on the use of gas and 
electricity3.
The supply-side crisis was exacerbated by what was initially a very 
strict campaign against economic and financial collaboration4. In cir-
culars to his prosecutors and deputy-prosecutors, the chief military 
prosecutor, Ganshof-van der Meersch, demanded strict application of 
article 115 of the Penal Code; and the ministers in the final Pierlot gov-
ernment who were drawn from the Resistance organizations and from 
the Communist Party, were no less severe. It is therefore not surprising 
that more than 13,000 prosecution dossiers for economic collaboration 
were opened in Belgium, a vast difference to the 1,200 in neighbour-
ing France. Furthermore, numerous companies were placed under se-
questration by the deputy-prosecutors, which had the additional effect 
of temporarily paralysing a substantial level of production. In January 
1945, the monthly average of industrial output was barely 16 per cent of 
the level in 1936-1938 and it failed to climb above the pre-war level until 
the beginning of 19475.
3 BZ.Ndl, London Archives, 1940-1945, GA, diplomatieke zaken (DZ) EZ/CHZ: report of 
the envoy van Harinxma thoe Slooten (Brussels) to his minister, 20.10.1944; ARA, 
fonds Société Générale de Belgique, Direction, Nokin Papers, dossier 99, copy 550/1: 
letter of 23.01.1945 from Blaise to Major-general Erskine.
4 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV 88, dossier 36: letter of 05.10.1944 from Baudewyns 
(Brussels) to Siepman (London). In respect of what follows, see chiefly: D. Luyten, 
Burgers boven elke verdenking? Vervolging van economische collaboratie in België na 
de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Brussels, 1996. 
5 V.A. De Ridder, ‘The Belgian Monetary Reform’, in: The Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 39 (XVI, 1), 1948-1949, p. 39-40.
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Reality fell short of expectations on the demand side, as well. To 
begin with, the government had assumed – naively, as it turned out – 
that the liberation of the country would coincide with the end of the 
war and that Belgium would then be immediately able to import raw 
materials and goods a-plenty, and thereby amply satisfy market de-
mand. The effect of the currency reform was also wrongly estimated, 
the government having assumed that the measures of 6 October 1944 
would enable it to keep the money supply fully under control and that, 
as the economy gathered pace, it would be able gradually to liberal-
ize the flow of money at the times and down to the last cent set out 
so meticulously in its plans. In practice, alas, things turned out quite 
differently, beginning with the fact that the liberation of Belgium did 
not coincide with a total cessation of hostilities. Against Field-Marshal 
Montgomery’s judgement, General Eisenhower had decided that the 
Allied armies should over-winter in Belgium, before delivering the final 
attack on Germany. His decision was prompted by his experience of the 
Normandy beaches, which were far from equipped to handle the con-
voys required to supply the troops. He needed a port like Antwerp that 
could efficiently store and distribute the mass of material coming from 
overseas. Consequently, Antwerp had first to be liberated and then re-
equipped. All that would take time and also meant that a considerable 
proportion of the American, British and Canadian forces – more than a 
million men – would spend the entire winter in Belgium. The numbers 
were, in fact, increased after von Rundstedt began his offensive in the 
Ardennes in December 1944.
The troops temporarily stationed in Belgium naturally spent their 
money chiefly in the locations where they were quartered, thereby cre-
ating unexpected additional demand in a Belgium pursuing a strict 
monetary policy. The armies also had need of services and goods that 
they could not bring in from outside, and these also had to be pur-
chased and paid for locally. In 1943 and again in 1944, the Belgian gov-
ernment in London and in Washington had spent days – weeks and 
months, even – negotiating with the Allies to get them to agree to pay 
their troops solely in Belgian money, once the country had been lib-
erated. Their agreement had been obtained, but at no small price, as 
the government had made 16 billion Belgian francs in new banknotes 
available to the allied armies for the troops’ pay alone, and a further 19 
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billion francs had been transferred to them for the purchase of goods 
and services. Of course, these amounts were not fully taken up and the 
pay of American and Canadian troops would be reimbursed in full in 
hard currency by their countries, though this occurred only later (after 
the cessation of hostilities in Europe) and effectively only after October 
1945. As agreed, the services provided to the Allied armies were charged 
to the liberated country concerned, as its share in the Allied war effort. 
Whether it was repaid or not, however, the monetary aid for the mili-
tary liberation of Belgium resulted overall in a considerable injection of 
new banknotes into circulation, representing yet another check to the 
government’s monetary plans at an untimely moment.
A second major factor disrupting monetary reform was the releas-
ing earlier than planned the account balances temporarily frozen at 
banks and savings banks6. A campaign to have the balances released 
had begun in early November 1944 among the self-employed and the 
liberal professions7. Gutt’s response to the campaign was an announce-
ment on 18 November that he would address the problem very shortly, 
an announcement that was followed on 22 November by the issue of 
two ministerial decrees granting significant exemptions to industrial, 
commercial and craft businesses and to a number of citizens who had 
suffered war damage. From the beginning of 1945 on, exemptions were 
granted at an increasing rate by Gaston Eyskens and Franz De Voghel, 
Gutt’s two immediate successors as Minister of Finance8. The net result 
of this accelerated unfreezing was a further injection of new banknotes 
into circulation, again, much earlier than had been planned.
The government was itself partly responsible for the distortions in 
executing the monetary reform. After the liberation, the budget deficit 
expanded by leaps and bounds, reaching 35.8 billion Belgian francs in 
1945 and 37.1 billion francs in 19469. Only 12 billion francs of this could 
be covered by a long-term loan. A further proportion was financed by 
the private bank sector taking up short-term Treasury certificates and 
a further proportion by the Postal Cheque Office, which the Treasury 
6 Van Praag, ‘L’assainissement monétaire’, pp. 23-25.
7 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 12, dossier 01.02.02.70 (A 269/1): assainissement 
monétaire (review by Gutt at the end of 1948, beginning of 1949, p. 9).
8 BNB, Archives, DC, 16.04.1945.
9 De Ridder, ‘The Belgian Monetary Reform’, 39, (XVI, 1), pp. 31-33.
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once now controlled. A final and not inconsiderable proportion of the 
deficit was covered by the Bank advancing new banknotes to the gov-
ernment.
The sharp rise of the deficit was due in part to payments to the Allied 
armies, but also to a steep increase of the government’s own expen-
ditures. Already in December 1944 the Social Pact, concluded during 
the war in secret between the trade unions and the employers’ associa-
tions, was translated into concrete measures, such as the setting-up of 
the State Social Security system, whose costs were covered in part by 
the government10. The government also felt itself obliged to grant sub-
stantial subsidies to agriculture and the coal industry, in order to keep 
the prices of vital foodstuffs and coal low. At the same time, it faced 
urgent tasks of settling war damage claims, reconstructing the trans-
port infrastructure in Antwerp, the Ardennes, and elsewhere amongst 
other commitments. Yet to fund all this tax receipts were limited: the 
economy was still dislocated despite all the efforts to restore its effi-
ciency. Table 26.2 indicates how public debt, which had already risen 
appreciably during the war, continued to climb after September 1944, 
rather than declining, as planned.
Table 26.2: Trend of Belgian public debt (1940-1945) (in billions of Belgian francs)























General total 66.0 167.2 212.4 255.1
Source: BNB Archives, SD, Smeers Papers, file 1: dette publique belge; De Ridder, ‘The 
Belgian Monetary Reform’, 39 (XVI, 1), p. 35.
As an orthodox central banker, Governor Frère was fully behind Gutt’s 
currency reform, but he watched with disquiet as the money supply 
10 BZ.Ndl, London Archives, 1940-1945, GA, diplomatieke zaken, (DZ) EZ/CHZ: report 
of the envoy van Harinxma thoe Slooten (Brussels) to his minister, 20.10.1944.
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rapidly expanded in terms of notes and coins. He soon began a counter-
offensive, focusing on deposits on transfer accounts11. Starting at the 
beginning of December 1944, he concentrated on the necessity of curb-
ing private bank lending in the form of advances in current account 
against the guarantee of temporarily and even indefinitely frozen ac-
count balances. This brought him into direct conflict with the business 
world, with Bekaert and Peltzer more than once sounding warnings 
at meetings of the supervisory council during the winter of 1944-1945. 
Bekaert stated that reserves in the business sector had been drained by 
the stagnating economy and that the over-drastic currency reform had 
not created any room for bridging the crisis. Businessmen hoped that 
the economic climate would shortly improve, but they were obliged to 
have recourse to bank credit in the meantime. By cutting back lending 
the Bank was putting the business world in an impossible position.
The continuing scarcity of goods became all the more acute during 
the winter months of 1944-194512. The government therefore felt obliged 
to maintain the rationing of essential foodstuffs and even to reduce the 
allowance for certain goods, including coal, margarine and butter. The 
interplay of scarcity of goods with an uncontrolled increase in money 
circulation sent retail prices soaring, and no government’s controls or 
subsidies were able to reverse the trend. In October 1944, the ‘official’ 
retail price index already stood at 260 (as against a pre-war level of 100). 
By September 1945, the index had risen to 387, staying at that peak level 
for a few months, but in the course of 1946 began to fall step-by-step, 
reaching a level of 331 in December of that year13.
May 1945 saw the import of foodstuffs, raw materials and other goods 
expanding again, initially in the wake of the special aid programmes, 
one of these being the Military Civil Program, which had been set up 
in November 1943 within the framework of the inter-Allied conference 
held at Atlantic City. No less effective in this respect, however, were the 
bilateral monetary agreements that provided Belgium with the oppor-
11 BNB, Archives, RR, 06.12.1944; DC, 09.12.1944, 20.12.1944, 08.01.1945; RR, 10.01.1945, 
14.02.1945.
12 BEngl, Archives, Belgium, OV 88, dossier 36: letter of 05.10.1944 from Baudewyns 
(Brussels) to Siepman (London). See also: dossier 4: Cobbold, Impressions of a 
week in Belgium, 18.12.1944.
13 De Ridder, ‘The Belgian Monetary Reform’, 39 (XVI, 1), p. 37.
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tunity to purchase goods on credit, the most important of which were 
the Lend Lease and the Reverse Lend Lease agreements concluded with 
the Americans at the beginning of 1945, and the Financial and Mutual 
Aid cooperation agreement concluded with the British14.
Anticipating the liberation, the Belgian government in London had 
also purchased foodstuffs from Canada, Argentina and the Belgian 
Congo during the war. In addition, soon as circumstances permitted, a 
mission headed by the Minister of Supply, Paul Kronacker, was sent to 
the United States and Canada to procure goods outside the framework 
of the aid programmes and the other agreements15.
 The recovery in industry and commerce was once more opening 
up the prospect of a growing market in commercial paper, in which 
the Bank had traditionally played an active part, and it was at this mo-
ment that the Banking Commission, headed by Eugène De Barsy, its 
new, dynamic and dirigiste chairman, gave the Bank the opportunity 
of renewing its grip on financial and monetary affairs. That came, in 
February 1946, with the Banking Commission’s imposition of an obli-
gation on the private banks to invest a high proportion of their deposits 
in Treasury certificates. By this the Bank saw a way to regain control 
of the volume of short-term money and credit and also to curb the too 
rapid expansion of deposits on transfer accounts16.
criTicism and evaluaTion
High expectations that could not immediately be satisfied inevitably 
had a negative effect on public opinion. Indeed the Belgian population 
was already exhibiting disquiet, disappointment and irritation at the 
end of autumn 1944, only a few months after the liberation. In this re-
spect, too, Gutt had miscalculated. During his visit to Washington at 
the beginning of 1944, he had already been warned by White of the 
American Treasury Department that his plan was too demanding and 
too harsh for a country just emerging from four years of occupation. 
14 BNB, Archives, DC, 22.02.1945 ff. See also: De Staercke, pp. 147-148.
15 BNB, Archives, DC, 01.10.1945, 08.10.1945.
16 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 1, dossier 01.02.01 (A 262/2): le crédit à l’économie 
privée de 1940 à 1950.
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Unruffled, Gutt had replied that: ‘I will make them accept the plan, 
because I will make them understand’. He even thought that the pop-
ulation would be behind him when the measure requiring moveable 
wealth to be declared was announced and that everyone would realize 
that justice was being done and that the hated war profiteers would be 
unmasked and punished.
The first negative reactions were directed at the monetary decrees17, 
which were claimed to be discriminatory. Why, for example, were Bel-
gians living abroad (les émigrés) escaping scot-free? Why were there no 
exemptions for the lower income groups? The exemption for the funds 
of cultural associations, churches and other non-profit organizations 
also came under attack as opening the door to unsound practices and 
downright malpractice. Similar criticism was levelled at the exemption 
of 50- and 20-franc banknotes from declaration: inside knowledge had 
clearly led to abuses, and some of those in the know had salted away 
huge quantities of these small denominations before 6 October.
Uncertainty about what was ultimately to happen with the indefi-
nitely frozen account balances likewise attracted a great deal of nega-
tive reaction, partly inspired by a number of economists who shared 
Van Zeeland’s views and who had been sharply critical from the outset 
of what they termed the deflationary character of the currency reform. 
However, it was not only economists who ascribed the continuing eco-
nomic stagnation mainly to the deflationary effects of Gutt’s currency 
reform, but the business world, as well18.
Criticism gained momentum when, in December 1944, Gutt submit-
ted his bill on the taxation of the increments in wealth, which was a log-
ical consequence of the bill for the mandatory declaration of moveable 
assets, approved in the preceding October19. Bankers and stockbrokers 
looked askance at such measures, forecasting a drift into the doldrums 
for dealing in shares and government securities, if the intention to reg-
ister all securities was maintained. However, the proposal to levy a tax 
17 Van Praag, L’opération Gutt, pp. 79-82, 86-87.
18 BZ.Ndl, London Archives, 1940-1945, GA, diplomatieke zaken (DZ) EZ/CHZ: report of 
the envoy van Harinxma thoe Slooten to his minister, 03.11.1944.
19 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, DS 11, dossier 01.02.02.50 (A 255/6): Mallien, The cur-
rency reform and the bill for an extraordinary tax on the growth of wealth.
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on the growth of wealth upset all members of the middle- and higher-
income groups now feeling themselves threatened20.
Tax specialists, too, had their doubts about Gutt’s reforms, regarding 
the tax on the increments in wealth as an inefficient way of punishing 
war profiteers. Moreover, collecting the tax would demand an extensive 
administrative apparatus, something that the tax authorities did not 
possess at that moment. Many people also found the tax fundamentally 
dishonest and immoral, as it targeted the growth of wealth from both 
reputable and disreputable activities: the bon-vivants who had blown 
their war profits were rewarded, whereas the careful savers were pun-
ished.
Worse still was the indefensible stipulation that the burden of proof 
regarding the extent of wealth as at 9 May 1940 lay with the tax subject. 
How could small entrepreneurs and those with a modest capital be ex-
pected to produce proof going back to May 1940 when they were not 
accustomed to keep accounts in those days and in many cases did not 
even have a bank account? For those with a large capital, there would 
be no problem in producing proof and those with really substantial for-
tunes would be untouchable, because their fortunes would have dated 
from before the war. Measures of this sort were regarded as unaccept-
able, discriminatory and anti-social, as well as dangerous in the turbu-
lent social climate of a country only recently liberated.
These were all solid arguments, though there was more than once a 
hint of self-interest, depending on who was putting them forward. Re-
porting to his minister, Binnert Philip van Harinxma thoe Slooten, the 
Dutch ambassador to Belgium, made the ironic comment that: ‘resist-
ance (to the tax proposal) from the monied class is all the greater, as it 
has always been a matter of course to mislead the tax authorities by sub-
mitting inaccurate income returns....For many here, even if they had not 
profited at all from the war, (there is) a great discrepancy between their 
far too low income declarations before the war and what they have now 
been obliged to declare as wealth’21. The ambassador had put his finger 
on the spot: the opposition to the bill was no longer a matter for learned 
economists offering an alternative approach to post-war policy. Rather, 
20 Newspaper La Libre Belgique, 30.11.1944, quoted by Van Praag, L’opération Gutt, pp. 
103-107.
21 BZ.Ndl, Londens archief, 1940-1945, GA, diplomatieke zaken, GA 194.45.
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it was a matter of every Belgian above the poverty line feeling targeted, 
which goes some way to explaining why, on 6 February 1945, Parliament 
passed a motion of no confidence in the Pierlot government. Gutt’s suc-
cessors, Eyskens and De Voghel, dropped the proposal and replaced it 
with one for three other taxes, including a moderate, one-off levy of 5 
per cent on certain elements of wealth. These three new taxes were ap-
proved by Parliament in the autumn of 1945 and raised nearly 50 billion 
Belgian francs, a sum that was applied to reforming the public finances.
To assess the Gutt Operation meaningfully in the light of history, it 
must necessarily be examined from both an economic and a structural 
angle: in other words, from a short-term and from a long-term point of 
view. Taking the short term first, the decrees were already attracting a 
great deal of comment and discussion at the time of their actual imple-
mentation. As indicated, there were numerous politicians, businessmen 
and economists in Belgium who were critical of the deflationary effect 
of the drastic reduction in the money supply and who consequently 
held the reform responsible for the crisis that Belgium suffered dur-
ing the first year after the liberation, the more so as the reform did not 
achieve its stated aim of an immediate fall in prices. That view was un-
doubtedly too one-sided. Unforeseen circumstances – and unforesee-
able by anyone – combined to thwart a rapid recovery of the Belgian 
economy and were thus partially responsible for the economic crisis 
during the initial months following the liberation.
However, the government was itself responsible for some of the unfa-
vourable circumstances. One in particular was the naivety with which, 
when still in London, it had regarded the post-war situation in Belgium, 
a naivety indicative of an ivory-tower mentality. Others were the chaos 
in the supply chain and the unnecessary boosting of the black market, 
a consequence of the immediate abolition of the German-inspired ad-
ministrative system of rationing. There was also the months-long dis-
location of industrial production, inter alia a consequence of the harsh 
attitude towards economic collaboration. In addition there were incon-
sistencies and miscalculations not only on the monetary side of the re-
form, but chiefly on the fiscal side; these served to generate too much 
emotional reaction and tension for the process of economic recovery to 
be set in train and pursued in an atmosphere of national solidarity and 
calm. Gutt’s aim was a reform that respected distributive equality and 
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restored a sense of morality through the selective punishment of war 
profiteers. In reality, his measures often produced the opposite result: 
on the monetary side, they proved anti-social in certain respects; while, 
fiscally, they left numerous loopholes for shrewd war profiteers and hit 
many in the mid-income bracket hard.
Despite the unfortunate circumstances and the mistakes that were 
made, many economists and politicians of the time took a positive view 
of the Gutt Operation. Belgian economists in the Liberal and Socialist 
camps, including Dervichian, Louis de Brouckère and Frère, the gover-
nor of the Bank, had defended the monetary reform from the start and 
continued to do so. Eyskens and Dupriez22 in the Christian-Democrat 
camp likewise remained fervent supporters of the monetary measures. 
However, everyone had to acknowledge that Gutt had not achieved his 
aim as regards prices and wages, though analysts argued that this fail-
ure did not alter the fact that his operation had clearly served to put a 
brake on inflation23.
Gutt’s monetary reform was also positively received abroad. Seeking 
to reform his country’s currency after the liberation, the Dutch Minister 
of Finance, Lieftinck, looked to the Belgian experiment for inspiration, 
though drawing the necessary conclusions from the Belgian experience 
and taking account in his bill of a number of errors and shortcomings 
that had come to light during the implementation of the Gutt Opera-
tion24. Great interest in Gutt’s plan had also been shown by Mendès-
France during his time with the Free French forces in London, where 
he was in contact with the Belgian government. It had prompted him 
to introduce a similar plan in Corsica, when the island was liberated in 
1943. However, it was not approved of by De Gaulle, who, when France 
was liberated, set it aside in favour of the proposals of René Pleven, who 
felt that reform could be achieved more smoothly through a large-scale, 
22 BNB, Archives, Studiedienst, dossier 01.02.02.70 (D 312): Dupriez, Etude critique de 
la politique des prix, 10.04.1945.
23 BNB, Archives, SD, De Voghel Papers, dossier c: presentation in the Chamber of 
Representatives of the bill on the war tax (written speech of 13.08.1945, with annota-
tions by the minister). The allusion to ‘ l’impôt monétaire’ refers to a proposal made 
at the time by Dupriez, but not taken into account (see above).
24 J. Barendregt, The Dutch Monetary Purge. The monetary consequences of German 
Occupation and their redress after Liberation, 1940-1952, Amsterdam, 1993. See also: 
Joh. De Vries, De Nederlandsche Bank, 1914-1948. Trips Tijdvak, 1931-1948, onder-
broken door de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 426 ff.
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long-term Emprunt de la Libération (a liberation loan) and a one-off 
levy on wealth and on war profits25.
Once hostilities had finally ended in the summer of 1945, Gutt’s re-
form was able to demonstrate that, in economic terms, the negative 
criticism of the early months had been exaggerated. What the reform 
had actually done was to lay the foundation for economic and financial 
stability, restoring confidence in the economic future of the country 
and creating the popular energy and optimism needed to tackle the 
task of reconstruction. No mean achievement. It has to be said, though, 
that the plan benefited from a number of fortunate circumstances. 
Belgium’s industrial equipment and port infrastructure had not been 
dismantled or seriously damaged, contrary to what had occurred in 
neighbouring countries. Belgium was also able to share in the substan-
tial stock of foreign currency built up in the Belgian Congo during the 
war, which consequently put her in a position to begin fairly quickly to 
import raw and ancillary materials from abroad, once peace had been 
restored in 1945, and even to purchase consumer goods in America. 
Furthermore, the government’s liberal trading policy in a seller’s mar-
ket and the consequent growth of the country’s gold and foreign cur-
rency reserves created ample scope for credit facilities to be granted to 
other countries within the framework of the monetary agreements on 
the Belgian model. These circumstances, too, aided economic recovery.
Looking back, it can be seen that there was a lot of truth in the claim 
that the financial reforms had produced a favourable economic result 
in the short term: their contribution to ‘le miracle belge’ of the 1946-
1949 period was indeed highly significant. However, their effect over 
the long term is another question and one that has to be asked, because 
‘the miracle’ had lost much of its lustre by the end of 1949. Statistics for 
all West-European countries from about 1950 on indicate high annual 
growth figures for each of them, with the exception of Great Britain 
and particularly Belgium. The weakening of the Belgian rate of growth 
during the 1950s was so marked that the country came to be called ‘the 
sick man of Europe’. The question then is whether there was any link 
between that weakening and the Gutt Operation, and the suggestion 
put forward here is that there probably was.
25 Van Praag, L’opération Gutt, pp. 120-141.
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In essence, the Belgian monetary reform was a monetary and finan-
cial operation conceived in purely technical terms, without any founda-
tion in economic reality and without any integration into a longer-term 
plan for industrial reform. Gutt’s traditional liberalism, in fact, was no 
longer relevant and most economists in Europe regarded it as outdated.
The era of the mixed economy had dawned. Through planning and 
direct intervention, governments now had to adapt the structure of 
their economies to the requirements of the coming new world order and 
the new world economy. In the Netherlands, the Minister of Finance, 
Lieftinck, integrated his restrictive monetary policy into the Tinber-
gen Plan, which was geared to a general restructuring of the Dutch 
economy. The Federal German Republic followed suit, albeit later in 
1948, with the Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, linking 
German currency reform to a structural economic reform known as 
‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’: this incorporated the planned dirigisme of the 
Nazi era into a market-oriented system, thereby initiating a particular 
version of the mixed economy for the long term. In France, a plan like-
wise aimed at restructuring the economy in a longer-term perspective 
– the ‘Plan national de rééquipement et de modernisation’, put forward 
by the General Commissioner of the Planning Office, Jean Monnet 
– was accepted by the French government and included in its politi-
cal programme. A similarly long-term structural reform was pushed 
through in Italy by Luigi Einaudi, one aim of which was, among others, 
state-directed economic development of the south of the country. The 
monetary reforms undertaken at the same time in France and Italy met 
with failure, but the long-term economic component of their respective 
post-war policies put down firm roots and enabled both countries to 
enjoy a dynamic rate of growth during the 1950s and 1960s.
This long-term economic strategy was lacking in Belgian govern-
ment circles in London. It was only in November 1946 that, in a confi-
dential note from Washington to Belgium’s Prince-Regent, Gutt gave 
an indication of his fear that something might be wrong with the way 
the Belgian economy was developing26. Of the two reasons he put for-
ward for this, the first was that prices in Belgium were rising much too 
quickly in comparison with their rate of increase in the sterling zone, 
26 De Staercke, Mémoires sur la Régence et la Question royale, pp. 367-372.
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which meant that Belgium’s export position would in time come under 
threat. He reproached his successors Eyskens and De Voghel for this, 
claiming that they had pursued, within the framework of the Social 
Pact, too lax a wage policy, contrary to the situation in Great Britain 
and the Netherlands, where a policy of austerity was still in place.
The second reason advanced by Gutt was what he saw as the absence 
of a plan for re-equiping the Belgian economy. It so happened that Jean 
Monnet had just succeeded in selling such a plan in the United States, 
which had enabled him to win substantial long-term loans for France. 
Again, Gutt blamed his successors Eyskens and De Voghel for what he 
called their lack of structural vision, but the same could equally be said 
of him. Ought not the Belgian government in London, and particularly 
the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, to have prepared such 
a long-term plan for reforming the industrial structure of the country 
and to have integrated it within the plan of overall monetary reform 
that was launched in October 1944?
However, Gutt’s personal, ideological makeup did not lend itself 
to such a vision. The concept of government-guided dynamic growth 
was foreign to him. He remained fundamentally true to his original 
liberal objective of static, microeconomic equilibrium and did not 
realize that a long-term industrial restructuring programme could 
be integrated into his monetary reform. Immediately after the libera-
tion, the Belgian economy had been favourably influenced by external 
factors, but these had been transitory. Once their effect had worn off, 
the structural weaknesses of the Belgian economy were revealed and 
the rate of growth began to lag behind that of the country’s more dy-
namic neighbours. It was a question of waiting for the laws promoting 
regional expansion, introduced by Gaston Eyskens in 1959, before any 
significant start could be made on industrial restructuring in Belgium. 
The establishment of the European Economic Community with effect 
from 1 January 1958 came at a timely moment to give the necessary 
boost to the Belgian restructuring to enable it to be anchored within the 
new, dynamic Europe. Numerous foreign companies then arrived to set 
up business and brought with them advanced technology and modern 
business techniques, introducing a spiral of expansion. The response to 
this appeared to be active and immediate in Flanders and the Brussels 
region, but much more muted in Wallonia, though this is a hypothesis 
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that requires further research. Such research could contribute to a bet-
ter insight into the complex, diverging Flemish-Walloon development 
within the Belgian economy after the Second World War.
Chapter 27
The Commission of Enquiry and 
the Legal Investigation
insTallaTion and sTarT
The euphoria-inducing sound of Allied tanks rolling into the country 
had barely died away before the settling of scores began. The hour of 
repression had struck in Belgium and the hunt began for the culpable, 
for those deemed responsible for four wretched years of occupation and 
privation. In the dramatic one-liner later uttered by Ingenbleek: ‘Les 
dieux avaient soif ’ (‘The gods were thirsty’)1. 
On the proposal of the ministers returned from London, a decree 
was issued on 11 December 1944, whereby a Commission of Enquiry 
was set up with the specific task of examining and assessing as soon as 
possible (i.e. before the end of January 1945) the activity of the Banque 
d’Emission and the actions of its managing directors and board of di-
rectors during the occupation.2.
Information about the Banque d’Emission had also been assembled 
shortly after the liberation by the Military Prosecutor’s Office and on 12 
December the chief prosecutor resolved to transpose this dossier into 
an ‘instruction’, with a view to a possible indictment3. On 14 Decem-
ber, two deputy-prosecutors, accompanied by a representative of State 
Security and by three accounting experts appointed in the meanwhile, 
made their way to the Bank to seize the Banque d’Emission’s archives 
and, with Governor Frère’s permission, to inspect certain of the Bank’s 
1 BNB, Archives, SD, Ingenbleek Papers, I 1: Ingenbleek, La vie en Belgique sous 
l’occupation.
2 BNB, Archives, RR, 27.12.1944; ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB, dossier 
25, copy 550/21: DC SG, 29.07.1952.
3 NBB, Archief, RR, 20.12.1944.
442 Chapter 27
own documents. At Frère’s request, Goffin and Vandeputte were also 
present at the search of the premises, in order to explain the content 
and structure of the archives. In total, the archive material occupied 
two kilometres of shelf space4.
On 9 February 1945, in a further move, the deputy-prosecutors went 
to the Société Générale de Belgique to seize all documents regarding the 
establishment and operation of the Banque d’Emission, as well as all 
documents that had anything to do with the employment policy and 
the ‘politique de moindre mal’. Finally, between 15 December 1944 and 
28 November 1945, sixty-four reports were drawn up of the conversa-
tions of the deputy-prosecutors with various persons concerned with 
the setting-up of the Banque d’Emission and with its operations during 
the occupation5.
The deputy-prosecutors were apprehensive about the enormous ex-
tent of the investigation they had been charged with and therefore at-
tempted to work together with the provisional administrators of the 
Banque d’Emission, appointed on 27 March 1945 by the government. 
For their part, the three accounting experts judged that the exact na-
ture of the Banque d’Emission’s transactions could be determined only 
by sifting carefully through the Belgian and German documents and 
identifying as many as possible of the Belgian individuals and compa-
nies paid directly or indirectly by the Banque d’Emission. However, this 
required both extensive examination and a prodigious amount of time6 
– two and a half years, as it turned out.
For its part, the Commission of Enquiry was under great political 
pressure to produce rapid results, but this proved to be impossible. It 
was only at the end of January 1946 that the final report was ready in 
printed form and handed in confidence to the Minister of Justice. It re-
mained for months a confidential document, but the matter leaked out 
at the beginning of 1947 and the report started to attract press attention, 
which determined the Minister to pass the report to the Senate Finance 
Committee and to the Secretariat of the Chamber of Representatives7.
4 Newspaper Cité Nouvelle, 21.02.1947.
5 Krijgsauditoraat CI 47/44, BEB, dossier 4, s. f. 3: dossier d’instruction.
6 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 1-2: letter of 16.12.1946 from Ganshof-van 
der Meersch to the Minister of Justice.
7 Newspaper Le Soir, 30.01.1947.
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The commission’s reporT
In the report, a first and fairly brief section set out the Commission’s 
opinion that there could be no disputing the legitimacy of the establish-
ment of a bank of issue (the Banque d’Emission) during the confused 
early days of the occupation. The report’s main attention then turned 
to the institution’s activities during the four subsequent years and to 
what extent they were susceptible to criticism and dispute. In its evalu-
ation, the Commission was equivocal, running with the hare and hunt-
ing with the hounds8. On the one hand, it expressed understanding for 
the difficult circumstances that the leaders of the Banque d’Emission 
had been faced with and the serious attempts made by them to resist. 
Consequently, the management of the Banque d’Emission could not be 
accused of open economic collaboration. On the other hand, the tone 
of the report’s commentary was often critical and took on a sharp edge 
in respect of the management’s stance.
In what follows, the attempt is made to review as objectively as pos-
sible the ‘compromise’ that the report ultimately became. In the view of 
the Commission, for example, it had been a mistake – with the benefit 
of hindsight – for the government to have authorized the return of Gov-
ernor Janssen and the Bank’s registered office to Brussels in July 1940, 
because this allowed the directors of the Banque d’Emission to claim 
that they had acted in accordance with the intentions of the govern-
ment in London. However, the legitimacy that they were able to invoke 
during the early years of the occupation had lapsed with the procla-
mation of the decree of 27 November 1941, which made clear that the 
government had declared Goffin’s appointment null and void and had 
transferred the Bank’s registered office to London. The Commission 
found it a matter of regret that the directors of the Banque d’Emission 
had made no effort to find out the real intentions of the government 
in issuing the decree. On the other hand there was no exoneration for 
the government in London either, as, in letters to Galopin and to A.-E. 
8 In respect of the analysis of the report of the Commission of Enquiry and of the 
analysis of the decision of the Krijgsauditoraat to drop the case, see chiefly the 
excellent work: D. Luyten, Burgers boven elke verdenking? See also the studies of 
E. Verhoeyen, België bezet, 1940-1944. Een synthese, Brussels, 1993, and P. Nefors, 
Industriële collaboratie in België.
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Janssen, it had never expressed any recrimination about the Banque 
d’Emission. There were, thus, shortcomings on both sides.
The Commission was much more critical about the clearing opera-
tions. It acknowledged the pressure exerted by the Germans and recog-
nised their power and organization. There was agreement, too, about 
the resistance put up by the Banque d’Emission leaders, but their at-
tempts at resistance from the end of 1941, and particularly from the end 
of 1942, were considered inadequate. It was also acknowledged that the 
arrangement of 7 December 1942 – arrived at after vehement discussion 
with the occupying power – had improved the situation. However, the 
concessions obtained had fallen far short of the stated goal and, even 
after this further trouncing – for it was nothing less – not one member 
of the management or the board of directors had resigned. In spite of 
all protests, the Belgian credit balance at the Deutsche Verrechnungs-
kasse had risen to more than 64.5 billion Belgian francs. Even worse, 
this included a good 20 billion francs’ worth of payments for which no 
details had been given and which could have hidden all kinds of dubi-
ous transactions.
The Commission emphasized the fact that the Banque d’Emission’s 
leaders had never pursued a policy that was in any way aimed at pro-
viding direct aid to the enemy. It also pointed out that they had sought 
no direct advantage from their participation in the institution and that 
they had been honest in their conviction that concessions had to be 
made to the occupier, in order to safeguard certain national interests, 
such as avoiding dual money circulation, securing supplies, identifying 
those guilty of collaboration, and opposing the deportation of work-
ers to Germany and France. The question facing the Commission was 
whether, in the light of what was achieved, the concessions were fully 
justified.
Although it was recognized that valid arguments could be advanced 
to do everything possible to prevent dual money circulation, the Com-
mission was not convinced that – had it come about – this would have 
been an obstacle to financial reform after the war. With the lessons of 
1918 still fresh in the memory, the government would certainly have 
dealt adequately with the problem after the liberation.
The Commission accepted that the argument for securing supplies 
had been valid at the beginning of the occupation, but pointed out that 
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this was no longer the case from 1942, when the credit balance at the 
Verrechnungskasse had got out of hand. It also accepted that maintain-
ing economic activity in order to prevent workers being deported was 
a valid argument for Belgian businessmen, but not a valid one for the 
leaders of the Banque d’Emission. On the contrary, their pursuit of such 
a policy implied a moral screen for collaboration. The strength of the 
argument regarding the identification of collaborators was likewise dis-
puted. Had not the Banque d’Emission itself admitted that the details 
given were generally too summary for reliable lists of untrustworthy 
citizens to be drawn up? Moreover, had Banque d’Emission control ac-
tually held the extent of exports to Germany in check? The institution’s 
leaders thought so and had pointed to declining figures towards the end 
of the war, but was that decline a consequence of Banque d’Emission ac-
tion or rather of industrial activity having been brought to a standstill 
by bombardment or a lack of raw materials?
Turning to the moral aspect of the policy of maintaining a presence, 
the Commission stated that, in this instance, it was bound to imply 
co-operating with the enemy. Arranging money transfers from work-
ers employed in Germany or France to their families in Belgium, mak-
ing efforts on the industrial front to improve the provisioning of the 
population, or doing all that was possible to keep workers employed in 
Belgium all fell under the umbrella of ‘providing social service’, but did 
this not imply that the Banque d’Emission was thereby an instrument 
of economic exploitation of the country and its work force? The man-
agement of the Banque d’Emission was not blind to this implication, 
but in the dilemma between maintaining a presence and not doing so, 
it had opted for what it considered to be the more difficult policy of 
the lesser evil. The Commission had difficulty in endorsing this line of 
argument, because – as mentioned above – it was rather sceptical about 
the Banque d’Emission having played a positive role. 
reacTions
Summing up its conclusions, the Commission stated that the Banque 
d’Emission had met its professional obligation in seeking all that was 
possible to safeguard not only the country’s industrial and commercial 
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equipment, but also its monetary system. The institution had also met 
its social obligation to do what it could to moderate the severity of the 
occupation. However, it had been found wanting in regards its political 
obligation to get occupied Belgium to participate as much as possible in 
the Allied struggle against Nazi Germany.
The founder-bankers had, in fact, expected the report to be more 
unfavourable and were consequently able to agree to some extent with 
its conclusions9. However, they were highly critical of certain aspects. 
In particular, they regarded as totally artificial the report’s separation 
of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission, whereby only the latter and its 
leaders were held responsible for all the difficulties arising from the oc-
cupation: ‘The Banque d’Emission had been a subsidiary of the Bank’, 
they argued. It was on the Bank’s authority and with the Bank’s bank-
notes that the Banque d’Emission had executed all its transactions10. 
The bankers also remarked that the government commissioner, Smeers, 
could have exercised a right of veto over the banknotes made available 
by the Bank to the Banque d’Emission to finance its clearing operations; 
the fact that he did not do so, appeared to have been no hindrance to 
his being made a director of the Bank after the liberation. The bankers 
also noted that the appointment of Goffin as governor of the Bank after 
Janssen’s death at the beginning of June 1941 had initially been accepted 
not only by the Belgian government in London, but also by Theunis in 
New York, who had even sent a congratulatory telegram to Goffin from 
there11.
The London decree of November 1941 had been regarded in Brussels 
as a measure underpinning the legal proceedings against the Banque de 
France and not as an expression of disapprobation of the two institu-
tions. Indeed, the written communications between the government in 
London and the leaders of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission dur-
ing the occupation had contained no criticism by that government of 
9 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB, dossier 25, copy 550/21: DC SG, 
29.07.1952.
10 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB, dossier 22 (copy 550/11): remarks on 
the report of the Commission of Enquiry, 15.03.1947.
11 ARA, De Vleeschauwer Papers, CRE, PD 40, dossier 598: Dubois-Pélerin to De Vlee-
schauwer (notes for the interpellation of Demany and letter of 16.06.1947).
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the ‘activities’ of both institutions12. The criticism of the Commission of 
 Enquiry was, therefore, regarded as totally unfounded. The leaders of 
the Bank and the Banque d’Emission had remained at their posts solely 
to avoid any lackey of the Germans being placed at the helm13. In the 
Netherlands, where Trip had resigned as President of the  Nederlandsche 
Bank, he was promptly replaced by the Germanophile Rost van Ton-
ningen, to the great misfortune of the central bank and the country14.
The criticism that the Banque d’Emission had not resisted the occu-
pier strongly enough over the clearing system, was also brushed aside. 
In fact, the increase in the Belgian credit balance at the Deutsche Ver-
rechnungskasse in Berlin, brought about by the financial transfers, had 
been a priority concern of the Banque d’Emission from the outset and 
had been successfully held in check by the counter-measures taken by 
the institution15. As regards commercial transfers, everything possible 
had been done to rid the clearing system of dubious transactions.
Turning to the employment policy of 1940, involving exports to 
Germany and the clearing system, the founder-bankers pointed to the 
patriotism and moral integrity of Galopin, who had initiated the poli-
cy. In this policy Galopin had always been emphatically supported by 
Professor De Visscher, Chairman of the Belgian Resistance Commit-
tee, who maintained contact with London and via whom Galopin was 
also able to reach the government there : ‘The policy of work resump-
tion was the only feasable option in 1940: it implied, however, economic 
cooperation between Belgium and Germany, from which the Belgians 
could not withdraw’16.
12 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB, dossier 18, copy 550/5: letter of 
10.09.1945 from A.-E. Janssen to Duquesne de la Vinelle; copy 550/14: Observations 
par la BEB sur la note du Comité d’Enquête portant sur les relations avec le gou-
vernement, 1945.
13 BNB, Archives, SD, 37, rapport BEB, dossier 8.11.34: remarques des banquiers fonda-
teurs sur le rapport relatif à l’activité de la BEB.
14 In this respect, see the testimony of Goffin: Krijgsauditoraat CI 47/44, BEB, dossier 
4, s. f. 3: dossier d’instruction (report of the testimony of Goffin).
15 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB, dossier 19, copy 550/7: les transfers 
financiers.
16 SOMA, Archives, De Winter Papers, CRE, PD 34, dossier 652: quoted by Plisnier in 
his defence, following the decision of the administrative commission (08.07.1948) 
that he should not be allowed to resume his function as secretary-general (among 
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The founder-bankers also remarked that the Commission of En-
quiry had presented a one-sided picture of the Belgian credit balance 
with the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse17. During the occupation, the to-
tal value of Belgian exports had amounted not to 64.5 billion Belgian 
francs, as indicated in the report, but to 98 billion. Besides exporting 
goods and services, Belgium had also imported goods to a total amount 
of 33.5 billion francs, chiefly for foodstuffs and raw materials that had 
helped to boost the population’s food supply and employment. A fur-
ther error had been made in the estimation of payments for which no 
transaction details had been given. The report spoke of a third of total 
exports, whereas the actual figure had been at most one tenth.
A final point made by the founder-bankers was that their policy of 
maintaining a presence had resulted in occupation costs being less on-
erous in Belgium than in neighbouring countries. If this was not so 
apparent in terms of absolute figures, it was certainly the case when 
the costs were placed in their correct context. On the eve of the Second 
World War, Belgium had been a country with a high level of industri-
alization, higher even than that in the Netherlands or France. Logically, 
therefore, the contribution to the war effort, imposed by the occupier, 
ought, in per capita terms, to have been much higher for Belgium than 
for her neighbours, but the figures showed that this had not been the 
case18. The policy of maintaining a presence had thus clearly served to 
moderate Belgium’s participation in those costs. In the opinion of the 
founder-bankers, this outcome was already sufficient justification for 
the stance they had adopted during the occupation.
other things imputed to him was ‘qu’il avait commis une faute grave en s’associant 
à l’oeuvre de la Banque d’Emission’; moreover, his policy of maintaining a presence 
was condemned, because it had resulted in too many unacceptable compromises 
with the occupier). Plisnier was later to be rehabilitated.
17 BNB, Archives, SD, rapport BEB, dossier 8.11.34: notes des banquiers fondateurs (re-
marks by A.-E. Janssen, undated).
18 Even if the French per capita figures are lower than the Belgian, it should not be 
forgotten that the full occupation of France by the Germans took place more than 
two years after the Blitzkrieg. Consequently, spreading the total amount of occupa-
tion costs over the entire French population, even for the first years of occupation, 
distorts the comparison with other countries, including that with Belgium.
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Table 27.1: German levies on occupied territories, 1940-1944
COUNTRy
Gross amount levied






























Source, Klemann, Nederland, 1938-1948, p. 116.
The prosecuTor’s decision and iTs afTermaTh
The Commission of Enquiry’s report drew a quite different reaction 
from the media and certain political parties. A particularly aggressive 
line was taken by the Communist Party, which gave additional empha-
sis to the criticisms voiced in the report19. It pressurized the Minister of 
Justice to ask the chief military prosecutor, Ganshof-van der Meersch, 
to report as quickly as possible to him on the progress in the legal in-
vestigation. This the chief prosecutor did on 16 December 1946, hinting 
that, from the point of view of a criminal prosecution, there were insuf-
ficient elements in the Banque d’Emission dossier for the investigation 
to lead to charges being brought20.
Less propitious conclusions were drawn by the three accounting ex-
perts, who submitted their final report on 14 June 1947. They felt that the 
Banque d’Emission had gradually become an instrument for financing 
the enemy’s economy. But at the same time they admitted that their 
report was made from a purely technical point of view and took no ac-
count of either the general context of the occupation or the difficult cir-
cumstances in which the leaders of the Banque d’Emission had to act21.
When rumours began that the military prosecutor was not going to 
act on the report and would halt the investigation, a fresh campaign was 
19 Newspaper Le Drapeau Rouge, 04.02.1947; 05.02.1947; 08.02.1947.
20 BNB, Archives, SD, enquête BEB, dossier 1-2: letter of 16.12.1946 from Ganshof-van 
der Meersch to the Minister of Justice.
21 Luyten, Burgers boven elke verdenking?, pp. 232-233.
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whipped up, demanding sanctions against the Banque d’Emission and 
its leaders22. However, the military prosecutor remained unmoved by 
the new campaign and was not prepared to accept the negative conclu-
sions of the experts. In an ordinance of 17 July 1947, he gave his decision 
that, in respect of possible breaches of articles 115 and 118bis of the Penal 
Code, the investigation regarding the Banque d’Emission and its leaders 
was dropped23. What was the prosecutor’s justification for this decision? 
In the first place, he had looked into the circumstances surrounding 
the Banque d’Emission’s establishment shortly after the beginning of 
the occupation. The departure of the Bank for France had created a 
monetary vacuum and, in accordance with the Hague Convention, the 
occupier had had a right in that case to set up its own issue institution. 
Founding a Belgian bank of issue was thus warranted because it had 
prevented both the establishment of a German institution and the at-
tendant circulation of German marks.
In the second place, the prosecutor had looked into the manner in 
which the Banque d’Emission had operated, and had tested two aspects 
of that operation against articles 115 and 118bis of the Penal Code. The 
first aspect concerned the cession of gold and foreign currency belong-
ing to individuals. Had the Banque d’Emission been seriously in error 
in the way it had responded to the German ordinance of August 1940 
concerning gold and foreign currency? Investigation had shown that 
the majority of the gold (coins and bars) and foreign currency had been 
transferred to the Reichsbank in Berlin in 1940 and 1941 by the then 
Bank governor, Georges Janssen. The prosecutor felt that the transfer 
could be regarded as justified, because the governor had hoped, albe-
it in vain, that he would thereby have been able to finance imports of 
foodstuffs.
The second aspect had to do with the clearing system and here, too, 
no contravention of articles 115 and 118bis of the Penal Code could be 
determined. The payments made by the Banque d’Emission in return 
for credit balances with the Verrechnungskasse in Berlin could not be 
considered as financial aid to the enemy. Had the Banque d’Emission 
not undertaken the task, the occupier would have used other means 
22 Newspaper Le Drapeau Rouge, 21.06.1947; newspaper La Libre Belgique, 22.06.1947.
23 Krijgsauditoraat, CI 47/44, BEB, dossier 4, s.f. 10: ordonnance de non-lieu, 17.07.1947.
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to settle the debts created by exports from Belgium to Germany. In-
deed, nobody could have prevented the German authorities from using 
Reichskreditkassenscheine or Reichsmarks to pay Belgian suppliers and 
it was precisely the purpose of the Banque d’Emission payments to pre-
vent such a dual or parallel circulation of money and maintain control 
over payments.
A final point was that, in the prosecutor’s opinion, the managing 
directors and the board of directors of the Banque d’Emission had been 
convinced that their ‘politique de présence’ had been a means of pre-
venting collaborators taking their places. The members of the two bod-
ies had received no remuneration for their commitment and nowhere 
had any evidence been found that they had exploited their position at 
the Banque d’Emission to benefit their own companies.
During the investigation, the Commission of Enquiry had ques-
tioned whether the shareholders of the Banque d’Emission ought to 
be held liable for the Banque d’Emission’s overall debt to the Bank, 
amounting – as indicated above – to 64.5 billion Belgian francs. Three 
eminent jurists had been consulted by the Commission on this matter 
and their scrutiny had led them to the conclusion that the legal liability 
of the Banque d’Emission’s shareholders must remain limited to their 
share of the subscribed capital stock. After extensive deliberation, the 
Commission endorsed their opinion, an endorsement that, because of 
the State guarantee, boiled down to the State itself assuming liability for 
the remaining debt. The government acted on the endorsement at the 
beginning of 194824 and thereby opened the way to the elucidation of 
the Bank’s balance sheet that took place in the same year, together with 
the reform of the institution itself25.
However, the limitation of the shareholders’ liability for the debts 
of the Banque d’Emission to the amount of capital they had subscribed 
continued to excite discussion26. At its establishment, the founder-
bankers of the institution had only partly paid up the capital to which 
they had subscribed and there was still a shortfall of 120 million Bel-
24 Newspaper Le Soir, 25.01.1948; newspaper Le Drapeau Rouge, 06.03.1948.
25 R. Brion and J.L. Moreau, La politique monétaire belge dans une Europe en recon-
struction (1944-1958), Brussel, 2005.
26 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB, dossier 25, copy 550/21: DC SG, 
29.07.1952.
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gian francs. The matter remained unresolved until 16 July 1952 when 
the Belgian Parliament approved a government bill for the liquidation 
of the Banque d’Emission, which obliged the shareholders to pay up the 
capital in full.
The liquidation of the Banque d’Emission rang down the curtain 
on a troubled episode in the history of Belgian central banking. Jules 
Dubois-Pélerin, at that moment President of the Société Générale de 
Belgique, wrote in this respect : ‘It is with great relief that the last phase 
of this sad adventure has been concluded. Our attitude and behaviour 
have been irreproachable from a political as well as from a moral and 
social point of view….Only one regret : our action was not always un-
dertaken in an atmosphere of perfect unity, which during the occupa-
tion years was not only desirable but, still more, also indispensible’27.
There was undoubtedly a subjective and partisan edge to Dubois-
Pélerin’s comments. The circumstances of war had been too complex 
for an exact distinction to be made between the respective areas of re-
sponsibility of the three parties concerned, i.e. the Bank, the Banque 
d’Emission and the Ministry of Finance; group interest and personal 
motives had also played a part, as indeed had the climate of repres-
sion at the time of the liberation, to which the government in London 
had made a considerable contribution. However, Dubois-Pélerin, in his 
comment, was correct in one thing: the united front during the occupa-
tion had not worked adequately; solidarity among the three parties had 
been lacking, and for this each of them bore a measure of blame.
27 ARA, fonds Société Générale de Belgique, BEB, dossier 25, copy 550/21: DC SG, 
29.07.1952.
Epilogue
Les livres ne sont pas faits pour être crus, 
mais pour être soumis à l’examen
(U. Eco, Au nom de la Rose)
This has been a lengthy book to write and its writing has taken many 
years of research, demanding close examination of countless items 
from the archives of prestigious institutions in Belgium and abroad. 
In their research, moreover, the authors were never shy of ‘picking the 
brains’ of eminent historians, politicians and journalists who, on pa-
per or on tape, had recorded their fascination and knowledge about 
the Second World War. And yet the book leaves many questions still 
unanswered – essential questions to which the interested reader would 
no doubt have expected a clear answer. Could it be that, despite all the 
generous support they received from the National Bank of Belgium, the 
authors have fallen short of their goal?
To answer this particular question is also to ask what historians can 
and may do with the mass of information at their command. For the 
authors, the task of a historian is not to separate the good from the bad, 
as done so vividly in the mediaeval triptychs of the Last Judgement. 
Rather, it is, to the best of their ability and as objectively as possible, to 
set out the building blocks that have been uncovered in research and to 
leave the reader to make the final assessment. That is no simple task and 
was certainly not for the present book’s two authors, who, as teenagers, 
experienced the war at first hand. Many might make light of this, but 
the impact on young people of their world exploding into war around 
them is not to be easily discounted. What that impact represented was 
a first hurdle that had to be overcome: no personal feelings could be 
allowed to intrude. In this respect, the authors have done their best to 
exclude any personal experience from this account. It remains for the 
reader to judge whether they have succeeded.
A specific question that might intrigue the reader is why the private 
bankers found it so necessary – and were so impatient – in June 1940 
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to set up a bank of issue. One explanation might concern the degen-
eration of the democratic institutions in Belgium, particularly during 
the final inter-war years. Could it be, too, that the policy of neutrality, 
with King Leopold III and Spaak as its great advocates, offered an ad-
ditional explanation for the lack of preparation for what everyone saw 
as an imminent world conflict, or should the emphasis rather be placed 
on the chaotic situation in the country during the first weeks after the 
German invasion? Perhaps the answer lies in a combination of all this. 
What is certain is that, after the German invasion, Belgium lay open 
like a wasteland for the enemy. Whether one now lays the emphasis on 
the thirst for profit of the bankers, who, in a spirit of revenge against 
the reforms of 1935 and 1937, saw a golden chance to regain their grip 
on the financial world in Belgium, or on attempts to assess the situa-
tion soberly and not in clichés, the fact remains that the mass flight of 
the political and monetary establishment left Belgium rudderless and 
a population dejectedly casting around for help. With the situation so 
chaotic, can the private bankers be reproached for having on their own 
initiative attempted to man the abandoned decks in their own country?
How did the government and the representatives of the Bank abroad 
assess the stance and actions of their counterparts in occupied Bel-
gium? More particularly, why were Gutt and Theunis so full of under-
standing for the misjudgements and wrong decisions of Governor Jans-
sen and so harsh and critical towards his successors? Georges Janssen 
was a person respected by all, unimpeachable and courageous, a man 
who radiated authority and decisiveness. However, the answer does not 
lie so much in the personality of the man as in the picture formed of 
him on the other side of the Channel and the assessement there of the 
situation in occupied Belgium. During the four years of their ‘exile’, the 
Belgian authorities in unoccupied territories changed markedly in their 
outlook. The clear vision with which they attempted to view their own 
country from London became clouded over the years and towards the 
end tended to darken very markedly.
Returning to the early months of the occupation, however, why was 
there no reaction from London to Janssen’s initiative to conclude a con-
vention with the Reichsbank, a convention that laid the legal basis for 
the derailing of the Belgo-German clearing system? When things came 
to be settled after the liberation, it was demonstrated with hard data 
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how the clearing system had, in fact, been totally corrupted and had 
thereby been an additional tool in enabling the occupier to plunder the 
country. The leaders of the Bank and the Banque d’Emission at the time 
were held responsible for this, but there was not a word about Jans-
sen. Nor was there any word about Janssen’s unfortunate action over 
the Belgian and Luxembourg gold held by the French government, nor 
even about the misconceived decision in July 1940 to grant Ingenbleek 
exclusive competence to take all executive measures in unoccupied 
countries, a competence that for months paralysed the activities of the 
Bank in London and New York. Was the absence of any criticism a 
consequence of the defective lines of communication during the first 
months after the French cease-fire? Did the precarious situation of the 
Belgian government on its arrival in London also play a part? There was 
also no reaction from Baudewyns, the Bank’s representative in unoc-
cupied countries. Did the fact that he was a Bank man to the core mean 
that he saw matters solely through the eyes of Janssen?
The attitude of the Belgian government in London towards Galo-
pin’s policy of opting for the lesser evil also hardened as time passed. 
Initially, it was agreed by all on both sides of the Channel that a resump-
tion of work was the only solution to the Allies’ blockade, demanded 
by Churchill and supported by Roosevelt. Belgium had always been 
dependent on imports for her food supplies and if there was no pos-
sibility of organizing relief for Belgium on the lines of what had been 
done during the First World War, a resumption of work was the only 
alternative to keep the population fed: the deal was for manufactured 
goods in exchange for food, with the invoices settled through the clear-
ing system in Berlin. In this matter, too, it appeared that all was well: 
Galopin’s reputation was unassailable and Janssen, together with the 
Bank and the Banque d’Emission, fully supported the new strategy; the 
resumption of work would not only secure food for the population, but 
also jobs, thereby preventing an exodus of workers to Germany and the 
feared dismantling of industrial plant and equipment.
The occupying authority paid no heed to the agreements, and the 
Belgian credit balance on the clearing account in Berlin came to as-
sume alarming proportions. Shortly after Janssen’s death at the begin-
ning of June 1941, the founder-bankers of the Banque d’Emission began 
systematically to take over decision-making and also within the Bank. 
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By then, however, the policy of accommodation had already begun to 
slip into the grey area of economic collaboration and alarm bells had 
begun to ring in London. Deliveries to the occupier were no longer be-
ing offset by food imports and in the autumn of 1942 the signal was 
given for the feared deportation of Belgian labour to Germany and 
France. The entire structure upon which the policy of opting for the 
lesser evil rested had been eroded and the government in London now 
clearly distanced itself from the entire concept, the more so as sporadic 
news was being received of war collaborators enriching themselves. The 
fact that the Bank and the Banque d’Emission were involved in the fi-
nancial settlement of transactions with Germany and France, through 
the clearing system, meant that charges of being guilty of collaboration 
were also levelled at them by London.
Were the accusations and the threats of sanctions after the war – 
 issued by the government in London and in even sharper terms by 
 Theunis in New York against anyone who had borne monetary, fi-
nancial or administrative responsibility – justified or had the Belgian 
 authorities overseas generalized and magnified the sparse information 
that reached them about collaboration in their home country? As was to 
be expected, the opinions of contemporaries were sharply divided. The 
Bank and the Banque d’Emission were convinced that, under constant 
pressure from the occupier, they had demonstrated an unimpeachable 
sense of duty in carrying out their thankless task of balancing accom-
modation with resistance. They were even supported in that conviction 
by outsiders. Indeed, such people as De Visscher, Pholien and Dierkx, 
all belonging to the top echelon of the Resistance, were by no means 
happy with the hard line adopted by the ‘Londoners’ on their trium-
phant return. Sixty years on, however, and now that the fire of emo-
tions has burnt low, how is the government’s attitude on its return from 
London to be assessed?
In speaking of De Visscher, it has to be made clear that his favour-
able judgement of the policy of maintaining a presence in Belgium, as 
that policy unfolded after 1942, cannot be taken as endorsing a compli-
ant attitude towards the occupier. He was unchanged in his view that 
those responsible for policy in Belgium were duty-bound to contest eve-
ry unjustified demand from the Germans and to accede only when the 
demand was made into a formal order from the Military Government. 
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What had irritated him during the occupation was the lack of solidarity 
between the Bank, the Banque d’Emission and the Ministry of Finance. 
He held to his belief that the united front that had so woefully collapsed 
during the crisis of 1942 could have continued to act as a buffer against 
the illegal demands made by the Germans – not that the plundering 
would have suddenly ceased, but because resistance in Belgium would 
thereby have been more effective. Was this a correct assessment of the 
situation? And who was actually responsible for the dramatic breach of 
the united front in 1942?
Although the various protagonists in the conflict continued to be-
lieve in the correctness of their own, individual courses of action, it was 
not so clear just what the limits were. The situation was very tense. The 
decrees issued in London on 27 November 1941 were already an unmis-
takeable signal to those responsible for policy in occupied Belgium that 
legal authority rested solely with the government in London and that it 
was there that strategies were determined and judgements made. Even 
though the decrees were designed primarily to support the Bank’s legal 
proceedings in New York against the Banque de France, there was no 
misunderstanding the underlying messages. One of these was that dis-
turbing questions were being asked in London regarding the policy of 
accommodation, the guiding principle determining the actions of the 
Bank, the Banque d’Emission, the private bankers and the industrial-
ists – in short, the entire non-pro-German establishment in Brussels – 
which they felt would vindicate their stance, if it was questioned.
Inevitably, the failure of Operation Barbarossa in Russia had an 
impact on the attitude of the Military Government in Brussels. If von 
Falkenhausen was to remain in Brussels and not bend under the pres-
sure of the Nazi authorities in Berlin to have Belgium placed under 
a Civil Government, as was the case in the Netherlands, concessions 
would be necessary. The harder line now taken by the occupier was re-
garded as unacceptable by certain directors of the Bank and prompted 
their resignation. Was this pure opportunism or a matter of principle? 
Together with his administration, Secretary-general Plisnier faced the 
same dilemma. Who was to incur the odium and take responsibility 
for the monstrous policy represented by the clearing operations? Was it 
those who remained convinced that, without the Bank’s and the Banque 
d’Emission’s ‘politique de présence’, industrial collaboration would have 
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got even further out of hand and that, however shaky, a Belgian hand 
controlling transactions with the enemy was better than no control at 
all? Or was it those who distanced themselves entirely from any partici-
pation in negotiations with the enemy? So far removed from the events 
we are describing, this may seem an academic question, but it was not 
so for the people at the time, who, after four years of occupation, ur-
gently wanted an answer.
Moving on to the Gutt Operation, we see that it was praised by some 
and questioned by others. Indeed, two diametrically opposed views 
were already apparent during its preparation in London and Brussels. 
Baudewyns and Gutt restricted it to an orthodox reform and looked 
to reduce the money supply to its level of May 1940; in line with this, 
they opted for a fairly strong Belgian franc. Van Zeeland held out for a 
pragmatic approach limited to eliminating hoarded money and aimed 
at keeping the exchange rate low, with both elements serving to boost 
economic recovery after the liberation.
It was Gutt, the Minister of Finance, who got his way. From the out-
set, however, the operation ran up against an unforeseen difficulty, in 
that delivery of the new banknotes from Great Britain was held up for 
a month, which served to encourage fraud. Much worse, though, was 
the short-term deflationary effect of the reform. The economy failed 
to recover, prices continued to rise and the black market flourished. 
Meanwhile, unforeseen wintering of the Allied troops in Belgium in 
1944-1945 brought about an increased demand for goods and services, 
so that the government was forced to resort to deficit spending to carry 
out the most urgent infrastructural work and to get the reconstruction 
of the country on track. Was the Gutt Operation therefore a failure?
It certainly appeared so to the average citizen during the first months 
after the liberation, but a definitive turning-point was reached in the 
summer of 1945. The worrying expansion of the money supply during 
the preceding winter, which had threatened to undermine the entire 
Gutt construction, ultimately turned out to be a blessing, because it 
created a reflationary climate that gave the Belgian economy the neces-
sary breathing-space to begin recovering without falling into a vicious 
circle of post-war price inflation. It was just at that moment, in fact, that 
the braking effect of the deflationary shock of Gutt’s monetary reform 
came into play, serving to stabilize prices, albeit at a much higher level 
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than had been anticipated. That stabilization, in tandem with wage in-
creases, in turn exercised a favourable effect on the real income of the 
great mass of those in waged and salaried employment. The reform – 
long years in preparation – and a happy conjunction of circumstances 
(‘chance’, if you wish) combined to produce what came to be called ‘the 
Belgian economic miracle’ in the immediate post-war years.
However, the miracle proved to be short-lived: by the end of the 
1940s, the Belgian economy was already in structural crisis. What 
caused this? How was it possible for the ‘prodigy’ to become in no time 
at all the ‘sick man of Europe’? Could it have been that the currency 
reform was conceived in too exclusively monetary terms and took too 
little account of the complexity of post-war economic life? Everywhere, 
the emergence of the mixed economy had followed in the wake of the 
liberating armies; systematic cooperation between government and 
business had become a necessary condition for survival in a new and 
complex society. For the Belgian miracle of the immediate post-war 
years to endure, reform needed an economic component besides the 
monetary and the question is whether the Belgian currency reform had 
given sufficient attention to this. Neighbouring countries that had inte-
grated monetary policy with wider structural reforms appeared later to 
have laid the foundations for a more durable recovery.
The development of Belgian financial and monetary policy during 
and immediately after the Second World War was not, thus, guided 
by an invisible hand; nor was it exclusively determined by chance and 
necessity. As is always the case in times of great tension, the dramat-
ic years of 1940-1945 threw up remarkable characters, pivotal figures 
standing out sharply, in high relief, who set their stamp on the course of 
events and whose names continue to resonate in the collective memory. 
If, after nearly sixty years, a book such as this, can succeed in setting 
such dominant characters in their proper place under the arc light of 
history, its authors will feel themselves sufficiently rewarded.
In the Free World, Gutt – Minister of Finance of little Belgium – 
stood head and shoulders above his fellow-countrymen and was, 
without doubt, the strong man of the government in exile in London. 
Calmly, but doggedly, step by step, he rebuilt his country’s battered im-
age. In Allied government circles, he came to be recognized – though 
not without difficulty – as the most respected defender of Belgian in-
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terests. Furthermore, his cooperation with the Dutch government in 
exile opened the way to important monetary agreements concluded in 
Europe after the war and even to wide-ranging initiatives for European 
cooperation and integration, though these paled into insignificance in 
the face of Gutt’s burning passion during those years for the post-war 
recovery of his country.
Abused and occupied Belgium was at first no place for heroes, but 
it was a cockpit for fighters. A person like Governor Janssen may well 
have made errors, but no-one can question his courage and resoluteness 
in the struggle against the occupier. The same can be said of Cracco 
and Vandeputte, who followed him in confronting the occupier, though 
certainly not from opportunism, as it was already too late for that. A 
place of honour has also to be accorded to Galopin, who, supported 
by the éminence grise, A.-E. Janssen, subtly and in his own way main-
tained the struggle between occupier and occupied, until his calami-
tous murder drew an early line under what had been an immeasurable 
contribution. Many other participants in the tragedy of the occupation 
are not mentioned here; they were by no means secondary figures, but 
the part they played lay elsewhere, not immediately in the glare of the 
spotlights. It has been the authors’ concern in this account to do justice 
to each of them, because the courage demonstrated by so many is a rare 
virtue and of all the more value because of that.
In respect of the occupier of Belgium, by way of postscript, it may be 
asked whether the Military Government was better than the Civil Gov-
ernment that eventually replaced it. Statisticians think it was. Was von 
Falkenhausen therefore right to charge Belgium with ingratitude after 
his conviction by the Military Tribunal in Brussels? No man of the par-
ty, he had – perhaps for personal reasons – fought to keep Belgium out 
of the grip of the Nazi party. Through endless discussion with Berlin, he 
was more or less successful in this until July 1944, when he was removed 
and the feared Civil Government took charge in Belgium, though too 
late to have much effect. Ought he, an enemy, to be included in the 
ranks, not of the heroes, but of the people of good will who attempted 
to make the suffering of World War Two more bearable? Or ought he 
simply to be lumped in with all the others who occupied, crushed and 
bled our country? Who is to say?
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